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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the powerful appeals to psychology that are made in contemporary 
popular debate in Britain about parents. It focuses on the political implications of 
psychological discourse and the knowledge claims on which it rests. Using feminist and 
discourse theory, it critically examines psychological discourse, psychology as a knowledge 
practice, and considers the dilemmas of feminist knowledge production given the practices 
and relations it bolsters.  
 
Constructions of mothers and fathers in parenting magazines and news-media images of lone 
mothers, lesbian mothers and ‘absent fathers’ are found to be profoundly gendered and 
conservative (hetero-gender normative) in spite of the rhetorical shift towards the gender-
neutral discourse of ‘parents’. Gender essentialist and identity/status-bound understandings 
are most striking where people’s ‘fitness to parent’ is questioned, often implicitly, which 
suggests that such understandings are naturalised in representations of parents who are not 
problematised. 
 
It is argued that the notion of ‘fitness to parent’, rather than contributing to discussion of 
parent-child relationships, obscures how impoverished popular debate is, because it has little 
ideological coherence despite its mobilisation of judgemental scrutiny and powerful 
condemnation. Ideas about ‘unfit’ parents do not, by exclusion, define a culturally ideal 
parent, but their implicit nature paves the way for common-sense appeals which deny their 
value-bases, reducing opportunities to challenge normative assumptions or superficial identity 
categories. 
 
‘Second wave’ feminist analyses of family ideology are employed, but are criticised from a 
feminist post-structuralist perspective which highlights the limitations of ‘identity’ (for 
prematurely foreclosing understandings of subjectivity and desire), and of ‘social influence’ 
as a model of individual-society relation. A critique of identity politics is employed to 
highlight how parental identities deployed in popular debate are imbued with psychological 
presumptions, without necessarily referring to psychologically/emotionally meaningful 
qualities of relationships between parents and children. Instead, a relational, performative 
approach to thinking about parents, and a psychosocial approach for considering the politics 
of cultural discourses are advocated. An examination of recent social policy debates suggests 
that the former may be gaining in persuasive value and impact on policy. 
 
Examining the authority of contemporary childrearing expertise suggests that arguments 
about parents are persuasive when they refer to psychological issues, whether or not they 
make explicit claims to expert knowledge. Paradoxically, as pop psychology becomes 
ubiquitous in Western cultures, the rising status attributed to the emotional realm can provide 
a means of contesting expert psychology, by undermining the valorisation of objectivity. 
However, the ‘psychologisation’ of contemporary social life reinforces psychology’s 
conceptual framework, which can, in turn, naturalise its conventional epistemology. This 
dilemma is explored in two spheres: feminist research and research with child participants. It 
is argued that feminists, and those critical of psychology’s modernist foundations, might 
employ their ‘expert’ warrant strategically in public debates about parents, but should also 
expose the politics of psychological knowledge. Similarly, despite theoretical limitations, 
identity politics might be put to good effect, such as to help children’s voices be heard today.  
 
Finally, it is argued that, today, psychology is powerful, not only through experts or 
professionals, but as expertise, such that people draw on psychological discourses in their 
own reflexive projects of the self. Thus, psychological discourses, including implicit notions 
of fitness to parent, are implicated in the construction of contemporary parental subjectivities. 
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 Chapter 1 
Disciplinary Roots and Discursive Routes 
 
At this time of political and popular concern about the family, much public debate 
focuses on who brings up children and how. The failure of parents to inculcate decent 
social or ‘family’ values in their children and the loss of parental authority are looked 
to as the causes of diverse contemporary social problems. Amidst today’s mounting 
prescriptions for ‘good parenting’, even politicians, including the present Home 
Secretary, Jack Straw, propose solutions to their concerns in the form of appropriate 
parenting, and legislate for parenting classes, home-school agreements, and on the 
responsibilities of the parents of young offenders, in addition to pre-existing 
legislation on the responsibility of all parents to their children, including after 
relationships between parents have ended. 
 
The further extension of legal measures to personal relationships is only part of the 
erosion of previous boundaries between the public and the private sphere. Discussion 
of ‘private lives’, relationships and emotions now occurs in the ‘public sphere’ and 
the language of psychology infuses politics and popular debate. This thesis examines 
the powerful appeals to psychology that are made in contemporary popular debate 
about parents, focusing on the political implications of psychological discourses and 
the knowledge claims on which they rest. 
 
To examine common-place or ‘popular’ understandings of parents in Britain today, I 
draw from feminist and other strands of critique and aim to identify aspects of popular 
accounts which hamper, limit or prejudice debates about parents, such as the much 
maligned identity categories of ‘lone mother’, ‘absent father’, ‘lesbian mother’, and 
the appeals to value-laden psychological knowledge which can regulate and 
pathologise whilst claiming to be value-free. My aim is to contribute to the opening 
up of discursive spaces for thinking beyond identity categories for parents and 
moving beyond static evaluations of the role of the expert; and to contribute to 
feminist debate about the dilemmas of engaging in the production of academic 
knowledge. In order to do this, I explore the cultural construction of contemporary 
parents in popular media, firstly in a medium marketed at parents, and then more 
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 extensively at sites at which ‘fitness to parent’ is implicitly questioned. I then 
consider how expert psychological knowledge can be understood to function for 
contemporary parents, and the possibilities of feminist intervention in public debates 
by producing alternative expert knowledge. By focusing on a particular element 
within understandings of parents: the notion of ‘fitness to parent’, I explore 
contemporary claims to expertise about parents and question the ungendered nature of 
the term ‘parents’. In the final chapter, I consider ‘fitness to parent’ as one aspect of 
how psychological discourses function at a personal level, that is, its place in the 
‘project of the self’ for adults today, whatever their parental status, and consider the 
value of post-identity approaches associated with Queer theory for social policy 
concerning parents.  
 
The ‘politics of psychology’ are made visible by a multidisciplinary perspective, 
drawn from cultural studies and contemporary social theory, which enables the 
discipline of psychology to be an object of inquiry, rather than a disciplinary 
perspective. The approach taken to the study of popular images of parents, the 
language of psychology and the power of psychological knowledge is one identified 
with the notion of ‘discourse’ as it has been developed in feminist readings of post-
structuralism (Barrett, 1991; Burman, 1990; Butler, 1990; Fraser, 1989; Sawicki, 
1991; Walkerdine, 1990). The theoretical shifts such work allows from a focus on the 
individual and identity, to identifications and subjectivity, are applied to thinking 
about parents. In particular, the implications of the critique of identity politics are 
explored in terms of potential feminist-informed strategies for resistance to the 
normalising effects of psychological discourses at individual and academic or policy 
levels.  
 
The first section of this chapter introduces some key themes within current 
expressions of concern about the family. It also aims to place them, and the thesis 
itself in a broader context. The following section provides some personal background 
to the thesis, which serves to highlight the historical location of both topic and 
approach in relation to ‘second wave’ Western feminism. The third section describes 
the points of departure for the study, and the fourth, the disciplinary influences on the 
approach adopted. The final section describes the chapters that follow. 
 2
 1.1 ‘Family values’: parents and children in 1990s British politics  
Feminist historian Linda Gordon places today’s concern about the family in historical 
context and views the anxiety itself as a cultural phenomenon: 
‘For at least 150 years there has been periods of fear that ‘the family’ - meaning 
a popular image of what families are supposed to be like, by no means a correct 
recollection of any actual ‘traditional’ family - was in decline, and these fears 
have tended to escalate in periods of social stress.’ (Gordon, 1999: p3) 
 
The notion of the family that has entered our common-sense through post-war popular 
culture and disciplinary practices is the 1960s’ sitcom image comprising a male ‘head 
of household’, who is the family breadwinner, a female ‘wife and homemaker’, and 
their dependent, biological children. Today, many people mistake this ‘modern’ form 
of family for ‘an ancient, essential, and now endangered institution’ (Stacey, 1998: 
p6). Contemporary concern about the family is prompted by demographic change, and 
arguments deploy varying figures as their evidence to support differing conclusions. 
Often, although not exclusively, concern about changes in family life exist in tandem 
with calls for a return to ‘family values’ which posit a romanticised nuclear family as 
the bedrock of society and the guardian of decent social values. Responses to this 
include the argument that there has not been an all-out rejection of family, just the 
emergence of diverse ways of living it (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995), and that 
such changes that there are can be interpreted as pro-feminist (Smart, 1997) or pro-
democratic (Beck, 1997). Either way, claims to know are the currency of political 
debates about social change and family policy. 
 
Since the 1980s, ‘family values’ rhetoric has come to be strongly associated with 
those on the political right, and is often accompanied by socially conservative or 
authoritarian, and anti-feminist sentiments. By the mid 1990s, one line of argument 
was that the left had made an error of judgement in vacating what was evidently a site 
of popular concern, so that by the 1997 General Election, all the major parties, 
including the Labour Party, were claiming to be ‘the party of the family’. When New 
Labour was elected to office, this now centre-left party spoke in the same terms as the 
Conservatives about ‘encouraging’ individual and family ‘responsibility’, which 
would be allowed to flourish by pruning back the over-protective ‘nanny state’ 
welfare system. 
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These contested assertions of ‘family values’, and debates about the degree of change 
regarding families, take place in the context of increasing social conservatism, the 
privatisation of social institutions, the triumph of neo-liberalism and market 
capitalism, and the most rapid shifts in gender relations in a whole century of cultural 
change. Indeed, gender is a sustained theme throughout all manner of contemporary 
debate about the family and in the current concern over social cohesion. When the 
whole fabric of social relations between men and women has undergone deep and 
seemingly irreversible transformations (McRobbie, 1994), it is not surprising that the 
‘traditional’ nuclear family seems endangered. Economic changes have also made the 
family’s conventional distribution of paid labour unviable for many people, and when 
New Labour promotes the uptake of paid work by mothers and even lone mothers in 
the name of (individualised) financial self-sufficiency, and alongside neo-
conservative rhetoric about ‘the family’, ideological markers dissolve. But were its 
rigidly gendered roles really the family’s most important contribution to society? 
Were the desirable qualities of parenting and ‘doing family’ really the sole 
prerogative of this particular family form and its identities? 
 
An important tool for the analysis of cultural politics in the 1960s and 70s was the 
idea of the moral panic. Moral panics express anxiety about the pace of social change 
and provide a normative and consensual language for understanding the turbulence 
caused by change. Dramatic changes in economic patterns, as well as shifts in 
gendered social relations increase inter-generational differences which exacerbate 
misunderstandings and tension. According to McRobbie (1994), moral panics now 
express a fear of being out of control. The calls for a return to ‘family values’ respond 
to the end of the sense of consensus on social values and presumed consequential loss 
of social cohesion. Even if this ‘cohesion’ was a coercive, authoritarian, mono-
cultural one and any consensus on social values and morality more apparent than real, 
its loss is mourned. The fear is the loss of control or certainty conveyed in the phrase 
a ‘moral vacuum’: a spiralling downwards into social disorder and amorality. The 
perceived threat from ‘below’ leads to an Othering of certain people and a 
pathologisation of their culture, illustrated in the discourse of an ‘underclass’. Selfish 
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 individualism is condoned in the name of the ‘free’ market, but condemned where it 
conflicts with the financial responsibility which is constructed as a ‘family value’.  
 
Young offenders, ‘young’ mothers and single parent families (especially those living 
on council estates) have been recurrent figures for concern in the early 1990s 
(McRobbie, 1994). Historically though, certain anxieties have arisen with startling 
regularity, as Geoff Pearson’s work illustrates (1983; cited in McRobbie, 1994). 
While moral panics inevitably construct a ‘golden age’, historical studies such as 
Pearson’s show that, even ‘back then’ (in the mid 1960s and mid 1940s), concerns 
about the ‘youth of today’ focused on their rowdy and undisciplined nature, their 
immorality, their increasing criminality and the absence of parental control. Most 
prominent among the folk devils of contemporary (reputedly ‘popular’) concern are 
lone mothers. These are women with dependent children, with no resident father, who 
run ‘female-headed households’. In most of the moral panics that characterise the 
1990s, much of the language is ungendered, whilst in actuality ‘lone parents’ are 
mostly mothers, ‘youth crime’ and ‘school exclusion’ mostly apply to boys, and 
‘social alienation’ to men. However, there is further cause for worry when problems 
that were ‘contained’ by gender now leak across that boundary: boys suffer 
increasingly from eating disorders, girls are increasingly amongst those excluded 
from school, and playground violence is being explained as girls kicking out literally 
in the name of ‘Girl Power’. When striking figures are presented, they sometimes 
show racial, as well as gendered, differences. However, different conclusions are 
drawn about the causes and consequences of these issues, especially on the 
significance of ‘race’, in relation to class or economic factors. Furthermore, different 
sets of figures construct an issue differently thereby producing different ‘findings’ 
and revealing the socially fabricated nature of statistics. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the rhetorical or ‘discursive’ aspects of such social 
changes, that is, with the language and images of ‘family’, ‘mothers’, ‘fathers’, 
‘parents’ and children. Their study is important because apparent clarity and certainty 
about the meanings of these terms in fact obscures contested aspects of their 
meanings, including who is represented by them, and what moral attributions are 
made to them. However, the thesis is ‘not only’ about cultural politics, as if this is 
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 aside from the ‘cut and thrust’ of ‘real’ politics or policy analysis. The way particular 
groups are represented places them in status hierarchies through which the ‘politics of 
representation’ are conducted (Fraser, 1989; Hall, 1992). Not only do these cultural 
meanings place people in relations of power, they impact materially in psychological 
and economic ways, as illustrations about welfare show most literally. They are the 
ideas and images with which ‘real’ politics is waged, and are viewed as illustrating 
some of the tensions of contemporary social democratic culture. The power that ‘ways 
of talking’ have is demonstrated by the fact that describing a particular family form as 
‘traditional’ allows it to be presumed ideal. There is a slippage from supposedly 
neutral description to normalising prescription like that that Burman (1994a) shows 
for developmental psychology. This puts those living in other forms of family on the 
defensive and can pathologise them/us for deviating from this supposed norm. Thus, 
‘ways of talking about’ parents is key to the approach adopted, and leads to the study 
of cultural texts about parents, rather than research with parents themselves. It 
therefore draws heavily from cultural studies, uses contemporary social and feminist 
theory, and in particular, approaches associated with the concept of discourse. 
 
The concept of the moral panic is a starting point for my study of representations of 
parents. It was drawn on to understand events following the death of James Bulger in 
1993, when the circumstances of his murder led to a spiral of anxieties, punitive 
measures and new groups of stigmatized individuals emerging in the landscape of the 
public imagination (McRobbie, 1994). This event was significant in drawing together 
two issues of concern: juvenile crime, and ‘inadequate’ families, lone mothers in 
particular, who were apparently failing to inculcate appropriate social values in their 
children (Roseneil and Mann, 1996). The concept of the moral panic and of media 
amplification are now such common currency that journalists themselves ask ‘Was all 
this just media hype?’. However, what is particular about moral panics of the 1990s is 
the hugely expanded mass media, and the emergence of media literate organisations 
and pressure groups who answer journalists’ calls for immediate sound-bite responses 
to counter moral panics and defend its folk devils (McRobbie, 1994). The media is 
now recognised as playing an active part in constructing particular meanings which 
have ideological effects, and in generating and amplifying concern. Importantly, the 
media sets the terms of public debate, outside of which it becomes very difficult to get 
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 heard. To this earlier form of sociological analysis of the media, I add a feminist post-
structuralist approach to language as constitutive of social reality. Thus, the 
significance accorded the media is heightened by understanding it as constructing, 
rather than merely reflecting, our experience of the world. However, the dominant 
meanings provided in mainstream media are contested, even where the alternatives 
are muted. I argue that this approach goes some way towards answering the 
psychosocial problematic of according popular images and discourse their due 
personal, as well as political, significance, yet according the individual subject a 
complexity and agency that earlier analyses sometimes compromised.  
 
Following the work of Stuart Hall et al. (1984), ideology is here understood not as a 
simple distortion of truth by dominant powers, but as working continuously through 
the mobilisation of popular notions of ‘common-sense’. Common-sense accounts are 
powerful because they are naturalised as consensual meanings and uncontentious 
truth. Popular discourses of ‘psychology’, in the broadest sense of concerning the 
mind or emotions, function powerfully in common parlance even though they are 
divorced from the epistemological claims of the discipline of psychology. They can 
therefore be even more powerful, since it is hard to challenge the perspective on 
which the knowledge is based when no disciplinary perspective is acknowledged, as 
when a knowledge presents itself as perspective-free. 
 
My interest is in the ideological consequences of the particular discourses or images 
of 1990s British public policy debates about parents. What meanings and expectations 
are brought into play when mothers are referred to, when fathers are specified, or 
when the increasingly popular term ‘parents’ is employed? What knowledge sources 
are there about parents/children/families and how do we know what ‘good’, ‘bad’ or 
‘ordinary’ parents are? Who are the experts on parenting? Psychologists, 
paediatricians, social workers, health visitors, parents or children might each make a 
claim. How could each party assert their opinion? Through its specific focus on 
discourses of parents, this thesis explores broader issues concerning contemporary 
conflicts over knowledge, expertise and truth. How might one intervene in popular 
debates to counter aspects of moral panics when appeals to better knowledge and 
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 truer accounts are undermined by a ‘loss of faith’ in the ways knowledge used to be 
guaranteed, the ‘crisis of legitimisation’ (Lyon, 1984; Lyotard, 1984)? 
 
In spite of an overarching framework which calls into question narratives of progress 
towards enlightenment or liberation, I have not wholly been able to resist such a 
narrative for the thesis itself. A feminist-informed post-structuralist approach is 
presented as an improvement on a socialist-feminist framework for understanding the 
way ideological images of mothers operate. My intention is not to present this as 
better simply because it is newer, but to recognise that post-structuralist approaches 
developed from auto-critique within earlier (structuralist) approaches, such as 
Marxism and, to some degree, rest on them. To omit this history risks losing such a 
strong emphasis on politics and power. However, the thesis does follow a 
conventional format in criticising old approaches and embracing newer ones and in 
attempting to apply the preferred framework to a novel topic. An approach to 
identities as ‘performative’ has been developed in relation to gender and sexuality in 
feminist theoretical work. This thesis considers whether this might be useful for 
thinking about parents today. It concludes that such an approach avoids some of the 
problems of mainstream psychological approaches and of identity politics, and ends 
optimistically, with an argument that recent changes in social policy seem to be 
compatible with such an approach. I could not resist the modernist discourse of 
progress for its political force, nor could I have sustained the production of a thesis 
without this belief (although at times it has been shaky). This paradox is examined as 
an issue in its own right because it echoes a key point of tension between 
contemporary theory and feminist or socialist politics. 
 
Whilst this Enlightenment belief underpins the thesis as a whole, a linear, modernist 
narrative of scientific investigation is only partially in evidence. The chapters do not 
narrate the rational selection of a topic, then a method, its application and the 
presentation of more-or-less assured ‘findings’. Instead, the narrative linking the 
chapters is partly chronological and partly a retrospective construction of an argument 
in spite of the original chronology. In particular, the structure conveys the shift in 
emphasis from representations of parents, to the knowledge claims embodied in these 
representations, and the operation of power through them. The thesis can be seen as a 
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 map of interdisciplinary approaches to a particular cultural terrain. In some ways 
though, the thesis maps a route I took as a PhD student, and as a person, over the 
1990s. Seeing it as a travelogue, a representation of route or chronology, of my 
journey through different disciplines, and the shifting vantage points they allowed on 
my object of inquiry, allows acknowledgement of the processes of its own production 
and refuses to obscure the fact of its fabrication post hoc as an account which 
re/constructs the original journey. 
 
1.2 The political is personal: mothers and daughters today 
As with most PhDs, my interest is not ‘purely academic’. As Acker (1981: p96) 
observed, ‘many of us study aspects of our autobiographies partially disguised as a 
“detached” choice of an interesting problem.’ As a childless (or ‘childfree’) woman 
who is interested in living and working with children, a series of changes in the way I 
have defined my identity and considered my relationships, sexuality, and living 
arrangements have prompted me to think about how others might view these and on 
them base judgements about my fitness to parent, teach or do youth work. The 
motives of someone whose relationships might easily be amongst those scrutinised 
and deemed unfit for childrearing to write about the forms of expertise which judge 
parenting are, at some levels, self-evident. Trying to understand the mechanisms of 
power of such judgements is a personal project, as well as a political one. I am also 
invested personally in the theoretical challenge of a more satisfactory understanding 
of subjective desire, since before beginning the thesis, (perhaps I imagined) feminist, 
same-aged friends viewed my interest in having a child as naïve and unquestioning. I 
wondered initially how I came to be interested in being a mother whilst cringing at so 
many cultural expressions of ‘mother’. Was I ‘buying’ into ‘rosy images of 
motherhood’ by splitting off and protecting my emotional life from my political 
understandings? It is now observed that as ‘women’s libbers’ of the 1970s moved 
through their 30s and 40s, feminist writing about motherhood (and heterosexuality) 
softened and now often enjoy a more celebratory tone. By the end of the 1990s, the 
more fundamentalist lesbian-feminist analyses have waned, and many of my friends 
have had babies. The shift away from identity politics that the thesis traces both 
within feminist theory and in cultural politics more broadly, is also part of my own 
biography. 
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Personalising the thesis also helps to historicise it. My experience of personal, 
particularly reproductive, choice cannot be understood outside the history of the 
struggles of second wave feminism in Britain. For this reason, I am fascinated by the 
contrast between my experience of choices regarding relationships and childbearing, 
and my mother’s, 25 years earlier. We share more common ground in our ideas about 
childrearing than on other issues it seems, but on the issue of agency or self-
determination and the articulation of decision-making around having children, our 
differing language can cause us some pain. 
 
At the start of their book, The Normal Chaos of Love, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim quote 
from a novel called A Home at the End of the World by Michael Cunningham. A 
daughter asks her mother: 
‘“Why did you marry the man you did?”… “You never worried that you might be 
making some sort of extended mistake, like losing track of your real life and going 
off on, I don’t know, a tangent you could never return from?” Her mother “waved 
the question away as if it were a sluggish but persistent fly. Her fingers were bright 
with tomato pulp. “We didn't ask such big questions then,” she said. “Isn’t it hard 
on you, to think and wonder and plan so much?”’(Cunningham, 1991: p189-90, 
cited in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: p1). 
 
My own mother is jarred slightly by my articulation of a decision about childbearing 
in terms of decisions about my employment, income, accommodation, geographical 
location, co-parents and circle of friends for babysitting. For her, having me, and 
three years later, my sister, ‘followed naturally’ from courting, getting engaged and 
then marrying my father at the age of 22, and ‘finding herself’ pregnant just before 
her 24th birthday. To her, my way of talking about such issues sounds a little ‘too 
calculated’. It seems cold, controlling and overly cerebral: falsely separating myself 
from others (particularly the father of any child), and with an omnipotent sense of 
control over my life, my biological fertility and independence of the will of God. 
Rendering them my ‘decisions’ is to bring them into the realm of rational, conscious 
reflection. Some of the cultural understandings on which I draw reject the idea of 
‘doing what’s natural’, ‘letting a baby come along’ and do not presume that 
motherhood is an inevitability. I am conscious of the debt that reproductive choice 
and currently available discourses of sexual relationships owes the women’s 
movement of my 1970s childhood, and am aware that I probably take-for-granted 
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 ideas about femininity that have changed considerably over the course of my mother’s 
and grandmothers’ lives. That I am troubled by the possibility of having made her 
sound naïve, passive or unreflective shows the implicit superiority attributed to the 
language of decision-making (at least, in my social circles) today. 
 
It is this culture of personal choice and individual responsibility for making one’s life and 
seeking emotional satisfaction which Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (ibid.) see as marking a 
new era. The pace of change at this cultural moment creates social differences between 
generations which provide the potential for tensions and misunderstandings. Whilst some 
critics point out that this sense of choice and agency that I experience is a privilege of the 
(new) middle classes (Leonard, 1996) and there are certainly limits to its generality, it is, 
arguably, part of what other commentators may describe as the ‘threat to the family’. 
Whatever intergenerational patterns commentators claim to discern, the meanings of 
‘family’ are strongly contested, and some arguments make powerful claims to ‘the 
natural’ and to common-sense. This thesis explores a small component of the complex of 
ideas around family, focusing on discourses of parents and the claims to knowledge by 
which they can be judged. Of particular interest are the discourses through which a 
decision to parent might be articulated, or through which medics providing fertility 
services and social workers conducting foster/adoption placement assessments decide 
who is ‘fit to parent’. What is considered a healthy desire to be a parent?  
 
The ‘big questions’ facing individuals today are often expressed through the same 
discourses available to the professionals: discourses of popular psychology, or which 
map the same terrain of psychological, emotional or subjective issues. The reflexive 
individual identifies and pursues their own goals which are articulated in 
psychological terms, such as, emotional satisfaction and intimacy needs (Giddens, 
1992; Rose, 1989a; 1993). Indeed, discourses of emancipation and rights now extend 
from the civil, into the psychological sphere, to include aspects of identity and self-
definition (Richards, 1994b). As the pursuit of love becomes more highly valorised, 
values which have bound the traditional family together (including gender and age 
status hierarchies, ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’) have less pull on us. Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (1995) argue that this does not constitute a threat to family, but merely its 
diversification as people try different ways of meeting their needs in negotiated, 
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 ‘alternative’ or post-divorce families. It is precisely family that fills the void left by 
the family, they claim. We are already formed through the desires that sustain these 
patterns of living so are not likely to adopt radical alternatives which do not meet the 
same needs for intimacy and security. A more likely tension, already evident for the 
work-rich, is between work and family life when both are seen as important to 
subjective well-being and personal development. According to Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, ‘our New Era’ is marked by the collision of interests between love, family 
and personal freedom. Even if this characterisation of the reflexive articulation of 
desire, doubt and deliberation over romantic/sexual relations and childbearing is an 
over-generalisation at present, such discourses certainly co-exist as possibilities 
amongst the contemporary ideas about childrearing, family and sexual relations. 
Whilst more traditional notions of family and duty still impact powerfully to 
particular gendered effects, the discursive space has been opened up whereby love 
and ‘the family’ can be seen to operate in tension with each other. 
 
The price to pay for prioritising personal satisfaction is the burden of responsibility 
for one’s experience and self-development, and it is mistaken to imagine that people 
simply apply rational planning strategies to achieve their goals. So the difference 
between the experiences of my mother and myself (and our peers) can produce envy 
on both sides. How ungrateful younger women must seem for choices which previous 
generations of women did not have, how sneering about ‘the way they did things 
then’, and superior the rationalist language of choice. Yet how loaded the choices and 
burdensome the consequent responsibility today, and how ‘easy’ this aspect of life 
can appear to have been back then. 
 
Discourses of psychology and psychoanalysis are some of the particular, and most 
powerful discourses through which to articulate Beck’s ‘project of the self’. They 
could provide the means of analysis especially for studying expressions of the desire 
to parent, as I intended at one stage, in which case they might have been both object 
and tool of analysis. Instead, I am writing about particular contemporary cultural 
understandings of self, ‘the individual’, ‘identity’ or ‘subjectivity’, but would use 
common discourses to construct understandings of my relationship to (the topic 
matter of) the thesis, my investments in academia, or my experiences of the writing 
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 process. In addition, discourses of psychoanalysis or psychology offer ways of 
thinking about the processes at work at a cultural level, such as the anxieties 
surrounding children in British cultural politics in the 1990s, or the ‘reflexive turn’ 
(see chapter 5) itself. Since a central challenge of modernity, according to Giddens 
(1991) is to live one’s life in a rewarding way, there might be conflict where family 
members’ or ex-members’ interests or desires clash. However, the struggle might be 
an intra-personal one towards identifying goals or desires, in which case 
psychoanalytic approaches are promising for the reflexivity they allow at the 
subjective level. Whilst psychoanalytic approaches have often made conventional, 
modernist, knowledge claims, they have also been important to the development of 
feminist and post-structuralist perspectives from which the ‘post-identity’ approaches 
employed here emerged. 
 
Mary O’Brien noted that ‘Theorists, like all of us, come from somewhere, and where 
they come from is a significant factor in their theorising’ (1981: p4). Putting the ‘I’ 
into the text voices an authorial presence which is usually obscured by academic 
writing styles, and helps reveal the process by which an authoritative account is 
produced - showing that since it is ‘made’, it could be ‘made up’. Putting my ‘I’ into 
the text might illustrate some of the individual-level implications of the political shift 
from ‘identity politics’ to ‘post-identity’ approaches. However, to allow personal 
significances to ‘leak’ into the account is only to reveal chosen aspects of what ‘goes 
on’ within/behind a text, and to explicate them through recognised discursive modes. 
Furthermore, it can simply be to draw on conventional understandings of identity 
which, as the thesis explores, retain a coherent ‘I’ or self ‘behind’ the text, thus 
retaining the privileges associated with the modernist (‘psychological’) individual. 
Challenging this felt too risky a discursive strategy for a PhD, and could only have 
been articulated as a political gesture in the later years of the thesis. The fact that I felt 
there were limits to how far I should be and wanted to be reflexive, where this 
deconstructed the subject and so undermined the speaking position of the author, 
shows that its privileged status remains, and highlights reasons for the limits to 
reflexivity in certain kinds of academic writing today. 
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 Answering feminist calls to reveal something of ‘where the writer comes from’ has 
tended to be answered in terms of identity disclosure and confession. Since I describe 
theoretical shifts that enable a move ‘beyond’ stable, coherent or exclusive identities, 
I would not be content to make a short declaratory statement, nor see this as helpful. It 
would also not adequately reflect the complexity of self, positioning and investment, 
which is itself a rationale for the thesis. In addition, the ‘I’ that articulates the thesis 
has not, of course, been left unchanged by the experience of doing the PhD, yet 
simple cause and effect relationships between the two cannot be disentangled. One 
consequence that can be noted here is that the PhD process not only allows me to 
engage with the arguments that could challenge my parenting, but that my academic 
labour, provides me with a professional status and class location which themselves 
make negative judgement from outside less likely. Furthermore, fears of judgement or 
of actual unfitness sit amongst ambivalent feelings about ‘mastery’ of disciplinary 
knowledges, of academic writing practices and about location within the academy. 
 
1.3 Points of departure
This thesis began as a study of who the popular media depicts as fit to parent. I 
wanted to make a feminist-informed critical study of the harsh public criticism of lone 
mothers, mothers on benefits (‘welfare mums’), ‘home-alone mums’ and members of 
the ‘underclass’. Mothers were the focus in expressions of concern about ‘family 
values’, the ‘crisis of masculinity’ and youth crime rates and seemed to be being 
blamed for these and other social problems, including their own poverty. Moreover, 
they were condemned in the abstract as a category, and when particular incidents 
brought individual women to the attention of the press, their unfitness to parent was 
sometimes assumed to follow inevitably from aspects of their social identity, such as 
their sexuality or relationship status. A particular media event that sparked my interest 
in doing the thesis was the fascination of the British news-media and subsequent near 
moral panic over ‘virgin births’ in March 1991. A second key interest was in the legal 
situation of lesbian mothers and co-mothers, and the campaign waged in the early 
1990s for lesbians and gay men to be considered as potential foster carers or adoptive 
parents. Since the parenting of particular women could be pronounced suspect simply 
at the level of identity attributed to them, the study broadened into the particular 
identities that could clash with, or render suspect, someone’s parenting. 
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An early rationale was that by examining alongside each other those mothers who 
were publicly condemned or scrutinised, I would be able to elucidate, by exclusion, 
those constructed as the cultural ideal. ‘Good mothers’ would be defined indirectly by 
those explicitly placed outside of the category, and this would show the idealisations 
at work. I imagined a narrow band of mothers who did not meet social disapproval 
consisting of white, middle-class women, married and financially independent or 
supported by their spouse. In retrospect, it appears naïve to have imagined a ‘safe 
space’ between the negative media images where women were not subject to scrutiny 
and condemnation. This assumes that ideology operates as a logical, coherent entity. 
Instead, I found contradictions between what ‘good mothers’ were supposed to be, 
and ‘no-win situations’ where a woman might be criticised, for instance, whether or 
not she took paid work outside the house, or could be characterised as ‘feckless’ for 
having unplanned children, or cold and calculating for choosing to have children ‘as if 
they were commodities’. I was struck by the depth to which politics suffused the 
question of who is fit to parent and by the absence of clear or unified contributions to 
the debate from feminists or those on the left. Moreover, the ‘debate’ itself seemed to 
be going on implicitly, with very little explicit discussion of the criteria by which we 
are to consider how well children are cared for. I saw the apparent quietness on the 
part of psychology as a striking omission given the ‘territory’ it laid expert claim to. I 
recognised how powerful psychological ideas were around childrearing and that the 
implicit nature of these judgements made them even harder to challenge. My interest 
in who was seen as ‘fit to parent’ became a study of the values mainstream culture 
assigns to categories of identity and the role of psychological concepts and ideas in 
popular culture and public policy debate. 
 
I was convinced from the start that arguments about who made good parents were 
always from particular political perspectives, which is why feminist, and socialist 
perspectives were needed to examine the mother-blaming for (male) youth crime; the 
attacks on feminism for supposedly having alienated men from the family; the 
stigmatisation of families on benefits; and the veiled racism behind slurs about large 
families or domineering mothers. However, what I increasingly came to realise was 
that there was no place beyond politics to work from to identify better parenting 
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 practices. Escaping the preoccupation with identities would not allow me to access 
necessarily fair criteria about what parents should provide; and authoritative claims to 
know, including my own, would subjugate other forms of knowledge, including those 
of mothers themselves. Not only is knowledge of ‘parenting’ or of what constitutes 
good mothering as ideologically formed as are the superficial categories of mothers in 
the popular media, but the very bases of these claims to knowledge rest on particular 
ideological assertions of the way the world is and can be known that have dominated 
Western thought since the Enlightenment. It seemed I could not criticise popular 
images of mothers on the basis of their ideological function if that required me to 
provide truer representations that I could guarantee were ‘better for mothers’. This is 
the political problem that prompts such a large focus on theory and epistemology in 
the thesis, and the political strategy approach to research. 
 
Thus, I became increasingly interested in the nature of ‘knowledge’: the practices of 
its production, the theories that assert, and the language that bolsters, its status. The 
emphasis shifted from who was seen as ‘fit to parent’ to the types of knowledge 
claims made about ‘fitness to parent’ in arguments within the political sphere, from 
different experts, practitioners and disciplinary perspectives. By 1994/5, I had come 
to see the thesis as centred on epistemology and was reading contemporary feminist 
philosophy on the nature of knowledge. In the final two years my focus returned to 
policy debates, through the 1997 general election campaign and then as the Labour 
Party’s trumpeted attention to parents and children merely translated into compulsion 
for attendance at parenting classes and appeared to be entirely rooted in concerns 
about the economic cost of crime. 
 
If I describe the period of study for my PhD (from 1992-1999) as a journey, then the 
written thesis is a map of that journey, constructing it in a particular way, for 
particular imagined readers. It is a verbal map, a travelogue. The final part of this 
chapter charts the terrain ahead. This next part illustrates the existence of alternative 
ways of mapping this journey. 
 
1.4 Disciplinary routes, personal routes 
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 I have difficulty stating my disciplinary perspective today for several reasons. Firstly, 
in my studies I have moved through a number of academic disciplines. Second, and 
relatedly, I feel heavily influenced by interdisciplinary work, particularly strands 
associated with feminist theory, post-structuralism and postmodernist analyses. These 
two have enabled me to teach in a range of different subject areas and departments, 
which, in turn, have provided for me various academic identities. Thirdly, the 
discipline that has been most significant for me, Psychosocial Studies, is itself a new 
interdisciplinary ‘discipline’, formed from the mutual critique of psychology and 
sociology, influenced also by cultural studies and psychoanalysis (described further in 
chapter 5). 
 
My undergraduate studies were of mainstream (cognitivist, scientific) psychology. 
The course was not critical or reflexive, nor did I myself bring a coherent feminist 
critique to it. As I remember it, only one course, and one taught by a visiting lecturer, 
made any attempt to place psychology in a broader context (which it did through an 
account of the history of psychology). Only when, as a post-graduate, I began 
teaching Psychosocial Studies in the Department of Sociology (as then was) at the 
University of East London (UEL), and studying discursive psychology at the 
Discourse Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University, was I able to question its 
perspective, its authority and its narrow focus on the decontextualised, rational 
individual. This has proven to be a powerful motivator to write about psychology and 
its authority. 
 
After my degree, I worked on the ‘Children’s Representations of Family Life’ project 
with Margaret O’Brien, in the above department, and was generously granted time for 
beginning the thesis. I was introduced to Psychosocial Studies through teaching on its 
introductory courses and later, on courses about the individual and society, individual 
development, social psychology and social constructionism, family sociology, 
childhood, life histories, identities and qualitative methods.  
 
I also attended part of the Department’s MA in Social Policy Research which was 
about ethnography, depth interviewing and grounded theory. Although I did not 
employ ethnography in either thesis or project work, this influenced me greatly. I was 
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 struck by the lecturer’s passionate conviction about the role research could play in 
politics, but struggled with my dissatisfaction at particular aspects (such as the limited 
researcher reflexivity) until I was able to articulate it as a question of epistemology. In 
spite of the critique of deductive methods, inductive methods might adopt the same 
epistemological certainty. Thus, the liberatory promise of ethnographic research - 
through the possibility of showing the perspectival nature of knowledge - need not 
bring in its wake a profound challenge to the basis of knowledge or recognition of the 
role of the researcher’s own perspective in forming the account. I came to know this 
lecturer as an ‘unreconstructed’ scientific Marxist, and debate issues of politics and 
knowledge with him and others in the department, and these form key themes 
throughout the thesis. 
 
I then studied on the Cultural Studies MA at UEL where I read postcolonial, 
postmodernist and feminist theory and philosophy, including Foucault, Kristeva, 
Lacan and Said. This interested me in the different backgrounds and influences on 
writers within discourse analytic work in psychology (see chapter 7). 
 
Over the next few years I taught communication studies at UEL, and the psychology 
of communications, and briefly on the MA in Subjectivity and Cultural Production at 
Goldsmiths’ College (both of which overlapped psychosocial studies through post-
structuralist critiques of psychology), I also taught contemporary social theory and the 
sociology of postmodernity, developmental psychology and Women’s Studies. Each 
of these was a valuable stimulus for reading and forum for discussion, and I was 
interested in some of the continuities across disciplines, including the impact of 
feminist and postcolonial writings, of ‘perspectivism’ and of the disaggregation of the 
unified subject into subject positions, readings or identifications. 
 
After writing and teaching a Women’s Studies course about researching and 
representing women and a Psychosocial Studies course about identities, my paid work 
has taken me back into empirical social research, and I feel acutely aware of the 
potential impact of authoritative knowledge claims. After an early PhD plan to use 
material from the Children’s Representations of Family Life project in order to 
contrast social psychological and discursive/critical developmental research 
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 approaches, then taking a route through feminist and postmodern critiques of 
empiricism, I am again involved in claiming to represent children’s views in my work 
with Rosalind Edwards and Miriam David. It is from and to these two projects that 
chapter 8 speaks. 
 
Although I was teaching on Psychosocial Studies courses and recognising continuities 
in the themes across cultural, communication and psychosocial studies, I only began 
to identify myself with it and the formation of my thesis study through it in the last 
few years. It was when we began to discuss an edited collection from the psychosocial 
studies staff team that I identified connections between my interests and the work of 
others in the subject area. Describing the above disciplinary influences might sound 
like a productive breadth of sources for a thesis. However, the process has not been as 
linear as this would suggest. It has involved various re-orientations and re-focusings 
of the thesis and the production of several chapters which were cut out to write it up 
as this text. Thus, rather than romanticising disciplinary nomadism, I would want to 
highlight the difficulties such disciplinary ‘homelessness’ can engender for 
establishing a disciplinary identity and core narrative. 
 
Since I began my studies clearly in the discipline of psychology, I cannot say I am 
academically ‘rootless’, but I do not cherish these roots as a sustaining source. 
Psychology is a key point of reference on my map and one that I have, in some 
senses, returned to. However, I like to think I have done so critically and from 
perspectives that are not themselves psychological. It is, though, important for me in 
terms of motivation. One of the less direct influences of teaching in media and 
communications was finding that students were so familiar with post-structuralist and 
postmodernist critiques of psychology that such criticism seemed ‘old hat’ and work 
that had already been ‘done’. This highlighted for me the importance of finding a way 
to express how powerful psychological discourses are, and of arguing that in spite of 
academic ‘deconstruction’ of its authority, it remains an authoritative discourse 
sustaining and sustained by many different institutions. This also warned me of a 
complacency that can accompany academic criticism and pointed to the relation 
between what is said in the academy, broader public discourses and institutional 
power.  
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The above map marks my most officially recognised stops because they relate to my 
studies and employment which provide markers of disciplinary location. However, an 
alternative way of narrating my thesis-journey is by tracing the people who were 
important in influencing and supporting me. This is difficult to map, not only because 
it jars with the usual practice of obscuring people and personal relations in the 
production of knowledge, but because of the impossibility of chronologising it as if it 
comprises discrete events and because it is constructed in hindsight through the lens 
of my current relationships with people and to their work. However, I could begin by 
recognising the importance of Lisa Blackman for the conception of the PhD and my 
perception of myself as someone who could do a PhD. She introduced me to feminist 
psychology texts, social constructionism and the work of Michel Foucault. After 
attending the Manchester Metropolitan University Discourse Unit’s conference on 
discourse analysis I asked Erica Burman to supervise the thesis. She and Lisa were 
very influential in shaping the PhD. In the first few years of study many members of 
the Psychosocial Studies staff gave me much needed personal and intellectual support 
and encouragement, especially Amal Treacher and Alison Thomas and, in Sociology, 
Alan White. Through teaching on their courses, as well as through staff seminars, I 
was influenced by Heather Price, Carole Satyamurti, Shelley Day Sclater, Jo Van 
Every and Sandy Brewer, as well as most importantly, Alan, Amal and Lisa. Karen 
Lyons, Cordelia Grimwood and Ann Hollows each gave me much encouragement to 
think about family discourse in social work practice. For learning about post-
structuralism, psychoanalysis, research epistemology and Foucault, several post-
graduate study groups (and shared offices) were significant, and these involved 
Annette King, Mary Wallis-Jones, Iain Macrury, Chris Cooper, Heather, Amal and Jo 
Brown. Others who have influenced the thesis academically and been very 
encouraging personally include: Sandy Brewer, Ian Parker, Barry Richards, Celia 
Kitzinger, Bill Schwartz, Couze Venn, Tim Jordan, Merl Storr, Valerie Walkerdine, 
Nikolas Rose and Mike Rustin. 
 
There are, of course, many points of overlap between people and disciplines. A casual 
corridor conversation with Barry Richards about how psychology’s original questions 
were still of interest to him, helped me distinguish my rejection of mainstream 
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 psychology for its ability to normalise and pathologise, from the subject matter or 
terrain that psychology lays claim to. Thus the thesis considers how much psychology 
can be reformed, and whether alternative approaches to social research can avoid 
replicating these problems. Identifying psychology as a place en route allows me to 
locate it in a narrative that moves away from it, in a conventional discourse of 
progress. It also allows me to see psychology as a place that has been both revisited 
and looked back on from other places, and for me to map my meandering amongst 
several disciplines as these other places.  
 
Although naming people helps acknowledge their contribution, and challenges the 
notion of the isolated intellect as originator of academic texts, it clearly cannot convey 
what, how or how much they contributed.  
 
Several groups and organisations provided direction(s) and markers along the thesis 
trip: the Challenging Women and Psychology Discourse Practice book collectives; 
the Women’s Workshop on Qualitative Family and Household Research; the History 
of the Present workshop; the London Childhood Studies group; the BSA’s Marriage 
and Divorce Study Group, a lesbian studies/feminist psychology group, the Sexuality, 
Identities and Changing Values, and Modern Feelings seminar groups; conferences of 
the Psychology of Women Section of the BPS and the Women’s Studies Network. It 
was my involvement with organisations outside academia, such as Rights of Women, 
which helped me feel that my (sometimes highly abstract) academic scholarship, or 
the skills I could gain from studying, could be put to some use. 
 
Even the above stays within the bounds of those from whom academic influence 
might be expected and neglects the contributions of friends inside and outside of 
academia, lovers, family and fellow activists. Leaving behind the idea of a travelogue 
that charts the journey, this final section maps the main route through the chapters as 
they stand in the final thesis. 
 
1.5 A map of the thesis chapter by chapter
The second chapter considers whether the increasingly common reference to 
‘parents’, as opposed to ‘mothers’ or ‘mothers and fathers’, might suggest a new, 
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 emergent constituency in British culture: a gender-neutral identity of ‘parent’. It 
examines the social construction of parents in the relatively new niche-market of 
‘parenting’ magazines. This chapter adopts the academic convention of using an 
historical account to ‘contextualise’ advice to parents. It privileges feminist accounts 
of the history of childrearing experts, and highlights the politics of knowledge of 
childrearing, but makes only small moves towards destabilising the account’s 
authority as historical truth, by revealing the analytic consequences of different 
feminist perspectives. It does not undermine the claims of (particular) feminist 
authors to know and represent history, but such an epistemological challenge is 
developed later (in chapter 6). Here an historical account is used comparatively (What 
tone do contemporary experts adopt in the presentation of advice to parents? Do they 
‘speak’ with the same authority as did the authors of childcare manuals a generation 
or more ago?), and to explore the specificity of current practices of expertise (Do 
readers today want advice, or simply information, on the basis of which they decide 
how to act?). 
 
 
The focus is then broadened from this new form of consumption to representations of 
parents in the popular news-media in order to contextualise, and probe the limits of, 
the gender-neutral discourse of parents. Chapter 3 therefore examines popular 
concerns about mothers in the mid-1990s and identifies a distinct set of issues 
surrounding specific categories of women regarding ideas about their ‘fitness to 
parent’. These include the ‘problem’ of lone mothers and their ‘fatherless’ children, 
and the ‘selfishness’ or ‘immaturity’ of women who deliberately have children 
without a male partner. Discourses of implicitly ‘unfit’ mothers carry popularised 
ideas about women’s psychology: about their ‘maturity’, ‘normality’ and psycho-
sexual development. 
 
Chapter 4, following the same approach, focuses on a key aspect of popular debate 
about fathers in the 1990s. It describes the polarisation of images of fathers in 
discussions about child support, such that ‘absent fathers’ were constructed in 
contrast to ‘family men’ in terms of class, culture, morality and financial 
circumstances, even though any particular man could, in fact, be both. The criteria by 
which men’s implicit ‘fitness to parent’ was judged in this debate were economic, 
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 rather than psychological. It appears then, that the discourses through which men’s 
parenting is scrutinised are particular to men. This section therefore concludes that 
discursively ungendered construction of parents in contemporary legal and policy 
rhetoric is compromised by a multitude of profoundly gendered understandings of 
parents (and of children) in popular debate. Negative and condemnatory discourses 
appear to be particularly gender-differentiated: different issues are identified when 
women’s ‘fitness to mother’ is questioned compared with when men’s fitness as 
fathers is under scrutiny. 
 
The following chapter, chapter 5, considers the status of such images. How do they 
affect individuals personally and how can we think about what this means politically? 
How does ‘the social’ get ‘inside’ people? This chapter starts with a socialist-feminist 
framework for recognising the ideological significance of the idealised or 
condemnatory images of mothers, but finds it limited for understanding the cultural 
formation of individual desire. Its reliance on the modernist subject risks reducing a 
woman’s desire to mother to a passive, uncritical acceptance of dominant cultural 
discourses. Desire is rendered inauthentic or superficial, and people are over-
simplistically categorised according to either/or options that solidify into identity 
categories. Post-structuralist understandings of power and subjectivity are considered, 
particularly where they allow a shift to ‘post-identity’ thinking, and an emphasis on 
identification, instead of identities. 
 
Chapter 6 considers some of the epistemological arguments underpinning claims to 
know about parents. It develops the focus on experts’ advice to mothers in chapter 2’s 
discussion of parenting magazines and outlines some of the political implications of 
psychological knowledge. Chapter 2’s illustration of the shift from powerful experts 
to powerful expertise is considered through the Foucauldian concept of 
‘governmentality’ which understands the power of contemporary discourses as being 
through their production of subjectivities, thus linking how psychology functions 
politically as knowledge and how cultural images produce subjective experience. A 
feminist-Foucauldian understanding of discourse must be able to recognise fully both 
the considerable power of psychological discourse, it pervasiveness in contemporary 
culture and the possibilities and actualities of resistance to it. Emphasising the 
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 political significance of claims to know about parents leads to a discussion of what 
claims might be made for feminist accounts, and what knowledge practices feminists 
might engage in. Potentially resistive approaches are identified, but arguments for and 
against them must be viewed in the light of the strategic thinking and localised 
practice which become necessary in the light of critique of prior certainties about 
knowledge. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses social psychological approaches to discourse analysis and their 
compatibility with the epistemological critiques discussed in chapter 6. Discourse 
analysis can provide a powerful means of contesting normative psychological 
accounts and knowledge claims because it can be presented as a ‘new improved’ 
method in psychology, and so retain psychology’s conventional authority. This 
chapter highlights some of the ironies of engaging with conventional knowledge 
practices whilst being critical of them, including the contradictions inherent in the 
production of a PhD thesis about the critique of modernist understandings of 
knowledge. 
 
Chapter 8 considers a particular post-structuralist discursive approach to research in 
the light of the discussion of conventional knowledge practices and feminist strategies 
in chapter 6, and of specific discourse analytic approaches in chapter 7. It explores 
further the theoretical shift from unified subjects to ‘subject positions’ which was 
introduced in chapter 5. It considers the ethical dilemmas of feminist-informed 
research which strategically responds within ‘the terms of the debate’ by focusing on 
issues arising in research with child participants. The central dilemma is that whilst 
research from children’s perspectives can effectively employ the political discourse of 
‘voice’, this discourse rests on the notion of identity which chapter 5 problematised in 
general terms, and which, more particularly, risks emphasising children’s otherness to 
the adult-centred model of the subject. This chapter considers whether eschewing a 
mainstream approach to knowledge allows the researcher to retain their powerful 
position with respect to interpretive authority, or any political warrant for 
representing participants or criteria for judging their research’s intervention in 
cultural politics. 
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 Chapter 9 draws together the previous chapters to consider how cultural ideas about 
‘fitness to parent’ function today. It places current popular debate about parents, and 
the theoretical dilemmas identified in the thesis about contesting dominant images, in 
the context of understandings of the emergence of the reflexive, self-governing, 
‘psychological’ self. It considers a particular element in how parents produce 
themselves through popularised psychological ideas about parenting, and whether the 
‘triumph’ of psychological discourse has paradoxically produced contemporary men 
and women as psychological subjects, but simultaneously ‘deconstructed’ the unified 
rational subject of conventional psychology by emphasising emotionality, non-
rationality and the unconscious. It considers whether recent social policy shows the 
popularisation of post-identity or ‘post-psychological’ ideas in understanding 
parenting as ‘performative’, rather than status-defined. Struggles to assert 
authoritative accounts about parents display the complexity of potential political 
strategies around knowledge after the ‘crisis of legitimation’. These must be seen in 
the context of the mobilisations of anxiety around the figure of the child at the end of 
the millennium, the incomplete rejection of the modernist enterprise, and our 
formation by it as contemporary Western moral subjects. 
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 Chapter 2 
Popular Advice for Today’s Parents 
 
Analyses of representations of contemporary parents could examine a range of 
cultural sites from legal documents or social work texts, to popular fiction, film and 
TV. This chapter, however, focuses on texts which address parents directly as their 
readers: parenting magazines. Commercial parenting magazines seldom distinguish 
between parents and so this chapter examines aspects of the social construction of 
parents at a site at which it operates as a broad, inclusive social category, and where 
the images sometimes idealise the ‘everyday’ parents they depict. In contrast, the 
following two chapters examine more specific representations, of mothers, and 
separately, of fathers, from a broader range of sources, including news-media and 
social policy documents. These are sites at which parents are spoken of, not to, and 
where it is those whose parenting is problematised who receive attention. This chapter 
therefore examines positive images of parents in accounts which are written for them, 
whereas chapters 3 and 4 examine negative and critical accounts written about 
(particular) parents. 
 
Over the last ten or fifteen years in the UK, parents have emerged as a new consumer 
market for glossy magazines about childrearing. The content of these magazines 
overlaps that of child-care books and manuals. While the books remain popular today, 
I argue that they represent an older genre of advice literature in which the views of a 
particular expert - usually a doctor - are presented as authoritative advice. The fact 
that parenting magazines contain pieces written by different authors raises the 
possibility of them presenting a range of views and types of expertise. This chapter 
explores how parents are positioned in relation to experts and expert knowledge about 
children in contemporary parenting magazines. Is advice presented with the same 
authoritative tone as in the child-care manuals? Firstly, an historical account of expert 
advice to mothers is presented, which puts the claims of ‘modern science’ into some 
socio-political perspective and raises questions about the role of expertise in mothers’ 
lives. Secondly, this chapter examines the ways in which mainstream parenting 
magazines advise parents today, and thirdly, it looks briefly at the particular niche 
market of ‘alternative’ parenting magazines.  
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 The use of history in this chapter is a ‘naïve’ one in which the claims to historical 
truth made by the accounts remains unproblematised. Feminist accounts are 
privileged, without an epistemological defence of this. The teleological presumption 
of historical progress is questioned, since this sits within the focus on the knowledge 
claims within, and the politics of, childrearing advice. However, a further questioning 
of the nature of the historical accounts of advice is reserved for the broader 
epistemological discussion in chapter 6. This relates to the fact that this chapter was 
not informed explicitly by a discourse analytic method, although it may be indirectly 
influenced by incomplete understandings of ‘discourse’. This allows the conventional 
understandings of Truth as guaranteed by empiricism to remain dominant. It therefore 
shows how this epistemological approach operates as the default and, even in the 
absence of any warranty or explicit rationale, is highly persuasive. Chapters 5 and 6 
return to look critically at such accounts, showing how discursive approaches 
destabilise their knowledge claims and how the linguistic style of empirical accounts 
conveys epistemological authority. For now, the focus is on knowledge claims within 
texts about childrearing, but later in the thesis when the necessary theoretical  
resources have been developed, the focus shifts to another layer of knowledge claims 
which allow the questioning of the claims to know within my own account. 
 
2.1 The promise of better knowledge 
In her study of advice about infant care from the mid-18th century onwards, Christina 
Hardyment traces the largely continuous line of men who were convinced that their 
knowledge of babies was superior to that of mothers (1983: p10). One of her earliest 
sources is William Cadogan’s 1748 booklet advising nurses on the physical care of 
babies born to those so poor they were abandoned to the foundling hospitals: many of 
whom did not survive. It begins with his statement of relief: 
‘It is with great Pleasure I see at last the Preservation of Children become the 
Care of Men of Sense. In my opinion, this Business has been too long fatally 
left to the management of Women, who cannot be supposed to have a proper 
Knowledge to fit them for the Task, notwithstanding they look upon it to be 
their own Province.’ (Cadogan, cited in Hardyment, 1983: p10)  
 
Childrearing practices hitherto governed by ‘old wives tales’, tradition or superstition 
would, in future, be governed by new knowledge provided by the application of the 
minds of rational men. Cadogan’s relief stemmed from the understanding that this 
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 was a superior form of knowledge supplanting old, inferior knowledges: the heroic 
salvation of children by the application of rational knowledge to childcare. It 
represented the triumph of mind and reason over superstition, disorder, impulse and 
emotion. The ‘ignorance’, ‘error positive’ and ‘prejudice’ of midwives and nurses that 
Cadogan warned against is echoed in some present-day advice, when, as Hugh Jolly 
puts it, it can be taken for granted that the new mother  
‘will have the advice of the experts, and will not have to rely on the advice of 
her own mother. The previous generation of mothers may not be the best 
advisors of the present generation’ (in Hardyment, ibid.: p10).  
 
In both past and present cases, the proferring of ‘better’ knowledge reflects the 
Enlightenment promise that new knowledge would better lives. Faith in the insight of 
the Men of Sense was in the genuine hope of improving the treatment of infants. 
Nature was sometimes to be opposed or tamed by reason, although not always, as 
shown in Hardyment’s description of apothecary James Nelson’s ‘rational and natural 
methods’. Competing claims about the status of expert knowledge and ‘the natural’ 
are a feature of child-care literature today. 
 
2.2 The ‘discovery’ of the child
The nineteenth century saw demographic shifts in the position of Western children as 
improved sanitation reduced infant mortality. Moreover, this century is marked by 
what Ehrenreich and English, in their 1979 book For Her Own Good: 150 years of 
expert advice to women, call the ‘discovery of the child’. As the industrial revolution 
transformed UK and US societies and work moved out of the home and into the 
factory, relations between older and younger workers changed, paving the way for a 
different understanding of youth. Previously, young workers learned as apprentices 
from experienced older workers, but now the pace of change meant that experience 
was valued less than malleability, and child workers were quick to adapt. By virtue of 
their rapid adaptation to new industrial conditions children came to be seen as ideal 
workers, and as the embodiment of progress. Once the continuing progress of 
humanity was tied to industrial ‘development’ hope for the evolution of the race 
rested on children which lent increasing importance to upbringing. This emphasis 
served the American dream that social distinctions amongst its culturally diverse 
inhabitants would be reduced by common socialisation. This model of society 
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 improving through slow processes of social evolution, rather than political upheaval, 
compounded the emphasis on children.  
 
The image we have of Britain at end of the nineteenth century is a Dickensian scene 
of contrasting experiences for children: privileged, cherished and cosseted in wealthy 
Victorian homes, or poorly and fatigued by working gruelling shifts in treacherous 
conditions in mills, mines or factories. From then onwards, (and still today), socio-
economic class position produced differing experiences of childhood, as of 
motherhood and fatherhood. In addition to children living lives in contrasting material 
conditions, different cultural meanings could be attributed to childhood. Ehrenreich 
and English describe how ‘the turn-of-the-century exaltation of the child was both 
romantic and rationalist, conservative and progressive’ and how  
‘only the figure of the child held the key to a future which could contain both 
behemoth factories and nurturing hearthsides, the cold logic of Wall Street and 
the sentimental warmth of Christmas’ (1979: p170).  
 
2.3 The professionalisation of motherhood
Ehrenreich and English link the rise of the US mothers’ movement to this ‘discovery 
of the child’, for ‘In the reflected glory of the child, motherhood could no longer be 
seen as a biological condition or a part-time occupation; it was becoming a noble 
calling’ (ibid.: p172). 
 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman supported the call for mothering to become ‘brain work and 
soul work’ rather than brute instinct (ibid.: p176). At this time, an objection to the 
education of women was that it could destroy ‘maternal instincts’ and even reduce 
fertility, so drawing mothering within the remit of the mind undermined this 
argument. Instead of posing a threat to ‘the family’, women’s education could only be 
to its betterment. In 1898, a (male) writer in Cosmopolitan magazine urged that 
motherhood be formally instituted as a profession, open only to those who could 
demonstrate ‘fitness’: “Doctors and lawyers and teachers and clergymen fit 
themselves to have charge of human lives. Why should not mothers?” (cited in 
Ehrenreich and English, ibid.: p176). 
 
The movement to professionalise mothering was an attempt to raise its status and 
thereby the status of women. It was with this aim that the mothers’ movement ‘invited 
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 in’ the experts. However, they needed no invitation since this was merely the next 
new area to which the ‘Men of Reason’ would extend their expertise. 
 
For mothers who were trying to gain recognition for the job of motherhood, it 
sometimes meant constructing it as a huge and daunting task. A speaker at the US 
National Congress of Mothers’ convention in 1897 asked:  
“What profession in the world, then, needs so wide an outlook, so perfect a 
poise, so fine an individual development, such breadth and scope, such depths 
of comprehension, such fullness of philosophy as the lightly considered 
profession of motherhood?” (ibid.: p183)  
 
Indeed, raising children came to be valued as an experience which provided 
knowledge, since to study and rear a child was to ‘know the race’. In such a 
demanding task, with such a noble form of knowledge, it is not surprising that the 
‘professionalised mother’ was quickly joined by experts. 
 
Once instinct and maternal love were no longer assumed to be enough to guide a 
mother, and she needed to apply the latest scientific information, she could fail either 
to have the new information, or to apply it faithfully. In either case she would be 
failing in her moral duty to do the best for the children and to be a ‘modern’ mother. 
The identification of the child with the interests of the nation (Gittens, 1998; Burman, 
1994a) placed new, evolutionary responsibilities on mothers. Mothering for the good 
of society meant a harsher package of responsibility and blame, with individual 
mothers viewed as culpable when things ‘went wrong’ (see chapter 3). In addition, 
with such an important task to do in the home, women’s attempts to fill public roles 
could easily be condemned. Trying to get educated and join the professions 
supposedly paled into insignificance compared with the new vocation of motherhood, 
and ‘if one wish[ed] to transform society, why not start with the little child?’ 
Furthermore, there arose the idea that mothers might not be the best judges of their 
own mothering, or even their fitness to do it. As the professionalisation of 
motherhood raised the status of mothers, so it raised the status of those who could 
claim to know better than mothers. But to whom might it be imagined women would 
prove their fitness to join the profession? 
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 2.4 Expert advice to mothers
Women were, by now, used to being advised, since a whole series of medical experts, 
domestic scientists and hygenists had advised, through radio in particular, on new and 
better ways of doing things. In the US especially, the house had been the object of 
concern during the domestic science era, and so the stage was set, but no longer was 
the patriarchal husband the key actor, Ehrenreich and English argue. Instead, the child 
came to be the central focus, rather than a mere helper about the house. The child 
study movement had changed childrearing from an unproblematic status as 
instinctual, to something a wife-and-mother could turn her whole attention to.  
 
Why, at this point in Western culture, did it begin to seem crucial that women devoted 
their minds to the study of their infants? Was the ‘fixation on children’ and 
enrichment of childrearing just ‘another advertisement for female domesticity’ to 
absorb the whole (now educated) woman and fill the void resulting from production 
leaving the modern household? Or, was it a result of changing understandings of the 
nature of the human subject and the will to do well by children? Perhaps increasing 
recognition for the importance of mothering raised the status of mothers, so that (at 
least middle-class) women could now make greater claims about their status in the 
domestic sphere, where they could reign supreme, just as their husbands supposedly 
did outside.  
 
Even if one accepts that the quest for knowledge was in good faith, it had some 
negative consequences for mothers. As the tasks of motherhood came to be seen as 
more complex, anxieties about what could go wrong increased, and individual 
mothers were the locus of blame. Given this intensified pressure, and the links 
between responsibility for ‘the child’ and the future well-being of society, was it good 
for mothers that experts were taking childrearing seriously? Or were they, as 
Ehrenreich and English see it, intruding, usurping and colonising yet another sphere 
of women’s knowledge? After the child study movement had roped mothers into 
documenting and studying their child, mothers’ knowledge and experience had been 
relegated and denigrated until mothers came to be seen not only as the main agents of 
child development, but also as the main obstacles to it. (Ehrenreich and English, ibid.; 
Parmenter, 1993). This professionalisation of the tasks of motherhood, rather than 
raising the status of mothers, could construct them as inadequate, ignorant or 
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 pathological (and their mothering potentially insensitive, neglectful or overbearing), 
in contrast to knowledgeable, objective and benevolent experts.  
 
Raising the status of childrearing from something automatic, and seeing it instead as 
something consequential, legitimated men’s interest in children - albeit initially only 
the white, class-privileged men deemed fit to represent the civilising rationality of 
science - and carried the potential for broader social responsibility for childrearing. 
But instead, the male Anglo-American childraising experts of 1950s ‘had no material 
help to offer, but only a stream of advice, warnings, instructions to be consumed by 
each woman in her isolation’ (Ehrenreich and English, 1979: p184). No longer seeing 
it as merely women’s business also held the possibility for fathers to be more actively 
involved in parenting - or, since it is likely that in poorer homes this had been a 
necessity anyway, for its public recognition, and a challenge to the exclusive 
association of the intimacies of childrearing with women. Indeed, once viewed as a 
matter for the mind, parenting could henceforth be understood as theoretically 
independent of gender. Here lie the conditions of possibility for the contemporary 
discourse of ‘parents’, and the reformulation of questions of gender for parents around 
gendered subjectivity, rather than biology and instincts.  
 
It is difficult to assess overall, whether mothers came to be granted more or less 
respect as a result of mothering coming under expert gaze. The different feminist 
positions in relation to science are echoed in the ambivalence amongst feminists 
towards the emergence of ‘scientific motherhood’. These reflect what seems to be its 
double-edged nature for women. 
 
The relation to the expert was also changing. By the mid twentieth century, advice 
about domestic life was becoming embroiled in consumerism. This embodied a 
different relation to and status of knowledge. Home economists, for instance, were no 
longer seeking to ‘educate’ women, but to ‘convince’ them. They sold ideas about 
needs which would be met by the gadgets they peddled. Perhaps this changed the way 
experts were seen, no longer disinterested and sometimes even contradicting each 
other.  
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 2.5 The rise of the psychologist
At the start of the twentieth century, experts had advised mothers on the physical 
health of infants. From the 1890s onwards, however, the new discipline of psychology 
had begun to claim the psyche, leaving the body to medicine - a division of labour 
which allowed them both to pronounce on issues such as childrearing. In the early 
days of psychology, religion was a ‘no go’ area for its objective scientific gaze 
(Miller, 1964), but few other areas, least of all mothers’ relationships with their 
children, were granted sanctuary by virtue of their being of the subjective realm 
(Ehrenreich and English, 1979). By mid-century, the psychologist was beginning to 
usurp the medical doctor as key expert on ‘the child’ (Ehrenreich and English, ibid.; 
Hardyment, 1983; Newson and Newson, 1974). Perhaps the link between children and 
the interest of the nation added justification for scientific scrutiny. As the power 
women had through their mothering came to be recognised, so mothers’ knowledge 
was subjugated to the knowledge of the men (and, today, women) of science.  
 
Psychology now offers knowledge about childrearing which can compete with, and 
sometimes be more persuasive than, medical discourse. The powerful claim of 
psychological discourses can rest upon the moral superiority that can be imputed to 
the more sophisticated concern with the emotional needs of the child over what can 
thereby be constructed as the limited and mechanistic concern of medicine with 
‘mere’ biology, and is underpinned by the implicit understanding that newer 
knowledge is better knowledge (see chapter 6). Viewing the mind as of higher order 
than the body results from Cartesian dualism, but there is also a more recent shift 
towards a re-valuing of the ‘subjective’ which also supports psychology’s status (see 
chapter 10). 
 
For about the first twenty years of the twentieth century, the ethos of hygienism which 
predominated in physical care persisted in the shift to psychological care (Newson 
and Newson, 1974). From the late 1920s into the 1930s, expert advice was 
characterised by absolute regularity in feeding, sleeping and toileting, and limited 
cuddling and holding (Urwin and Sharland, 1992). These abstemious qualities 
continued with the reign of experts such as J. B. Watson, who firmly warned against 
the dangers of ‘mollycoddling’ babies and creating weak, undisciplined, hedonistic 
individuals (Newson and Newson, 1974; Hardyment, 1983). Here, in the dangers to 
 32
 be guarded against we see the emergence of a concern with ‘character’, rather than 
physical health. Such psychological concerns about infants’ mental and moral well-
being, expressed at this time through discourses of ‘moral fibre’ and self-discipline 
were, of course, the privilege of those gazing upon well fed, Western babies. 
Objective scientific knowledge and the control and regularity of a rationally ordered 
care regime were to protect children from the irrational elements of women’s 
mothering. The development of the industrial model of childraising automatically 
undermined the professional aspirations of the mothers’ movement, since following 
the schedule for feeding and sleeping and waking needed less judgement by mothers 
thereby reducing them to ‘semi-skilled employee[s] with punched-card instructions to 
follow’ (Ehrenreich and English, 1979: p183). The 1930s expert advice on the child is 
commonly characterised as environmentalist. Knowledge of the child's learning in 
response to environmental influences might be put to effective use in the production 
of ‘better adjusted’ children, which meant adjustment in the psychological sense. 
Whilst Watson’s regime was austere to a degree often viewed as cruel today, it was 
advocated in good faith, in the belief that scientific knowledge and methods were the 
way of progress.  
 
Imperialist thinking and motives cannot be left out of this modernist belief in 
progress. The Second World War provided the context for an explicit regimentation 
of mothering and the increasing attention to the development of the child (Urwin and 
Sharland, 1992). After the War, the general shift in emphasis changed the tasks of 
parenting from one of control and management of the child's health and character, to 
one in which surveillance and nurturance of the child's mind and emotions was 
emphasised (Rose, 1989). This meant a step back from ‘working on the child’ to a 
more relaxed approach which sometimes emphasized the child’s ‘natural’ 
development as unfolding at its own pace (Gergen et al., 1990; Reese and Overton, 
1970). The influence of psychoanalytic thinking, particularly the work of Susan 
Isaacs, was to make possible an emphasis on understanding the child's perspective. 
Once the child's emotions were seen as reasonable, parents ought to try to understand 
them. An understanding of emotional development as something complex superseded 
the idea of emotions as simply fuelling progression along an already mapped route 
(see Burman, 1994a; Urwin, 1985). This allowed a discourse of individual differences 
to emerge, which not only admitted both environmental and child-originating aspects, 
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 but lead to the construction of the child as an active subject in their world of 
relationships. Indeed, the complexity and relational nature of the child’s emotional 
development was foundational for conceptualising what is now the ‘parent-child 
relationship’ (Urwin and Sharland, 1992). This can also be seen as a step towards 
according renewed respect for the subjective realm. Since this approach accorded the 
child aggressive, as well as loving, feelings it became possible for the child to be seen 
as in conflict with its environment. Newman, in 1914, had stated that ‘The 
environment for a child is its mother’ (cited in Urwin and Sharland, ibid.) and this 
was the starting point for D. W. Winnicott: mothers provide the environment for the 
infant, and are therefore responsible for their physical, emotional and psychological 
health. Chapter 3 highlights some of the implications of this. Recognising the 
potential for conflict allowed the possibility that the interests of the child and of 
mother might not be harmonious, which was a crucial distinction for feminist writings 
on motherhood (see chapter 5). 
 
2.6 Child-care books and manuals
Sir Frederick Truby King, one of the earliest popular childrearing ‘gurus’, was a New 
Zealand doctor who promoted breast-feeding and hygienic bottle-feeding practices 
through lecture tours of England in the inter-war years. His Motherhood Book was 
popular in the 1940s, and his advice met what Parmenter (1993) identifies as a post-
war need for firm direction. Even though society was becoming more secular, the 
imagery of baby Jesus at his mother’s breast, and appeals to nature were used to 
promote breast-feeding, and Truby King’s book opened with Milton’s scolding 
words: ‘Accuse not Nature, she hath done her part; Do but thine.’ He decried the 
tragedy of ‘ignorance, fear and mismanagement’ of a baby being denied breast milk, 
‘his’ ‘birthright’ (cf Parmenter, ibid.: p6). 
 
Dr. Benjamin Spock is today the most famous and perhaps most significant of the 
child experts. Baby and Child Care outsold everything except the Bible in the fifties 
and sixties (Boseley, 1998). His ideas influenced a generation of north-American and 
British parents - the consequences of which are pointed to by those who claim society 
owes him a great debt, as well as those who say he is to blame for a selfish, 
hedonistic, undisciplined generation. His advice was dramatically different from what 
had gone before - he advocated the expression of love and affection, the toleration of 
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 thumb-sucking and he discouraged smacking - but what was most significant was the 
landmark change of tone. He was not chiding or patronising towards parents, and he 
even urged that parents trusted their instincts. Shortly after his death in March 1998, 
Sarah Boseley wrote:  
‘If the opening words of his child-care manual are often quoted, it is because the 
change in thinking they offered was so radical at the time. It felt like freedom. 
“Trust yourself. You know more than you think you do”.’(The Guardian, 
March 17th, 1998)  
 
From the 1960s and 70s onwards, increasing numbers of child-care manuals have 
been produced and bought. These books mostly address first-time mothers (Marshall, 
1991), and most mothers have consulted at least one at some point (Clarke-Stewart, 
1978, cited in Marshall, ibid.). Their distinguishing feature is that they contain 
sustained advice from an expert, who almost always has a medical background, 
sometimes with a paediatrics or gynaecology specialism, and whose personal 
experience of parenting get a brief mention in the preface or on the back cover. They 
are often large ‘coffee-table’ books which are presented in a consistent style, format 
and tone. In addition to Spock’s Baby and Child Care which has undergone many 
revisions and remained a best-seller for 40 years, some of the most famous of the 
British experts still writing this type of book include Hugh Jolly, Penelope Leach and 
Miriam Stoppard (each of whom are medical doctors). 
 
Most of the others refine Spock’s approach and some develop the more child-centred 
aspects. To his ‘trust yourself’ statement (above), Leach adds ‘And you know more 
than anyone else’ (cited in Boseley, 1998). Spock’s reassurances still echo, and are 
important, but there is some irony in mothers being ‘told’ or ‘allowed’ to trust 
themselves by an expert, although perhaps after the rolling waves of advice this is not 
altogether surprising. One could view experts’ attempts to be encouraging and 
confidence-inspiring for parents as not necessarily because they really believe that 
parents will naturally know what’s best, but because, in the end, a baby needs a 
‘cheerful mother more than he [sic] needs breast milk’, as Spock put it when he 
‘allowed’ bottle feeding in his 1957 edition of The Commonsense Book of Child-
care (cited in Parmenter, 1993: p6). Either way, this values the psychological and 
emotional dimensions of parenting above the practical details. The guarded 
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 recognition of parental instincts and greater trust of ‘gut feelings’ illustrate the 
increasing admission of the emotional and subjective aspects of raising children.  
 
The enormous growth in numbers of ‘baby books’ (Hardyment, 1983; Marshall, 
1991) is viewed by some feminist commentators as a colonisation of mother’s 
knowledge by (mostly) male experts (and chapter 5 examines this type of analysis), 
but this ‘growth market’ needs to be viewed in the context of the growth of literacy 
and development of mass markets in general (Jordanova, 1985) and the 
professionalisation (and array of ‘how to do it publications’) common to many areas 
of Western life today (Woollett and Phoenix, 1991). 
 
These books have attracted considerable attention from historians of childrearing 
practices (Newson and Newson, 1974; Hardyment,1983) and from feminist critics for 
their normalising and blaming of mothers (Hardyment, ibid.; Marshall, 1991; Singer, 
1992). Marshall describes the way contemporary child-care manuals construct the 
‘modern’ mother as informed and concerned, and as listening to, then acting on, the 
advice of experts. She quotes Hugh Jolly in his 1986 Book of Child-care:  
‘Today’s doctors no longer sit on a pedestal doling out orders to their patients. 
They must have your partnership as parents if they are to get your child well as 
quickly as possible…’ (Marshall, 1991: p3). 
 
Rather than the patronising, didactic tone of the earlier experts, ever since Spock’s 
first book, they attempt to address parents as equals who simply lack knowledge in 
that area. They are often descriptive and chart how the child ‘ought to be’ growing 
and developing month by month. Burman notes that ‘normative descriptions provided 
by developmental psychology slip into naturalised prescriptions’ (1994a: p4), so that 
even a ‘descriptive’ text functions powerfully to produce culturally specific sets of 
requirements of parents. Chapter 8 examines the way different models of child 
development produce different understandings of what mothering ought to be, 
focusing on the period after Spock and Jolly, from the 1970s to the 1990s. Today’s 
experts are cautious, tending not to pit their knowledge against the natural impulses or 
feelings of parents, instead offering suggestions about how to understand them or put 
them into practice. From the 1970s onwards, as criticisms of expertise gained 
popularity alongside a general ‘permissiveness’, mothers consulted baby experts in 
order to seek reassurance that what they chose to do was right, rather than to be told 
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 what to do (Parmenter, 1993). However, whilst there may be discourses of 
partnership, and of ‘you know best’ - or at least, ‘you know your child best’, in taking 
up the tone and manner that signify ‘expert’ there is an assertion of the superiority of 
expert knowledge, and an authority that can still sometimes sound rather patronising. 
In what tone are today’s parents advised in contemporary parenting magazines? 
 
2.7 Informing Today’s Parents
Parenting magazines are a genre of glossy magazine which are on the shelves in 
newsagents and supermarkets in the UK today. They are ‘special interest’ magazines 
about babies and children that are addressed either to parents or specifically to 
mothers. These monthly magazines are popular (having a 1,086,000 readership, which 
is about a fifth of the glossies’ - NRS Jan-Jul 1998), widely available (prominently 
displayed for sale almost anywhere newspapers are sold) and cheap (‘magazine’, as 
opposed to ‘book’, price: from £1.80-£2.50 at 1998 prices). Rather than being freely 
distributed as is healthcare literature on mothering, they are bought and consumed 
privately by individual parents. Their magazine-style format and colour photography 
makes them accessible, appealing and more like popular monthly women’s magazines 
(Cosmopolitan, Elle, Marie Claire), than childrearing books. Magazines are a 
relatively new forum for material addressed to parents about the care of children. 
However, like child-care books, they are a medium through which messages about 
what is viewed culturally as contemporary good child-care and parenting behaviour 
are communicated and in which particular consumer ‘needs’ are constructed (Burman, 
1994a). The next part of this chapter describes the topics covered and the tone 
adopted in the advice provided in parenting magazines, and considers how ‘parents’ 
are constructed in terms of gender, that is, whether they address mothers and/or 
fathers, or mothers in particular. 
 
Amongst those currently on sale are: Practical Parenting, Pregnancy & Birth, 
Parents, Mother & Baby, BABY Magazine, Our Baby and First Steps. When the 
original study for this chapter was conducted in 1995, M & M (Maternity and 
Mothercraft) was ‘available free at health centres, GPs surgeries, ante/post natal 
clinics, parentcraft classes’. It was not sold commercially, but was supported through 
the advertisements it carried. However, it adopted the same glossy format as 
commercial magazines, as opposed to the more sombre, information-centred style of 
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 healthcare leaflets, which indicates the (at least perceived) success of parenting 
magazines. The different magazines vary slightly in their focus, mainly in relation to 
the age of child, so that, for instance, one might cover pregnancy, birth and babyhood; 
another, babies and toddlers; or early to middle childhood. However, none focus on 
children over 8 or on teenagers, and when they carry articles about these age groups, 
as occasionally they do, they imagine them to be the older siblings of children within 
their usual age-range. 
 
Initially, I compared issues from Winter 1995-1996 of each of the above seven titles, 
and I later examined Practical Parenting, Mother & Baby, and Parents in more 
detail, examining 4 issues of each from mid-1994, mid-1995, early 1996, and 
additional issues from 1992 and 1998. Across the different titles, but fairly consistent 
over time within each title, are sections that correspond to each other, such as, issue-
based articles focusing on different developmental or health related topics; shorter 
first-person experiential accounts (e.g. ‘3 mothers tell their birth stories’); an advice or 
‘problem page’; anecdotes, photographs and letters from readers; competitions and 
special offers and consumer news and product reviews. The form and the contents are 
remarkably similar across titles which, I would argue, constitutes them as a genre, but 
each title has a particular ‘house style’. The details of format, layout, and names for 
the sections convey subtle differences giving each title a slightly different ‘flavour’. 
In describing the titles of magazines or sections, I retain the original capitalisation 
where it may help convey the overall tone. 
 
The largest sections in each are concerned with core issues that reflect the age range 
focused on, so for Mother & Baby and Practical Parenting this is pregnancy, birth 
and babyhood. Mother & Baby has a ‘Development Section’, Practical Parenting has 
one called Early Education and Parents has both an Early Learning and a 
Development section. Mother & Baby’s consumer section is called ‘Wise Buys’ and 
carries pictures and descriptions of goods, whole-page ‘On test this month’ articles 
and readers’ consumer views (‘Mums Check Out’). Readers’ letters in Parents are in 
a section called ‘From You to Us’, in Practical Parenting ‘Parent to Parent’, and in 
Mother & Baby ‘Here's your chance to air your views’ and ‘Mums in Touch (Make a 
friendly pen pal)’. The advice-seeking letters’ page in Mother & Baby is titled ‘Q & 
A. Our panel of experts can help you with your problem’; and in Practical Parenting 
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 is ‘Ask Our Doctor’. Many of these sections give advice in some form or other, but 
these letters pages encode the most explicit parent to expert advice-giving 
relationship. Like Mother & Baby, Parents has a team of experts to answer the letters 
according to their specialism. It includes an experienced midwife, a consultant 
obstetrician and gynaecologist, a clinical child psychologist, a breastfeeding 
counsellor, a health visitor and a community paediatrician. Under the title ‘we can 
Help’, it says  
‘Are you worried about a crying baby, breastfeeding, a clingy toddler or your 
child’s health, and feeling the need to share your anxieties with someone? 
Whatever your problem, big or small, write to us and one of our experts will be 
able to help you.’ (July, 1994) 
 
Although the experts will be in a position to ‘help’, the problem is parents’ worries 
and the need to be met is their need to ‘share it’. This suggests that a big part of the 
experts’ role lies in reassuring parents, which accords with Parmenter’s comment 
about what mothers want from their doctors today, and matches the increasing 
emphasis on mental well-being which prioritises a child’s need for a confident parent 
over any particular childrearing approach or technique.  
 
2.8 The tone adopted
In each magazine, the contents’/first page includes a short address to readers from the 
editor and a photograph of them. In Practical Parenting, the editor is pictured 
cuddling her child and, below her welcoming message to parents, she signs her name 
simply ‘Jayne’. Both Mother & Baby and Parents introduce their staff team by 
labelling small photographs of each of the staff with brief, but personal (and 
identificatory?) descriptions, for instance, stating that the consumer writer is the 
mother of six-year old twins, or that the fiction editor’s daughter has just started 
secondary school, as opposed to their writing or research credentials. These 
presentation devices create a friendly tone and the impression of the magazine’s team 
as ‘down to earth’ and ‘just like you’, as opposed to being disinterested journalists or 
superior experts.  
 
Across articles and letters pages, the over-riding tone is of support for parents - from 
the staff, the experts and from other parents. This helps make the information features 
into information sharing, rather than lecturing or advising. Sometimes this is from the 
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 experts and at other times it is from parents’ or readers’ experience, which is therefore 
valued by being given a place in the magazine’s main articles. It contrasts with the 
knowledgable expert who authors a childrearing manual, and instead, has people ‘just 
like you’ who have looked into (what the experts say about) an issue and are simply 
(re)presenting the information.  
 
The fact that every issue has different sections provides variety in the tone with which 
readers are addressed. The key format in which information on child health and 
development is provided are the topic-based 1-3 page features which are written in a 
factual tone, sometimes as editorial, and sometimes by a named and introduced expert 
whose relevant expertise is stated. Sometimes, when the article is not name-authored, 
experts are quoted in small caption-like comments to supplement the main body of 
text. Articles in which a parent, usually a mother, gives an account of their 
experience, whilst being presented as testimonial and satisfying our appetite for Oprah 
Winfrey-style intimacy, sometimes have a didactic element. Not only do they express 
values and presumptions about good parenting anyway, but they are sometimes also 
‘used’ as a vehicle for information or advice-giving. In Practical Parenting, October 
1998, the Pregnancy Diaries of three women are presented. Alongside each woman’s 
own account and photograph are ‘boxes’ displaying facts about her stage of 
pregnancy and a medical advice box which answers its own questions on related 
issues (for example, explaining what a breech birth is). These ‘boxes’ clearly 
distinguish testimony from technical information, and the authentic feel of each 
woman’s account is maintained by not interrupting it to provide explanatory 
information. ‘Sharing experience’ is the key theme in these and the significance of 
first person narratives is indicated by the fact that in Practical Parenting’s October 
1998 issue, four of the five cover stories which are written as information articles by a 
main author, draw on personal stories in the form of short vignettes with pictures, 
which supplement or illustrate the piece. The use of what appear to be real-life 
experiences do add interest, and the feeling of intimacy and authenticity. However, 
the accompanying photographs always show remarkably photogenic people and 
fortunate timing on the part of the photographer, which makes one wonder whether 
the production of intimacy - in which the photograph plays a key role alongside the 
first person narrative - is more important than their actual authenticity or veracity. 
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 Often regular staff writers introduce experts to parents thereby providing some form 
of mediation, or perhaps a form of vouching for the expert, by ‘setting up’ an article, 
introducing the expert, describing his or her credentials and then ‘handing over’ to the 
expert. Alternatively, in confessional or mock-intimate style staff raise ‘their own’ 
questions and concerns. The role of the staff here is significant in producing the tone 
of information rather than didacticism. Perhaps this helps to retain this construction of 
the relationship between magazine staff and readers as one of equals with the staff 
simply using their access to the experts for the wider benefit of parents. The 
mediating role is most prominent in Mother & Baby, and is very rarely used in 
Parents, in which an article by a particular expert is more often presented without 
personal introduction by a regular member of the magazine’s staff and the expert’s 
qualifications are stated matter-of-factly in the prose. 
 
2.9 From advice to knowledge
Mother & Baby magazine contains the most ‘advice’ of the three, yet still illustrates 
the tone of neutrality that accompanies what is, supposedly, simply ‘information’, and 
often ‘new’ or ‘better’ information. What feels like old news is sometimes 
superficially framed in a new way. The appearance of new information must help the 
magazines sell, and keep selling, to parents who have bought them before, but it also 
seems that emphasising newness avoids insulting readers as might implying that they 
do not yet know about issues that are already popular knowledge. A perceived need to 
‘save face’ illustrates and reinforces the implicit moral imperative to be up-to-date 
with the latest advice on best practice. However, an empowerment discourse is often 
implicit in the way information is provided and practices suggested, and sometimes 
there is an explicit ‘it’s up to you to decide’. Perhaps there is a tension between the 
‘newness’ needed to sell frequently published magazines and not undermining 
parents’ existing knowledge so much that it knocks their confidence, their pleasure in 
reading the magazine and therefore knocks sales. 
 
Parents strikes a slightly different tone regarding the relationship between parents and 
experts than Mother and Baby and Practical Parenting. It emphasises information, 
rather than advice, for instance, ‘Breastmilk - ‘There is no substitute’ New research 
shows that breast really is best’ (June 1995, italics added), and the pull-out-and-keep 
monthly installments, including the ‘instant expert’ series which began in July 1994. 
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 It pays close attention to the precise specialisms of experts, for example, ‘Ask the 
Experts - Your questions answered by our school specialists’ (June 1995). It does 
have didactic articles such as ‘Dressing your new baby: We show you how to make 
dressing easy and stress-free for you both’ but it maintains a clearer distinction 
between information and experience pieces than, say, Practical Parenting. Either 
type of article has a particular, consistent tone. Different boxes of the layout give 
different sets of information, but there are no boxes of contrasting ‘tone’, for instance, 
of ‘one mum’s personal story’. By 1996, the ‘we can Help’ page started to be called 
‘Dilemmas’, focusing on an issue that ‘has come up again and again in readers’ 
letters’ and having an appropriate expert responding to the help request letter, 
alongside several responses to the letter from readers, and next month’s ‘problem 
letter’ inviting readers to write in giving their advice. 
 
The tone of parenting magazines suggests a concern to appear knowledgeable and 
confident in their assertions, and the process of sounding so often leads them to 
generalise. The balance to be struck by these writers is between being perceived as 
well-informed and having (access to) expertise, yet not being too authoritarian or 
condescending. The weak attempt to present experts as ‘just like you’ and ‘facing the 
issues most parents face’ (which is less successful than for the magazine staff) sets up 
an identificatory, rather than hierarchical, relationship with them. The importance 
attached to stating their credentials shows that they are accorded respect not because 
they are the experts, but for their knowledge. Hence it is expertise, as opposed to the 
expert which is the site of authority and the reason why parents should listen. There is 
no invocation of abstract authority, or ‘divine wisdom’, but rather a rational appeal to 
the knowledge of an expert in their field. ‘Their fields’ demarcate specific areas on 
which they each offer advice, and they do ‘offer’ it, as opposed to giving it in a 
didactic manner. 
 
Today’s experts would not dream of telling parents how to raise their child, they 
simply ‘help’ them to make (the right) decisions. This style of presentation illustrates 
the commodification of knowledge. The literal or metaphorical question is ‘Which 
line of expertise will readers buy?’. This discourse of consumption presumes an 
‘empowered’ consumer who can choose between different varieties of expertise. 
However, this is a false ‘freedom of choice’, since psychological ideas are 
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 institutionalised in practices such as social work and health visiting. Competing 
expertises, for instance, spiritualism, holism, and even medicine in particular 
moments do not, of course, operate in the ‘free market’ that this rhetoric assumes.  
 
The removal of a single authority and the range of formats for ‘information’ presents 
an evident multiplicity of expertise. This inevitably produces contradictions, although 
these are seldom acknowledged. So, for instance, the articles on osteopathy in Parents 
are printed alongside conventional medical discourses, but the magazine format 
allows them to co-exist between its covers. This alignment of magazine staff with 
parents, that is, as parents who are interested in the same information, might offer 
potential alignments against experts or against offending companies or organisations, 
without explicit commitment to such positions. 
 
Psychological discourses on parent-child relationships are not specific to this medium 
of parenting magazines, of course. A whole ‘family’ of professionals surround the 
family (Rose, 1989a) and even paramedics who provide authoritative sources of help 
and advice to mothers (such as midwives, health visitors and GPs) might employ 
psychological discourses. Once the child became the key object of concern in parent-
child relationships, developmental or child psychology came to be a dominant 
discourse through which we construct parenting in contemporary western cultures 
(see chapter 8). However, parenting magazines illustrate the broad shift from 
prescriptive advice and authoritative tone to a more equal, empathetic tone 
emphasising supporting and informing parents. They help parents gather information 
in order to improve their knowledge, but let them decide how best to act on the basis 
of this knowledge. The superior and patronising authorial tone of the manuals is 
replaced by an identificatory stance which manufactures a feeling of intimacy and so 
denies any hierarchical relationship between reader and author/s, and the explicit 
invocations of expertise naturalises accounts that are not attributed to particular 
experts.  
 
Expert discourses, rather than the experts themselves, provide the claims to 
authoritative knowledge in this advice literature. Whereas Ehrenreich and English 
focus on the power of the experts in relation to mothers’ knowledge and experience, 
this suggests the need to focus examination of expert power and authority on the 
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 ‘discourse’ itself (see chapters 6 and 7). The term discourse is being used here to refer 
to a set of concepts and social practices through which we understand an object 
(Foucault, 1977; 1981a and b; Parker, 1992). The ‘invitation’ to parents to think of 
themselves, their tasks and their relationships through the discourse of psychology 
echoes the way ‘self-help’ discourses encourage people to form themselves through, 
and thus regulate themselves within the terms of psychological or psychiatric thinking 
(see Allwood, 1996; Rose, 1985; 1993).  
 
2.10 Imagined Readers
Two major publishing houses, Emap elan and IPC Magazines, currently dominate 
the UK market, each publishing several parenting magazines. Emap elan presents 
itself as a company with ‘a fresh approach to women’s magazines’, and their titles 
include glossy monthlies Elle, New Woman and more!, ‘teen mag’ J17, Slimming 
and Here’s Health, and Period Living & Traditional Homes. Their women’s 
monthlies (Elle, New Woman and more!) are generally seen as being a little more 
risque than some of the long established women’s magazines, such as Woman’s 
Weekly, and their greater explicitness about sexual matters is in line with the ‘modern 
woman’s’ reported sexual assertiveness. Its three parenting magazines are Practical 
Parents, Pregnancy & Birth, and Parents. Emap elan’s titles do not necessarily 
specify women’s interests, but they do map onto conventionally female domains of 
family, health and home. 
 
Emap elan’s media pack provides a short profile of each magazine. These make 
explicit the differing markets, emphases and tones of their three magazines. Mother & 
Baby is presented as follows:  
‘The essence of Mother & Baby is the love between a mother and her child. 
Our reader is a woman who has always wanted to be a mother – being a parent 
is instinctive and natural. Mother & Baby’s name, together with its warm, 
reassuring tone and image is exactly what appeals to her.’  
 
It is described as a practical magazine, providing ‘consumer and expert advice, 
information and encouragement’. It is the only one of the three that specifies real-life 
stories, and it is described as in ‘an easy-to-read, accessible format’.  
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 In contrast, Parents is ‘news-led’ and ‘information-packed’, offering ‘an intelligent, 
up-to-the-minute read, for mothers wanting more from their magazine than just basic 
babycare’. Open about its appeal to the ‘quality end of the market’ and in a more 
expensively bound format, it differs in that it is more specific about expertise, experts 
and areas of knowledge even in its one-paragraph description: ‘Parents fulfils the 
desire of these readers to give their child the best possible start in life through their 
role in its physical, psychological and educational development. As well as the 
important areas of pregnancy, birth and child-care, Parents contains a crucial section 
dealing with development and early learning. It boasts a panel of heavy-weight 
writers including Sheila Kitzinger, Irma Kurtz and Penelope Leach’ (italics added).  
 
Pregnancy & Birth too provides information and advice, but also entertainment ‘on 
the all absorbing subject for her and her partner.’ Its specific focus on pregnancy 
creates its market niche, and despite the fact that it ‘uniquely, looks at pregnancy from 
the woman’s point of view’, the motive for this emphasis becomes more apparent 
when, in addition to listing ‘what to buy for her baby?’ as one of the ‘most crucial 
decisions in her life’, it goes on to state: ‘As [she is] an inexperienced shopper, 
Pregnancy & Birth is a hugely influential sourcebook. For advertisers this is an 
opportunity to gain her trust, awareness and purchase of your products – early.’ 
Whilst they all attempt to woo advertisers, none of the others makes such a direct 
appeal to them in their profile. 
 
2.11 A Gendered Readership?
One might expect magazines with titles like Mother & Baby and Pregnancy & Birth 
to attract more female readers than the gender-neutral titles Parents and Practical 
Parenting, unless the discourse of parents, as opposed to mothers and fathers, is now 
general, mainstream and normalised. Does today’s ‘modern’ mother identify as a 
parent, more than as a mother? Does the term parents have particular positive 
connotations, so that she is pleased to be addressed as a parent? If so, it could be 
because it is less associated with appeals to natural and instinctive knowledge than 
‘mother’, and more with discourse on parenting as an object of legitimate concern and 
thought, that is, parenting as a matter for the mind. Is there indeed a constituency of 
mothers, let alone parents, such that generalisations across the category are 
meaningful? Do the two Emap elan titles Mother & Baby and Parents attract 
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 different readerships or display any differences in content? Before looking at their 
content regarding gender, I will describe their self-conscious market orientations. 
 
From the readership information provided by Emap elan in their media pack, it is 
curious to note that a higher proportion of the readers of Parents are women (44% of 
the ‘adult readership’), compared with the proportions of female readers for the titles 
with more female-gendered titles, that is, Mother & Baby (38%) and Pregnancy & 
Birth (29%) (Emap elan, 1997). This suggests that the gender neutral address of 
Parents does appeal to women. However, despite claims that men are finally getting 
in touch with their parental sides in the 1990s (Biddulph, The Guardian, 23rd 
September 1998), Parents does not attract a readership comprising significantly more 
men than the maternal titles. Indeed, proportionally more men read Mother & Baby 
and Pregnancy & Birth. Could it be that this pattern is explained by men reading 
parenting magazines concerned with earlier stages of the parental experience because 
it is a new experience, and then reading less as their parenting career progresses 
(perhaps when women have become established as primary carer)? Whilst a higher 
proportion of women with children 0-4 read Parents than either of Emap’s other two, 
Mother & Baby has over twice the total circulation of either Pregnancy & Birth or 
Parents. The differences in tone and emphasis are recognised by the publishers who 
distinguish different readerships for the three magazines.  
 
The media (advertisers’) pack describes mothers as ‘desperate for information to help 
them in their task of being a good parent’. A table entitled Looking for Information, 
presents figures comparing where mothers gain information. The magazine itself is 
rated (around 70%) against ‘other mothers/friends’ (65%), grandparents (40%), child-
care books (30%), and TV programmes and ante-natal classes. The figures vary 
slightly between the three magazines, but the real interest in these figures is revealed 
in smaller type: ‘where do they look for ideas on what to buy?’ and, below the table, 
‘Readers find their buying ideas in their magazine’. This supports the argument that 
parenting magazines have come about as a vehicle to promote the consumption of 
goods for children and babies, and as Burman (1994a) argues, are therefore active in 
the production of particular consumer ‘needs’. Perhaps the top priority is to attract the 
readership from amongst those who make the majority of the household and baby and 
child-related purchases. 
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2.12 The ungendered discourse of ‘parents’
On closer inspection some apparently gender neutral titles make references to mothers 
on their covers. Parents, between 1995 and 1996 had introduced under the large letter 
title ‘Parents’: ‘Smart solutions for today’s mums’. Similarly, First Steps has ‘Getting 
the most from motherhood’ written beneath the title on the cover. Practical Parenting 
also added a more specific subtitle: ‘From Pregnancy to Pre-school’, between 1994 
and 1996. So, it seems that whilst these magazines embrace the image promoted by 
their gender neutral titles, the presence on their covers of the word mother suggests 
either that they wish to retain some associations that the reference to ‘mothers’ 
provides or that they address women as their most likely buyers. Perhaps there is a 
tension between appearing relevant to mothers specifically as their primary market, 
whilst not wanting to appear unfashionably out of step with the language of ‘parents’ 
or connote any of the old-fashioned or supposedly unflattering ‘mumsy’ meanings 
that the term ‘mother’ can have. 
 
Whilst it is not so surprising that Mother & Baby carries articles addressing mothers 
such as ‘When only mum will do: why your baby wants YOU most’ (October, 1998), 
Practical Parenting very frequently places mothers in the first person, for example, 
‘“I want a natural birth” four mums in labour’ (July, 1994). Sometimes, even an 
explicit address to ‘parents’ is contradicted by the more frequent address and 
orientation of its articles to mothers, or presumptions within a piece. Parents 
magazine actually clearly genders its readers at times through references to ‘your 
breasts’ or ‘your [post pregnancy] body’ and articles such as ‘Distant Dads’ in which 
women describe what it’s like when ‘your partner’ is never there when you need 
‘him’. Practical Parenting stands out even more than Parents for the disjunction 
between its gender neutral title and gendered address to readers as mothers. The 
October 1998 issue has a cover article entitled ‘“I’m really frightened, mum” Help 
your toddler overcome common childhood fears’ and in Family Cookery section an 
article ‘What’s for tea, mum?’ The last article is called ‘And Finally - How one dad 
coped at his caesarian birth’, but the only other man ‘present’ is the doctor writing the 
article about childhood fears, and every other first person experience is by a woman. 
The father’s birth experience is in the regular ‘Readers’ File’ section, whilst the 
‘Parent to Parent’ page of ‘Your latest news, views and photos’ and the ‘Meet Our 
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 Babies’ photograph section only contains contributions from women. It seems 
therefore that sometimes the magazines determinedly address ‘parents’ and do not 
gender the titles of sections, thereby keeping open the possibility of contributions 
from fathers, but that mothers are by far the more likely contributors and therefore, 
visible readers. Of course it could be that men read the magazines, but are less likely 
to contribute to them. In addition, or perhaps as a consequence, it appears to be 
mothers to whom articles are really addressed. The gender-neutral address to parents 
or readers in titles functions to include fathers in an abstract way, but is undermined 
by the fact that discussion of concrete issues, the detail of practical tasks, ‘parents’ 
bodies’ and ‘readers’ experiences’ are mostly oriented towards mothers in particular. 
 
The mainstream, popular parenting magazines inform parents, rather than advise 
mothers, as advice literature did in the past. However, whilst they do not maintain the 
tone associated with advice-giving, they do still value expertise, and (while not taking 
the position of expert themselves) draw on expert discourse and do ‘invite the experts 
in’. Similarly, whilst on the surface, they present discussions as being about 
‘parenting’, they are discussing practices and people who are often implicitly 
gendered, and in the conventional ways. So despite appealing to the ‘modern’ 
discourse of parents, they reflect and reinforce the practice of gendered parenting, that 
is of the majority of the work of parenting and responsibility for children being 
women’s. While there may be many parents who do not identify with the mainstream 
magazines for a variety of reasons, there are some sites at which particular alternative 
perspectives on parenting are articulated consistently. The final section examines 
whether these might embody similar parent-expert relations and shifts from the 
authority of experts to expertise, through the study of a particular example. 
 
2.13 ‘Alternative’ parenting magazines
There are a few alternative magazines for parents which contrast with these ‘glossy’ 
ones, although even taken together, their circulation is tiny and highly specific. They 
are more specialist, writing for self-consciously ‘alternative parents’, and produced on 
shoestring budgets by editors whose concern is political or to spread the word about 
their approach to parenting, rather than strict commercial success. Radical 
Motherhood and natural parent are two independent publications ‘by parents, for 
parents' which take a critical stance to the advice of the experts.  
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Radical Motherhood is a North-east London based monthly subscription magazine 
that reflects explicitly feminist, critical and anti-consumerist perspectives. It has a 
different relation to consumer products than the mainstream magazines because it 
does not take advertisements and because of its articulated anti-consumption theme. 
The spaces into which readers are welcomed are also significantly different and this 
produces a more explicit alignment between readers and writers. Parents are 
encouraged to write articles, or to comment on or disagree with previous pieces. 
There are no pre-set forums or styles for readers’ contributions and journalistic pieces 
are welcomed. The emphasis is local and participatory, so there are appeals for other 
local parents to get involved in the magazine’s production and to influence its 
direction, which contrasts sharply with the editorial control over the mainstream 
magazines. It highlights how limited the contributions welcomed from readers are in 
them, when they invite contributions to particular sections, for example in the Say 
Hello! and Parent to Parent sections, which are therefore circumscribed by their 
formats.  
 
Apparently more commercially successful, is natural parent magazine. When this 
chapter was first drafted in 1994 it was published as Mothers Know Best, but in late 
1997, it was relaunched as natural parent. Its key theme is the critique of 
mainstream medicine and professional intervention around children’s health and 
education. It is sceptical about the knowledge of mainstream experts. Mothers Know 
Best articles often presented detailed critiques of allopathic (conventional Western) 
medicine and arguments in favour of alternative or naturalistic methods, for instance, 
criticising the (routine) inoculation of infants. The focus of natural parent is 
perhaps slightly broader with more coverage of educational issues, particularly 
alternatives to state schooling (such as Montessori and Steiner schools). Regular 
features include ‘Diary of a Home-schooler’, astrology and homeopathic first-aid. The 
main emphasis remains children’s emotional and social development and spiritual 
well-being, so, for instance, helping children cope with loss and separation, or ‘deal 
with anger naturally’ are approached holistically and therapeutically, in ways which 
might involve the whole family or in conjuction with natural remedies and alternative 
approaches to health. Articles are often advice-giving, but not didactic or patronising; 
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 rather the writer’s claim to expertise is stated, and they are unabashed about their 
passionate belief in their particular approach. Its small circulation is probably mainly 
amongst parents who are politicised and highly educated, with relative independence 
from, and confidence in the face of, professionals. Its range of strategies for resisting 
‘the experts’ includes information-based challenges to conventional advice, espousals 
of preferable alternatives, or asserting the right to be autonomous and self-directed in 
one's childrearing. However, discussion of alternative/complementary medicine is not 
totally restricted to the ‘alternative’ parents’ media, Parents, at least, is notable for its 
supportive coverage, for instance, running ‘Does your child need antibiotics? Why 
medicines aren’t always the answer’, and ‘How osteopathy can help your child’, and 
also ‘Independent nursery - could this be the right Pre-school option for your child?’ 
in June 1995. 
 
The editors, Bryan Hubbard and Lynne McTaggart, are husband and wife, and are 
pictured with their two small daughters next to the editorial introduction. They 
describe natural parent as ‘a different style of parenting magazine’ and encourage 
readers to spread the word to ‘like-minded friends’ (September/October 1998). The 
re-launch upgraded the format and overhauled the image to a slick and professional 
one which more closely resembles the mainstream magazines in its aesthetic appeal - 
glossy, attractive and with close-up colour photography. It did not noticeably reflect a 
change of emphasis or readership. The change of title is a shift from addressing 
mothers to addressing parents. It seems to echo the increasing use of the discourse of 
parents, not only amongst the mainstream magazines, but also in social policy and 
legal rhetoric. Whilst natural parent has a critical perspective on gender, it is not as 
overtly feminist as Radical Motherhood (or the US magazine Hip Mama). It seems to 
embrace the gender neutral discourse of parents wholeheartedly. It is ‘men-friendly’ 
and includes fathers in the address and topic of articles, as well as in the letters and 
photographic images. It employs a very positive discourse of family, and describes 
itself as ‘your guide to holistic family living’. The imagery, language and lifestyle 
choice presented suggest an orientation towards middle-class nuclear families, and as 
well as the presumption of nurturant, ‘involved’ fatherhood, is an implicit notion of 
heterosexual complementarity. Unlike Radical Motherhood and Hip Mama it does 
not cover issues to do with poverty and thrift.  
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Its readers are critical and challenging, and comment on the new-look magazine. 
Alongside a letter congratulating them on the new format, is one which says ‘it’s a bit 
glossy, isn’t it?’ revealing the expectation that the magazine’s ‘alternative’ outlook 
includes an environmental concern:  
‘Surely your original format was professional-looking enough to appeal to the 
shallowest of us who may have “holistic” leanings? How much of the recycled 
(and recyclable) content of the magazine has been compromised to achieve this 
unnecessary face-lift? The magazine now has a definitely unnatural feel to it.’ 
(letters, page 7, September/October 1998) 
 
That the editors saw fit to make it more professional-looking perhaps relates to their 
concern to challenge conventional professional practice and wisdom regarding the 
education and health care of children. However, the fact that some readers have a 
critique of professionalism or of attempts to convey it through presentation, suggests 
differences amongst even the relatively specific group of ‘like-minded’ 
natural/alternative parents, which might be about ideological principles or priorities or 
about strategies for resisting conventional expertise. 
 
A reference to popular parenting magazines in the September/October 1998 issue 
emphasises their self-conscious difference. The first UK website for parents, UKmums 
Online, which was launched in May 1998, is described as ‘pitched more at the mass 
market of parents’: its ‘features and letters, for instance, would be more at home in the 
pages of Practical Parenting than natural parent’ (p60). The site publicises itself 
as providing ‘practical advice to mothers, particularly if they are isolated and unable 
to compare notes with other mothers’. This reference to mothers as studious tallies 
with the construction of parents as information-seeking in the mainstream parenting 
magazines. Such images are reminiscent of the child study movement, and are an 
extension of the early problematisation and ‘professionalisation’ of motherhood 
which first took mothering into the realm of the mind. 
 
2.14 Popular psychology and the modern parent
Over the past forty years there has been a shift from scientific advice to mothers to 
psychological knowledge for parents. This comprises of psychological ideas coming 
to dominate how we speak of children; a shift from an advising to an informing role 
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 for experts, and sometimes a changed orientation to parents rather than mothers. The 
shift to a consumer-driven role of expert knowledge places parents as consumers. It 
produces not only the option of consuming knowledge, but a moral imperative to seek 
out and assimilate knowledge that will enable them to do their task well. This 
provides the market for monthly ‘throw-away’ magazines, as opposed to books that 
might have been handed down from mother to daughter. There is some popular 
recognition of the historically changing nature of childrearing advice, as Figure 1 
illustrates. However, the pace of change has implications for relationships between 
generations, for mothers and daughters in particular. 
 
Our understandings of ‘what children are’, and therefore what parenting ought to be, 
are already formed through psychological ideas and theories, so that we already 
‘know’ that the most important tasks of parenting are psychological. Indeed non-
psychological constructions would probably not make sense and would stand out in a 
culture now saturated with a language of psychology. Being a good, and ‘modern’, 
parent now involves being up-to-date with current thinking on child psychology, 
being knowledgeable of this particular form of knowledge of ‘the child’. Moral 
attributions attach to the effort one makes in order to keep oneself informed, however, 
the financial ability and the will to consume products in order to inform oneself is 
assumed. The shopping mall analogy for parents selecting an expert discourse fails to 
recognise that the discourse of psychology is supported by a network of institutions. 
and also, that ideas are sometimes popularised beyond their original frameworks as 
Denise Riley explored for Bowlbyism (Riley, 1983). Ordinary parents are expected to 
be able to draw on psychological discourses and so since, as a culture, we are already 
convinced of the value of psychology, parents need only have ‘new’ concepts or 
findings presented to them. Therefore the expert is not powerful in the same way that 
he (most usually) used to be. Yet whilst this might imply a more fragile authority, the 
naturalisation of the status of expert discourses such as psychology perhaps makes 
them even more pervasive. Certainly there is a greater possibility of competition from 
alternative discourses, but these need to present themselves as expertise in order to 
contest authoritatively and it seems very unlikely that discourses on parenting that did 
not address psychological, emotional and inter-subjective aspects would be accredited 
much status. 
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Figure 1: ‘Momma’s Fault!’  
 
 
This cartoon strip by Posy Simmonds, shows popular recognition of the fact that there are historically 
changing vogues for, and fears about, childrearing, and captures the potential this provides for mothers 
to be blamed for getting it wrong. There is also a subtext about reacting against our parents’ approach 
to childrearing and attempting to do it ‘better’ for our own children. 
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 That fact that mothers want reassurance or confirmation, rather than advice from the 
experts indicates the broader cultural shift concerning knowledge. Mothering 
practices are already informed by expert discourses, but the centrality of the expert is 
eschewed, yet, as Urwin and Sharland (1992) note, this displaces rather than 
altogether removes ‘him’. There may be increased skepticism about experts, but no 
less a respect for expertise in general amidst shifts in vogue and status of particular 
ones. Problematising psychological knowledge, in an account such as this, is not 
simply to condemn it as ‘bad’ knowledge (inaccurate or maliciously motivated), but 
to question the extent to which its authoritative status makes it difficult to contest. It 
can render other forms (such as mothers’ own knowledge) pathological or simply 
irrelevant such that alternative discourses are often not only depicted as inaccurate, 
but those espousing it are depicted as charlatans (Foucault, 1980), or perhaps in the 
case of readers of natural parent as eccentric (see chapter 6).  
 
Parenting magazines make no direct statements about fitness to parent. This is 
unsurprising given that parents are the consumers that magazines rely on. The 
representation of parents as gendered results from market pressures, not purely 
ideological forces. The following two chapters examine forums which speak about, 
rather than to, parents, in which judgemental discourses about who should and should 
not be parenting are found. The next chapter examines some of the powerful effects of 
psychological ideas about mothers and childrearing - in terms of their categorisations 
and value-judgements - despite being in popularised forms and fora, and not attributed 
to specific experts. 
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Chapter 3  
‘Unfit to Parent?’ Monstrous and Selfish Mothers 
 
This chapter focuses on discourses of mothers in contemporary British culture in 
order to examine some of the exclusions from popular understandings of fitness to 
parent. It examines representations of women whose mothering is scrutinised, 
criticised or condemned, that is, those who are constructed as unfit parents. Through 
these, it questions whether some of the ideas which circumscribe ‘good enough 
parents’ are, in fact, gendered, so that dominant discourses of mothers, more 
particularly than discourses of parents, inform popular depiction of unfit parents. It 
considers how ideas drawn from psychology, and discourses of ‘the psychological’, 
function in these popular debates about mothers.1  
 
Whereas in the previous chapter the material examined was drawn from a particular 
type of textual source - parenting magazines - this chapter looks at images from a 
broader range of cultural sources. In the main, the material is drawn from British daily 
newspapers, and occasionally from national radio or magazines. All the quotations are 
from popular, non-specialist sites. The articles are written for lay audiences 
(sometimes with particular political orientations) and are mostly ‘rapid-fire’ responses 
to current affairs, such as next-day articles by journalists after the release of policy 
documents, or about other newspaper articles or ‘media storms’. Rapid-response 
articles in newspapers aim to be accessible and to communicate ‘information’ and 
opinion concisely. They draw on images that have popular currency, address issues 
that are deemed newsworthy and so provide an insight into cultural ideas and 
preconceptions. Chapter 4 applies the same approach to representations of fathers. 
Together these chapters provide a broader cultural backdrop to the discussion of 
parenting magazines in chapter 2, since it is drawn from discussions about, not for 
parents, but it is specifically about those whose parenting is problematised. This 
chapter questions how far gender-neutral discourses of parents apply when the 
broader context is of a culture saturated with ideas about gender, and in which 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Alldred, P. (1996a) ‘Fit to parent’? Developmental 
Psychology and ‘non-traditional families’ in Burman, E. et al. Challenging Women: Psychology’s 
Exclusions, Feminist Possibilities, Buckingham: Open University Press. I am very grateful for the 
contributions my co-authors made to the book chapter and, therefore, indirectly to the thesis. 
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mothers are both idealised and denigrated (Dally, 1982; New and David, 1985; 
Hollway, 1997). Documenting the popular use of psychological discourse reveals 
some of its implications for everyday life, particularly its ‘normalising’ functions. It 
demonstrates some of the rhetorical tools for popular, as well as clinical, judgement of 
mothers. 
 
Recent policy-related discussions of families take place in the context of ongoing 
moral panics about children and about particular mothers. It is the representation of 
these particular mothers that this chapter focuses on. Arguments that growing up 
without a father is (necessarily) a bad thing question whether ‘children’s needs’ are 
fully met in ‘mother-headed’ households which ‘lack’ a man – an argument which can 
apply to either lone mother or lesbian (two-parent) households. The 1980s saw 
negative depictions of ‘single mothers’, and particularly of young mothers 
(McRobbie, 1989; Phoenix, 1991), but the hostility and sense of moral outrage in 
criticisms of ‘lone mothers’ (as they are now more commonly referred to) has further 
intensified since then. Lone mothers have been an object of concern throughout the 
1990s, and the Governments of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair have 
each constructed them as a social problem and couched policy proposals in ‘problem-
solving’ rhetoric. Most recently, the New Labour Government sought to encourage all 
parents including ‘lone parents’ into work, by which is meant paid work outside of the 
home. Concern about the state’s financial support of families often reveals strong 
trans-Atlantic influences, and the discourses are reminiscent, or borrow directly from, 
the USA on ‘welfare moms’ or the ‘underclass’. As chapter 4 demonstrates, calls for 
‘a return to family values’ and the Major Government’s ‘Back to Basics’, have often 
been underpinned or prompted by concerns about money and fiscal policy. The focus 
here is on several particular media events, articles and policy changes. These include: 
the ‘Virgin Births Scandal’ of 1991; the legal headway made by lesbian mothers in 
1994 – officially designated International Year of the Family, but which Maureen 
Freely described as ‘the Year of Parent-Bashing’ (1994: p24, cited in Ribbens, 1994: 
p7); and the representation of lesbian mothers during the 1997 pre-Election clamours 
to be ‘the Party of the family’ (Alldred, 1998b, included as Appendix A). These have 
occurred in the context of debates about reforming the welfare state; moral panics 
about childhood and youth crime; the regulation of new genetic and reproductive 
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technologies; the legacy of ‘Section 28’; and the outspoken condemnation of lone 
mothers by Government Ministers at the 1993 and 1994 Conservative Party 
Conferences (Phoenix, 1996; Roseneil and Mann, 1996) which heard some of the 
harshest rhetoric against families that don’t match the ‘cornflake-packet’ - or 
Victorian ‘family values’ - ideal. Specific articles are drawn on to illustrate some of 
the available, and often powerfully mobilised, discourses of mothers in 1990s Britain. 
However, many of the themes they draw on have rich histories of association with 
women or mothers across Western cultures. 
 
3.1 Monstrous mothers and selfish women 
Marina Warner (1994) noted the co-occurrence of two cultural events in Britain in the 
1993-1994 period. The first is the massive success of the Steven Spielberg film, 
Jurassic Park, in which the all-female population of dinosaurs (bred by twentieth 
century scientists from genetic material in fossilised mosquito blood) develop the 
capacity to reproduce. The second is the moral panic expressed by some cultural 
commentators about (the numbers of) lone mothers having children, and having ‘yet 
more’ children (Warner, ibid.). In Jurassic Park, the dinosaurs were deliberately all 
made female so that they could not breed and could therefore be controlled, but the 
crafty inhabitants of the Park (referred to in Michael Crichton’s book as a matriarchy) 
mutate some gender-ambidextrous frog DNA. Thus, nature - coded female - proves 
itself ‘uncontrollably fertile, resistant to all the constraints of the men of power’ 
(Warner, 1994: p2).  
 
It seems that today’s lone mothers, lesbian mothers, and single women seeking donor 
insemination are related to Jurassic Park’s female monsters by the cultural fantasies 
and fears they evoke. These are women who are having children without husbands, or 
making families without men. They are breeding outside of male control, or allowing 
men only marginal roles in reproduction. One of the fears is that by doing so they are 
undermining ‘society as we know it’. However, alarmist reactions to this fail to see 
‘the everyday world as problematic’ (Smith, 1987). If the core of this anxiety is the 
power women have by virtue of their reproductive capacity, are women thereby able 
to destabilise patriarchy or do the fears arise at a more individual level from a 
recognition of maternal (‘parental’) power which shatters infantile fantasies of 
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omnipotence? Fears about how women wield such power produce representations of 
them as monstrous. Both film and moral panic echo the association of women with 
nature, men with culture, and nature as threatening and needing to be brought under 
the control of ‘man’. In the considerable media attention to today’s mothers-without-
men, psychological discourses have been mobilised in relation to the women 
themselves, as well as to their children, and can question whether they are ‘natural’ 
women or deviant and dangerous. Just as chapter 2 described how childrearing was 
‘civilised’ by the rational men of science, here, which women are ‘fit to mother’ 
might be known and regulated through the scientific knowledge of psychology. 
 
Warner aligned the recent moral panics about mothers with fears that are expressed 
within myths of Medea, the Greek mother who, in some versions of the myth, kills her 
own children. This act shocks us deeply, it is ‘monstrous’. Characterisation of the 
feminine as monstrous in Western culture has taken a variety of forms and still exists 
in many contexts: from the she-monsters of ancient mythology to the evocation of 
images of the all-devouring or toothed vagina in science-fiction and horror genres 
(Creed, 1986). Images of the monstrous mother have included the over-protective 
mother who refuses to relinquish the child and so smothers or subsumes them; the 
selfish and withholding mother; and the all-powerful and sadistic mother who 
threatens to castrate or emasculate men (Kaplan, 1992; Creed, 1986; 1993). Such 
narratives can be understood as revealing the intensity of fear about women’s power 
over children, and therefore indirectly, over men. As Freely put it in relation to 
today’s concerns: ‘We’re arguing about who controls the next generation’ (1994, 
cited in Ribbens, 1994: p7). The significance of such cultural imagery is that they 
construct mothers who deviate from the supposed ideal as dangerous, not merely 
different, but threatening. It produces a sharp polarisation between the ideal, 
wholesome and dependable ‘good mother’, and the deviant or dangerous woman who 
is unfit to parent. The fears revealed at this particular cultural moment are about the 
consequences for men of women bearing and rearing children without them, and the 
danger of these ‘monstrous’ women breeding ‘monstrous children’. Hence the 
concurrent demonisation of certain mothers and of certain children (Holland, 1998) 
are not purely coincidental. 
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Sophie Laws (1994) discussed some of the social policy suggestions that have rested 
on either discourses of lone mothers as bad mothers, or of single mothers as selfish 
teenagers who become pregnant in an attempt to jump the (long) queues for public 
housing. She laments the lack of feminist responses to the types of condemnation, 
vilification and scapegoating of mothers witnessed at, and since, the 1993 
Conservative Party conference. Then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, later drew on 
‘family values’ rhetoric when he argued that it would be a good thing if more single 
mothers gave their children up for adoption, and an editorial in the Daily Mail (19th 
January, 1994) argued that even if such a policy damaged the real children of today, it 
would be a kindness to children as yet unborn, since people would be deterred from 
having more. This discourse of protecting the child’s best interests is, of course, 
highly persuasive and is enshrined in the 1989 Children Act. Precisely what these 
interests might be and how they are to be assessed is, however, seldom detailed and 
indeed the whole discourse is problematic (Woodhead, 1990; see also Fraser, 1989, as 
discussed in chapter 6). This allusion to ‘the best interests of the child’, because it is 
so vague, can be used to draw moral backing for a wide range of arguments and it 
leaves unquestioned any ‘common sense’ ideas invoked. The above can be seen as 
instances where children’s and women’s interests are counterposed, and this 
conflicting rights approach supports the reasoning for the 1991 Child Support Act (see 
chapter 4). In addition, the very idea that ‘a child whose mother is alive and kicking’ 
(and wants to care for the child) can be considered available for adoption is shocking, 
and reveals its historical roots in ‘fatherless’ children being described as ‘orphans’ 
because it was men who owned, and were the financial guarantors for, children 
(Armstrong, 1995). 
 
Whilst during 1994 and 1995 the pitch reached in condemning lone mothers in the 
mass media approached hysterical, the most venomous rhetorical attacks were 
reserved for women deliberately choosing to raise children without men. However, 
the distinction between the general category of lone mothers and this particular subset 
sometimes collapsed, and it was implied that all lone mothers were intending to parent 
alone when they conceived. Arguments about psychological development were 
applied to women in either situation. An earlier media event in which the women in 
question were choosing to parent without involved or even known biological fathers 
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was what came to be known as ‘the Virgin Births Scandal’. The media fascination 
with, and treatment of, these women sparked this thesis. 
 
The ‘Storm over Virgin Births’, as the Daily Mail headline put it on the 11th of 
March 1991, was when the British popular press sensationally revealed that fertility 
services were being used to allow ‘virgins’ to have babies. ‘Virgins’ was used to 
designate women who were not in relationships with men, and the media story was 
about three women who were being provided donor insemination (DI) by the 
Birmingham British Pregnancy Advisory Service clinic. One of the women did 
describe herself as heterosexual and a virgin. Three tabloid newspapers capitalised on 
the chance to have the word ‘virgin’ across their front pages (the Today newspaper, 
the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror, 11th March, 1991) and the journalists 
salaciously enjoyed this aspect of their stories. They seemed to relish the opportunity 
to scrutinise and put into doubt the sexual (and implicitly developmental) status of 
these women to whom they had applied the term virgin in the first place. Not only 
were these women single, but the heterosexism of hegemonic discourses of sexuality 
made not being procreatively sexually active with men, equivalent to ‘not fully 
sexually active’, providing the implicit, but offensive, suggestion of the women’s 
immaturity or incomplete development. On Radio 4’s topical discussion phone-in 
programme, Call Nick Ross, that week (13th March, 1991) a British-trained clinical 
psychologist called to say that, in his expert opinion, women who were ‘not mature 
enough to be able to maintain relationships’ were evidently unfit, or perhaps if they 
were lucky, just not yet fit, to mother children. By ‘relationships’, what he apparently 
meant were specifically heterosexual, long-term, monogamous sexual relationships, 
which involved penetrative sex. This hegemonic construction of ‘a proper 
relationship’ allowed him to presume it without having to specify its nature. Its 
normative power is thereby reinforced because it can be presented as an issue about 
which there is consensus, or on which ‘common-sense’ can be relied, and to which his 
clinical judgement lent weight. 
 
The supposed ‘selfishness’ of these women was a key theme and the Archbishop of 
York, John Hapgood, was one of the ‘moral authorities’ the newspapers quoted 
making this accusation. His statement was about selfish or pathological motives for 
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wanting a child and the danger this might pose to the child. This point might not be 
controversial in the abstract, it functioned in this debate not as a general background 
comment but to condemn these women, who Hapgood had not met personally in order 
to cast his judgement:  
‘A child wanted because the parent wants something to love, wanted as an act of 
defiance, wanted in extreme cases, as a kind of accessory, has to carry too much 
of the emotional burden of its parent’s needs. It can be the victim of dangerous 
selfishness’ (The Guardian, 12th March, 1991). 
 
According to MP Dame Jill Knight (whose remarks in Parliament were quoted widely 
in these articles) the deliberate bringing into the world of a child with only one parent 
was ‘highly irresponsible and with no thought for the child’ (Daily Mail, 11th March, 
1991). Lack of forethought or regard for the needs of others are associated with a 
selfishness and irresponsibility that is popularly associated with immaturity. Hence, 
these comments too undermine the women’s developmental status and suggest 
immature recklessness. Yet there is an inconsistency in the condemnation of women 
who have chosen to parent alone, especially, for instance, those who conceive through 
donor insemination, since theirs has clearly been planned parenthood. 
 
The leading sentence of the same article in the Today newspaper was ‘A CAREER 
woman has chosen the colour of her unborn child’s skin, hair and eyes in what will be 
Britain’s first virgin birth’ (original capitalisation). The term ‘career woman’ 
functioned as a signifier of the selfish, demanding greediness of women who actively 
choose to have children without adopting a traditionally gendered role and division of 
labour. This title also mobilised fears about genetic engineering for dramatic effect. 
This conflated several issues of popular concern: about women mothering without 
men; about ‘rising tides’ [sic] of babies being born to lone mothers (especially those 
on benefits); about the selection of embryos on the basis of genetic characteristics 
(and the production of ‘designer babies’); about the eugenicist potential of the 
acceptability of racial selection; about the implications of genetic selection for the 
treatment of physically disabled or homosexual people, and about the 
commodification of babies, which can represent the triumph of capitalist values over 
family values. Concern about parents’ control over their offspring’s genotype raises 
much broader issues about the practices of fertility clinics, the regulation of genetic 
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engineering and the socio-political conditions for eugenics. However, the fact that 
these concerns were alive in the public imagination at this time (as a result of debates 
and new practices stemming from the 1990 Human Embryology and Fertilisation 
Act), did not help the case of single women wanting even ‘low tech’ fertility services 
such as donor insemination. 
 
There are differences in the public attribution of selfishness to different women. A 
woman can be considered selfish if she is heterosexual but is not interested in having 
children (without evidence of psychopathology - although lack of interest may be 
evidence enough! See Morell, 1995); or if she has chosen to have a career and has 
also chosen not to have children (though ‘yet’ can be assumed for younger women). 
Yet paradoxically, if a woman wants a child, but is single; or if she does not work and 
can therefore provide full motherly care, but then happens to be financially dependent 
on the state, she can again be accused of selfishness. In effect, women deemed fit to 
mother are considered ‘selfish’ for choosing not to have children, whilst women who 
want children, but who are not deemed suitable, are ‘selfish’ for wanting or having 
them. Women’s desires to have or not to have children are thus an area of public 
comment and moral judgement. There is not simply a pronatalist ideology which 
assumes and naturalises motherhood for all women. Women are differentiated on the 
implicit basis of purported ‘fitness to parent’ which is only read from superficial 
indicators at best. Furthermore, financial circumstances are often a key element in 
public questioning about whether someone is ‘fit to parent’, such that having babies 
whilst on benefits is judged negatively and in some cases, this financial issue is 
accorded greater significance than issues that might have previously drawn 
disapproval, such as a mother’s lesbian identity, and more psychological questions 
(Alldred, 1998b). 
 
Being seen as selfish in one’s decision to have a child is also applied with double 
standards between men and women. ‘Absent fathers’ may have received moral 
condemnation at points during discussions of the 1991 Child Support Act and 
Agency, but this category of father-who-is-lacking applies to a man who has moved 
out of co-residency with his children, has usually moved out of close contact with 
them and who no longer takes financial (or emotional) responsibility for them (see 
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chapter 4). Condemnation and a charge of being lacking or absent is levelled at 
mothers who have ‘chosen’ to go out to work even whilst remaining primary 
emotional and financial support for their children. A man’s absence from his family 
might be considered ‘a pity’ and his irresponsibility seen as a weakness. A woman 
who moves out of the family home on separation, leaving her children to their father, 
is more likely to be met with disbelief, condemnation and her pathologisation as ‘not 
right’, or ‘not normal’ (see e.g. Mother Love programme in the Having It All season, 
BBC TV, 1998). The difference between expectations of mothers and of fathers sets 
up differing moral judgements on and differing criteria for defining their ‘absence’. 
 
One might suspect that this preoccupation with selfishness related to the concern 
about men’s loss of  - or ‘denied’ - familial and sexual roles (Radford, 1991), but this 
was not how it was actually expressed. Discourses of selfishness were, and are, very 
powerful because they refer or allude to negative effects on the child. Exactly how the 
child would be affected was not spelt out, but vague suggestions and leaving crucial 
points unspecified managed to provide common-sense validity and the impression of 
consensus about these views. As Radford (ibid.) points out, the appeal to populist 
moralism remained powerful as long as the confused and partial nature of the 
assumptions was not revealed. Figure 2 illustrates the responsibility that is often 
attributed to lone mothers for being without a partner, and the way this can blame or 
pathologise them. Figure 1 illustrated mother-blaming for the childrearing principles 
adhered to, whereas Figure 2 highlights the blaming of mothers for their relationship 
circumstances.  
 
3.2 Lesbian mothers 
A generation after Stonewall, in the context of increasingly liberal sexual values and 
the defence of minorities, illustrated by the rise of ‘political correctness’, lesbians and 
gay men still face actual, and rhetorical, homophobic violence. The late 1980s 
witnessed intensified rhetorical attacks on lesbian mothers, in the context of harsher 
criticism of mothers in general (Harne et al., 1997) and a particular ‘attack’ on lesbian 
and gay families.  
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Figure 2: Did lone mothers eat their husbands? 
 
 
This image, from a postcard published by Hallmark Cards, mocks the blame attributed to lone mothers 
for raising their children alone. It plays with the ‘low-life’ underclass discourse, or even the threat 
posed by the supposedly monstrous women feminism produced, using stylised conventional 
accessories to (over) gender the bugs. 
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‘Section 28’ (eventually section 2A of the 1988 Local Government Act) was a 
conservative, homophobic move resulting from the media storm (over 100 newspaper 
articles and 20 television/radio programmes, see Cooper, 1994) sparked by the 
London Borough of Haringey’s extension of their ‘positive images’ policy, beyond 
redressing racist imagery, to cover heterosexist imagery in schools. Simultaneously, 
in autumn 1986, there was the initial outcry about this policy from Haringey’s Parents 
Right Group, and the discovery by then Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth 
Baker, of a children’s book, Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin, held by the ILEA 
school library service. This picture-book for primary school-aged children is about a 
girl growing up in a household with her dad and his male partner. Kenneth Baker 
demanded its removal. The media debate was not about the ‘positive images’ strategy, 
or about how schools should deal with issues of sexual preference which arise 
anyway, but was framed provocatively, as ‘should homosexuality be taught in 
schools?’ (Cooper, 1994; Levidow, 1989). 
 
‘Section 28’ aims to ‘restrain local authorities from promoting [sic] homosexuality’ 
and prevent in schools ‘the promotion of homosexuality as an acceptable family 
relationship’ (cited in Colvin and Hawksley, 1989). It remains on the statute books 
until the New Labour Government ‘finds time’ to act on its pre-election promise to 
repeal it, but the Government Minister responsible in the Lords acknowledges that it 
is unnecessary and open to harmful misinterpretation. Many view it as policy which 
was rushed through Parliament to build on popular sentiment and of little legal 
significance. In this respect, it is similar to the Dangerous Dogs Act, speedily enacted 
after a pit-bull terrier had savagely bitten a child’s face, since both were firm, 
protective, (over)reactions. However, as Levidow (1989) notes, whilst acting 
decisively to assuage or contain anxiety, ‘section 28’ did not draw support for the 
Conservative Party. Although it has never been tested in court, its social significance 
has arguably been greater than its legal significance. Its codification in law is a 
powerful marker of dominant meanings of ‘normal’ family life and sexuality, and the 
boundaries of acceptable difference from these, and it has prompted such over-
cautious acts as the cancellation of touring theatre company visits by a secondary 
school headteacher and even a county council’s ban on the distribution of a directory 
of voluntary work opportunities for young people (Colvin and Hawksley, 1989). 
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However, it is also said to have stimulated newly politicised alliances of lesbians and 
gay men.  
 
More recently, similar themes have been illustrated in the harassment of Norrina 
Rashid, a, lesbian, Muslim youth worker, employed on Bradford Council’s 
Youthreach project (Rights of Women, 1997). Norrina has received death threats, and 
homophobic leaflets circulating incite harassment of her, of the project, and publicise 
her personal details. Whilst the anonymous group, the Muslim Awareness Campaign, 
attacks the council’s equal opportunities policies and the defence of equal rights for 
lesbians and gay men, it is significant that their vicious attacks have targeted someone 
working with young people. The juxtaposition of children or young people and 
homosexuality ignites particular discomfort and concern, illustrated in extreme case 
here. The social anxiety mobilised assumes firstly, that homosexuality is bad, and 
secondly, that young people are subject to such a degree of influence by such a ‘role 
model’ that they might adopt or develop homosexual feelings, relationships or 
identities. It assumes a model of young people as extremely impressionable, in 
discourses of ‘social influence’ which, although much more palatable and reasonable 
sounding, still rest on models of the ‘corruption’ of youth by/into perverted ways 
(ideas most strongly associated with older men seducing younger men and boys). This 
model of ‘influence’ on an individual is examined in chapter 5. These instances of 
homophobia and heterosexism are part of the broader picture of popular responses to 
homosexuality and the following discussion focuses on lesbian and gay parents. 
 
In the early 1990s, the ‘Paragraph 16’ campaign was so-called because it objected to 
this section of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Children Act (1989). This 
paragraph was about the consideration of people for fostering or becoming adoptive 
parents and it stated that some people, by virtue of their ‘lifestyles’ were unsuitable to 
parent. It specified no further and it was feared that this vagueness could allow the 
discriminatory rejection of lesbians and gay men purely on the grounds of their 
sexuality. It is important to note that this statement was not about criteria for the 
detailed, particular assessment procedures, but about those who might be allowed into 
the assessment process. Lesbians, gay men and allies campaigned not to be discounted 
before the stage of rigorous individual assessment, but tabloid journalists in particular, 
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framed it as homosexuals demanding ‘equal rights’ to foster or adopt. Many LEAs, in 
fact, already had adoption teams that took seriously the council’s non-discrimination 
policies (and some, at times, have specifically requested lesbian households), but the 
public concern whipped up around this invoked implicit narratives of corruption, 
abuse, and - as with Section 28 - of a ‘loony Left’ out of control in local government. 
Social workers’ training increasingly encourages them to reflect critically upon the 
criteria they use, and the personal bases of their judgements, however, adoption 
panels, comprising of representatives of community groups and professions, are more 
likely to be influenced by currents of popular concern which lead them to avoid ‘risk’ 
by approving adoptive parents who are unlikely to attract any controversy (Campion, 
1995; and see Gaber and Aldridge, 1994).  
 
An opportunity for renewed popular questioning of the fitness to parent of lesbian 
mothers arose in June 1994. This was when, under the 1989 Children Act, a lesbian 
couple who had organised the conception of their child together were the first to be 
granted what journalists described as ‘joint legal parenthood’. In actual fact, since 
then, many lesbian co-mothers have obtained parental responsibility, and these cases 
are often uncontroversial (Harne et al., 1997; Woodcraft, 1997). Examining popular 
discussion reveals more about possible concerns over lesbian mothers than their 
official treatment in law would suggest. Articles in The Guardian and Observer on 
the 2nd and 3rd July, 1994 reporting this case both drew on empirical research 
findings and expert testimonies to provide reasoned arguments in support of their 
generally sympathetic positions. The Observer’s piece was called ‘Why is it wrong to 
have two mums?’ and its caption read ‘As lesbians win the legal right to be joint 
parents, Lisa O’Kelly discovers that children can get on very well without a father 
figure’. It began by reporting some of the exclamations of outrage and disgust at the 
court’s decision, which included statements by Conservative MPs Emma Nicholson 
(who has since ‘defected’ to the Liberal Democrats) and (again) Dame Jill Knight. 
The late Sir Nicholas Fairbairn (former Scottish Solicitor-General) was quoted: ‘It’s 
ridiculous. We don’t put children in the hands of the insane. Why should we put them 
in the hands of the perverted?’ This comment, which questions the ‘normal’, ‘healthy’ 
development of the women, was not credited with being worthy of engagement on its 
own terms. Instead the article discusses the development of children in lesbian or 
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mother-only households, that is, households that do not contain a father figure 
irrespective of the mother’s sexual preference. The concern is with the child’s 
‘normal’ development, specifically their adoption of gender roles which are 
conventionally aligned with their physical sex. The concern that they might ‘grow up 
gay’ was not aired in these left-liberal papers. 
 
Mothers in these images are divided by a simple, well-worn good/bad distinction 
which maps onto the dominant discourse of marriage and motherhood as women’s 
primary duty (Kaplan, 1992). The bad mothers in this schema are deviating doubly 
from their role: failing in their duty as mothers to provide an ‘adequate family’, (often 
implied to be the adequate family), instead selfishly denying their children a father; 
and failing to be ‘wifely’ by selfishly denying men children (or, as ‘implacably 
hostile’ mothers are accused, of denying men access to their own children). Of course, 
selfishness in a mother is supremely deviant; it is antithetical to representations of true 
motherliness (Kaplan, ibid.; Woollett, 1991).  
 
Taken together, these representations of lone, lesbian, and fertility-aided mothers 
illustrate the demonisation of women who mother (or wish to do so) outside of the 
conventional ideal mother image. They each ‘fail’ to meet the same aspect of the 
ideal, that of mothering within the heterosexual nuclear family. The intensity of their 
popular condemnation has been startling. Such representation in the media cannot 
simply be dismissed as inconsequential popular ‘small-talk’ because, although the 
relationship is not unidirectional, the concepts popularised in them have been 
addressed and developed in policy debates. In the 1970s, Anglo-American feminists 
challenged the dominant cultural discourses of motherhood (Dinnerstein, 1976; 
Oakley, 1979; see chapter 5), and expressions of ‘concern’ that the ‘selfish’ 
generation of women that the 1970s spawned is responsible for the moral 
development of today’s children sometimes follow political opposition to these 
analyses. Perhaps concern is often less consciously articulated resistance to what has 
been a dramatic pace of cultural change around gender relations and the family. The 
anxieties such change provokes can be for the cohesion and morality of society, 
and/or for personal security and certainty of a place within it. The loss of certainty 
about social roles is understandably threatening, for the fear of displacement it can 
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engender, especially for some men, as lone mothers are seen, if only as a result of 
media attention, to manage to run families well enough without them. As Levidow 
(1989) and others have argued, ‘nothing is ever just a moral panic’: ‘At some level it 
always involves real distress, even authentic grievances, whose sources – internal 
and/or external – get personified in the form of folk devils’ (Levidow, ibid.: p181). 
Whatever arguments there may be about demographic statistics or about the direction 
of causality, the anxiety is real. Only a Labour Government that was seen to share 
these concerns could have been elected in 1997, and the displays of macho, 
conservative, ‘no nonsense’ rhetoric, reflect a seemingly accurate recognition of 
collective anxiety. 
 
3.3 ‘Non-traditional’ families 
Women ‘carry the burden of gender’, by being Other to the privileged masculine, as 
many feminists have described from de Beauvoir (1949) onwards (e.g. Burman et al., 
1996). Similarly, white people have not been used to having to think of themselves as 
racialised (Collins, 1990; Davis, 1990; Frankenberg, 1993; Min-Ha, 1989), since 
whiteness’s privileges have also produced its naturalisation so that only its Others are 
marked as ‘raced’. In mainstream British culture, ‘black’ is an established descriptive 
term and identity category (although sometimes masking diverse identities), whereas 
‘white’ is only just coming to be used commonly as a descriptor and therefore visible 
as a ‘race’. Similarly, ‘the family’ is used as if it requires no definition or justification. 
The ‘nuclear’ family has become naturalised as family and this particular form of 
family is assumed by default when broader definitions, its use as an analogy, or gay 
appropriations are not made explicit. If you ‘belong’ to one you are not likely to be 
asked why. Similarly, heterosexuality does not often have to be specified, let alone 
explained causally. Heterosexuality is, of course, one of the key assumptions within 
common deployments of the term ‘family’, but the concept of ‘otherness’ can be used 
to consider how mothers who are in one way or another seen as different from the 
norm, are positioned as marginal to the naturalised category of mother. The Othering 
of ‘unfit’ or ‘deviant’ mothers reinforces the naturalised status of the narrow 
definition of the (‘normal’) mother. 
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People whose living arrangements do not resemble the conventional family are asked 
‘why not’ or when they will change their situation, so their non-conventional living 
arrangements are tolerated only because they are assumed to be temporary. Families 
that are defined as different are more likely to be considered problematic, and to be 
scrutinised by professional bodies, such as psychologists, as well as in public 
discourse. The illustrations in this chapter happen to be the usual, recognisable ‘non-
traditional’ family constellations, (lone parent families and lesbian/gay families). 
They are minority, but clearly identifiable forms of family, but are only some of those 
that are made Other by the normative formulations of family. The labels ‘non-
traditional’ or ‘alternative families’ set them outside ‘the traditional’, which therefore 
retains its central position as the norm. Such terms may, therefore, sustain their own 
construction as Other, or their marginality in relation to the category ‘families’. 
 
The term ‘traditional’ evokes a history, by virtue of which the object is naturalised. 
This then confers a moral weight so that it becomes possible to argue that it ought to 
be simply because it has been. As with many invocations of history and tradition, in 
the British context the image evoked is of white families; positioning Black families 
as Other and outside the body of the nation (Gilroy, 1987). Ann Phoenix (1996) 
shows how this outsider status attributed to Black people produced a silence on ‘race’ 
in the recent condemnation of lone mothers by Conservative politicians. Thus lone 
mothers not being racialised in this debate is not necessarily something to celebrate, it 
is not the absence of ‘race’, but a naturalisation of whiteness. Thus, the supposedly 
general concept of family is often actually quite particular. Jo Van Every (1991) 
describes the way this construction of ‘the family’ takes as its central defining 
characteristic the existence of children, though it rarely states this, and besides 
presuming heterosexual relations and marriage, the children are assumed to be the 
genetic children of the couple and to have been conceived ‘naturally’. She argues that 
British social policy replicates and reinforces this set of assumptions. 
 
3.4 Mothers who are Other 
The cultural criteria by which someone is constructed as ‘fit to parent’ is rarely 
explicated. Instead, we understand what is constructed as ‘normal’ from the more 
explicit representations of difference from the norm. The category is not defined 
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directly, but its boundaries are maintained through the Othering and often 
pathologisation of those who fall outside of it. Doubt is cast on parents who are seen 
as marginal. Those described here are viewed as marginal because of their household, 
relationship status, or sexuality. Over the 1990s we have also seen the scrutiny of 
different categories of mother including those at the margins of typical age ranges; 
teenage mothers (see Phoenix, 1991), and older mothers (see Berryman, 1991). Harsh 
scrutiny of older mothers was stimulated recently in media coverage of the 
conception, then birth to a 62 year old woman, a case with the additional moral 
complication that she had lied about her age in order to receive fertility treatment 
(‘Granny’s Baby Son’, in The Sunday Times, 29th March 1998). Those who mother 
at later ages are accused of selfishly bringing into the world a child whose mother will 
die prematurely, or of ‘trying to have it all’ by concentrating on a career and then 
wanting motherhood as well. 
 
The argument about the shift from the all-powerful expert to persuasive expertise in 
chapter 2 must not be over-stated. There may be a shift to the more subtle and 
seemingly autonomous power of expertise (and perhaps especially for the middle-
classes and particularly reflexive parents), but not to the exclusion of expert 
judgement, which is still powerful for those mothers, and particularly working-class 
mothers, who are subject to professional gaze. Although the focus on the family by a 
range of professionals and professional discourses which are allied with the psy-
complex (Burman, 1997; Ingelby, 1985; Rose, 1985; 1990) is a general feature of 
contemporary social life, some mothers are more likely than others to be scrutinised 
and ‘it is mothers in the more vulnerable social groups that are most likely to be 
negatively evaluated by such discourses, and subjected to the imposition of expert-
defined models of ‘correct’ mothering (David, 1988; Edwards, 1992, Lewis, 1986)’ 
(Ribbens, 1994: p7). 
 
For people positioned as Other, there can be significant political (Spivak, 1988) and 
psychological (Fanon, 1969; Walkerdine, 1996) implications. Like Bhabha’s (1984) 
understanding of the colonial subject, Valerie Walkerdine argues that understandings 
of the working-class are constituted through a mixture of ‘fear, phobia and fetish’ 
(1996: p146). She continues: 
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It is the working-class woman as mother who is to be held responsible for the 
future of democracy by the adequacy of her rearing of its future citizens. On the 
one hand she may be the basis of her child’s success in school and therefore 
upward mobility, and on the other, her very inadequacy may produce the very 
anti-social and criminal behaviour which poses the greatest threat to the liberal 
order.’ (p148) 
 
Therefore, ‘her fitness to ensure that the erstwhile masses become proper democratic 
citizens must be watched at all times’…‘through the available medical, educational, 
social work and legal apparatuses’ (1996: p146). This is how a set of mothers come to 
be seen as not only not good enough at raising their children, but are pinpointed as 
positively harmful to society (Roseneil and Mann, 1996) in a process akin to that 
which Levidow (1989) traces whereby making children aware of (the social 
existence) of homosexual families is transformed into the intolerable threat of 
annihilation by dangerous Others. Chapters 5 and 6 examine arguments about how 
psychological knowledge ‘soft polices’ mothers. 
 
Writers such as Burman (1994c), Ribbens (1994) and Walkerdine and Lucey (1989) 
have each argued that the hidden value judgements around differences in childrearing 
are particularly significant in relation to social class. Ideas about ‘proper’, ‘modern’ 
parenting often involve particularly middle-class cultural values, in contrast to which 
working-class parenting is seen, not just as different, but ‘as stupid and morally 
degenerate’ (Ribbens, 1994: p10) and pathological. Ribbens describes this as a 
consequence of experts being middle-class, so that the ‘cultural circles between 
middle-class/better educated mothers, middle-class researchers and middle-class 
educational institutions may all reinforce each other in their implicit evaluations and 
understandings of what childrearing is all about’ (ibid.: p12), but in addition, there is 
the non class-specific superiority attributed to ‘new’ knowledge that chapter 2 
described. 
 
Working-class mothers are often popularly characterized or parodied as dictatorial, 
restrictive, harsh, punitive, severe, ‘love-withdrawing’, irrational and impulsive, and 
experts, such as psychologists and researchers, have contrasted their authoritarian 
childrearing with the more permissive, sensitive, rationalising parenting of middle-
class mothers. ‘Child-centred’ approaches which are seen as enlightened, modern and 
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good have been described as particularly bourgeois (Walkerdine, 1984; Walkerdine 
and Lucey, 1989). Ribbens (1994) reviews some of the expert attributions to working-
class mothering and points out that in research by Newson and Newson (1978), 
working-class mothering is depicted as inferior, yet the authors do not reflect upon 
their own perspectives and experience as they employ quite particular educational 
discourses. Similarly, the responsiveness and stimulation required of ‘good mothers’ 
by developmental psychologists such as Sylva and Lunt (1982) presumes for mothers 
a particular kind of educational role. Education in this sense is defined by particular 
abstract measures of ability, and these abilities are not necessarily accorded the same 
priority by working-class mothers (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989). In British culture, 
education is so bound up with understandings of class already that it provides a way 
of demarcating class membership. Walkerdine and Lucey (ibid.) produced an 
important analysis of the way middle-class researchers could depict working-class 
mother-child relationships as authoritarian and less educationally oriented, without 
exploring their own values, and therefore lending expert endorsement to particular 
styles of parenting, and withholding it from others. They placed the more overt 
conflict observed between working-class girls and mothers in a broader cultural 
context and questioned the presumption that middle-class mother-child interaction 
was necessarily better, when hostility might simply be covert, sublimated or 
repressed. 
 
Similar accusations of inferior mothering have been leveled at Black mothers, which 
supports the idea that they reflect cultural anxieties about changing demographic 
patterns and gender relations. Black mothers generally have been seen as failing to 
discipline their children (an expression of a mother’s total responsibility for their 
‘product’) or emasculating sons and defeminizing daughters and ‘retarding their 
children’s academic achievement (Collins, 1992: p215). For African American 
mothers, Patricia Hill Collins describes how high rates of divorce, births outside of 
marriage and female-headed households are used to imply that Black mothers ‘wield 
unnatural power in allegedly deteriorating family structures’ (ibid.). It seems the 
polarised images of mothers are even sharper for African American mothers who are 
depicted as either dominating matriarchs or passive, indolent ‘welfare moms’ 
(Collins, 1990). Furthermore, despite discourses attributing a ‘more natural’ maternal 
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identity to Black women in Britain (Lawler, 1996), illustrated by presumptions that 
they need less postnatal care (Torkington, 1988 cited in Lawler, ibid.), Black women 
seem more likely to attract scrutiny than to be presumed good mothers, and racist 
policies underlie the promotion of contraception to Black and Asian women in the UK 
(Bryan et al., 1985), as well as by Western agencies in the South. In the British 
context, the class structure of disadvantage overlaps ‘race’ to such a degree that it is 
possible to argue that the demographics associated with Black families or Black 
unemployment are to some degree explained by class. Although, as Gilroy (1987) 
argued, there are important specificities of ‘race’ which Marxist analyses sometimes 
failed to acknowledge, arguments of the significance of socio-economic class for 
Black people in Britain are important in order to challenge racist discourses which 
would see problems associated with poverty, such as of crime, as intrinsic to Black or 
immigrant communities, paving the way for psychological discourses of criminality 
which essentialise ‘deviance’. Whilst ‘race’ is implicated in the US underclass 
discourse, the existence of an established Black middle-class does mitigate somewhat 
against its ‘over-racialisation’. In Britain, popular accounts of race are sometimes 
confounded by class, and the discourse of an underclass is sometimes heavily 
racialised. 
 
How class is defined is immensely problematic today. A woman’s class location is no 
longer assigned on the basis of her husband’s occupation (and the Census allows 
‘Head of household’ to be self-defined or to relate to income), but much 
contemporary sociological work disputes the neat class binary, adding, for instance, 
variables which define groups on the basis of patterns of consumption and social 
status (e.g. neo-Weberian approaches). While the middle/working-class duality may 
still have ‘gut validity’, there are queries about how education, income, occupation, 
political orientation, values and aspirations function in defining class. As the previous 
chapter suggested, rather than being a side-issue, consumption may be of particular 
significance for what parents in different class locations can provide, or can be seen to 
provide, for their children. 
 
Whilst we must recognise that some children do not receive good enough parenting, 
the pathologisation of certain mothers can involve (a) a lack of recognition of 
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structural factors, and/or (b) an inability to tolerate different cultures of childrearing 
without asserting a normative hierarchy, and/or (c) a lack of critical self-reflection on 
the part of those judging. As Gans (1962, cited in Ribbens 1994) noted, there may 
well be a failure on the part of middle-class researchers or professionals to accept that 
what they are observing in working-class life could constitute an active rejection of 
middle-class values and culture. A parallel argument might be made about 
ethnocentrism, and denial of structural and cultural racism in the judgements of white 
experts on Black families and a failure to recognise that such ‘unnaturally powerful’, 
domineering Black mothers can also be seen as having provided for Black children 
the ‘homeplaces’ which sustained them by providing a refuge from the racist values 
of mainstream culture (hooks, 1991). 
 
In these representations of mothers in popular culture, the implicit norm common to 
each is of the ‘natural mother’. In the ‘virgin births’ debate, Dame Jill Knight’s 
description of ‘these women’ (single women choosing to become mothers) who have 
‘none of the natural feelings about the matter’ (Daily Mail, 11th March, 1991) 
constructs their motherhood as something Other to the natural motherhood of 
‘normal’ women who can be trusted to have appropriate feelings and motives. Since 
motherhood is so naturalised for (‘normal’) women, and still constructed as a 
woman’s ultimate fulfilment (Marshall, 1991; Morell, 1995), it is only women who 
fall outside of the category of ‘natural’ whose desire to be a mother is questioned. 
Anne Woollett (1991) describes how women requesting fertility services are asked to 
articulate their desire and convince medics of their suitability to parent in ways that 
biologically fertile women do not have to. Michelle Stanworth (1987) describes how 
women’s mothering is so naturalised it is assumed that all women desire it, but single 
women, lesbians and disabled women are expected to forgo it in the interests of the 
child. Lawler (1996) points out that it is not women’s desire for a child that is 
questioned in the virgin birth ‘storm’, but women’s acting on that desire in 
circumstances deemed inappropriate. However, in the reasoning of Peery (1994), even 
this ‘natural desire’ to be a mother, when held by ‘unnatural’ women, such as, in his 
view, women who are lesbians, makes them not ‘more natural’, but doubly deviant. A 
popular illustration of this was in The Sun’s (29th April, 1997) representation of a 
lesbian couple in their twenties, who live together, describe themselves as ‘in love’ 
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and construct their relationship in romantic, couple, and family unit discourses, who 
have had a child whom they planned together, as outside of ‘family values’. Their 
desire to have a child and to live as a family, which might easily have been depicted 
as an ‘emulation’ of family values, was described in the editorial as ‘Making a 
mockery of family values’ (see Alldred, 1998b).  
 
3.5 The monstrous children of monstrous mothers 
Moral panics about children co-occur with those about mothers. It seems there need 
be no particular concern about children born to ‘natural mothers’, but that ‘unnatural 
mothers’ may breed monstrous children. The imperative to be conventionally 
gendered applies to children as well as mothers. The accusation that mothers are 
emasculating their sons - and to a lesser degree, defeminizing their daughters - 
expresses a concern that ‘natural’, ‘normal’ boys and ‘natural’ ‘normal’ girls are 
raised. Heterosexuality is key to the regulation of these conventional gender roles and 
indeed, can be seen as the defining characteristic of ‘proper’ masculinity or ‘mature’ 
femininity. As Judith Butler (1990) showed, the ‘heterosexual matrix’ requires and 
produces the gender binary. Although often couched in terms of concern for children, 
the children in these narratives are usually gendered, and concern has almost 
exclusively centred on boy children. It follows in the wake of a series of panics about 
boys: from joy-riding in the early 1990s, violent crime and murder committed by 
children which peaked in the mid-1990s, and the more general, on-going concern 
about youth crime and school exclusion rates (see Campbell, 1993; Phillips, 1993). 
 
The intense interest in child murderers shown by the British media in 1993 and 1994 
(see James and Jenks, 1994) is one example of how a phenomenon with a 
considerable history (Smith, 1994; Wilson, 1973) is presented as a new phenomenon, 
which adds fuel to the moral panic. Deborah Marks describes how children whose 
actions do not fit the dominant cultural constructions of childhood as innocent and 
ineffectual are marked as deviant individuals, and outside of ‘natural childhood’ 
(Marks, 1996a). The 10 and 11 year old boys who were convicted of the murder of 
James Bulger have, at their conviction and since, been represented as monstrous 
children (James and Jenks, 1994). Keeping these ‘monsters’ outside of the category of 
children, means childhood can be kept comfortingly innocent (Marks, 1996a). 
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Media coverage often constructs concern over the gendered development of boys 
growing up ‘without a father figure’. Concern about this ‘problem’ is already 
confounded with cause: assuming the absence of a father figure to be a problem for 
boys’ masculinity. ‘Problem boys’ are sometimes assumed as ‘outcomes’ in 
discourses of lone mothers. This incident brought the suggested links between the 
‘problem’ of lone mother families and the psychological and moral development of 
children into the open. After John Venables and Robert Thompson were charged with 
the violent murder of James Bulger, the attention of the media turned immediately to 
their home backgrounds, and their mothers particularly, to try to understand how such 
monstrous children had been bred. The BBC documentary Children of Crime (7th 
April, 1998) asked ‘what was it in the background of these two seemingly normal 
boys’ who ‘wouldn’t have been considered potential murderers’ that allowed them to 
become ‘capable of such evil’? As viewers, we generated our own characterisations 
from the sparse, though disturbing, details of their home lives: the fathers of both had 
left, one boy’s father had been an alcoholic and violent and the other boy was the 5th 
of 7 brothers, two of whom had been taken into care, several had been in trouble with 
the police and were allegedly abusive to each other. In the media debate, much was 
made of the violent videos at John Venables’ home (and Child’s Play 3 achieved 
notoriety) which, although there was no confirmation that he had watched this, 
marked his mother as remiss. The documentary suggested that these ‘low achievers, 
lacking in adult supervision’, lacking ‘other role models’, had had a disturbing impact 
on each other and ‘unleashed a spiral of violence which neither could control’. Their 
mothers had, perhaps mainly by omission, allowed their boys - ‘left to their own 
devices’ - to become capable of monstrous behaviour. 
 
While there may have been some concern for boys growing up without a father figure 
during war-time, there might be differences in the particular fears for the boys. The 
conditions of possibility for the role-model discourse of concern today include the 
increasing dominance of psychological discourses of development, psychoanalytic 
discourses of family dynamics and broad shifts in gender relations. The ‘crisis of 
masculinity’ and fear of the loss of socially useful roles for men are part of what 
produces the discourse of a threat to the traditional family today. Whilst away from 
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hearth and home, the ‘masculinity’ of men who had gone to war was not in question, 
indeed their actions were socially-sanctioned and ‘manly’ in contrast to the socially 
disapproved and alienated ‘absent fathers’ of the underclass discourse (see chapter 4). 
 
3.6 Lone mothers and their children: scapegoats and ‘scape-kids’? 
The fear of crime, and moral panics about children who are beyond control, connects 
to fear of disorder ‘from below’ in the discourse of a dangerous and growing 
‘underclass’ (Mann and Roseneill, 1994). This discourse has racialised as well as 
gendered associations, through the danger attributed to unbridled Black masculinity, 
seen as aggressive and hyper-sexual (Fanon, 1969; Mercer, 1994), and the ‘unnatural’ 
power wielded by Black mothers (Collins, 1992). Economic factors such as long-term 
unemployment and increases in the employment of mothers, mean that the traditional 
expectations of gendered family roles, that is of men as breadwinners and women as 
full-time homemakers are not necessarily possible. Changed gender expectations are 
drawn on to account for the sense of ‘being adrift’ that is observed in many young 
men today, compared with the increasing self-confidence and positive sense of 
identity more girls display. However, structural factors are often missing from the 
analysis and instead, the discourse of concern for the children of lone mothers blames 
mothers for the conditions in which they raise children. These are the context for the 
rising incidence of, and attention to, lone mothering. 
 
The writings of Hall et al. (1978) about the moral panic around ‘mugging’ in the early 
1970s resonate with the construction of moral panics today. Just as the increasing 
crime rate in the early 1970s was proposed as an index of disintegration of the social 
order, so the rate of increase in lone parent families (mostly mother-headed) is 
interpreted. The themes of ‘race’, crime and youth identified within the mugging 
crisis are also part of the contemporary discourse on the crisis of the family. 
Reporting that there are a higher proportion of Black mothers than white mothers who 
are single is ‘easily’ misinterpreted as suggesting that Black mothers outnumber white 
mothers among the ‘rising tides’ of lone mothers, and this fuels popular racism. It 
provides reminders of the racist and xenophobic discourses of the ‘swamping of 
“British culture” by “immigrants”’ that has received various revivals since the 1950s. 
Chains of association run in both directions: ‘youth’ are out of control and engaging 
  
 
79
in crime because the now weakened family is unable to socialise them properly into 
‘family values’; and, because women have taken men’s jobs and ‘pushed them out of 
the family’, men are left without their expected social roles and so, midst this 
despondency, grows a culture of social alienation and further disintegration of ‘the 
family’. The ‘underclass’ debate in the USA, originally associated with the work of 
Charles Murray (e.g. Murray, 1984) is heavily racialised and illustrates similar 
themes. Maxine Baca Zinn describes how in one of the two models of the underclass 
in the U.S. debate (a ‘structural deficiency model’) the cause of the swelling 
underclass is seen as a value system which is ‘characterised by low aspirations, 
excessive masculinity, and the acceptance of female-headed families’ (1992: p72). 
 
The rhetoric of a moral panic can sometimes become melodramatic, as claims about 
the threat to ‘the family’ in the ‘virgin births’ debate illustrate. The Daily Mail’s 
opening sentence was: “In a scheme which strikes at the very heart of family life, 
women who have never had sex are being helped to have a baby” (11th March, 1991, 
emphasis added). Emphasising the newness of a phenomenon, and any increase (or 
better still, ‘escalation’) that can be associated with it, build the tension for 
journalistic pieces. The same article made this explicit as it continues with: ‘and will 
seriously undermine the ideal of the family unit by encouraging more single mothers’. 
It is interesting that the type of ‘family unit’ is not specified here. What is meant by 
‘the family’ is so common-sensical as to not need specifying, as was the case for 
‘relationship’ in the ‘virgin births’ media coverage. 
 
Hall et al. (1978) argue that, in moral panics, irrelevant or peripheral aspects are 
raised into sensational focus distracting attention from the deeper causes. The 
preoccupation with women’s relationship status and identity diverts attention from 
questions about the quality of the children’s experiences of care and relationships. It 
supports an analysis in which the sphere of influence on a child extends no further 
than the household, where responsibility is therefore located, to the occlusion of 
broader cultural influences. Writers such as Campbell (1993) and Warner (1994) 
understand the social changes that have produced or accompany, these moral panics 
as centring on masculinity, such that anxiety about the ‘crisis of masculinity’ is 
displaced or projected onto mothers as they provide a convenient scapegoat for social 
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problems and political ills. When children do things we find shocking, it appears that 
our anxiety is lessened once we have someone to blame. Blaming individual mothers 
deflects broader social and economic analyses of the problem. In actual fact, when 
women’s power within the family is hailed as a cause of the problem, to credit 
mothers with having produced the ‘crisis in masculinity’ seems to be to bolster their 
power. Analysing moral panics about lone mothers and ‘virgin births’ we can see how 
they function as an authoritarian backlash, and a sense of conservative consensus 
about the meanings or causes of ‘social problems’, both of which function to restrict 
women’s freedom and autonomy around motherhood (Falludi, 1992). 
 
3.7 Psychology and the popular 
Academic knowledge produced by psychology (and other disciplines) informs 
broader cultural representations of children, but the relationship between the two is 
not as straight-forward as the rhetorical style of academic knowledge and the ‘top-
down’ model of ‘truer’ knowledge filtering down to non-professional people suggest. 
Instead there is a much more reciprocal relationship whereby each informs the other 
and the two cannot be completely disentangled (Riley, 1983). Academic research (and 
funding) is stimulated by political questions and it becomes productive both through 
its popularisation (see Riley, ibid.) and through promoting particular policy or legal 
interventions into children’s lives. Denise Riley analyses the processes of 
popularisation of psychological concepts around mothers and children, and Goldberg 
(1996a) shows how the psychoanalytic concept of containment is used beyond its 
theoretical framework. Convergences of scientific and popular moral rhetoric can be 
seen in the types of questions that academic psychologists ask, as well as the areas in 
which, or assumptions upon which answers are sought (Burman, 1994c). 
 
Because psychology produces knowledge about children and their needs, it has 
consequences for what parents, especially mothers, are required to be and do. 
Developmental psychology reinforces cultural gender roles and relations by 
reproducing a limited range of gendered positions, for adults, of man and woman, and 
for children, of boy and girl (Burman, 1991). Motherhood is increasingly defined in 
terms of psychological discourses of children’s needs and potential. There is a 
growing emphasis on mothers’ roles as educators (David, 1988; Phoenix and 
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Woollett, 1991), and as health workers (Stacey and Davies 1983, cited in Ribbens, 
1994). These increasingly specific and professionalised demands of motherhood 
produce the notion that certain women are ‘unfit to parent’. As well as informing and 
reinforcing normative policies and institutional practices, such discourses are 
productive through the anxieties generated by the apparent fragility of children’s 
‘normal’ and healthy development (Urwin, 1985; Woollett and Phoenix, 1991). In 
addition, there are specific locations at which professionals employ psychological 
discourses on health, development and normality as they implement policies and 
provide services (Burman, 1997). It seems non psychologists have more control and 
authority over matters relating to parenting then professional psychologists, for 
example, social workers’ assessments of potential foster carers or adoptive parents, 
and medics’ decisions in the case of access to fertility services both regulate who 
becomes a parent. 
 
3.8 Psychological discourses, mothers and feminist critique 
Feminists have found good reason to criticise psychological discourses of motherhood 
(Urwin, 1985; Woollett and Phoenix, 1991) and the construction of mothers through 
ideas about children (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989; Burman, 1991). By virtue of 
women’s positions as primary carers for children, alongside the narrow focus on the 
infant-parent dyad as the key influence on a child (Riley, 1983), psychology 
constructs mothers as objects of surveillance and regulation. Since the emergence of 
the concept of ‘mother-child relationship’, childcare advice has become less 
concerned with the problems of managing difficult children or difficult childrearing 
tasks and more about the problems of in/adequate mothering (Urwin and Sharland, 
1992). Problematising mothering makes it the key site of scrutiny and blame and leads 
to psychology’s provision of polarised subject positions for mothers to occupy. Such 
positions permeate cultural meanings of motherhood and also sustain social work and 
legal practices that would, however, sound unreasonable to us if they did not employ 
psychological discourses. 
 
What can be described as normal, can often then be constructed as natural. Discourses 
of what is natural are powerful across the cultural spectrum, but feminists have often 
criticised their use in challenging women’s reproductive decisions in particular 
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(Stanworth, 1987). The professionalisation of childrearing practices can be seen as the 
‘colonisation’ of an area of women’s (mothers’) knowledge by male-dominated 
professions (Ehrenreich and English, 1979; Margolis, 1984). It is also an instrument 
of colonisation in the international sense of Western cultural domination. Western 
expertise carries considerable authority elsewhere in the world because of the 
modernist promises of scientific knowledge and processes of commodification and 
globalisation. But the supposedly universal individual whose development is the 
concern of Western child psychology is, of course, a particular form of individual - a 
rational, individualist subject embedded within capitalist desire and consumption. 
(See the critique by Burman, 1994b, of the Western ethnocentric presumptions about 
the individual and ‘development’ in international aid and development programmes). 
 
Psychological discourses, because they can describe what is ‘normal’, have the power 
to define what is pathological. Critical psychologists such as Billington (1996) and 
Burman (1994c) highlight the power of psychology to pathologise children who do 
not conform to psychological norms, or women who do not fit the dominant cultural 
subject positions for women (see, Goldberg, 1996b and Warner, 1996a). In the public 
debates described, it is women whose age, relationships and/or sexuality do not 
conform to conservative images of mothers whose mothering is presumed to be 
lacking. Through its authority on childrearing, psychology replicates and reinforces 
particular cultural ideas about individuality, rationality and maturity. Discourses of 
nature abound, in part through their close association with children, and, fuelled by 
our emotional investments in children and our own fears of vulnerability (Burman, 
1994a), the toleration of children or mothers/parents who are different from the norm 
is limited so that they rapidly become pathologised (O’Hagan and Dillenberger, 
1995). 
 
Denise Riley (1983) described psychology’s narrow focus as a ‘bell-jar approach’. In 
line with their scientific aspirations, conventionally psychologists would imagine the 
bell-jar over mother and infant, isolating their object from the wider environment and 
thereby excluding ‘contaminating variables’ in order to draw cause-and-effect 
conclusions about the mother-child relationship. Placing ‘[m]other and child … on a 
psychological desert-island’, as Chodorow and Contratto (1992: p201) put it, is 
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inadequate for understanding cultural influences on children, and is also damaging for 
the way it reinforces the idea of a mother’s sole influence and responsibility. Adrienne 
Rich (1977) described how this responsibility creates a form of psychological 
isolation, ‘that of the single adult woman who, though physically surrounded by 
others, bears the total task of mothering. The successes, failures and day-to-day 
burdens of childcare are hers’ (Chodorow and Contratto, 1992: p201). Indeed, many 
mothers find themselves mothering in physical isolation too, which can be 
exacerbated by poverty, which limits movement and activities. More recently, the 
focus has been broadened slightly from the mother-infant dyad to the household unit. 
In discourses of concern about the absence of ‘a father figure’ in women-headed 
households, focusing on only a limited sphere of influence on the child means that a 
male role model is viewed as needing to be co-residential in the household. Another 
recent concern about the effects of violence on television undermines this view of a 
very limited sphere of influence, and directs our attention to a more important aspect. 
The presence or absence of an actual man in the home does not necessarily provide ‘a 
positive role model’, without assuming he presents a ‘model’ masculinity, and that 
any male role model is better than none. Surely what is more important is precisely 
what kinds of masculine identities a child experiences, which is where psychologists 
might benefit from a cultural studies approach (see Edley and Wetherell, 1996). 
 
Discourses of development are common in the discussion of children’s well-being, 
but the ‘virgin births’ discussion saw the questioning of the development of the 
mothers under scrutiny. A woman’s relationship status was taken to be an indication 
of maturity (yet relationship was defined in the crudest of senses as whether she was 
planning to co-parent with her male sexual partner). The quality of any relationship 
was not the issue (apparently any relationship with a man would have removed the 
need to challenge her right to parent). No questions were asked about the emotional or 
practical support these women had. The unspoken underpinnings of such discourses 
are assumptions about development. It is implied that there is both a consensus about 
psychological criteria for, and a means of assessment of, a person’s developmental 
status or maturity. In fact, there is neither. Rather, a tautological argument circulates 
whereby the ‘normal’ development of an individual to a certain point of ‘maturity’ 
indicates their fitness to parent, yet parenthood is also seen as producing or defining 
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maturity. A mother’s ‘normality’ is constructed as an indicator of ‘successful 
outcome’ for themselves, and through the model of ‘influence on the child’, this is 
seen as the best predictor of successful/normal outcome in the child. It is paradoxical 
that in some discourses a woman who is not ‘mature enough’ should have her 
mothering prevented or closely scrutinised, whilst in other discourses being a mother 
is constructed as a, or the, route to maturity (Woollett, 1991) or to full, proper, 
femininity (Walkerdine, 1990). 
 
The fact that the ‘virgin births scandal’ subsequently gave its name to a ‘syndrome’ 
(Donovan, 1992) indicates that the desire to have a child when exhibited by women in 
this category is considered worthy of professional attention. It is designated an 
identifiably peculiar desire, something other than the norm and a category of 
pathology. The British organisation Families Need Fathers report that, in the USA, 
there is now public recognition for a syndrome, called Parental Alienation Syndrome 
(Palmer, 1988; Gardner, 1992), which describes mothers who are poisoning the minds 
of their children and maliciously turning them against their fathers. 
 
Burman (1994c) identifies how the assumption of a causal relationship between 
mothering behaviour and outcomes in terms of qualities of the child - what she terms 
the ‘developmental myth’ - justifies close scrutiny of mothers to ensure that ‘our’ (the 
Nation’s) children are to develop healthily. A model of education as ‘investment' 
relies on (and reproduces) the developmental myth and places increasing pressure on 
parents to stimulate their child in order that they ‘capitalise’ on their potential. The 
social ‘ownership’ of children, which is illustrated in this discourse of concern for 
‘our children’, is soon ‘forgotten’ when it comes to allocating blame for having raised 
‘bad kids’. Similarly, responsibility is rapidly re-individualised when questions about 
financial obligations are raised, when, as chapter 4 shows, the cost of childrearing is 
seen as the responsibility of the nuclear family or, even more narrowly, the biological 
parents. It seems that individualism and the narrow focus of psychology work most 
perniciously when deployed to account for negative influence on children. 
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3.9 ‘Fit to parent’ or ‘fit to mother’? 
The term ‘fit to parent’ masks the fact that discourses of parents and parenting are 
profoundly gendered. Even when gender-neutral terms are used, as they are in most 
recent social policy and family law these usually do have gender-specific addresses 
and effects (Day Sclater and Yates, forthcoming 1999; Harne et al. 1997; Hester and 
Radford, 1996; Smart and Sevenhuijsen, 1989). Deborah Marks (1996a) describes the 
different gendered positions produced by ideas about the care and education of 
children and the rhetorically ungendered roles of ‘parents’ and ‘professionals’. 
Shelley Day Sclater’s work suggests distinctly gendered patterns in the way ‘parental 
responsibility’ is interpreted by post-divorce mothers and fathers (Sclater and Yates, 
forthcoming 1999) ‘Parental involvement in education’ usually means more work for 
mothers in the home (David, 1988), or unpaid work in the classroom (Standing, 
1994), and mothers usually do, and are looked to by professionals to negotiate their 
child/ren’s service needs (Graham, 1984). The skill(s) of ‘parentcraft’ are discursively 
ungendered, yet women offered or seeking help are likely to be viewed differently to 
men. The naturalisation of women’s maternal care (Rich, 1977) means that a woman 
requesting help could be seen as unnatural, deviant, and a possible danger to her 
children, whereas a man might receive a (condescending) congratulatory pat on the 
back for being willing to learn about parenting.  
 
Recent discussions of parents in the media have actually been highly gender-specific; 
concerns are precisely about how women are ‘parenting’ and how little men are 
‘parenting’, or, according to some, ‘being allowed’ to take up their role as father, and 
furthermore, the criteria by which parenting is judged are different for mothers than 
for fathers. Moreover, the work of all of the above authors demonstrate how the 
gender-neutral discourses of parents works to disadvantage women, for instance in 
legal decisions on child residency (Harne et al. 1997; Smart and Sevenhuijsen, 1989).  
 
To summarise, women who fail to conform to culturally dominant sexual, 
reproductive and gender positions continue to be pathologised in some of the 
misogynistic representations of women in popular culture. Among the implications of 
this are that childbearing on the margins of the narrow ‘normal’ category of mothers 
can render one’s parenting suspect, pathological, or, in some circumstances, prevent 
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it. This chapter has described some of the particular ways in which women can be 
seen as unfit to parent, and how their sexual relationships and identities, as opposed to 
their (actual) parenting skills, become the focus. The implicit attributions of 
selfishness and immaturity were linked, but muted themes. The particular impact of 
these terms for women reveals the extent to which it is mothers - rather than ‘parents’ 
- who are still expected to take responsibility for children. In addition, mothers are 
positioned as the guardians of liberal democracy through their responsibility for the 
production of responsible citizens and are sometimes even held responsible for 
preserving the nuclear family and men’s position within it. It is ‘failing’ to meet the 
expectations of motherhood, not ‘parenthood’, which earns women the label of 
selfish, which can be seen as indicating her immaturity or worse, her pathology and 
consequent unfitness to mother. The discourse of fitness to parent impacts 
differentially on women and men because of different understandings of how they 
ought to be responsible and of how they might be dangerous. The gender-neutral 
discourse of ‘parents’ reaches its limits when women are disapproved of, or when the 
child - as the outcome of the woman’s mothering - has gone ‘off the rails’. In fact, it 
seems that most popular representations of unfit parents are of mothers, or at least that 
these discourses are the most intense and severe. 
 
The following chapter will explore a particular strand of popular representations of 
fathers and explore the ideas through which men are judged fit, or unfit, to parent. 
Chapter 5 will then examine the significance of such images, that is, how we are to 
understand their impact on individuals. The approach adopted in this chapter will be 
examined critically in chapters 5, 6 and 7, and the empirical claims embodied by this 
style of rhetoric, the implied relationship between ideological representations and ‘the 
real’, and the concept of moral panic will be questioned.  
  
Chapter 4  
Supporting Children? Absent Fathers and Family Men 
 
This chapter examines a key feature of representations of fathers in British culture in 
the 1990s: fathers’ responsibilities to their children after a relationship between 
parents has ended. It focuses on the public policy discussions concerning fathers’ 
financial obligations, in terms of the payment of child maintenance by ‘absent fathers’ 
to lone mother families, because this has been a topic of intense debate from 1990 to 
the present, centring on the 1991 Child Support Act and Agency. In the context of 
very little public representation of fathers’ private lives (Burgess and Ruxton, 1996; 
Hearn, 1992), fathers in the particular position of no longer being in a sexual 
relationship with their ‘baby mothers’, and their ‘financial responsibility’ especially, 
have come to dominate discussion of fathers in the public arena in recent years. 
 
Following the account of mothers in the media in chapter 3, this chapter identifies 
some of the prominent themes in popular representations of fathers. In chapter 3, it 
was argued that the popular sphere displays a distinct set of ideas about mothers, as 
opposed to parents. This chapter explores further the generality and limitations of the 
discourse of ‘parents’ by considering the particularity of discourses of fathers in 
mainstream British culture. However, by comparison with the discussion of mothers, 
this chapter has a narrower empirical focus on the construction of fathers in debates 
about the implementation of policies concerning the financial support of children. The 
themes that emerge are unsurprising, except for their starkness and simplicity: 
fatherhood is defined biologically, and its prime responsibility is viewed as financial. 
In spite of all the commentary on fathers, and the moral attributions made to the 
different ‘father figures’ characterised in popular debate, the relationships it is 
imagined, expected or hoped fathers have with their children, besides a specifically 
economic one, remain under-articulated. Indeed, the rhetoric of the debates further 
obscures the issue by assuming consensus or trying to persuade.  
 
In this debate, public criticism of ‘fathers’ centred on their inability or unwillingness 
to provide financially for their children, whilst mothers were sometimes criticised for 
having ‘pushed men out of the family’. There is concern about the alienation of young 
men and fears about an ‘underclass’. Discourses of a negative impact on child 
 87
  
development (again) refer to ‘the effect’ of growing up amongst the ‘dependency 
culture’ associated with ‘passive welfare’, and, for boys, of growing up without a 
‘father figure’. These issues also apply to lone mothers on benefits. Concern about the 
cost of social security and the ‘crime bill’ appear to underpin harsh rhetoric about 
both absent fathers and mothers on benefits. Economic concerns and fears about 
social cohesion seem to be expressed through psychological discourses. Focusing on 
this particular debate illustrates the complexity of contemporary images of fathers. 
This raises questions about how such representations function ideologically, which 
will be explored in chapter 5. 
 
4.1 The Child Support Act 1991 
It is possible to argue that much vilified lone mothers are only part of the picture, 
since ‘it takes two to tango’. The fathers of their children are the missing piece of the 
jigsaw. However, this image is complicit with the fantasy that ‘absent fathers’ can be 
‘matched up’ with the lone mothers who are raising their children. Even to imagine 
them theoretically matching up oversimplifies the demographic picture, and of course, 
grossly oversimplifies the emotional picture. Such an approach reveals a pre-
occupation with macro/social, at the expense of micro/individual level analyses (for 
instance, with economics, rather than human relationships), and is compatible with the 
presentation of social policy initiatives as problem-solving. Here, two ‘social 
problems’: the state’s support of lone mothers, and ‘the erosion of the family’ - or 
men’s place within it - can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. Thus, John 
Major’s Conservative Government could present the Child Support Act - a legacy of 
Margaret Thatcher’s commitment to chasing ‘absent fathers’ for unpaid maintenance 
(Radford and Rupal, 1993) - as helping to solve both these ‘problems’. 
 
The rise in the numbers of lone parent families to almost one in five families with 
dependent children, along with the increasing proportion of them on benefits, meant 
that the cost to the state of supporting lone parent families increased rapidly over the 
1980s (DSS, 1990). In 1989, 30% of lone mothers were receiving maintenance from 
their child/ren’s father, but for those on Income Support the proportion was only 22% 
(Clarke et al., 1995). In addition, over the 1980s the proportion of never-married lone 
mothers has increased dramatically relative to those who are widowed or divorced 
(Millar, 1992). Late in 1990, the Government’s White Paper, Children Come First 
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(DSS, 1990), set out plans for what, with astonishing speed, became the 1991 Child 
Support Act (‘CSA’). Its aims were to reduce the financial cost to the Treasury of 
supporting these children, and ‘to make absent fathers face up to their responsibilities’ 
(Anderson, 1995: p6). The Act established a body, the Child Support Agency, with 
responsibility for calculating and collecting child maintenance payments from the 
non-residential parent, initially in cases where the parent who the child was living 
with was on benefits, and later to be extended, as a service, to any separated parents. 
According to the White Paper, one of the things it sought to rectify was that lone 
parents had to actively seek and obtain maintenance orders in courts and that the level 
of orders made varied between courts, but were generally so low as to ‘in no way 
reflect the real cost of caring for a child, or of the absent parent to pay’ (Clarke et 
al.,1995). Press coverage concentrated on the fairness of maintenance bills in relation 
to the ‘absent’ parent’s ability to pay, while whether the actual costs of childrearing 
were met was relegated as a peripheral issue. In effect, focusing concern on the 
formulae used to calculate the amount payable rendered discussion of how children 
ought to be supported outside the remit of the debate (Anderson, 1995). The CSA and 
operation of the Agency have been extremely controversial (e.g. Smith 1997) and, 
arguably, have not provided an effective means of meeting the real costs of raising 
children, nor achieved their stated objectives (Bradshaw, 1996, cited in Smith, 1997; 
David Rendell MP, cited in Perkins, 1998). 
 
In spite of the fact that the Act refers to ‘parents’, and distinguishes them by their 
residential status in relation to the child, popular discussion of the Act and Agency 
reflected a widespread understanding of parenting, and therefore, the operation of the 
Act, to be significantly gendered. The Act refers to ‘the absent parent’, as distinct 
from ‘the parent with care’ with whom the child, or children, live. Overall, the ratio of 
lone mothers to lone fathers is 9:1 (Millar, 1992), so the overwhelming majority of 
‘parents with care’ are mothers, and ‘absent parents’, fathers. Furthermore, the fact 
that the basis of the Act’s concern with absent parents is money reinforces the broad 
cultural - and cross-cultural (Lewis and O’Brien, 1987) - notion of the male parent’s 
role as the provision of material support. Although the Act itself employs a gender-
neutral discourse of parents, and so also applies to the few cases in which mothers are 
absent parents, in practice it reinforces the connection between fathers and financial 
support. The Act requires that lone parents claiming Income Support, Family Credit 
 89
  
or Disability Living Allowance co-operate with the Agency. It is not that they may, if 
they wish, initiate proceedings in order to get or increase the maintenance they 
receive, but that they must facilitate the Agency’s work in collecting money from the 
absent parent. Lone mothers on benefits have to provide information to allow the 
Agency to trace an absent father, and if they do not, because they do not wish him to 
be contacted, they face deductions from their benefit as a penalty. The fact that there 
is no obligation to involve the Agency for those not on benefits, but that it is 
compulsory for those who are, along with the punitive benefit deductions, mean that 
the Act has an image of being harsh, unsympathetic and coercive to poorer parents. 
That parents with care on benefits are mostly mothers is significant here. Referring to 
parents without gendering them allows both the Act’s practical consequences, and the 
meanings that it reinforces, to be ignored. It obscures the relevance of the general 
disparity between men’s and women’s incomes, and the preponderance of women and 
children living in poverty. 
 
The gendered impact of the Act and Agency were central to opposition from feminist 
organisations such as the Campaign Against the Child Support Act (CACSA) and 
Rights of Women. The Act specified that in addition to maintenance for the child, the 
calculation of maintenance should include support for the parent with whom the child 
is resident: ‘A child needs not only to be fed and clothed. He [sic] also needs someone 
to look after him.’ (DSS, 1990: para. 3.4). In practice, when most lone parents are 
mothers, this reinforces both the idea that mothers should be financially dependent on 
men, and the actuality of women’s reliance on their children’s fathers for money 
(albeit via the Agency). Furthermore, for any individual woman, this is abstracted 
from the nature of her past and present relationships, and even from her wishes on the 
matter. It forces the perpetuation of a link with the biological father not only where it 
was not desired (including by all parties), but even for men who had been violent or 
abusive. Feminist campaigns tried to expand the clause that exempts women from 
penalisation for ‘non co-operation’ with the Agency when they conceived as a result 
of rape or incest, to include those who feared violence or abuse from ex-partners. The 
resultant exemption rule (Section 6) allows Agency workers some discretion where a 
mother claims that the Agency’s approach to the children’s father will cause ‘harm or 
undue distress’, but the emphasis is on mothers convincing staff there is ‘good cause’ 
for their fears. There is evidence of variation in the way this is applied and of Agency 
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staff not believing women’s fears and so making the harsh benefit deductions penalty 
(of around £9 per week for the first 6 months and half that for the following year) 
(Clark et al., 1995; Smith, 1997). There were even cases of women being sent to 
prison for non co-operation, which clearly ran contrary to their children’s interests 
(Cook and Bahl, 1998). In some cases where mothers expressed a concern about the 
possibility of violence, mishandling by Agency staff allowed men access to the 
addresses, exposing them and their children to further threats or actual violence 
(CACSA, 1995).  
 
Furthermore, it seems that men who are having to make a financial contribution are 
more likely to feel they are ‘owed’ some contact with children with whom they had 
lost touch, and, as a result, initiate contact proceedings under the Children Act 1989 
(Clarke et al., 1995). One could read into this an intention for the Act to prompt 
fathers to maintain contact, or even, as Mitchell and Goody (1997) note, a 
‘disincentive’ to separate. The presumption that contact with the father is necessarily 
in the child’s best interests has been over-applied, so that even where the father has 
previously been convicted for abuse or domestic violence, this has not been taken into 
consideration in court decisions about contact and as a result, mothers and children 
have received further abuse (Anderson, 1997; Hester and Radford, 1996; Women’s 
Aid Federation, 1996). The CSA is, therefore, out-of-step with much contemporary 
thinking about children and families, and with the intent of the 1989 Children Act 
(CA) (to promote the principle that the child’s best interests are paramount), and its 
overriding concern with getting money from fathers can, in practice, work against 
children’s best interests. 
 
There is now wide acceptance that the Child Support Act has, in many cases, been 
coercive, punitive, or at least, unhelpful for the mothers who have come within its 
jurisdiction. Although, as Fox Harding (1996) notes, it may gain support since future 
clients will include parents (with care) on better incomes, its operation until now has 
left parents with care on means-tested benefits without any financial gain and often 
with even less regularity and reliability of income (Clarke et al., 1994; 1996). 
However, at a broader political or ideological level, it is harder to judge its 
consequences for women in general. Feminist evaluations face the dilemma that 
whilst the principle of fathers’ economic contribution might be welcomed (as it is by 
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lone mothers in the study by Clarke et al., 1996), this risks reinforcing women’s 
financial dependence on individual men, and that whilst it holds the potential to 
redistribute wealth from men to women, for the benefit of children (Anderson, 1995), 
many individual women have suffered as a result of its intervention. 
 
4.2 The Act on ‘the act’ - Fathering as biological 
Central to the Act is the idea of a biological father’s financial duty to his child/ren. 
This is seen as an inalienable responsibility. It is not affected by the present 
relationship between parents, nor the existence or otherwise of a past relationship, or 
the father’s social or emotional links to the child. Indeed, there is no allowance for 
consideration of the actual relationships involved, so that either it is presumed that 
social parenthood necessarily follows from biological parenthood, or that if it does 
not, it ought to. It is imagined that caring for children, financial responsibility and 
biological parenthood all coincide, as the norm (see for example, the reference to 
‘ordinary family life’, DSS, 1990, para. 3.21), and the Act insists that the latter two 
remain inextricably inter-linked without regard to the relationship of the parents to 
each other and to the child’ (Clarke et al., 1995: p135). Many pressure groups drew 
attention to the reliance on a normative construction of family to which lone parent 
families were being compared, ‘found lacking’, and forced to mimic as regards 
financial arrangements. 
 
Financial responsibility for children is so tied to biology in the Act that it applies not 
only where a father has no continuing contact with the child (as is the experience of 
50% of children after their parents’ relationship ends, Bradshaw and Millar, 1991), 
but even when the child has never known their father. This shows the Act’s concern 
with finance or with moral lessons in so-called ‘family values’, rather than the child’s 
best interests. Even where a social parent, such as a step-parent, wishes to take 
financial responsibility for a child, the Act prevents this. It explicitly states that step-
parental relationships do not override the biological parent’s responsibility for 
maintenance as long as the child needs it (DSS, 1990, 3.19). This is even extended to 
the level of genetic material: a woman who conceives with the sperm of a donor, in 
the absence of sexual intercourse must provide details to the Agency because the 
donor is liable. So, sperm, rather even than sexual intercourse, is the marker of 
fatherhood. As Fox Harding (1992: p132) puts it, ‘A rapist, a casual sexual partner or 
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a sperm donor in a private arrangement are all potentially financially liable parents for 
the purposes of the Act (DSS, 1993b)’. One cannot wilfully absent oneself from this 
responsibility and only full legal adoption transfers it to a non biological parent. 
 
The only legally fatherless child, as far as the Act is concerned, is one born through 
donor insemination (DI) at a Human Fertilisation and Embryology Agency licensed 
clinic. The clinic assures anonymity to its donors, and only children so conceived will 
not be expected to receive support from their fathers. Donor liability is therefore a 
concern for women who do not want medical services, cannot afford private clinics, 
or are not accepted for ‘treatment’ because they are deemed unfit to mother, as 
lesbians might be. Even signed and witnessed letters of intent (‘contracts’ between 
mother and donor) may not withstand the Agency’s insistence. As the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill was debated in Parliament, there was some 
resistance to full donor anonymity on the grounds that a child had a right, or a need, to 
know the identity of their biological father. Guidelines for licensed clinics stipulate 
that the decision to provide a woman with DI must take into consideration the need of 
any child so conceived for a father. This relates to media-fuelled concern about the 
number of women, lesbian and heterosexual, who are having babies through DI. 
Indeed the Birmingham British Pregnancy Advisory Service clinic closed after news 
of its provision of DI to lesbians broke the news in 1991 (see chapter 3). Here, 
psychological claims are asserted about children’s needs and development, which are 
far from universally accepted or supported by the evidence (Burman, 1994a; Cooke 
and Bahl, 1998). The argument that people might want to know their biological 
father’s identity cannot here be a psychological or emotional one about knowing 
about the man with whom their mother conceived, (since he would not know either 
their mother or of their existence), and the agency holds merely medical history and 
basic genetic information about donor’s ethnicity, height, eye and hair colour.  
 
That the crudest biological marker is invoked to define fatherhood (in actual fact, 
paternity) fits with a more general shift to biology as ‘the new religion’ (as Melvyn 
Bragg called it on his Radio 4 programme In Our Time in March 1998) (see also 
Bragg and Gardiner, 1999). ‘Fathering’ as a verb, is taken at its most literal in both 
the 1991 Act’s definition, and in the popular derogatory depiction of ‘feckless men 
fathering away on council estates’. Having described some of the legal discourses of 
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fathers, this chapter now describes the vivid images deployed at different moments 
during the popular debate over the Act and Agency. 
 
4.3 The bad guys and the good guys
As the Bill passed through Parliament in 1991, popular media images became 
increasingly caricatured. Absent parents were depicted as ‘runaway’ fathers who were 
errant or feckless men. The Daily Telegraph on 26th February 1991 retained the 
gender-neutral language in the title of its piece: ‘Child aid agency will track down 
errant parents’, although explained in its second paragraph that …‘it is part of the 
Government’s measures aimed at fathers who abandon their families and do not fulfil 
their maintenance obligations’ (Anthony Looch, p12). The Western Mail (11th 
March, 1991) under the heading ‘“Tighten-up” call in crisis over runaway fathers’ 
stated that: ‘More than 30,000 Welsh children are thought to have lost contact with 
their fathers’. These reflected the idea that fathers had ‘run away’, ‘deserted’ or 
‘abandoned’ their families or children, and constructed the women and children ‘left 
behind’ as deserving of pity. The mothers ‘left holding the baby’ were seen as 
somewhat passive, having been left by men, rather than, for instance, having ended 
their relationships, agreed to separations, or having ‘got rid of’ violent men, etc. The 
portrayal of children sometimes drew on the pathos of the ‘little orphan’ image: 
‘Tragic children who “lose” their fathers’ was the Daily Express’s headline (11th 
March, 1991). ‘Tragic’ mobilises ideas of pitiful, abandoned children, but referring to 
them as losing their fathers, as they might a toy, almost implies that they are 
responsible for the loss of contact.  
 
The discourse of ‘missing fathers’, which carries a sense of unknown whereabouts 
and also, perhaps, of longed for, marked the first wave of reportage, but the tone of 
journalists soon hardened and became more condemnatory. The intensity conveyed by 
the word ‘crisis’ was reinforced by the use of words that suggested harsh, stern 
responses, such as the Agency implementing a ‘crackdown on errant fathers’ and 
‘tracking them down’ in order to collect money. The depiction of the men concerned 
increasingly used a language which criminalised them, such as ‘runaway fathers 
brought to book’, and representing the Bill as a ‘crackdown from “the party of law 
and order”’. Alongside the strong discourse of responsibility, assumptions were made 
about the class and economic circumstances of the men in question. They were 
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depicted as young, working-class and poor. Commonly invoked was an image of 
rundown council housing on large estates in deprived areas where the breakdown in 
law and order was so severe that all semblance of social order had been lost, and 
society was spiralling out of control into lawlessness and ‘anarchy’. Later, James 
Pirrie of the Family Law Association (Independent, 1st July, 1993) referred to this 
bogeyman of the absent father as ‘wandering around council estates siring children 
without a care in the world’. This image was unsympathetic to say the least: these 
were ‘bad lads’. However, this stereotype abstracted men from the contexts of their 
lives - most importantly from the loss of semi-skilled male employment, a key feature 
of the particularly depressed areas journalists documented – and its social and 
psychological, as well as economic, consequences (Campbell, 1993; Phillips, 1993).  
 
That the ‘new agency [was] to pursue absent fathers’ (The Guardian, 11th December, 
1991, italics added), that they would be ‘tracked down’ and ‘Caught in the manhunt’, 
provided connotations of criminality, and, through associations with being hunted, 
constructed men as like wild animals. Being hunted suggested that these men were 
roaming, lost to society, uncommitted, and free to move on. This was sometimes 
linked to the idea that their roles as husbands and fathers had been undermined by 
feminists, and now they were ousted from the family, ‘out in the cold’. This connects 
with the increasing attention to men as ‘the new victims’ in society, and of the 
backlash against feminism which constructs men as victims of it. However, there were 
also more ‘Jack-the-Lad’ type accounts. These represented men as feckless and 
irresponsible in their ‘matings’, but as forgivable in their laddish ‘naughtiness’ at 
‘playing the field’ or ‘sowing their wild oats’. Associating men’s sexuality with 
animal instincts invokes the discourse of male sex-drive (see Hollway, 1989) which 
functions to reduce to the biological, and hence make men less culpable for coercion 
or force in pursuit of their ‘uncontrollable’ desires. However, another aspect of the 
‘manhunt’ imagery is lighter and ironic. Judy Hirst’s ‘Caught in the Manhunt’ article 
in The Guardian (11th December, 1991) playfully mobilises the long-standing 
imagery of women as predatory, and as trying to lure and entrap men. The phrase ‘a 
good catch’ to refer to a wealthy or otherwise ‘desirable’ man illustrates the idea that 
the goal of (heterosexual) femininity is about ‘getting’ and ‘keeping a man’, that is, 
marrying him or being ‘on track’ to. The irony is that not only are women not the ones 
‘after men’, (rather, the state is), but they are seen to be ‘getting along fine’ without 
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men, which is what appears to provoke the real fear underlying the reported ‘crisis’ of 
the family that lone mothers are seen as representing. 
 
4.4 Polarised images of fathers
Images of fathers had become polarised in these popular representations. ‘Absent 
fathers’ were contrasted with the ideal of proper fathers tacitly imputed with moral 
goodness. Its implicit nature meant that what exactly good fathers were believed to be 
and do was not specified. Their defining feature, by virtue of their contrast with 
absent fathers, was that they were ‘present’. In practice, this was defined as being 
physically co-present in the same house as their children, as distinct from being 
emotionally present for them. Such men were, however, fulfilling their social 
obligations by taking up their rightful familial role. The image of the ‘family man’ 
carried a maturity, respectability, and an association with ‘family values’, in contrast 
to those other men who needed to be forced to accept their familial responsibilities. 
 
Politicians spoke as though the Act was conceived of as targeting the ‘lower orders’ 
as the Agency’s first Chief Executive, Ros Hepplewhite, recognised (Sunday 
Telegraph, 27th March, 1995). In particular, its targets were the ‘Jack-the-Lads 
fathering away on the council estates’ (Poly Toynbee, The Guardian, 2nd February, 
1994). In contrast to respectability, veiled in the more class-neutral sounding 
‘responsibility’, the crude assumptions were that ‘errant fathers’ and ‘feckless single 
mothers’ were financially or selfishly motivated individuals as opposed to respectable 
folk who upheld traditional ‘family values’. The Government imagined that those 
needing a lesson in family values would not be amongst their own, but this splitting of 
good and bad characteristics into separate groups of fathers did break down.  
 
Between 1991 and 1994, there was a series of high-profile media revelations about the 
extra-marital affairs of Ministers in the Conservative Government, which in some 
cases had had children born of them. Journalists criticised the hypocrisy of these men 
who made public pronouncements about conservatively defined family values in the 
‘Back to Basics’ polemic, but who had fathered children by women other than their 
wives, and, as Phoenix (1996) notes, had helped create lone mother households. 
Suzanne Moore, amongst others, expressed astonishment at the resilience of women 
who publicly stood by these men, whether as wives or as Conservative ‘ladies’ of the 
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constituency, despite having been wronged by them. A cartoon by Janis Goodman in 
the feminist magazine Trouble and Strife in Spring 1994, captured this hypocrisy and 
the ‘them-and-us’ split. It depicted a white man in shirt and tie delivering a lesson in 
‘Back to Basics: Grammar’ which ‘explained’ the distinction: ‘I have a love-child, 
you have a bastard. You are feckless, I am foolish’ (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Lesson in ‘Back to Basics’ (Double) Standards 
 
 
This cartoon by Janis Goodman, published in Trouble & Strife in Spring 1994, mocks the hypocrisy of 
Government Ministers whose double-standards allowed them to condemn ‘feckless fathers’ and lone 
mothers, whilst themselves having children not only ‘out of wedlock’, but by women other than their 
wives. 
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This polarisation of images of fathers did, and does, a disservice to several 
constituencies of fathers: those who are themselves lone parents; those who 
successfully co-parent with their ex-partners (so whilst not co-residential, are not 
absent emotionally); and indeed, co-residential fathers who do not endorse traditional, 
patriarchal ‘family values’. Residential markers do not necessarily indicate levels of 
involvement in parenting, but refinements to the categories of ‘absent’ or ‘(good) 
fathers’ (such as ‘actively involved, non-residential fathers’) did not emerge. These 
impoverished categories simplified the picture in several other respects: by assuming 
that all children have known and socially acceptable fathers, and that having fathered 
a child makes one a parent in a socially meaningful sense. The crude present/absent 
dichotomy sometimes relied on the stereotypical images of fathers as distant authority 
figures. This is out of step with contemporary popular culture. British soap operas 
increasingly allow men’s emotions to be in focus, and Hollywood narratives, whilst 
often clumsy and patronising, now portray men as nurturant, involved fathers – even 
though they often rely on the juxtaposition of ‘conventional’ and ‘new man’ images 
or the ‘conversion’ of ‘hard’ men to protective fathers (e.g. Schwarzenegger as the 
male scientist who conceives in Junior; Leon; the Rocky films; Three Men and a 
Baby).  
 
Policy-related discussion in popular media did not much engage with either the 
actuality of fathers’ lives, or with the complexity of the feelings men and women 
might have about fathers’ roles and shifts concerning them. It was striking that in 
arguments which were quick to make moral attributions, discussion of the actual roles 
that fathers ought to play in children’s upbringing remained largely absent.  
 
4.5 ‘Teaching them a lesson’ 
The compulsion of the Act is justified by ‘the rights of children who continue [after 
their parents’ relationship break-up] to be entitled to be maintained by their parents’ 
(DSS, 1990, para. 5.31 cited in Clarke et al., ibid.). However, for lone mothers on 
income support the money the Agency received from the absent parent was, in the 
original formula, deducted pound-for-pound from the benefits, so simply replaced 
state support, although lone mothers in paid work did receive some or all of the 
maintenance. Similarly, ‘absent parents’ on income support might have £30 deducted 
per week from benefits, whereas for those not on benefits a margin of protected 
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income kept them above benefit entitlement levels. The Act is therefore understood to 
have a disproportionate impact on the poor. With no financial benefit to the child or 
residential parent (or - after a small maintenance disregard was introduced in the 
revised formula - a few pounds difference), it is hard to see how the Agency acts in 
children’s best interests, at least regarding their financial well-being.  
 
When the Act was introduced, it was widely recognised that it was intended to relieve 
the tax-payer of the burden of the social security bill for lone parents, rather than to 
support children or enact their rights. Articles and campaign T-shirts referred to it as 
‘the Treasury Support Act’. The rhetoric claimed that the Act ‘put children first’, but 
since there was little financial advantage, the strongest argument for this was that a 
child benefited from the knowledge that their absent parent contributed to their 
upkeep. The Foreword to the White Paper described the payment of maintenance as a 
way in which children learn about the responsibilities which family members owe 
each other (cf Clarke et al., 1995). However, benefit entitlement is a marker of 
poverty, whereas, at the level of rhetoric, vivid images of parents stirred further 
meanings in the public imagination. The ‘lower orders’ seen as needing the lesson in 
‘family values’ were marked in terms of class.  
 
They were ‘feckless fathers’, and ‘welfare mums’. The women were depicted as 
welfare scroungers, and sometimes as the victims of bad, restless, uncommitted men. 
The (absent) fathers were associated with delinquency and immaturity, as well as 
criminality. The discourse of ‘an underclass’ was mobilised. TV reports showed 
dismal estates in deprived areas such as in parts of the north east of England, where 
women with children were trapped in poor quality council housing with no money to 
go out. The men-folk were seldom caught on film, reinforcing their absence/exclusion 
from family homes, and when they were, the footage was shot outdoors conveying a 
sense of their alienation and aimless roaming in the wilderness. McKee (1983, cited in 
Lewis and O’Brien, 1987) notes the resilience of the fathers-as-breadwinners 
discourse even in economic recessions which make it ever more difficult. Such 
unsurprising pressures on relationships were overshadowed by images of self-
sufficient women who chose not to have an extra adult in the home, so that although 
less money might come in overall, she would have full control of how it was spent. 
The assumption that lone mothers base employment decisions on strictly economic 
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factors, as the model of ‘rational economic man’ implies, was contradicted by the 
particular gendered moral reasoning used by the women in a study by Edwards and 
Duncan (1997). Black lone mothers prioritised demonstrating self-sufficiency to their 
children, which correlates with the fact that they have higher rates of employment 
than white lone mothers (Edwards and Duncan, 1997; Phoenix, 1996). The current 
silence over ‘race’ in conservative discourses of lone mothers might be explained by a 
primary motivation being reduction of the welfare bill (see Phoenix, 1996).  
A favourite of journalists was the infantalisation of the men concerned, when women 
said things like: ‘I’ve already got two kids, why would I want someone else to look 
after?’, which fed into the immaturity theme. The idea that these men were being 
taught a lesson could construct them as naughty boys being brought to order by a 
paternalist state, which was stepping in to teach them their responsibilities because the 
absence of ‘father figures’ in their own upbringing meant they had failed to learn 
lessons of ‘family obligation’. This attributes inadequate socialisation into dominant 
(‘decent’) cultural values to lone mother households and positions the state as 
benevolent pseudo-parent. Primarily financial motives for reducing the welfare bill 
could therefore be hidden behind discourses that the Act was ‘for their own good’.  
 
When Ann Chant succeeded Ros Hepplewhite as head of the Agency in 1994, Sally 
Hughes wrote a piece called ‘New nanny for the state’s troublesome child’, 
commenting that ‘Placing women at the head of disciplinarian agencies that chases 
naughty boys distances politicians from policies that would undermine important male 
support and consent’ (Hughes, 1994: p35). Both directors were cast as ‘middle–aged 
battleaxe[s] wielding a rolling pin’, exercising personal grudges, rather than doing a 
difficult job, and Hepplewhite’s resignation, midst personal attacks and scapegoating, 
seemed to attract less public sympathy than might the sacrificing of a man’s career. 
The ‘nanny’ reference conveys the delegation of responsibility, alludes to the 
discourse of welfare as overprotective, or as interfering, and invokes the figure of a 
scolding matriarch who knows best and will teach her charge a lesson. 
 
The Act could thus be presented as helping solve the problems of family breakdown, 
youth criminality, and urban disorder, in analyses which presume simplified causal 
links between them (Roseneil and Mann, 1996). Popular debates over 1993 and 1994 
made explicit the connection between lone parenthood and the emergence of a so-
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called underclass. Lone mothers on benefits have become an emblem of the 
‘underclass’ discourse, but are positioned as both symptom and cause of the social ills 
conflated in this analysis. Chapter 3 described some of the discourses of lone mothers 
in contemporary Britain, but these are further bolstered and become even harsher 
when associated with the idea of a growing and dangerous underclass which has taken 
hold of the popular imagination (Roseneil and Mann, ibid.). According to Charles 
Murray, leading proponent of the underclass thesis, its three symptoms are ‘crime, 
illegitimacy and economic inactivity amongst working-aged men’ (Murray, 1994: p2). 
Despite claims of empirical and analytic integrity, the underclass thesis (particularly 
in Murray’s own writing) is supported by little evidence, has been too readily adopted 
from the US context, and conflates description with analysis, its ‘victims’ with its 
cause (see David, 1994; Edwards and Duncan, 1997; Mann, 1994; Morris, 1994; 
Slipman, 1994). 
 
From generalisations about class, presumptions about culture are made. The discourse 
of ‘welfare dependency’ laments a ‘culture of dependency’ in which people do not 
aspire to work. It assumes that people ought to embrace ‘the Protestant work ethic’, 
and is usually fuelled by welfare bill concerns. Like the idea of an underclass, it has 
been popularised despite little conceptual development, and it is problematically 
assumed that families where several generations are long-term unemployed share this 
culture of dependency. This concept ‘psychologises’ material reality, so that 
unemployed people themselves, rather than their economic and social circumstances, 
are seen as the cause of their need for benefits. Furthermore, ‘dependence’ is valued 
negatively, which re-stigmatises benefit receipt, over-emphasises individual 
responsibility and romanticises ‘independence’. There seems to be ‘an intolerance of 
all dependency’ (Rustin, 1998: p8), and parents are viewed as responsible for 
avoiding passing on a culture of dependence to their children (e.g. in many of David 
Blunkett’s 1998 speeches as Secretary of State for Education).  
 
New Labour continues the Thatcher Government’s attack on ‘dependency culture’, 
rather than adopting a structural analysis as might have been hoped, and retains the 
view of social policy as a means of instilling decent values in citizens. The 1998 
Budget clearly problematised those who do not work, even those (including lone 
parents) who are at home to care for their children. The tough talk about expecting all 
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who can to work and providing benefits only for those who absolutely cannot work 
assumes that jobs are available. When benefits are framed as ‘disincentives’ to work, 
and their withdrawal is understood as promoting an active work-ethic, critics can see 
it as a Government tackling financial issues under the guise of a moral crusade. 
 
The underclass discourse has its roots in the long-standing British tradition of ‘social 
pathology’ views of the poor. In right wing social and economic thinking (e.g. the 
Institute of Economic Affairs), it is often accompanied by anti-feminist and racist 
motives (Edwards and Duncan, 1997). It is moralistic and judgmental about poverty 
and assumes that poverty and cultural alienation necessarily go hand-in-hand. It 
presumes a consensus about cultural values, then pathologises those who do not hold 
it. Moreover, these culturally deviant families present the threat of ‘contamination’ to 
higher, ‘more civilised’, levels of society. Constructing them as dangerous has a long 
history in the perception of threat from the unruly masses (Morris, 1994). So, men 
who father children without joining the household are seen as threatening in terms of 
crime they may commit, their ‘promiscuity’ and their moral cultures. The women are 
seen as ‘encouraged’ to breed by ‘over-generous benefits’ and having children for 
instrumental reasons such as for social housing and benefits, although this is not 
supported by research with ‘young’ mothers (Phoenix, 1991). The concept of an 
underclass conflates class and financial situation, assumes intransigent class cultures, 
and polarises the supposed differences in social values held, enabling ‘the threat’ to be 
contained only by the discursive expulsion of the ‘menace’ from the body of 
(‘decent’) society.  
 
There then emerged a constituency of men who explicitly claimed this absent father 
identity, but who presumed themselves to be men of morals, not feckless or evading 
their responsibilities. They happened not to live with their children, but were 
distinctly different from the absent fathers so far depicted. This represented a 
challenge to the image of absent fathers and began its transformation. 
 
4.6 Family men after all: absolving (some) ‘absent fathers’ 
Over 1992 and 1993, there was hardly a let up in the Child Support Agency’s bad 
press. A stream of unjust seeming cases described in newspaper and magazine articles 
suggested the complicated formula needed serious attention. The sums of money 
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requested by the Agency were portrayed as too high, unreasonable or financially 
crippling for the men concerned. Typically, an article would describe the finances of a 
man (I have not seen a single article about an absent mother’s finances) who would 
have to move house or would not be able to afford to visit his children, because of the 
amount of his income the Agency demanded. Amongst these were stories of men who 
had since re-partnered, and were now supporting other children. They and their new 
partners appealed about the unfairness of the requests. Claims that eight men had been 
so overwhelmed by the Agency’s demands that they committed suicide spearheaded 
an emotive campaign that eventually claimed supporters on both sides of the political 
divide (Hughes, 1994). Articles often pitied unfairly treated men or ridiculed the 
Agency for its incompetent procedures or bills too small to be worth their 
administrative cost, which made it appear petty, irrational, and even vengeful 
(feminised forms of monstrosity, as chapter 3 argued).  
 
By 1994, there had been a shift in the representation of absent fathers. Articles in The 
Guardian had titles such as ‘Fathers who are reduced to paupers’, ‘parents at the 
bitter end of the new child support system’, ‘financial stranglehold on hard-pressed 
fathers’ and ‘Payers angry at “victimisation”’. Sub-titles reported ‘The agency has 
created a nightmare world, say fathers facing demands’ and sympathetically 
described ‘middle-class fathers who already pay up’. The villain of the piece was the 
bureaucratic, insensitive state agency. Absent fathers had become the new victims: 
hard-pressed, in strangleholds, or facing demands. Their complaints were no longer 
irresponsible reluctance to pay what they ought, but legitimate claims that the system, 
or at least the formula, was unfair. Significantly, they might be ‘reduced to paupers’, 
but they were not already poor. These absent fathers were of a different ilk to those of 
the feckless father discourse, they were the mostly middle class men who suddenly 
found themselves expected to pay far more than anticipated. They differed in class 
and economic circumstances, and as commentators observed, in their success at 
getting their complaints heard. These were articulate, middle class and educated men 
who knew how to present their claims persuasively, could ‘use’ the media to their 
advantage and therefore formed a peculiarly effective lobby. They were also a 
constituency quite unused to being constructed as problematic, who were coming to 
the attention of the state for not meeting their responsibilities, and arguing that the 
demands were unreasonable, put them in the morally more justifiable position of 
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being unable, rather than unwilling to pay (Phoenix, 1996). This 
‘unable/unreasonable’ argument dominated accounts, so that these fathers, 
interestingly, were not accused of being selfish. 
 
The polarisation collapsed as it became recognised that some absent fathers were 
family men after all. A man could be both an absent father to one set of children and 
the (other sort of) father to children born to another partner. These might be his 
second family or step-children. Moreover, men who could demonstrate themselves to 
be present and financially responsible fathers for their second family did not fit the 
Jack-the-Lad image. They were family men and responsible fathers after all - just 
elsewhere. This pulled the rug from under the ‘family values’ argument that absent 
fathers were immature men who were not meeting their responsibilities. However, a 
second family might not necessarily entail financial support if maintenance payments 
from the children’s birth father came into the household.  
 
Second families were only ever portrayed as respectable, reputedly because 
journalists and editors recognised themselves in the figure of the ‘absent father’. 
Middle-class absent fathers formed an articulate lobby, and had political clout. In 
addition to their greater financial means, their impact was popularly understood as 
because they addressed their peers and ‘in the corridors of power walk many twice 
and thrice married men’ (Hughes, 1994: p35). The imputation of fecklessness and 
irresponsibility to ‘gentlemen’ of ministerial rank shook the categories, and the 
‘civilising’ lesson in family values was of course ‘inappropriate’. Indeed rallies 
organised on behalf of protesting ‘absent’ fathers by fathers’ rights organisation 
Families Need Fathers comprised families, rather than men (Mitchell and Goody, 
1997) showing these to be (second) family men after all and importantly, drawing 
public sympathy for families forced into competition with other families, rather than 
men who’d left women holding the baby. 
 
Collapsing the polarisation of fathers meant that the easy attribution of good and bad 
to family men and absent fathers could be rethought and some discretion allowed. It 
admitted the significance of social relationships, and required a climb-down from 
rigid ideological positions. It also popularised a broader range of terms for family 
forms and relationships, such as ‘second families’, ‘second wives’, ‘earlier children’, 
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‘birth parents’, ‘co-residential parents’; reconstituted, reconstructed recombinant or 
divorce-extended families (see Stacey, 1990); serial families (Mitchell and Goody, 
1997) and exercised the step-family terms.  
 
4.7 Breadwinners and losers 
Protests about the steep demands of the Agency, coupled with complaints against it - 
which by February 1995 totalled 30,000 (Anderson, 1995) - had led to an enquiry by 
the House of Commons Social Security Select Committee. The 1995 White Paper 
Improving Child Support proposed five key modifications to the formula: the 
introduction of a ceiling of 30% of an absent parent’s net income to be paid as 
maintenance; for wealthy absent parents, halving the maximum additional element of 
maintenance payable; introducing the recognition of property settlements (usually the 
parent with care keeping the family home), and of the costs of housing a new partner 
and step-children. This last point indicated that financial obligation was no longer 
seen as applying to biological children only, and similarly, any exceptional costs of 
caring for step-children could be recognised in claims of particular hardship, for 
which a new element of discretion was introduced.  
 
Anderson called these changes ‘an absent fathers’ charter’ because ‘virtually all the 
demands of the largely white middle-class absent fathers lobby [were] met, in most 
cases significantly reducing liability for maintenance under the Act’ (1995: p6). The 
Child Poverty Action Group agreed that the package was overwhelmingly in favour of 
absent parents and much opposition centred on the fact that it offered nothing to 
alleviate the hardship of parents with care (Mitchell and Goody, 1997). According to 
Anderson: 
‘By introducing these changes, the Government has effectively acknowledged 
the massive failings of the Agency; and in the face of opposition from an 
organised group of potential voters, has ditched its supposed ideology that the 
Act was designed to make absent fathers face up to their responsibilities’ 
(Anderson, 1995: p6). 
 
Juliet Mitchell and Jack Goody (1997) describe how protesters against the Act fall 
into three main categories:  
‘First, absent fathers who object to paying maintenance or higher maintenance 
than they want to; they are supported by some women, largely second wives, 
with new children to maintain. Second there are a wide range of women’s 
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interest groups who argue that the Act has worsened the situation of lone 
mothers. Third, there are those who see the Act as indicative of a wider crisis 
of the family in which fathers are being scapegoated and cast out in the cold’ 
(ibid.: p204).  
 
Since the changes to the formula, the middle category of protest has waned, the first 
are seen as more intransigent. According to Frank Field MP, who chaired the Social 
Services Select Committee, the first group expresses the ‘raw gender conflict at the 
heart of the CSA row’, since ‘Even if the legislation is right – which it is not – there 
will always be fathers who don’t want to pay.’ (cited in Hughes, 1994: p35), and the 
third group is small in numbers, but is ‘an articulate exponent of a virulent backlash 
against feminists and all women who are not attached to men’ (Mitchell and Goody, 
1997: p207). 
 
The powerful ‘absent/second family fathers’’ lobby was notable by its absence during 
the first phase of media coverage which painted crude, unsympathetic images of the 
absent father bogeyman. Perhaps they managed not to identify with the absent fathers 
so depicted because of their different general class location in a similar way to 
Duncan and Edwards’ (forthcoming, 1999) findings that more middle-class lone 
mothers did not self-identify as ‘lone mothers’ in spite of meeting the sociological 
criteria, because of its ‘welfare mum’ associations which implied certain class and 
economic positions. It seems one is ‘allowed’ to have out-of-wedlock children if one 
can afford to support them, since financial provision is a ‘privatised’ responsibility of 
the family’s (and Tim Yeo and Cecil Parkinson used this defence). The breadwinner 
discourse, coupled with conventionally gendered care patterns, means that where lone 
mothers struggle to get by, individual men, whether involved or not, are deemed 
responsible and at fault if they do not pay. However, they may be redeemed as good 
fathers if they can show they have taken up further family responsibilities (instead), 
and earlier on, if they were wealthy enough to make private arrangements or (ensured) 
their ex-partner did not claim benefits. The implicit distinction between ‘fit’ and ‘unfit 
fathers’ centres on the presence of their money, hence the condemnation of material 
absence through absence in person, unemployment or ‘underclass’ membership. 
Fathers are reduced to having a solely financial role, and if the state’s role in 
supporting families was to be minimised, individual men needed identifying as 
fathers, so biological paternity provided a marker with a measure of ‘proof’. 
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4.8 Ideological lessons 
How, then, might the Act’s ideological intentions be summarised? Can the positions 
within the debates and campaigns on the Act be understood ideologically?  
 
Whilst Tories tried to unite behind the ‘family values’ banner in order to make party 
political gain from the anxiety mobilised, there was clearly never consensus within 
the party. Indeed, contradictions within the Act are understood as a result of different 
opinions in the Party and tensions between Government Departments. Even Children 
Come First contained sections which justified the Act differently: was it to make 
fathers face up to their responsibilities, to teach children about familial obligations, or 
to tackle the problem of the rising welfare bill?  
 
The Act’s primary ideological lesson might be said to be the universal financial 
responsibility of biological parents for their children. However, as Clarke et al. (1994) 
point out, the Act gives the impression that absent parents only really become 
financially responsible for their children when the parent with care is on benefits 
(cited in Burns, 1995). So ‘family values’ ideology seems to be deployed where it is 
in the interest of benefit savings. 
 
Generally, the Act has been understood as promoting conventional family ideology 
which presumes, as the norm, a heterosexual, ideally married, couple who live 
together and raise their mutual biological child/ren on their private income in a 
household comprising them alone. It therefore feeds into the problematisation, and 
stigmatisation of families who do not fit this model (see chapter 3). Insisting on an 
ongoing administrative/financial link between biological parents and children can be 
seen as trying to support this model of family and institution of marriage, and perhaps 
even to discourage separation. The Act evidently ‘recognize[s] shifting patterns of 
family life and child care, [and] the enormous rise in lone-parent families [yet] by 
enforcing two-parent responsibility it could be seen as trying to be a rock in the flood 
waters of social change...’ (Mitchell and Goody, 1997: p202). However, despite its 
rhetoric of supporting/promoting the family, ‘[a]t end of its first year in operation it 
was admitted that, out of £210 million collected from fathers, £203 million went to 
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the Treasury and only £3 million to families. So while taxpayers generally have 
benefited at this stage, few families have’ (Hughes, 1994). 
 
Technically, the Act asserts the role of ‘absent parents’, which in practice, reasserts 
the role of (absent) fathers, so some see it as reacting to a perceived and lamented 
erosion of the nuclear family and men’s position within it. Reaffirming ‘the institution 
of fatherhood’ is sometimes a reaction against feminism - men wanting back their seat 
at the head of the table, as the patriarchal head of household. Significant here is the 
paucity of discourse of contemporary father-child relationships so that the dominant 
image of fathers remains the breadwinner or even the distant disciplinarian. The sole 
focus on responsibility for financial support, even if justified as teaching (potentially 
broadly interpreted) ‘family responsibility’, regrettably reinforces the notion of fathers 
simply as breadwinner and reaffirms mothers in caring roles financially supported by 
(individual) men. The Act defines fatherhood biologically, and goes to extreme 
lengths to maintain this principle. It also expects that mothers (with care) will know 
who the father is, that he is socially acceptable and can be contacted, and resists 
recognising that it could be otherwise. The popular images in the debates over the Act 
construct absent parents as irresponsible men and other fathers are assumed to be 
responsible parents and good fathers.  
 
The Act reflects the ‘Once a parent always a parent’ idea of the 1989 Children Act 
(Roache, 1991). A man might be an ex-partner to a mother, but to a child, there is no 
such thing as an ex-father (Mitchell and Goody, 1997). A man’s kinship to his 
children is no longer linked to his relationship to their mother. So the Act tries to 
separate out adult partnerships from (father-child) kinship relationships. In principle, I 
would welcome this because it might pave the way to think further about how 
children can be protected from difficulties in adults’ relationships, but in practice, it 
can falsely separate the mother’s interests and the child’s as regards relationships with 
the father. The Act’s initial non-recognition of the potential obligations of step-
parents was softened by subsequent revisions, but public discussions never took off 
around social parents, biological parents and about (whether rules can be set about) 
their financial and other responsibilities.  
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Other aspects of the Act’s ideological stance could have broader implications. It 
attempts to shift the boundary between public (state) and private (family) 
responsibility (Edwards and Duncan, 1997), so that the state no longer has 
responsibility for supporting mothers without partners, or rather as the Act would 
have it, whose ex-partners do not pay maintenance. It also illustrated negative 
meanings accorded to benefit receipt or ‘dependency’. The discourse that ‘over-
generous benefits’ reduce the ‘work incentive’ is highly debatable within its own 
terms, but it surely has no place if children’s best interests are central, nor if 
maintenance is the child’s right. It also demonstrates the state’s intervention in private 
relationships. 
 
However, trying to make explicit the Act’s ideological intentions does not provide a 
map of politics/perspectives from which opposition can easily be predicted. Initially, 
campaigns and positions on child support seemed to be about the ‘raw gender 
conflict’ over money and the care of children. But it was soon recognisably more 
complicated. The debates brought into public view some anti-feminist sentiments, 
such as ‘blaming’ women raising children without men on feminism ‘gone too far’. 
Whilst some lone mothers can be seen as having the reproductive, sexual and 
financial independence from men that feminists fought for, (e.g. some never-married 
mothers and those using DI), other mothers might see themselves as having been ‘left 
holding the baby’ and unable to earn wages which covered childcare costs, if they 
wanted work outside the home. Similarly, it is possible to interpret the Act along these 
contrasting lines. It can be viewed as bolstering the traditional nuclear family, or as 
trying to prevent women being left holding the baby and promoting shared 
responsibility for childrearing. 
 
The Act and responses to it cannot be understood simply in gendered terms. The sides 
of the debate were never wholly populated by people of opposite genders: some men 
support the principle of men paying, as do some women. Men and women could 
occupy opposing sides of the argument (as absent and residential parents pulling 
money between them) or could unite in opposition to the Act, arguing (for instance, as 
CACSA) that the state should provide support, or that the Act intruded into personal 
relationships. Women might unite behind feminist ideas about women’s financial 
independence and autonomy in their relationship with the child’s father, or mothers 
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might be pitted against each other in the tug over money between first and second 
wives/partners, (or mothers of children versus current partners with children). In 
addition, whilst there were judgemental discourses of ‘absent fathers’ as against 
(good) (present) fathers, the same man might be an absent father to one family and a 
present, financially contributing father to a second family. Similarly, a mother might 
have an ex-partner who is the father of her children and a current partner who is an 
absent father to some other children, so that gendered and parental identities were not 
simple and could not straightforwardly predict views about child support. 
Recognising that some absent fathers are good fathers to other children suggests that 
it is not the family per se that is in crisis, but first families. 
 
Men and women on benefits might have united against wealthier parents so that 
reactions to the Act might have divided along class or socio-economic lines. 
However, even though the popular discussion of the Act made presumptions about the 
class and culture of those on benefits, proponents and protesters cannot simply be 
lined up in terms of social class. Neither do right-left political distinctions mark the 
positions with stable coherence. The CSA had had wide cross-party support in 
parliament, which is why the strength of reaction against it was unexpected, and more 
broadly, the lone mother ‘bashing’ which blamed them for the underclass, was seen to 
have drawn support from a considerable range across the right/left divide (Roseneil 
and Mann, 1996). Ideological objections came from both sides:  
‘On the left the argument centres on the system’s rigid imposition of paternal 
over societal support for families. On the right there is outrage at the denial of 
individual bargaining power to men who have for generations assumed they 
were entitled to discard first families and start new ones’. (Hughes, 1994: p35) 
 
Or, whereas the left might reject it for its limited and rigid ‘family values’, some 
conservatives condemned it as an attack on the institution of marriage because it 
erodes the distinction between married and unmarried fathers (or marriage and 
cohabitation) (Mitchell and Goody, 1997). Similarly, instead of being seen as resisting 
the changes brought to marriage by women’s increasing economic independence, it 
could be seen as responding constructively to these and not leaving women solely 
responsible for children after/outside relationships.  
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Some libertarians and feminists might criticise its regulative intervention. As Roseneil 
and Mann (1996: p196) point out: ‘Whereas choice is usually portrayed by the right as 
a tremendous benefit to society and the economy, it is seen as inappropriate for 
women who want to have children without the support of an economically active 
man’. Similarly, non intervention by the state into systems that will therefore ‘self-
regulate’ or into the private affairs of individuals, would be the principle in neo-liberal 
‘free market’ thinking, yet the CSA represents the setting up of a Governmental 
agency with powers to find out about and intervene in private financial relationships 
between individuals. While this is not new for those drawn into the benefit system, a 
commentator quoted by Mitchell and Goody (1997) noted that it was a first for those 
not on benefits. 
 
The absent father/lone mother/underclass discourse could draw together different 
ideological strands and those from different political traditions:  
‘With its different strands, emphasizing morality or economics, the discourse 
united Tory traditionalists concerned with “family values” and morality, 
Christian socialists and liberals with similar interests, and Thatcherite hardliners 
keen to continue “rolling back the welfare state”’. (Roseneil and Mann, 1996: 
p193) 
 
Mitchell and Goody (1997) describe how protest against the Act was both feminist 
and overtly anti-feminist, and how misogynist men’s groups co-operated with some 
feminist campaigns in opposition to the Act. Strange bedfellows, indeed. Some 
feminists and ‘family values’ moralisers might together insist on men’s 
responsibilities to their children. 
 
There were various responses to the Act from amongst feminists too, for instance, 
prioritising redistribution or shared responsibility for children (and so, supporting its 
aim), or prioritising women’s financial independence of individual men or the state’s 
responsibility. Even from within socialist perspectives, the Act could be justified as a 
redistributive tool or be seen as a privatisation of childrearing costs. The Act and 
much of the opposition to it might claim to be putting children first. 
 
The Act was not, therefore, a lesson from a Government with clear ideological 
principles, as the contradictions and climb-downs show. It clashed with the same 
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government’s 1989 Children Act (see Clark et al., 1995), and revealed divisions 
amongst Conservatives between hard-line welfare reformers, family values moralisers 
and more liberal strands of thought. Furthermore, the Government’s attempt to bring 
back ‘traditional family values’ works against another government objective – getting 
lone mothers off state benefits and into the labour market. The two are ideologically 
inconsistent since traditional ‘family values’ motherhood is full-time home-based, and 
inconsistent with the idea of mothers as workers (Edwards and Duncan, 1997). 
Different models of fatherhood underpin the two Acts; either as a ‘parent’ and thereby 
having/potentially having ‘parental responsibility’ (CA), or as family breadwinner in 
a conventional division of labour between parents (CSA) (see Burghes et al., 1997). 
Even if its intent was ideologically clear, its consequences certainly are not. 
 
4.9 The absence of discourses of good fathers 
It may be the confluence of concerns about lone motherhood and about a dangerous, 
growing underclass that produces the harsh judgements about parents which chapters 
3 and 4 describe. Moreover, while these debates raise important concerns - about the 
alienation of some men from social ties of kinship and community, the caring and 
parental roles young men aspire to, and the social exclusion of men, women and 
children as a result of poverty – they are not helpful where they caricature and 
condemn people at the level of abstract identity categories. This chapter shows the 
complexity and intensity of the cultural politics of child support. Many broader 
cultural tensions are drawn on, including concern about the family, about morality, 
about social roles for men and women, and responses to feminism. The complexity of 
positions in response to the Act are a result of the nature of the terrain and the various 
struggles waged on it, rather than only the result of an ideologically confused Act 
itself.  
 
The radical men’s magazine Achilles Heel ran a special issue on men and families in 
autumn 1994, in which a contributor wrote:  
‘The debate around the CSA has, rather, thrown into question the meaning of 
responsible fathering in the first place. It is not only about father absence in 
other words - it is also about what we understand by father presence in the 
family. It is frequently assumed that we know what we’re talking about when 
we refer to absent fathers: but do we? What does it mean to be an errant father? 
Or a good father? These are questions which are central to the development of 
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any anti-sexist politics aimed at tackling men’s power in the family…’ (Collier, 
1994).  
 
Whilst this debate may have been sparked at marginal sites associated with critical 
approaches to gender or to parenting, it did not develop in the mainstream media. Like 
the idealised figure of ‘mother’ against whom the mothers described in chapter 3 were 
compared and found lacking, the concept of the good father was at the centre of these 
debates, though barely ever gestured towards directly, let alone described. Virtue 
could be assumed for fathers who did not come to the attention of state as a result of 
needing benefits. Failing to explore good fathering left it open for ‘family values’ 
arguments to be drawn on, presuming moral superiority. However, ‘family values’ 
itself is an ‘empty’ category, with competing accounts of its meaning. Such limited 
imaginative space for discussing the roles of mothers, fathers, or ‘parents’ implied 
these roles could be taken-for-granted at precisely the moment they needed 
reconsidering. Changes in women’s employment, men’s employment, sexual 
relationships, and parent-child relationships have important implications for parenting 
roles and the everyday work of parenting, yet progress towards ‘family friendly’ 
employment practice is slow, in part because we are not having the necessary debates 
at a popular cultural level. This absence left an oversimplified dualism between those 
constructed as bad fathers and those assumed to be good fathers, with unhelpful 
presumptions about class and wealth within them. 
 
It is not easy to describe the intentions behind the Act, and amendments to it 
compromised them. Nor is it easy to appraise it as a piece of legislation. Lone mothers 
experience it differently according to their economic position, their relationship to the 
father and his economic circumstances. So too do absent parents, for the above 
reasons and perhaps also, according to which children are the focus. These are 
difficulties in assessing any complex policy where the outcomes for different parties 
cannot easily be summarised, but in addition to this, here it is apparent that at times 
there are different parties, positioned in opposition to each other to gain at each 
others’ expense, but that either relationships between them may vary or the parties do 
not remain static. At times during this debate, it was possible to imagine positions 
divided along the lines of gender, class, politics, but these could not be sustained. 
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This chapter supports the conclusion of chapter 3 that much discussion of parents 
occurs alongside distinct understandings and expectations of ‘fathers’ and of 
‘mothers’. ‘Father absence’ is seen primarily as an issue of financial support in 
powerful policy discourses and secondly, but perhaps increasingly, as a psychological 
discourse about its consequences for identity and role. There are different 
understandings of being motherless to being fatherless. Fewer children are motherless, 
and if they are left by an able mother, she is condemned for her selfishness in a way in 
which men are not, both morally for ‘abandoning’ her children, and psychologically 
for being able to do such a monstrous, unmotherly thing. The poignancy of the death 
of Diana, Princess of Wales, showed the significance attributed the loss of their 
mother for her two teenage sons as a result of the dominance of constructions of 
mothers as primary caregivers/emotionally central. Paternity has historically been so 
much more disputable than the identity of one’s mother, but so much more loaded in a 
particular sense that is reproduced here: the fatherless child was at a loss for inherited 
wealth and status, of professional direction/apprenticeship for boys, and has been 
viewed as identity-less. There remains a paradox that the status implications of being 
fatherless still seem to outweigh the emotional ones. Such parental functions map 
onto different aspects of identity, such that fatherlessness has conventionally 
undermined external, social or bureaucratic aspects of identity, as opposed to the 
subjective or psychological aspects of identity (Richards, 1994b) with which mothers’ 
conventionally greater intimacy with children has linked them. However, more recent 
discourses about father absence, raise concerns about identity in the psychological and 
personal sense. 
 
The current intensity of feelings about the financial support of children when mothers 
and fathers are not together, is illustrated by the shocking suggestion by Newt 
Gingrich, in 1994 in the USA, that the children of young unmarried mothers on 
benefit should be removed to orphanages, and in the UK by comments by Michael 
Howard and Peter Lilley at 1993 and 1994 Conservative Party Conferences that it 
might be better if these children were adopted. Louise Armstrong (1995) notes ‘the 
exquisite canard of implying that children with an alive-and-kicking mother were 
orphans’, but shows how ‘[o]rphanages have, throughout history, been populated with 
children who were - not parentless, but fatherless’ (1995: p8). The concept of welfare 
itself has a gendered history, since, in the US it developed from ‘mother’s aid’ which 
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was given to widows who were the sole support of children: precisely for husbandless 
women and fatherless children (Armstrong, ibid.).  
 
What significance should be accorded to these discourses of fathers? Analysis of the 
ideological meanings of such representations is needed, but this chapter shows some 
of the difficulties of ideological analyses when images are complex, there are 
competing accounts of them, different analyses of them and the images themselves 
are not static. The following two chapters draw together the accounts given in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the nature of such discourses of mothers and 
fathers, how their political implications can be understood, and what they mean for 
personal experience. Moreover, what is the relationship of the two: how does a model 
of ideology allow us to conceptualise the subjective implications of particular 
imagery? 
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 Chapter 5 
Ideological Images or Cultural Discourses? Frameworks for Psychosocial 
Studies 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have characterised representations of ‘parents’, mothers and 
fathers in contemporary British media. Parenting magazines were criticised for 
naturalising women’s care for children in spite of the language of ‘parenting’. An 
account of the unsympathetic images of lone and lesbian mothers identified some of 
the psychological ideas employed, and an account of the 1990s child support debates 
argued that the polarised imagery of fathers divided them on the basis of wealth and 
paid little attention to fathers’ emotional relationships or responsibilities towards their 
children. What approach should be adopted for the political critique of such images? 
What do they mean for the personal experiences of individual men and women?  
 
Cultural images such as these are political because particular value-judgements inform 
them and they place people in status hierarchies and relations of power. Moreover, 
the values themselves are often obscured and naturalised. Should the representations 
depicted be seen as expressions of dominant family ideology which construct certain 
people as fit or unfit to parent? Amongst ‘second wave’ Western feminists in the 
1970s were socialists and others who employed the concept of ideology in order to 
examine the political implications of dominant cultural ideas about mothers. 
‘Ideology’ and the feminist analyses it prompted have been very important for 
feminist struggles, but Marxist approaches proved limited for understanding the 
relation of ideology to individual experience. They did not provide a satisfactory 
model of subjectivity or of the formation of individual psyche by the social world. 
What is needed is an approach that recognises the immense power of cultural 
images, without positioning individuals as passive in relation to them. Emphasising 
the cultural (re)production of personal desires must not devalue emotional investment, 
nor leave us ‘trapped’, unable to resist dominant ideas, from which we fantasise 
liberation.  
 
This chapter explores some of the limitations of the ideology framework for 
critically examining representations of mothers and outlines a post-structuralist 
approach. (Distinctions between the two frameworks are explored further in the 
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 following two chapters). It therefore begins the explicit discussion of approach and 
methodology in the thesis, including the approach that has informed earlier chapters. 
Ideology critique has implicitly informed earlier chapters, in part because of its impact 
on sociology, cultural studies and some discursive psychology. This runs counter to the 
idea that the empirical chapters were, or ever could be, devoid of theoretical 
presumptions about the nature of the representations ‘described’. A particular 
epistemological perspective is already constructed in the words ‘describe’ and 
‘representation’ – the default, empiricist one. This theoretical and epistemological 
approach was ‘at work’ in these accounts even though it was not stated. This approach 
was unremarkable for its conventional understanding of media images as reflective, 
and potentially distorting, of reality, or, by the absence of alternative claims it allowed 
empiricism to operate as the default. 
 
5.1 Family ideology
In late 1960s counter-culture, marriage and the family were seen as sexually 
repressive, authoritarian institutions. However, missing from this critique was a 
recognition of the structure of male dominance/female subordination and of the 
objectification of women in dominant discourses of heterosexuality (Segal, 1983). 
The growing women’s movement heard women’s accounts of their lives, of feeling 
isolated, frustrated and undervalued as housewives. Women’s private unpaid 
domestic work made them economically dependent and often therefore physically 
and emotionally vulnerable. Those in paid work found they were still expected to do 
housework as well – a ‘second shift’ (Hochschild, 1990) - which prompted feminist 
criticism of men’s absence from domestic work and childcare (Nava, 1983). Some 
of the strongest support for ‘traditional’ family ideology in the latter part of the 20th 
century has come from dominant views of childrearing.  
 
Critiques of family ideology showed just how particular was the supposedly universal 
model of ‘the family’, and how by privileging certain domestic arrangements over 
others, it renders what is seen as other to this image inadequate or pathological (Barrett 
and McIntosh, 1982; McIntosh, 1997). So problems with family ideology are not only 
the particular roles and relationships it depicts and legitimizes, but also those it 
excludes and marginalises. As with the depictions of ‘common sense’ knowledge about 
parents, it naturalises its own status, so that its particular value judgements are not 
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 explicit. This results in an over-simplistic splitting, on the basis of which it is assumed 
that families which match the nuclear family ideal are good for children, and those 
which do not, are not. The concept of ideology is important for highlighting how ideas 
have social roots and perform social functions (Donald and Hall, 1986; Parker, 1992). 
It has provided a way of recognising and critiquing the particular version of the family 
which saturates the media, advertising and popular entertainment (Barrett and 
McIntosh, 1982). Figure 4 parodies naturalised (and idealised) images of ‘the [nuclear] 
family’ and highlights its pathologising function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: We are the normal people: What does that make you? 
 
 
We are the normal people. ‘What does that make you?’ is written on this Chic Pix (London) postcard. 
This irreverent image highlights the normalising effects of the hegemonic definition of ‘the family’ as 
the (1950’s image of the) nuclear family. The wording conveys the smugness possible amongst those 
who fit the image, and its (or their) questioning of the normality of its Others. The image mocks the 
celebration of domestic consumer goods, and the graphics mock such a naturalised image of the 
family.  
 
 
Whilst it can be argued that the seed had been sown for greater attention to women’s 
domestic exploitation in Engel’s argument that women’s sexuality must be freed 
from financial dependence (and Lenin’s argument that domestic labour should be 
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 socialised), this phase of critique of the family did not challenge the ideological 
construction of femininity and masculinity, and the idealisation of heterosexual love 
as the basis for family relationships. The ideology framework therefore allowed 
feminists to stimulate recognition of the gendered division of labour, domestic labour 
and sexual and domestic violence within, and beyond, Marxist circles (see e.g. Comer, 
1974; Oakley; 1972; Zaretsky, 1976). 
 
5.2 Feminist critiques of ideologies of motherhood  
Marxist-informed analyses provided a powerful way of articulating a political analysis 
of intimate relations (e.g. of family and heterosexuality), particularly after Althusser’s 
influential (1971) essay describing ‘ideological state apparatus’ which, importantly, 
suggested that Marxist analysis should also consider the cultural realm and the way 
social institutions positioned people differently in relation to their labour, capital and 
each other. The organisation of everyday life could thereafter be understood as 
political, but such understandings lacked a gender analysis, since all other social 
stratifications were subordinated to class. Some feminists used the framework to draw 
analogies which theorised gender oppression as the most fundamental, such as 
Firestone’s (1970) ‘sex class’ and to develop the concept of patriarchy to understand 
the trans-cultural/historical nature of women’s subordination (Crowley, 1999; 
Eisenstein, 1984; Fraser and Nicholson, 1990). However, within Marxist and other 
liberatory discourses formed by modernist metanarratives, there is not the theoretical 
space to address adequately issues of subjectivity. This section examines some of the 
limitations of the (historically inevitable) reliance on the modernist (liberal-humanist) 
subject through the issue of motherhood.  
 
Motherhood was a key focus of ‘second wave’ Western feminist critique. The 
dominant Western cultural constructions of mothers were criticised for idealising 
motherhood, abstracting it from actual social and material conditions, and for 
pathologising and condemning women whose mothering, or desire to do so, fell outside 
of the normalising discourses of mothers, as chapter 3 argued. The 1970s women’s 
liberation movement challenged gender roles in particular to counter views that:  
‘women’s exclusive role is mothering and nurturing; that the seat of 
authority in the home is the father; that working mothers neglect their 
children; that women can’t have a career and a child; that men expect women 
to service them in the home; that children have to be raised as role-gendered 
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 boys and girls and that men wouldn’t enjoy being present at the birth of 
children’ (Clarke, 1982: p172).  
 
Feminist writings identified the pronatalism of Western societies (Riley, 1983), and 
the way being a mother is conflated with being a woman, or can mark a woman as 
adult (Chodorow and Contratto, 1982; Woollett, 1991), or truly feminine (Rich, 
1977). Attention was drawn to the physical and social isolation within which most 
women mother in the West, and the psychological isolation and responsibility this 
produces (Rich, 1977; Riley, 1983). Most feminist analyses, but especially socialist-
feminist ones, also rejected the emphasis on the private provision for childcare and 
the individualised nature of a culture which only emphasises caring for one’s own. 
 
The women’s movement campaigned for women’s autonomy in choosing whether to 
have or not have children, and to raise them in conditions of their choosing (Segal, 
1983). It was of central importance to undermine the association of women’s social 
position and the ‘natural’ order (Lawler, 1996; Stanworth, 1987), especially around 
mothering and women’s sexuality, which can be reduced to the ‘biologically 
determined’ in dominant popular (and academic) understandings. The naturalising of 
caring for children (and others) as women’s work, and of women’s heterosexuality, 
or even submissive sexuality, was challenged, along with some of the ways these 
come to be naturalised. Thus, Rich (1977) distinguished women’s experience (or 
potential experience) of motherhood, from the institution of motherhood, to which 
actual mothering has been subjected and therefore drawn under male control. Barrett 
and McIntosh (1982), in critiquing ‘the anti-social family’ – a term which disrupts 
the presumption of a benign institution guaranteeing benign relationships - identify 
the family as both ideology and a social and economic institution. These are 
mutually reinforcing such that cultural meanings reinforce the institution, which has 
material effects, which in turn sustain cultural meanings. They identify the 
discrepancy between the ideology and most people’s lived reality which (even at the 
start of the eighties) did not match the nuclear family stereotype. 
 
These critiques have been important for Anglo-American feminism, both as a bed-rock 
of critique, but also as the ground on which painful lessons were learned. Since 
motherhood, heterosexuality and family connected with the experiences of many 
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 women, they were issues on which those outside of academic circles had their own 
views. The particularity of what was presented as the feminist analysis, was identified, 
particularly by African Caribbean and Asian women, working-class women, lesbians 
and others whose experience did not match that described (e.g. Amos and Parmar, 
1984; Carby, 1982; Hooks, 1991; Riley, 1988). A movement of predominantly white, 
middle-class women was perpetuating the mainstream’s exclusions by the over-
generalisation of experiences assumed to follow from the identity of ‘woman’ (Barrett 
and McIntosh, 1985; Feminist Review 17 and 22; Riley, 1988; Spelman, 1988). 
Chapter 3 described how for black women in racist cultures, the family and homeplace 
might be a valuable site of resistance to racism and ethnocentricism, regardless of its 
gender politics and that this might be highly significant for women’s overall experience 
of family (hooks, 1991). Similarly, women whose identities beyond home are 
dominated by meanings assigned class or dis/ability might also find their family roles 
and relationships an important source of respect. As a consequence, the meaning of 
family for women cannot be generalised and perhaps neither can it be simplified to an 
overall positive or negative.  
 
The consequences of this for feminist theory (and perhaps activism) have been 
profound. ‘Women’s interests’ can no longer be understood as unified and the factors 
most commonly recognised as structuring women’s experience (class and educational 
privilege, ‘race’ and ethnicity, sexual orientation) cannot simply be understood as 
summative, but might be more profoundly and unpredictably inflected by each other 
(Brah, 1992). That feminists could not speak for all women spawned the expansion of 
identity politics, but was also its first and deepest crack. It produced the attention to 
difference and insistence on opening up space for diverse analyses that characterises 
‘feminisms’ today (Hall et al., 1999). The difficulties of treating women, analytically, 
as a class, not only showed the limitations for feminists of appropriating a Marxist 
approach (Barrett, 1991; Bhavnani and Coulson, 1986; Ramazanoglu, 1986) but, along 
with the collapse of Eastern European and Soviet communism from the late 1980s, 
presented a profound challenge to class unities and hence to Marxism itself, at least 
among Western left intellectuals (Fraser 1989; Lovibund, 1989; Soper, 1991). Even if 
the theoretical necessity of common interests had not posed a problem for socialist and 
other forms of feminism at this time, recognition of the problematic understanding of 
subjectivity was a second, and related, key issue, to which this chapter now turns. 
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Western feminism can be divided into distinct historical periods each characterised by 
the dominance of a particular style of political struggle, or for Julia Kristeva (1986), 
‘signifying space’. In the early part of the twentieth century, the campaign for women’s 
suffrage was a struggle for women to be recognised as equal to men, and therefore 
involved identification with the dominant values of masculinist rationality. In contrast, 
Kristeva characterises the women’s liberation movement of the 1970’s in the West 
(‘second generation’ feminism) as distinctive in its concern with the symbolic order. 
‘Post ‘68’ feminism refused insertion into existing dimensions of politics, criticising 
dominant values and asserting women’s difference from men. Within second 
generation/’second wave’ feminism, Ann Snitow (1992) describes three phases of 
influential US writings on motherhood between 1963 and 1990. The first two are of 
interest here because they are ‘counter-ideological’. The first phase is from 1963 to 
1975, the second is from 1976 to 1979, and taken together, these are typified by Betty 
Friedan’s (1963) The Feminine Mystique and Shulamith Firestone’s (1970) The 
Dialectic of Sex. These books challenged the dominant images of motherhood, and the 
presumption of families as the harmonious, functional, 1950s model, but are recalled 
with embarrassment among many feminists for their outspoken critique and negativity. 
They have been demonised as anti-family and mother-hating. Firestone argued, in 
1970, that ‘the heart of woman’s oppression is in her child bearing and child rearing 
role’, and that gender oppression was more basic than class conflict. Her coup was in 
using arguments about biological difference for struggle against, rather than for, the 
status quo (Fraser and Nicholson, 1990), but the mode of grand explanatory narratives 
meant her lack of attention to historical detail troubled others (e.g. Mitchell, 1973) even 
before the eruption of the feminist auto/critique described above.  
 
Snitow’s third phase is of texts which tended to romanticise and idealise motherhood, 
such as the autobiographical writings of feminists who are sometimes described as 
having ‘changed their minds’ once they had children themselves (e.g. Betty Friedan, 
who came to see the family as essential to human happiness), or which claimed the 
principles behind mothering produced particular forms of moral development and as a 
potential basis for a female ethic of peace (e.g. Sara Ruddick). These texts can be seen 
as displaying a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to the inadequate recognition of emotional 
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 investment in ‘family’ in earlier writings, for reasons which include those explored 
below. 
 
5.3 Choosing to mother as ‘voluntary enslavement’
The damning indictment of family life was a prominent, if not consensus, view 
(Barrett and McIntosh, 1982) and ‘the contradiction between motherhood and 
liberation has been key to feminism’ (Gieve, 1987: p38), or certainly to twentieth 
century Western feminism. The analogy of gender with class in Marxist approaches 
allowed popular analyses of how women’s domestic labour was exploited and 
functioned to subordinate women to men, and led to the popularised formulation that 
having children was ‘against women’s interests’. This analysis of gender within terms 
familiar to class theorists was an appealing move since analysis of the exploitation of 
women as workers had not recognised reproductive labour and care, leaving class 
analyses ‘gender-blind’. However, as feminist critiques became more sharply 
articulated and broadly recognised, reactions to women who wanted children (and 
admitted wanting) were sometimes hostile or patronising (Attar, 1992; Leonard, 1992). 
There may never have been an outright rejection of mothering (Rowbotham, 1989), but 
a certain tone emerged amongst some feminists. Kristeva (1986) describes how the 
desire to be a mother was considered alienating and even reactionary among some 
‘second generation’ feminists, and the sense of it as a betrayal of feminism or other 
women. Women who had chosen to have children, or wanted to, were sometimes made 
to feel defensive. Claire Duchen conveys this hostility: ‘Freewheeling childless 
feminists could appear to be saying, ‘You made your bed, now lie on it’ as a result of 
the ‘ironic equation: enslaved motherhood + voluntary motherhood = voluntary 
slavery’ (Duchen, 1986, cited in Rowbotham, 1989: p60). 
 
Constructing women as duped into their ‘collaboration with the state’ or obediently 
adopting their prescribed role in the reproduction of patriarchal social relations must be 
rejected along with other implications of ‘false consciousness’, as Michele Barrett 
(1991) argues, but it is particularly regrettable for feminism to patronise and blame its 
subjects. Worse still, after feminism had ‘revealed’ that childbearing was not ‘in 
women’s interests’, women who ‘failed’ to learn this lesson appeared stupid, and those 
who acted against their interests could be seen as failing to be rational, self-preserving 
subjects, which risks playing into older accounts of women’s irrationality or/as 
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 pathology. The rational individual is clearly the ideal here and, taken to extremes, a 
rationalist utilitarianism – that if it wasn’t good for us we wouldn’t do it – seeks a 
causal motivation which socio-biological arguments are quick to answer, and do so 
in terms which feminists have long sought to contest. 
 
The degree to which this was ever defended theoretically is perhaps less important than 
women’s perception, then and now, that they are blamed for their complicity with their 
oppression. The wave of articles in early 1999 which consider young women’s views 
of feminism illustrate this perception. In response to Germaine Greer’s lamentation that 
complacent young women have foolishly settled on ‘equality’ rather than ‘liberation’, 
Tracey Emin says ‘I’m a strong woman …free to make her own choices. If I feel like 
wearing nail polish I will’, and Clare Rayner says ‘We should not feel guilty for 
cleaning our toilets if we want to’ (The Guardian, 24th February, 1999). Seeing women 
as complicit in their own oppression led to an individualist politics of guilt, 
(Kaufmann, 1998) and ‘victim’-blaming (Burman, 1997) because of an overarching 
liberal individualism (Seidler, 1994). Emin’s defiance of a feminism which is 
perceived as condemning and censorious emphasises her sense of active desire. It was 
the moral condemnation by some feminists of other women’s ‘politically incorrect’ 
desires that were the heart of the feminist ‘sex wars’ over pornography and lesbian 
sadomasochism in the 1980s and early 90s. Any approach which individualises the 
problem to see the solution in each woman’s individual restraint or purging of 
forbidden desires, is inadequate as a political or psychological model. Understanding 
women’s adoption of mothering roles as a result of ideological pressure leaves no room 
for a desire to mother as anything but passively accepted, emotionally superficial and 
inauthentic. It imagines an either/or investment in mothering/not mothering - with these 
positions seen crudely as collusive or resistive (Alldred, 1996b) - which oversimplifies 
feelings and loses the possibility of recognising the complexity of many women’s 
feelings about motherhood and the ambivalence many mothers feel (Eichler, 1980; 
Gieve, 1987; Hollway and Featherstone, 1997). It also allows a devaluation of the 
desire to nurture which we may wish to salvage from easy criticism.  
 
The problems with this are common to sociological and social psychological 
approaches to ‘social roles’, including the criticisms of ‘sex roles’ that feminists 
developed. At a sociological level, sex role theory presented an oversimplified 
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 description of social life, reducing the complexities of actual behaviours and 
characters of men and women to two categories, glossing over within-group 
differences. At a psychological level, the complexity, depth and potential 
contradictoriness of feelings and ‘attitudes’ are not recognised. Referring to 
motherhood as a role fails to recognise that it forms part of many women’s ‘core 
identities’, is ‘invested with blood, sweat, tears and toil’ (Elshtain, 1981, cited in 
Edwards, 1993: p12) not something women can easily split off from the rest of 
themselves. Role theory fails as an explanation because it does not allow for 
variation, complexity, or for a notion of ‘self’ other than a cluster of roles (Stanley 
and Wise, 1983). Tension and conflict are only explained as the consequence of 
multiple roles clashing or failing to mesh, implying that conflict would be avoiding 
by simply reducing the number of roles or juggling them more skilfully (Edwards, 
1991), thereby leaving individuals responsible for their own ‘role strain’ (Kessler et 
al., 1985). The dramaturgical metaphor thus risks failing to view roles within the 
material and structural constraints of peoples lives (Edwards, 1991) and making 
them sound ahistorical ‘givens’ (Smith, 1987). Whilst ‘role strain’ and ‘role conflict’ 
allow the recognition of an individual’s occupancy of multiple roles, they deal only 
at the level of unified subjects so that conflict is between their social roles rather 
than internal multiplicity, contradiction and incoherence, such as ambivalence about 
motherhood.  
 
The concept of roles has been popularised far beyond its sociological (especially 
social interactionist) origins and, like ideology, is immensely pervasive. It was 
valuable for enabling psychology to attribute significance to the social context of 
individuals’ lives, such that, for instance, the demand of ones’ work role to be at 
work by 9 o’clock could clash with ones’ mothering role which is not disciplined by 
the clock. However, we are more than ‘merely roles’. These describe a sociological, 
rather than psychosocial level of experience, and are anyway altered by their uptake 
by psychology, which maps them onto a core person (Henriques et al., 1998). The 
explanatory framework of ideologies of motherhood, family, femininity, maturity is of 
these having effects on the subject. This requires that the subject is understood as 
existing prior to ‘the social’ and is ‘imprinted upon’ by social images, which can be 
seen as having a contaminating effect. It is this construction of the subject as epistemic, 
whose pre-social ontology is the point of origin for desires and guarantees authentic 
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 selfhood which leads to the problem of disentangling ‘real’ desires from those that 
have been socially produced (Duchen, 1986, cited in Rowbotham, 1989). If the desire 
to bear or raise children is deemed inauthentic because it is a ‘mere’ product of culture, 
what are ‘real’ desires, and how are these to be distinguished? This understanding of a 
pre-social subject, bounded and independent of the social world is a feature of the 
European Enlightenment worldview within which Marxism – and modernist feminism 
- was conceived. Retaining a unified subject allows the fantasy that the contradictions 
can be smoothed out leaving a comfortable, integrated subject. However, this 
subject’s occupancy of social roles is static, not dynamic and ‘the reality of struggle 
and resistance as a permanent part of social life is left untackled (Anyou, 1983)’ 
(Edwards, 1991: p29) as Foucauldian feminists also have emphasised (e.g. Bell, 
1993; Butler, 1990; Sawicki, 1991). A psychosocial perspective recognises 
intrapsychic complexity, such as the clashing of pulls, drives or emotional 
commitments within the experience of an individual at a given time, yet need not 
individualise these as emanating from the epistemic subject.  
 
Psychosocial studies emerged from the mutual critique of sociology and psychology 
at a time (around the late 1970s and early 80s) when sociology emphasised the 
structural constraints on people, including dominant social meanings and systems of 
organisation, but paid little attention to emotional life, and psychology’s object, the 
individual, was theorised as if abstracted from society, only peripherally influenced 
by ‘social factors’. As politically motivated social psychologists tried to relocate the 
subject in the wider social world they were limited by the model of the bounded 
individual in their social context. This dichotomy between ‘the individual’ on the 
one hand, and ‘the social’ on the other, was what post-structuralist writers radically 
reworked: ‘From the individual to the social – a bridge too far’ as Henriques et al., 
(1984/1998) described it. Psychosocial studies is also informed by cultural studies 
approaches to examining ‘the social world’ and psychoanalytic approaches to 
understanding the intrapsychic world of dynamic processes. Barry Richards, who 
has led psychosocial studies at the University of East London throughout the 1990s, 
describes his own ‘psychosocial study’ (Richards, 1994a) as exploring ‘the psychic 
meanings and emotional resonances of some key cultural phenomena while also 
attending to their historical and political dimensions’ (p13). This thesis has been 
formed through my teaching work in that department, but probably has a reversed 
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 emphasis. It has focused on the political dimensions of cultural phenomena 
concerning parents and knowledge about parenting while attending to the subjective 
implications of the theoretical approaches to studying it.  
 
5.4 Contemporary ‘fitness to parent’ ideology? 
This section will consider the value of ideology analysis for the accounts presented in 
earlier chapters and will then consider the popularised psychology which provides 
resources for understanding subjectivity in everyday discussion of parents and children. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 argued that the cultural images of mothers and of fathers contained 
negative meanings attributed to working-class mothers and fathers, but in neither 
case were all negative discourses reducible to a class value hierarchy. In chapter 3, 
an analysis which replaced class to see gender oppression as the fundamental 
dynamic would have neglected the mobilisation of meanings of class, ‘race’, 
sexuality and of ‘normality’ and ‘naturalness’ in relation to mothers. Even dominant 
mainstream understandings of motherhood may position women differently, and 
women are pitted against each other competitively in discourses of child 
development, of disadvantage, or for resources. In addition, whilst an ideology 
analysis can criticise negative representations, silences and absences are difficult to 
examine as ideological representations, yet are important. For instance, Ann Phoenix 
(1996) argues that the absence of ‘race’ in recent conservative criticisms of lone 
mothers does not mean that there are no troubling racial meanings at work. Rather, 
precisely this silence presumes and therefore normalises whiteness thereby 
constructing black families as outside of the British nation (Gilroy, 1987). 
 
The original aim of this thesis is changed by the recognition of the multiple, 
contradictory nature of contemporary ideology, (Billig, 1990; Billig et al., 1988). 
Drawing together the various understandings of ‘unfit’ mothers would not reveal she 
who is deemed fit to mother. The images of ‘unfit’ mothers are not consistent with 
one another, they overlap and sometimes contradict. The culturally ideal mother is 
not a fixed point of reference. There is not a ‘safe’ space between criticisms of 
mothers which is free from criticism. Indeed, for any given woman, there may be 
contradictory judgements. A black, working class woman may find her mothering 
suspect on account of her class background, naturalised on account of her ‘racial’ 
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 identity, but applauded if she remains in paid work. But within such ideas are 
contradictions. The recent emphasis on mothers going out to work to provide 
financially for their children suits the Government’s welfare agenda and has come to 
be commended – in psychological terms - for ‘modelling’ financial self-sufficiency 
to children. However, it is contradicted by older, still powerful, psychoanalytically 
backed ideas about the value of mothers’ full-time care for their children. Instead of 
a coherent object of scrutiny and judgement within an ideology of fitness to parent, 
each eruption of debate or condemnation re/constructs the ‘qualities’ defining 
unfitness. ‘Fitness to parent’ does not appear to have the unity of an ideology and it 
does not promote identifiable interests which always work for/against particular 
social groups. It cannot be seen as the coherent distortion of truth and neither is 
resistance to it coherent enough to be identified in the abstract. However, it remains 
important to analyse the ideological implications of strands within it. 
 
In chapter 4, resistance to the Child Support Act and Agency was difficult to map 
ideologically because, although ideological arguments within the Act and within 
opposition to it can be identified, the arguments were not articulated by homogenous 
groups of people, nor did the various parties remain constant, as Mitchell and Goody 
(1997) also argue. For example, resistance to the principle that absent fathers pay 
child support to ex-partners might unite: men who have no contact with their 
children; poor men; men with second families; the second partners or mothers of 
such men; women wanting financial independence of men; and socialists or 
feminists wanting state provision for children. While ideological positions can be 
identified, particular political arguments cannot be reliably assigned to particular 
groups of people. Neither gender, nor class group interests remain distinct. Nor even 
critical perspectives: various different arguments or accounts present themselves as 
feminist. Similarly, family ideology is not only articulated by those on the right, as 
Barrett and McIntosh (1982) showed through calls from those on the left for ‘a 
family wage’. Indeed, even if the principles of a feminist critique are agreed, 
alternative analyses are possible, as the discourse of parents can illustrate. In 
parenting magazines, referring to mothers reinforces the idea that women should be 
the ones to raise children, but referring to ‘parents’ obscures whose labour it usually 
is, and in relation to feminist historical analyses of childcare books, those that 
advocate more participation by men can be interpreted as doing so because the task 
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 is ‘too important to be left to women’, whilst those emphasising the maternal role 
can be seen as denying women an autonomous existence outside the home (after 
Jordanova, 1985). The question of warranting any particular (say, feminist) analysis 
raises a bigger question about warranting any descriptive account that claims to be 
‘pre-analysis’. The previous chapters are, of course, my accounts of popular images 
of parents, with little explicit warranting but the inference that they are descriptive 
and as unveiling the truth behind the depictions, but I have no defence against the 
charge that mine are just another set of ideological accounts. Should a feminist 
reader believe my account because I identify as feminist? Chapter 6 explores how 
any warrant is supported once the unity of the identity group whose perspective it 
‘admitted’ is shattered. 
 
Modifying this PhD title from ‘fitness to parent’ - a psychological quality, an object 
with putative coherence - to ‘fit to parent?’ was to emphasise its function as a question 
in popular debate. Even when implicit, it is a threatening query about someone else’s 
fitness to raise children, and is often therefore accompanied by process of social 
distancing whereby those in question are made other to the questioner and the 
presumption of the questioner’s fitness is bolstered. In spite of its questioning nature in 
popular debate, and the contested nature of popular understandings of parents, it is 
not a question psychology answers directly. 
 
We need a way of criticising the powerful, normative meanings of family which still 
operate through explicit appeals to ‘family values’ and popular presumptions about 
‘good parents’ and ‘nice families’. So how can we understand cultural images of 
mothers, fathers and ideas about fitness to parent as affecting individuals? How do 
those of us who cringe at some of the images of mothering and are critical of its 
naturalisation come to identify having children with our own satisfaction and adopt 
conventional subject positions within the dominant cultural discourses of wanting 
children? As argued above, the satisfactory theorisation of the subjective implications 
of romantic imagery of mothers and family life has been limited within ‘second wave’ 
feminist theory because of the individual/society dichotomy and modernist subject, but 
these are both challenged by post-structuralist approaches which inform psychosocial 
studies. However, it is unsurprising, given that these underpin the Western post 
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 Enlightenment worldview, that these features of the subject, and relation of the subject 
to the social is presumed in the popular sphere. 
 
Earlier chapters showed how concepts of role models and of social influence are 
pervasive in popular debate providing an unproblematised common-sense 
understanding of how ‘the social’ affects ‘the individual’. In chapter 3, concerns 
expressed about ‘unfit mothers’ were about the influence they might exert on their 
children. Concern over lesbian mothers, or lesbian or gay foster carers/adoptive 
parents, is often that the children will grow up gay. This was even more crudely 
expressed in the fear about the lesbian youth worker’s influence on the sexuality of 
the young people she worked with. Similarly for mothers, the idea that letting single 
women have donor insemination would ‘encourage’ others to do the same was what 
allowed the 1991 ‘virgin births’ to be seen as ‘striking at the heart of the family’. 
Thus, women were constructed as highly suggestible, whilst, of course, the media’s 
own moral panic gave much publicity to (these women’s) rationales for mothering 
without a man. The media does not, therefore, simply reflect, but produces what it 
claims to depict, even what it laments (see Watney, 1997 for a critique of the 
concept of moral panic in chapter 1).  
 
In chapters 3 and 4, concerns about boys growing up without a male role model 
assume the family or household delineate the sphere of influence on the child, 
underplaying the influence of the peer group (Rich Harris, 1998) and of broader 
cultural meanings (Burman, 1994a; Riley, 1983). Concern about ‘father absence’ is 
clearly about some abstract level of role or identity because, as Phoenix and 
Woollett (1991) argue, little concern is expressed about ‘the development of those 
children whose fathers frequently go away on business, or as Hardyment argues, 
whose jobs keep them out of their homes for most of their children’s waking hours’ 
(1991: p4-5). The discourse of the ‘father figure’ role model for children, 
particularly boys, has prevented consideration of the quality of interaction between 
the fathers and children, whether coresident or not. This results in powerful appeals 
to children’s wellbeing attaching to a superficial concept of role model which is 
empty of meaning in any psychological sense, as Hester and Radford’s (1996) 
research shows for contact disputes where ‘[t]he quality of a child’s relationship 
with the father was rarely questioned. A father who simply expressed an interest in 
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 seeing his child was usually accepted as a ‘good father’. Contact was not terminated 
until there was strong evidence that a child was suffering from abuse as a result of 
seeing the father’ (cited in Cooke and Bahl, 1998: p11). In each of these cases, the 
concern is about individuals being subjected to bad influences, in its strongest form, 
‘corruption’, and mostly on the psycho-sexual development of children and young 
people. The same model of influence is invoked in understanding the effects of TV 
violence, and is referred to as an ‘injection’ model of media influence. The concept 
of roles has entered popular discourse, where it can allow for a feminist critique of 
women’s roles, but can reinforce this understanding of the individual-social relation. 
This highlights the difficulty of ascertaining its (political) value (to any woman) in 
the abstract. 
 
5.5 The ‘turn to language’
The above concerns reflect the critique of ideology developed by post-structuralist 
writers. Michel Foucault, in particular, identifies three problems with ideology: that it 
is inevitably constructed in opposition to truer knowledge; that it relies on a liberal 
humanist model of the subject; and, as Michelle Barrett argues in her later work, that ‘it 
is enmeshed in the unsatisfactory and determinist base-and-superstructure model within 
Marxism’ and understood as functioning to cause and express particular economic 
relations (1991: p123). Post-structuralist approaches are united broadly by an argument 
about the centrality of language in human social life and consequent 
reconceptualisations of the relationship between language, social institutions and 
individual consciousness, particularly by Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Althusser and 
Kristeva (Weedon, 1987). The rest of this chapter focuses on issues of the 
subject/subjectivity, but chapter 6 returns to questions of knowledge and truth.  
 
Post-structuralist approaches radically undermine the conventional Western view of 
language as a transparent medium, merely reflecting meanings by providing a label. 
Instead, language is understood as constitutive of social reality: 
‘Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organisation 
and their likely social and political consequences are defined and contested. Yet 
it is also the place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed’ 
(Weedon, 1987: p21, original emphasis). 
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 The power of language lies in calling into being what it names. That is, it is 
perfomative (Butler, 1990), not in the volitional sense of ‘free’ agency, but in the 
power of reiteration to produce the phenomena it regulates and constrains (Butler 
1993). Language is ambiguous and plurivocal, a site of continual conflict and 
contestation (Sawicki, 1991; Weedon, 1987). The language and social practices 
through which we understand an object are incorporated within the term ‘discourse’ 
(Foucault, 1972; 1977a; 1981b; Parker, 1992) (which is discussed further in chapter 7). 
Through challenges at the micro-level, hegemonic systems of thought (such as 
phallocentric discourse) are not in possession of total power (Sawicki, 1991). Even 
dominant discourses remain contestable, their effects, and that of resistance to them, 
remaining unpredictable (Bell, 1993; Foucault, 1981a; Walkerdine, 1996). 
 
The view that personal decisions, for instance, about having children, were individual 
choices within the ‘private sphere’ could pre-empt broader political analysis (Marshall, 
1986). However, the rhetoric of the personal being political seemed to create moral 
imperatives for personal life. The inadequacy of the ideology framework to theorise the 
desires and motivations of an individual (Hollway, 1989), and the individualism these 
engender (Venn, 1985) are features which relate closely to individual/society dualism. 
This reconceptualisation of language as productive challenges this, along with other 
binaries, such as language/practice, ideology/institution, private/public and impacts on 
arguments about reform/revolution, structure/agency and determinism/voluntarism. 
Dissolving the boundary between the subject and social means that there can be no 
subject prior to the social. Experience is constructed through, and against cultural 
discourses of family, maternity, maturity, femininity, masculinity, satisfaction, life 
purpose etc., which is not to imply any delusion, or superficiality. The opposition 
between any ‘real’ and ‘socially produced’ desire to have children is dissolved once the 
epistemic subject is problematised: ‘the real’ is as much the product of cultural 
discourses as ‘the ideological’. Thus, discourse avoids the distinction between truth and 
ideology (Weedon, 1987) and authentic/inauthentic distinction between desires which 
have ontological significance. 
 
Understanding discourse as powerful in this way entails a reconceptualisation of 
power itself. In contrast to ‘sovereign power’ (the conventional model of power that 
was available to Marxist and first and second wave feminism), where it is exercised 
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 from above as negative or repressive, it is understood as circulating throughout the 
social body, never fully possessed by those ‘in power’, but existing in action, in 
what it produces, as well as what it represses (Foucault, 1981a). Thus, in modern 
society, according to Foucault, power operates at the level of the body, and through 
‘technologies of the self’: it ‘reaches into the very grain of the individual, touches 
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, 
learning processes and everyday lives’ (1981a: p39). Such ‘disciplinary power’ is 
associated with the emergence of modern social institutions and knowledge forms 
and a self-disciplining individual (Gore, 1995; Rose, 1990; Dean, 1994). It is highly 
pervasive, yet aspects of its operation are invisible to earlier forms of 
socialist/feminist analysis. Thus, despite concerns that, as structuralist analyses are 
undermined and attention turns to language, power and materiality are neglected, 
power is foremost in post-structuralism and individuals are seen as positioned midst 
relations of power, where even their resources for understanding are, and themselves 
produce effects of power. Despite this, we are not determined and the possibility of 
social/political change is retained (Hollway, 1989). 
 
5.6 Cultural discourses and ‘governmentality’
Power operates through, not over, subjectivity: individuals are not ‘disciplined’ 
against their will, but are enjoined to regulate their selves (Deleuze 1977; Foucault, 
1977; 1981a; Martin et al., 1988). Discourses of family are not powerful through 
coercion, but because they command our subjective investments (Rose, 1987; 1990; 
1993; Van Krieken, 1991). Mothers and fathers, husbands and wives ‘themselves 
regulate their feelings, desires, wishes and emotions and think themselves through the 
potent images of parenthood, sexual pleasure and quality of life’ (Rose, 1990: p73). 
What can be viewed as the ideological effects of images of family, are not passive 
effects on individuals, but are dynamically productive through subjectivity, through the 
production and regulation of our own active desire and emotional investments (Dean, 
1994; Foucault, 1981a; Rabinow, 1984).  
 
This does not require rejecting the idea that certain social objectives are at work in 
particular discourses, however, their political consequences cannot be guaranteed. 
Families can still be understood as reproducing workers for capitalism ‘not in spite of 
the wishes of women and men, but because it came to work as a private, voluntary and 
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 responsible agency for the rearing and moralising of children and promoting their 
mental and physical welfare’ (Rose, 1989a: p130). The ‘shaping of wills, desires, 
aspirations, and interests, the formation of subjectivities and collectivities is more 
typical than the brute domination of one will by another’ (Rose, 1987: p67) and more 
effective (Van Krieken, 1991). Mothers do not need coercing or persuading to try to do 
their best for their children in general. While condemnatory discourses of (‘unfit’) 
mothers do depict failure to be a ‘good mother’ or construct some women’s mothering 
as dubious in advance on account of social identity categories, it is not that negative 
external images scare women into trying to mother well, but that cultural 
understandings of motherhood, amongst them perhaps feminist discourses too, produce 
mothers’ genuine personal investments, pleasures and frustrations. Thus, cultural 
discourses are powerful at the level of subjectivity. Parents ‘govern’ themselves 
through the operation of guilt, personal anxiety and private disappointment, as well as 
through discourses of emotional reward, personal satisfaction and the pleasures of 
intimacy, interpersonal relationships and self-knowledge.  
 
In The History of Sexuality Volume 1, Foucault showed how sexuality has come to 
be seen by Westerners as a site through which we uncover authentic desires, come to 
know our ‘real selves’ and thereby re/construct our true identities. Parenting too now 
occupies a central place in our self-identities, our relationships, our life projects, and 
is seen as revealing aspects of ourselves. Our personal qualities are tested by the 
demands of childrearing, revealing hidden qualities, and we are brought face-to-face 
with, or may re-enact, the dynamics of our own childhood. There are psychoanalytic 
and popular discourses of the relationship between our own behaviour as parents and 
that we experienced from our parents. Intimate relationships among ‘parents’, 
between parents and children, as well as between lovers, are sites of the production 
of (our)selves as identities and subjects (Sawicki, 1991). 
 
Whereas the self has long been the object of reflection and practices 
‘whereby individuals, by their own means or with the help of others, act[ed] 
on their own bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being in order to 
transform themselves and attain a certain state of perfection or happiness, or to 
become a sage or immortal’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: p208-9), 
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 contemporary self-reflection can constitute a new self positively without renouncing 
the (old) self, in contrast to Christian and Graeco techniques of verbalisation of the 
self. The Christian examination of inner thoughts with respect to purity of self 
appears a ‘condition of possibility’ for Freudian thought, and the shift to 
understanding and working with the self. In the modern world, where knowledge of 
oneself is a fundamental principle, reflection upon childhood experience and its 
consequences forms a primary element. The life story expects it, and causal relations 
are read into it beyond the clinical sphere (e.g. on Radio 4’s Desert Island Discs 
etc.). It is because of these cause-and-effect narratives that the self is to be known 
and accepted, not blamed for its moral failings. We make ourselves our own 
projects, but allow others, and particularly parents, to have produced us as we are. 
 
Foucault’s ‘technologies of domination’ included the way people are objectified and 
divided by oppositional categories of madness/sanity, normal/perverted etc. (1977a; 
1980). The discursive questioning of fitness to parent can be seen as a ‘dividing 
practice’ (Rabinow, 1984) excluding certain people from the social body of normal 
adults who are assumed to make decent parents. The assignment of fathers to either 
polarised image in the child support debates was a dividing practice on the basis of 
benefit receipt. Other meanings concerning their virtue as a father were attributed on 
the basis of this classification, as with the stigmatisation of benefit receipt in 
general. Foucault’s technologies of domination are linked to technologies of the self 
by what he calls ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1988; Dean 1994). Parents govern 
themselves through their reflection upon self, behaviour and relationships and not 
even attempting to do so today would mark parents as old-fashioned and perhaps 
uncaring, because it would fail to show concern for the psychological health of 
relationships. The reflexive individualisation expected of today’s subjects (Beck, 
1992) might include particularly psychological, teleological narratives for parents 
and would-be parents, which is what supports the market for parenting magazines. 
 
5.7 Why feminism can’t counter ideology
Understanding power as productive through subjectivity allows the conceptualisation 
of desire as active, genuine, dynamic and complex. As Kristeva (1986) reminds us, 
feminist analyses of women’s desire for children ‘in spite of feminist critiques of 
motherhood’ are important in order to counter essentialist analyses, whether of 
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 biological determinism (e.g. sociobiology) or psychic determinism (e.g. some 
psychoanalytic approaches), particularly given the rise of fundamentalist religion 
and popular moralism about ‘family values’. 
 
Valerie Walkerdine discusses the relationship between cultural representations and 
the psychic production of ‘feminine’ desire in her essay, Some Day My Prince Will 
Come (reprinted in Walkerdine, 1990). Drawing on psychoanalysis, she develops a 
model of subjectivity which allows for desire in ways that neither conventional 
media effects models or conventional developmental approaches have. She describes 
the ideological effects of representations of girls and women in girls’ comics in the 
1970s in terms of their preparation of girls for heterosexual romantic love. The 
comics’ key narrative is that the heroine’s feminine virtues - her uncomplaining self-
denial, passivity and deference to her father or male suitor - will eventually be 
rewarded by romantic success. Rather than seeing girls as passively accepting 
conventional heterosexual relations as natural or inevitable, Walkerdine recognises 
both the power of ideology, and highlights the complexity of its mode of operation. 
‘Contrary to some classic approaches to feminine role models, I shall not 
argue that young girls passively adopt a female role model, but rather that their 
adoption of femininity is at best shaky and partial: the result of a struggle in 
which heterosexuality is achieved as a solution to a set of conflicts and 
contradictions in familial and other social relations.’ (Walkerdine, 1990: p88) 
 
The images or cultural narratives ‘insert girls into ideological and discursive 
positions by practices which locate them in meaning and in regimes of truth’ (p87) 
so producing femininity. Such meanings come to be part of women at the level of 
desire and through dynamic social processes, including direct interpersonal relations 
and rather than a simple accept/reject of ideological messages, these dynamic 
processes allow for complex outcomes.  
 
Walkerdine’s analysis develops from her recognition of the limits of providing 
‘positive images’ of women to children in order to counter sexist imagery. ‘Positive 
images’ approaches risk constructing a subject who is passive in their absorption of 
cultural images and perhaps overly-rational in their selection, when available, of 
‘more positive’ images. This neglects the role of the unconscious in the production 
of desire and relegates the emotional realm to the playing out of superficial, static 
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 cultural roles. Instead, cultural discourses can be seen, not simply as biased accounts 
of reality, but as producing subject positions, which, through processes of 
identification, we take up and from where certain realities are experienced. Not only 
our minds but also our feelings and desires are culturally formed. Walkerdine 
emphasises the role of the unconscious and the irrational in the formation of the 
subject. This could explain how intellectual critique does not wash away say, a 
feminist’s fantasy that the Prince will be her romantic saviour. Even toddlers are 
already positioned as little boys or little girls, and little girls quickly come to 
understand this idea that the rewards of femininity are future ones. Not only is she 
positioned as a girl, but she may often actively position herself as girl where there may 
be straightforward benefits or strategic ‘solutions’ given the penalties of doing 
otherwise, and it may indeed bring her later happiness. To imagine a little girl will 
simply give up her princess fantasies is to assume she has no emotional investment in 
them, or that any investment was misjudged. Instead, understanding women’s 
subjectivities as constituted through such narratives raises the possibility of thinking 
beyond identities, to consider, for instance, how feminists may identify with 
romantic, maternalist or essentialising imagery or how even lesbians may find the 
Prince’s eventual arrival amongst their fantasies. 
 
It is the idea that ‘lifting the veil of distortion’ will let girls see beyond culturally 
prescribed femininity that Walkerdine responds to because it makes it sound as if 
femininity were merely a superficial social role, easily cast off, rather than 
something that has engaged their/our emotional investment. It can also appeal to an 
underlying true nature that will surface and can be relied upon to be in their interest. 
The idea that awareness of political critiques of dominant cultural discourses might 
render them less ‘effective’ is evident in some feminist and Marxist writings. When 
feminist values or alternative discourses are seen as a counter-ideological an 
‘enlightening’ and protective function is sometimes inferred. Such ‘enlightenment 
relies on an ideology/truth distinction that comes from Marx’s critical or 
epistemological definition of ideology as distorted knowledge (‘the mystification that 
serves class interests’), rather than Lenin’s ‘descriptive’ definition (Barrett, 1991). 
This hope that feminist analysis will protect women from pronatal or maternal ideology 
or make the ‘knower’ immune to their ‘effects’ remains implicit in some popular 
feminist writing. For instance, the publisher’s recommendation of Tuula Gordon’s 
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 (1990) book, Feminist Mothers, says that ‘Feminism...can be significant in providing 
protection against the myths of motherhood’. The same conceptual apparatus underlies 
accusations from the other end of the political spectrum that feminism is to blame for 
turning women off men, motherhood or the family (Falludi, 1991). Feminism cannot 
simply ‘counter’ ideology as an intellectual critique once ideology is understood as 
operating through the unconscious and emotional levels, and needs formulate 
challenges to dominant cultural discourses in terms that do not neglect our formation 
as subjects already through such discourses or require the rational identification of 
interests. As Foucault highlighted, to imagine that cultural analysis or political critique 
of certain ideas can in some sense ‘do away with’ them is to neglect to consider their 
imbrication with power which operates through their production of subjectivity. Such 
expressions illustrate the rethinking of strategic responses to cultural discourses once 
their power is understood as productive, not merely repressive. 
 
5.8 From identity to identifications 
Identity categories did not work to explain experience or politics, as argued above. 
Nor do they adequately map behaviour or ‘attitudes’ (a concept which itself is 
deconstructed along with the bounded individual). They meant having to choose one 
aspect of self above others (Lorde, 1984), which always required a disavowal or 
exclusion of other parts (Hall, 1996). Identity assumes a unity or internal coherence 
which leaves no room for the multiplicity of identifications, a stability or 
‘definability’ which precludes the recognition of change over time or radical 
incoherence, and it often sets up oppositions that polarise (such as male, female) and 
categories which foreclose (such as homosexual/heterosexual). As Judith Butler 
shows, the binary gender identity system sustains heteronormativity - not only the 
classification of relationships, but with powerfully normalising and naturalising 
consequences (1990). 
 
Whilst feminist discourses cannot inoculate, they can, however, provide for 
alternative subject positions which may facilitate resistance to specific ideas for an 
individual woman at a given moment. The popular recognition of a discourse as 
feminist or the association of certain subject positions with feminist ideas may, in some 
circumstances, provide a position of resistance or it may simply be that moving 
between different discursive positions – such as ‘mother’ and ‘parent’ (see Alldred, 
 138
 1996b) - allows the strategic evasion of certain meanings. Recognising the 
impossibility of identifying subject group interests leads to a focus on resistance that 
can occur at the level of the individual. Similarly, the critique of identity politics that 
accompanies this recognition promotes a focus on identifications rather than identities 
for understanding subjective investments in cultural forms, seen in contemporary 
literary, media and communication studies. And the critique of the unitary rational 
subject from feminist, post-colonial, post-structuralist, psychoanalytic and 
postmodern theoretical directions all promote a focus on intra-psychic processes. 
 
Feminist writers such as Butler (1990; 1993), Hollway (1984; 1989), Kristeva 
(1986), Urwin (1985) and Walkerdine (1984; 1990) use psychoanalytic 
understandings of subjectivity, which, since Freud’s writings of an unconscious, 
enable the deconstruction of the unitary rational subject, and challenge the role 
reason and rationality have been assumed to play in human life and social 
organisation. Whilst psychoanalytic approaches provide the foremost theoretical 
resource for conceptualising subjectivity, rather than assuming a unified subject, 
they presuppose gender, knowing man through reflection on representations of 
woman and woman as the lack of masculinity (Warner, 1996a). Freudian and post-
Freudian work sometimes relies on identity categories or whole-subject positions, 
most obviously in Oedipal relations. Resolution of Oedipal conflict and the Electra 
complex require subjects to hold coherent identity categories (a heterosexual parent 
of each gender), for the production of children whose sex-typed (i.e. normative) 
gender identity is consolidated by a heterosexual orientation. As Sam Warner writes:  
‘[Judith] Butler (1990b) argues that while psychoanalytic stories disrupt the 
notion of a gender stability, they nevertheless institute gender coherence 
through the stabilising metanarrative of infantile development. The 
construction of infantile development thus “instantiates gender specificity and 
subsequently informs, organises and unifies identity” (Butler, 1990b: p329-
330)’ (1996a: p44). 
 
Whilst it is arguable that pre-Oedipal dynamics do not require gendered identities or 
a heterosexual parental partnership (Hollway, 1997), some object relations 
approaches have bolstered conservative evaluations of sexual identity categories 
(e.g. despite some feminist Kleinian therapists today, other Kleinian psychoanalysts 
continue to view homosexual identities as pathological - immature, narcissistic or 
masochistic (see critical account by O’Connor and Ryan, 1993).  
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It is a paradox of psychoanalytic theory for feminists (and see e.g. Brennan, 1989) 
that it both enables the deconstruction of the modernist subject, which the concept of 
identity maps onto, yet often fundamentally generalises across crude identity 
categories (of boy, girl, mother, father) and is often highly hetero-gender normative. 
Even feminist psychoanalytic writers, such as Nancy Chodorow (1978), can be 
viewed as reifying, and her followers sometimes essentialising, gender difference by 
attributing differences they find between men and women to universal features of 
male and female psychosexual development (Fraser and Nicholson, 1990; Pollitt, 
1992). The questions she poses, such as Why female mothering produces the next 
generation of women inclined to mother and men not so? are still very important, 
but the reliance on identity categories polarises and entrenches difference and can 
seem to block further conceptual development by the simplifications they force. 
Whilst Chodorow’s analysis is culturalist and she advocates men’s increased 
involvement in mothering to promote more profound social change, the different 
male/female psychic forms, orientations or capabilities can reinforce conventional 
essentialist understandings, and make it hard to ‘offer up’ the first generation of 
children to be reared by men who themselves were produced as less relational 
subjects. Its cause-and-effect narrative makes radical change hard to envisage: by 
reinforcing the social influence model within the modernist subject/society relation, 
including the understandings that children’s relationship with their primary carer 
produces a deep sense of self, which remains relatively constant thereafter and has 
particular impact on behaviours and relationships. (The ‘gut validity’ of such 
narratives for us now relates to the popularisation of psychoanalytic, certain 
psychological and feminist discourses (Parker, 1997), but as Pollitt (1992) argues, 
Chodorow’s arguments about the production of male denigration of women makes 
her far less idealising of women’s relational selves than popularised versions can 
be.) Furthermore, the drive for explanatory theory leads to overarching cross-
cultural and trans-historical analyses which loose sight of differences in mothering 
practices and understandings, and social and economic power relations within which 
other or more complex relations may operate. Besides glossing over differences 
between mothers who share a culture, it also draws other cultures’ practices within 
particular Western understandings of childrearing, gender, self, etc.  
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 Nancy Chodorow did, however, challenge the psychological superficiality of 
understandings of ‘sex role socialisation’. Similarly, psychoanalysis asks valuable 
questions and reveals the limitations of mainstream psychology, but sometimes 
stakes its claims to modernist metanarratives. The conceptual framework of male 
and female was simply all that was available for second wave feminisms and other 
modernist liberatory discourse, (and, likewise, the liberal model of power), so 
inevitably the ‘generic individuated concepts of ‘women and ‘men’, in their 
‘bifurcated one-dimensionality’ were the ‘conceptual protagonists of the patriarchy 
debate’ (Crowley, 1999: p133). As Warner (1996a) argues: 
‘Like Butler, we believe that we need to challenge the fixedness of 
sex/gender binary distinctions by disrupting the place of sex as standing 
outside cultural practices: “it seems crucial to resist the myth of interior 
origins, understood either as naturalised or culturally fixed. Only then, 
gender coherence might be understood as the regulatory fiction it is - rather 
than the common point of liberation” (Butler, 1990b: p339)’. (ibid.: p51-2) 
 
Feminists informed by post-structuralist approaches, such as Fraser and Nicholson 
(1990) highlight the need to interrogate the terms themselves, the historical 
specificity of the problem and the conceptual resources we have available for its 
study. So, for instance, we might look at the histories of the terms ‘woman’ and 
‘mother’ and the social conditions within which they are in particular relationship to 
each other. We might explore further the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
and popularisation of the term ‘parents’ in contemporary Britain, its genealogy, as 
Foucault called it, amongst the struggles over gender over the course of this century, 
or longer histories of particular understandings of the child. 
 
Foucault argued for a shift from resting our understandings of self and knowledge 
on the ‘knowing subject’ to looking at the discursive practices by which we 
construct the subject and knowledge (Rabinow, 1984). Stuart Hall argues (1996) that 
this need not mean abandoning the subject or any sense of agency, but ‘thinking it in 
its new, displaced or decentred position within the paradigm’ (p2) and rearticulating 
the relationship between subjects and discursive practice. Asking how we ‘do’ 
subjectivity or ‘know’ ourselves, (within which identity is one, albeit dominant, 
discourse or technology of the self), shifts attention to the processes and dynamics 
that allow the production of subjects such that subjectivity is experienced as 
relatively stable, and self as relatively coherent by most of us. Freud’s formulation 
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 of identification was, from the start, partial and ambivalent, so identifications were 
not seen as forming a coherent relational system (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985). 
Judith Butler (1990; 1993) writes about the radical productivity or ‘performativity’ 
of identities. Within them are the seeds of resistance as well as perpetuation of 
dominance because 
‘Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly 
reconstituted, and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability. They 
are that which is constantly marshalled, consolidated, retrenched, contested, 
and on occasion, compelled to give way’ (1993: p105). 
 
The contemporary formulation of the notion of identity has been popularised over 
the past 30 years as a political and often empowering technology. It produces or 
corroborates this sense of self, even as it limits, constrains or reveals its artefactual 
nature in the slippages and leaks it fails to contain. Psychoanalysis highlights how 
the excluded parts (whose very exclusion permits identity) return to disrupt and 
trouble the prematurely foreclosed categories of identity. It is the violence of this 
disavowal at the subjective or intrapsychic level, as well as at the interpsychic or 
cultural/political level (where emphatic self/Other splitting allows processes which 
sustain cultural imperialism) that Couze Venn (1985) points to in arguing the political 
urgency of reconceptualising subjectivity (as do others such as Barrett, 1991; Minh-Ha, 
1989; Spivak, 1988; 1999).  
 
Approaches incorporating discourses of psychoanalytic process would allay the 
concern of Henriques et al. (1998) that discursive psychology which rejects 
cognitivism in favour of ‘subject positions’ can neglect individual internal processes 
and the unconscious dynamics which allow/produce the uptake of certain subject 
positions. Many feminist theorists find psychoanalytic discourses of process more 
useful than its gendered roles/identities and many draw on Lacanian work for its 
‘turn to language’ (e.g. Judith Butler, Theresa de Lauretis, Jane Flax, Julia Kristeva, 
Toril Moi, Valerie Walkerdine). Thus, ‘post-identity’ readings of psychoanalysis 
which focus on processes and relations, rather than identities and family roles might 
offer ways of developing post-structuralist psychosocial work further.  
 
The implications of the popular discourses of mothers, fathers and ‘parents’ 
discussed in earlier chapters for particular individuals cannot therefore be predicted 
from identity categories. Media theory first emphasised the power of ideological 
 142
 messages in cultural images; then recognised differences among the audience and 
audience agency; and now might emphasise, not only the possibility of resistive 
readings by active, critical subjects, but also their unpredictability. Identity 
categories cannot guarantee or fix particular readings, nor could their stability be 
assumed for any particular person, that is, their readings might differ at different 
times (Mills, 1994). The fact that multiple discursive subject positions are potentially 
available to an individual at a given time is not to imply that they are all equally 
available. As Walkerdine and Butler, after Foucault (1980: p141) highlight, people are 
‘always already’ constituted in ways which mean differential access to other subject 
positions because they will require different investments from, and may produce 
different consequences for them. Harsh characterisations of certain parents in the 
media do not only impact on us as we are divided dichotomously by being either 
object of the discourse or part of the safely normalised body that they are ‘othered’ 
from. Our subjectification by/in the discourses may be much more complex. 
Individuals may be emotionally invested in particular ways through diverse 
processes of identification and may also be interpellated or positioned within certain 
meanings, that is, through both techniques of the self and of domination. 
Importantly, because an individual’s positioning in particular discourses is not fixed 
or determined, multiple and even contradictory desires or elements of identity can be 
acknowledged without implying that inconsistency suggests ‘irrationality’ or 
pathology.  
 
These critiques challenge the media’s reliance on generalisations to the level of 
identity categories. Identities represent qualities of parents or of parent-child 
relationships as little as they guaranteed politics or experience. The labels ‘lone 
mother’, ‘virgin’ mother, ‘absent father’, lesbian mother, married/single, 
heterosexual/gay do not mean anything reliable in terms of ‘fitness to parent’ even if 
we reify that as a quality. To imagine they might do means operating at the level of 
abstract social identities and roles both to identify those in question and to 
understand their relationships with actual or potential children, and assuming the 
identity categories have stability, internal (‘construct’) validity and coherence. Even 
if the categories mapped onto people, rethinking the individual/social binary means 
that parenting is not understood as a matter of qualities that reside in the individual. 
Furthermore, recognising the relational nature of subjective experience means that 
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 dynamics and relationships are more psychologically meaningful than ‘family roles’. 
This is also important in order to provide the conceptual space to acknowledge 
children’s active co-construction of parent-child relationships (Burman, 1994a; 
James and Prout, 1991). So, even if identities had sociological validity (the labels 
distinguished social groups and were applied to the right people), their psychological 
validity (whether they have any emotionally relevant meanings and what they 
exclude/identify) is questionable. This is a distinction between roles and 
relationships. For instance, we do not know about the emotional presence/value of a 
father to his children from his residential absence, about a mother’s relationship with 
her child/ren from her sexual orientation, nor does household composition tell us 
about meanings and relationships within it. Thus, the discourses identified in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4 can be understood, in Foucault’s terms, as individualizing 
characteristics deemed pathological; as differentiating, classifying and ranking 
individuals (or families); as excluding some by defining limits of difference or 
normality; and normalizing all by defining, invoking or contrasting with ‘the 
normal’. 
 
The concern of this chapter has been to identify an approach to understanding the 
significance of dominant cultural representations for individual experience. It has 
explored some limitations of socialist-feminist analyses of the family as ideological, 
and outlined the possibilities of a discursive approach to subjectivity. This approach 
might provide a framework for understanding the cultural production of desire (to 
parent). Ideally one would retain the political force of the concept of ideology in 
order to understand how discourses of mothers, fathers and ‘fitness to parent’ 
function politically, but develop a more sophisticated understanding of power and of 
subjectivity than was available in the liberal model of power and sociality common 
to modernist ‘enlightenment’ and ‘liberation’ discourses, including radical feminist 
and socialist frameworks. A post-structuralist approach which deconstructs the 
individual/social boundary allows the exploration of the cultural reproduction of 
women’s desire to mother whilst avoiding the problems of ‘social effects’ models 
and of identity politics.  
 
Liberalism and socialism have been powerful accounts of the relationship of 
individuals to society (Mills cited in Denzin, 1987), but the radical pluralism of 
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 post-structuralist approaches (e.g. Butler, 1990; 1993; Sawicki, 1991) is distinct 
from liberal pluralism because it rejects the idea that political power is shared 
between competing interest groups whose identities are relatively stable and who 
compete on an equal basis for political influence. Such approaches are potentially 
valuable for psychosocial studies because they operate with a ‘relational and 
dynamic model of identity…constantly in formation in a hierarchical context of 
power relations at the microlevel of society’ and recognise plurality both within and 
between subjects (Sawicki, ibid.: p8). It suggests a focus on resistance at subjective 
levels, which I begin to outline in relation to mothers’ resistance to psychological 
‘expertise’ about childrearing in Psychology, Discourse, Practice (Burman, Aitken 
et al., 1996). The following chapter explores what this loss of faith in the founding 
subject means in terms of the guaranteeing of knowledge. It considers the 
implications of post-structuralist approaches for collective resistance to 
psychological expertise about mothers. Might feminists produce better 
knowledge(s), and would they admit their own perspectives? The final chapter 
attempts to apply Judith Butler’s notion of performativity to contemporary parental 
identities.  
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Chapter 6 
Mothers, Experts and the Politics of Knowledge 
 
The family has been a site of ideological and political struggle since the late 
eighteenth century (Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1989a), and, as chapter 1 illustrated, 
remains so today. In the second half of the twentieth century in particular, an ‘army’ 
of professionals has grown up around the family, and central amongst them are 
psychologists and social workers (Ingelby, 1985; Rose, 1985). They rely on 
understandings of ‘family’ which reflect particular historically and culturally specific 
notions of sexual morality, and gender and generational relationships, which none-
the-less are taken to carry general moral weight. Furthermore, what are often 
particularly middle class values implicitly form the basis of professional practices 
which impact disproportionately on working class and disadvantaged families and 
others who may not share their cultural values. For these reasons it remains 
imperative that we maintain a critique of ‘family ideology’ and what passes for  
‘family values’. It is therefore important not to throw out the baby of ideological 
critique with the bathwater of the liberal-humanist subject of modernist liberatory 
promises. However, political critique needs to find means other than through identity 
politics (as argued in chapter 5) or appeals to Truth guaranteed through scientific 
knowledge.  
 
Since the late 1960s, there has been wide-ranging criticism of the role, power and 
discourse of the expert, reflecting the emergence of the contemporary ‘crisis of 
legitimation’ and experts of childrearing have been a particular focus of feminist 
critique. Chapters 2 and 5 suggested that expertise is of increasing significance, aside 
from professionals’ practices and interventions, at an individual level, through self-
government. This chapter explores aspects of the politics of expert knowledge by 
considering expert psychological knowledge of childrearing. It discusses how 
feminists might engage with debates about parents in political forums and engage 
with representations of mothers and fathers in popular culture. How can we make 
claims to know who is ‘fit to parent’ when we may wish to criticise the conventional 
basis of knowing, as well as some of the presumptions about ‘good parenting’? What 
are the implications of the model of power as productive for psychological expertise 
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and parents, and what does this mean for how we think about resistance at individual 
level and how we might attempt it through research. 
 
6.1 The politics of knowledge 
The Enlightenment promise, since the eighteenth century in Western Europe, has been 
that the triumph of rationality over moral reasoning will offer ‘emancipation from the 
dogma of tradition’ (Giddens, 1990: p48). Thus, higher status is attributed to 
knowledge derived through the application of rational and objective ‘scientific 
methods’ such that it carries more weight in almost every Western cultural context 
than knowledge whose claim to truth is not guaranteed by science. The discipline of 
psychology was born through the application of scientific method to the study of the 
human mind (Miller, 1964). Chapter 3 described the promise that scientific rationality 
held of better knowledge to rear children by, and showed how the status accorded to 
experts was reflected in the longer statements they were allowed in the articles cited 
from The Guardian and the Observer, and the way in which they were given ‘the last 
word’ on the matter (De Swaan, 1990). 
 
The ‘God’s eye’ view of the world that science and academic scholarship claimed to 
have has long been challenged by Marxists, as well as by feminists and those in the 
black and gay liberation movements this century, revealing the particularity and 
partiality of its supposedly objective view (Barrett, 1991; Nicholson, 1990; Spivak, 
1988). Moreover, writers associated with post-colonial and postmodern critiques of 
the metanarratives structuring Western Enlightenment thought have more recently 
shown how the very idea of a ‘God’s eye’ view, let alone arrogant presumptions of 
access to it, must be situated in Western modernist worldview. Those positioned on 
the margins of society by the elevation of white, masculinist rationalism show how 
this sense of rational self and of potentially rationally-organised society was always at 
the cost of maintaining certain exclusions: of women, children, ‘non white’ peoples, 
the ‘mad’ and the criminal from full subjecthood and civic participation; of emotion 
(devalued, feminised, sanitised); the body (shameful, unclean, to be hidden or 
controlled); and the unconscious (disavowed, sought to be mastered). Thus, the 
foundations of such a worldview were never as firm as they were made to appear 
(Lyon, 1994); the structuring metanarratives as much a part of the culture as the 
‘reflections’ of it they claimed to provide (Lyotard, 1984). Modernist beliefs 
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themselves emerged from and came to prominence as a worldview because of 
particular socio-historical conditions. The increasing dominance of Europe 
economically and politically provided intellectual support for the assumption that the 
modernist view of the world was superior, and colonial exploitation provided the 
material resources and economic advantages. The master narrative of progress 
presented imperialist relations as bringing ‘civilisation’ to primitive countries, just as 
expert-lay relations presented rational knowledge as an undoubted development from 
‘old wives tales’ and folk wisdom about childrearing. Thus, knowledge so produced is 
infused with politics even before we look at its current sites of operation around 
parents in particular. 
 
To the Nietzschean view of ‘truth’ as merely the solidification of old metaphors or 
opinions that have forgotten their nature, Foucault added the understanding of the 
radical productivity of language and hence the imbrication of ‘knowledge’ - that is, 
that which presents itself as knowledge - with power. Foucault (1980) said: ‘It seems 
to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, and for bringing it 
about that a true discourse engenders or “manufactures” something that does not yet 
exist, that is, it fictions it’. The putative objectivism and realism of science denies its 
political nature. The political problem lies in, not simply the status such knowledge 
has accrued, but the obscuring and naturalising of the particular perspectives of its 
own production and therefore its value base. This negation of particularity and 
presumption of generality is the process of naturalisation which chapter 5 argued was 
a feature of the discourse of ‘family’. Similarly, in relation to media representations 
considered earlier, it is the naturalisation of particular values and concerns that is the 
problem with the construction of consensus values in ‘moral panics’.  
 
The stories that psychology produces are fictions that function as truth, not 
necessarily untruths, but accounts fabricated from a peculiar set of knowledge 
practices which sanitise and exclude that which they cannot isolate and measure 
(Hollway, 1989). Psychological expertise carries immense authority and, through 
acting on relations of power between people, it ‘does’ politics. It can either draw on 
an empirical objective-realist warrant for its knowledge, or be a ‘better’, more 
‘human’ science than the hard, uncaring ‘natural’ sciences. For example, in 
contemporary Western morality tales, emotional neglect figures as a cruelty that 
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surpasses physical deprivation, perhaps because physical neglect is assumed to be due 
to a lack of understanding or acute poverty, whereas emotional neglect is presumed to 
be due to malicious intent or sinister pathology. It is assumed therefore, that we know 
what emotional ‘needs’ are. Psychology is powerful when mobilised as truth, but also, 
in addition to values inherent in its production, the knowledge it ‘reveals’ functions 
with moral force in relation to parents, and mothers in particular. So we can see that in 
the putative objectivism of scientific claims to know ‘children’s needs’, politics are 
done. 
 
Nancy Fraser (1989) shows how arguments about what people need ‘do’ the politics 
in US welfare debates. These debates involve disputes about what exactly various 
groups of people really do need, whose knowledge of their needs is truest and ‘who 
should have the last word in such matters’ (p161). Needs talk functions as a medium 
for making and contesting political claims: an idiom in which political conflict is 
played out and through which inequalities are symbolically elaborated and 
challenged. ‘Objective fact’, such as ‘needs’, used to be seen in opposition to politics, 
for instance, in the Marxist science/ideology dichotomy, but in welfare state societies 
it has become a major, institutionalised political vocabulary.  
 
Following Fraser’s analysis, the culturally specific ‘resources’ for argumentation can 
be conceptualised as: the ‘officially recognised idioms in which one can press claims’ 
e.g. needs talk, rights talk (of child’s best interests, the cost to society, of promoting a 
fair and just society, rights due to every individual, mothers’ needs/abilities); and the 
different vocabularies for instanciating claims of the above (e.g. child-centred, 
feminist, psychological, medical, therapeutic, educational, patriarchal, post-feminist, 
religious, spiritual, economic). There is then the issue of how competing claims are 
adjudicated authoritatively (e.g. expert judgement, majority-rule voting, religious 
doctrine, the interpretations of those in question); and of how competing parties are 
positioned (as parents, ‘unfit’ parents, campaigners, clinicians, politicians). 
Psychological knowledge is therefore drawn directly into contemporary politics and 
social policy debate as a power vocabulary for instanciating needs claims.  
 
Fraser is a feminist political theorist whose engagement with the work of Foucault can 
be seen in her arguments about need. Needs are not given and unproblematic, and it 
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matters who is making claims to know about needs. Claims to know often assume 
their way of knowing are adequate and fair, and fail to problematise the social and 
institutional logic of processes of need interpretation (the social relations in force 
between interlocutors). Just as Fraser writes about ‘the politics of needs 
interpretation’, not about the actual distribution of needs satisfactions, so this chapter 
is not about children’s needs of parents, but contemporary claims to know such needs. 
Fraser identifies three analytically distinct moments in struggles over needs – 
identifying ‘needs’, arguing about how they are to be met and by who, and meeting 
the needs. This chain shows how representational politics are heavily implicated – 
perhaps ‘productive of’ – distributive/material politics: symbolic struggles need to be 
won before the fairer distribution of resources (even though materiality also produces 
and reinforces status). This thesis focuses on theoretical issues about the cultural 
‘politics of representation’ (Hall, 1992) in the first two of Fraser’s stages. 
 
The juxtaposition of ‘needs’ and ‘rights’ discourse has implications for the boundaries 
between ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘domestic’ spheres of life (Fraser, 1989). It 
appears to illustrate the ‘psychologisation’ of the political sphere, which will be 
considered in chapter 9. 
 
6.2 ‘Psycho-politics’1
Similarly, accounts of children’s needs are politically significant through their 
construction of what parents ought to be and do in order to meet these needs (Burman, 
1994a; Day Sclater et al., forthcoming 1999; Woodhead, 1990). For instance, 
feminists might argue that state provision should meet parents’ day-care needs, whilst 
social conservatives might argue that a child’s need for his/her mother means she 
should meet these needs, or economic conservatives, that the market is the best 
institution for meeting these needs. The indeterminacy of ‘children’s needs’, yet their 
prominence today within the family justice system (Day Sclater and Yates, 
forthcoming 1999) means that discourses of developmental psychology currently ‘do’ 
family politics. Psychology, and developmental psychology in particular, functions 
powerfully in political debates as scientific knowledge, at a personal level (see 
                                                          
1 I borrow this phrase from Shelley Day Sclater (e.g. Day Sclater and Yates, forthcoming 1999). I use it 
here to mean both the politics of psychological knowledge in the sense outlined above, and the intra-
psychic ‘politics’ and the social relations these produce, which is taken up in a later section. 
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chapter 5 and later), and at an institutional level as a key resource for the wide range 
of welfare professions (health visitors, social workers, community psychiatric nurses 
and teachers, as well as clinical and educational psychologists) which have arisen in 
industrialised countries ‘to supervise, evaluate and “support” families’ (Burman, 
1997: p135). Moreover, particular knowledge forms and practices are naturalised in 
‘needs’. Needs claims are bound up in understandings of ‘in order to’ relations 
(Fraser, 1989), which for child psychology Burman (1994a) calls ‘the developmental 
myth’ of linear, causal narratives. ‘Children’s needs’ are connected, in chains of 
cause-and-effect, to particular ideas about what outcomes are desirable. Their 
assertion as scientific truths obscures the lack of consensus about ‘natural’ 
development and ‘normal’ outcomes, for instance, about what forms of adult sexuality 
are psychologically healthy, or about what are tolerable levels of thwarted wishes, 
work or sweets in a child’s life. Critical psychologists have demonstrated the socially 
constructed nature of ‘children’s needs’ (Kessen, 1991; Phoenix and Woollett, 1991; 
Woodhead, 1990), questioned the universalism of developmental psychology, its 
narrow focus, and the foundations of its knowledge, including its denial of its political 
nature. A Western understanding of individual development is naturalised and 
exported internationally as an objective universal, whilst it embodies and idealises a 
particular capitalist individualism and social organisation and hides the particularity 
of the political values it embraces (Burman, 1995a). 
 
The theoretical problems with the modernist underpinnings of psychology that were 
identified in chapter 5 also have political consequences for ‘families’, mothers and 
fathers. Through its claims to empiricism, psychology conceals normative 
prescriptions under the guise of scientific descriptions (Burman, 1997). Since the 
critiques of psychology from the 1970s onwards (see chapter 5) and the publication of 
Richards (1974) in particular, most British developmental psychologists have sought 
to recognise the social context of children’s development (Woodhead et al., 1991) 
(e.g. Richards and Light, 1986) and, indeed, amongst the authors in these collections 
are some whose work has been significant in the development of social constructionist 
and discourse analytic work in social psychology (see chapter 7). However, whilst 
critical developmental psychologist, such as Erica Burman (1991; 1992; 1994a; 1997) 
and John Morss (1990; 1995) (and see Broughton, ed., 1987; Stainton Rogers and 
Stainton Rogers, 1992) highlight the problems inherent in the discipline’s approach, 
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much British developmental psychological research continues within the parameters 
of conventional psychology. So, some contemporary work continues to challenge the 
narrow focus on parental (or maternal) influence on children’s development, instead 
emphasising siblings (e.g. Dunn and Kendrick, 1982) or the peer group (Rich Harris, 
1998), but it still relies largely on a ‘social influence’ model which constructs the 
prior individual ‘affected’ (a secondary process) by ‘the social’. The individualising 
that results from this individual-society dualism means that parents are seen as the 
locus of responsibility and potential blame, and as earlier chapters argued, 
problematised parenting tends to point most sharply to mothers. As a consequence 
parents are seen as producing certain characteristics in their children, rather than 
seeing children as actors within particular dynamics and relationships with particular 
carers. The secondary nature of social context means that individuals are too easily 
abstracted from the social so that ‘instead of poverty, unemployment and frustration, 
we have evil children, bad mothers, absent fathers and broken homes’ (Burman, 1997: 
p142). Thus, social inequalities are legitimated as flowing from individual differences 
in a liberal moral culture (Seidler, 1994). Moreover, what dominant groups prefer as 
the desirable way to rear children is portrayed as the ‘natural’ way for everyone to 
rear children, with severe consequences for those whose lives do not match these 
conservative cultural expectations. Such differences from the socially constructed 
norms for this natural universal process are seen as unnatural, and through being 
individualised and depoliticised, difference ‘can only be envisaged in terms of 
deviation, deviance or inferiority’ (Burman, 1997: p137) (as chapter 3 illustrated). 
 
Feminists and others might therefore challenge both who makes claims to know about 
mothers, and how, that is, question the discipline of psychology and the authority 
relations it produces. The certainty and clout it has as a scientific knowledge and its 
popularisation mean that contesting psychology’s authority on parenting is incredibly 
difficult. Its popularisation can obscure the fact that the discourse itself may be at 
issue in ‘needs politics’, and the naturalisation of its values and epistemology blocks 
broader discussion of them (which might challenge their status).  
 
Politics can therefore involve asserting or contesting epistemology, the status 
attributed different ways of knowing, as well as questions of ‘which people’ (or the 
state versus the individual), should bear a given responsibility. In advance of 
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questions about the power to meet or withhold provision are questions of 
interpretation and about the power to define. Arguing about who ought to meet a 
need, reifies the need itself as fact. For instance, over the past thirty years, parental 
interaction with children has been colonised by professional discourses of education 
and learning which has attracted feminist criticism for increasing the pressures on 
parents, having a disproportionate impact on mothers, and providing increased 
opportunity for professional interference in mothering (David et al., 1993; Woollett 
and Phoenix, 1991). A particular issue is whether children should be taught 
reading/word recognition before starting school. Arguing that this should be the job of 
a professional educator, rather than an addition to mothers’ responsibilities is to 
accept the idea that pre-school children should be taught to read. Thus, political 
debate about provision enclaves the need itself as ‘non political’. So some debates 
about the ‘politics’ of an issue assume and thereby reify the knowledge of the issue. 
There may be political gains from distinguishing challenges at these different levels in 
relation to a specific issue. The following section considers what types of knowledge 
claim were made in the presentation of advice to parents in the contemporary British 
parenting magazines studied in Chapter 2. The section after that tries to use these to 
suggest strategies for resistance to expert/mother relations or for feminist research 
interventions. 
 
6.3 Contemporary knowledge claims about parenting 
Chapter 2 gave an account of the politics of expert-mother relations historically and of 
the contemporary expert/expertise-parent relations in parenting magazines. This 
section will identify what some of the different expertise-parent relations ‘do’ in terms 
of their epistemological bases or their claims to know. Focusing on expertise in this 
(abstract) way highlights the possible commonalities across settings. The different 
knowledge claims and the various positions they provide for different speakers to take 
up can be understood as some of the theoretical ‘resources’ available either to a 
mother when speaking directly with an expert (at a clinic, in a psychologist’s office, 
or speaking with a teacher at the school gate), or to the reader of a parenting magazine 
at the individual, probably intra-psychic, level of the processes of identification and 
resistance to the text. 
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Experts such as psychologists and doctors can draw on an empirical warrant to 
present their accounts as expertise. The scientific epistemology constructs their 
knowledge as formed by objective perception of the real - enabling them to say, for 
instance, that ‘this is normal for a 2 year old’. What is absent from the account is 
recognition that ‘the real’ is perceived from their particular social position and 
through the lens of their professional discourse. Two similar bases on which their 
accounts can rest are their abstract knowledge-base or disciplinary discourse, and their 
experience of professional practice. For the former, they are the bearers of superior 
knowledge and for the latter, their knowledge claim rests on an appeal to their own 
direct perception (an empirical claim), enabling them to say, for instance that they 
themselves have seen many 2 year olds having temper tantrums. Since these rest on 
the same epistemology, similar questions can be asked of them: how many 2 year olds 
have they seen? were these typical 2 year olds? etc.  
 
Each of these are so conventionalised that they hardly need stating, and can 
sometimes be mobilised without making them explicit. This was the case for many of 
the topic-focused articles in the parenting magazines where a ‘qualified’ knowledge 
claim (as Foucault calls medicine and psychiatric discourses in Foucault, 1980) was 
seldom elaborated. A statement of job title or status, such as ‘Consultant 
paediatrician, John Barker explains…’, asserts that this is an expert/someone with 
official access to expert discourse and that their professional judgement and authority 
can be trusted. In popular journalism, as chapter 3 showed, the opinions of such 
figures assume a quick authority, carrying more weight than those of lay persons 
(‘parents’) but which close scrutiny sometimes reveals overreach the legitimate 
territory of their expertise. 
 
The problem with this authority is that it omits to mention that it has value 
judgements within it, for instance, about what is an acceptable ‘two year old tantrum’ 
and what is unacceptable behaviour. Furthermore, it pretends to be value-free 
knowledge. Thus, dominant cultural perspectives are naturalised, often reinforcing 
particular ethnocentric, middle class meanings and values to the detriment of those 
who not share them. In this way the values that inform expert knowledges are not 
explicit and so can escape direct challenge. However, experts avoid inviting angry 
challenges or direct resistance either, as Van Krieken (1991) and other Foucauldian 
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writers have argued, because it is simply less effective to try to assert their will 
through top-down pronouncements, or because they possess genuine faith in the 
emancipatory promise of better knowledge. This latter is underlined by the 
construction of experts’ benevolence in the discourses of ‘help’ and ‘support for’ 
parents. ‘Support’ is increasingly the preferred term for professional intervention in 
families, for instance, in the area of social work practice which used to be called 
‘child protection’, which is now ‘family support’ (Margaret O’Brien, pers. comm.) 
and the 1998 Government White Paper, Supporting Families. 
 
In parenting magazines, explicitly ‘factual’ articles are not always attributed to a 
named expert suggesting that the epistemological claims of the discourses provide 
adequate status for the article. This suggests that the authority of the expert as 
someone placed in a position of respect and esteem is being superceded or displaced 
by the authority of the expert knowledge form itself. Hence the value of the 
reconceptualision of power through discourse (power/knowledge), rather than 
embodied by experts, as argued in chapter 5. When articles are attributed to an expert, 
if any more attention is paid to them beyond their professional role/title, it is 
sometimes a reference to their place of work (say, a prestigious London teaching 
hospital), but is more often about their own status as a parent (of a certain number/age 
of child/ren). This is an allusion to experiential knowledge which will be discussed 
shortly.  
 
It is sometimes not clear whether the named expert actually wrote the piece 
themselves. Here, scientific writing’s convention of using the third person evades the 
issue by not requiring an ‘I’ in the text. Many of the articles in parenting magazines 
are not attributed to experts but are attributed to regular feature writers or remain 
unattributed. However, epistemological claims may not be made explicit in the piece, 
but are either assumed to be already attached to the disciplinary approach or to the 
language and rhetorical forms employed. Thus, articles in the magazines need not 
state claims of objectivity or of validity and reliability about the medical or 
psychological knowledge they present, but mobilise the understanding of scientificism 
simply by their style of assertion. In such cases, claims to expertise or common-sense 
are possible and can sometimes blur. Indeed, it seems that precisely the absence of 
any such explanatory, justificatory, legitimating statements at the start lends an article 
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the status of expertise. Other articles that do not explicitly or implicitly invoke 
expertise begin with a warrant, such as ‘One mother’s own story of…’. Thus for an 
experiential account more justificatory ‘work has to be done’ by the editor than either 
the ‘Our expert writes’ or unattributed ‘expertise’ articles. However, the journalistic 
production of either of these remain obscured.  
 
The most explicit advice-giving relation is evident in the ‘problem page’. It is 
interesting that these occupy such a ‘back-seat’ in magazines, often near the back and 
never announced or sensationalised (thankfully) on the front page, when, anecdotally 
at least, problem pages are widely read sections. Perhaps this suggests an ambivalence 
on the part of many contemporary parents to expert advice. There is the possibility for 
more complex interaction between readers, experts and magazine staff in the readers’ 
letters page, but whilst it may be called ‘From You to Us’ in Practical Parenting, 
parents do not, of course, have any editorial control over what goes in the section.  
 
Similarly, the first-name familiarity of the editor does make her seem approachable, 
but it is, of course, an empty promise of intimacy of personal support. We might 
welcome the egalitarian intent of the ‘sharing’ discourse and ‘we’re parents just like 
you’ orientation, but it can be seen as liberal rhetoric that denies the real relations of 
power at work. The friendly, identificatory tone in parenting magazines obscures the 
relations of power between the knowledge base and parents, as it does the authorial 
power that the writer and editor have over interpretation of the information. 
 
Discourses of needs run throughout the different magazines, mainstream and 
alternative, and throughout their difference section: parents’ needs (for professional 
advice or reassurance, for labour-saving, child-stimulating or child-safe gadgets); 
children’s needs (for their parents, for attention, for professional surveillance (health 
and development ‘checks’), for educational ‘stimulation’ and hence for toys, games 
and equipment). Consumer ‘needs’ are constructed in articles, and advertisements 
present their products as meeting needs which have a big subjective pull on parents in 
line with the ‘educationalised’ role of parents to stimulate their child to develop better 
and faster. Indeed the difference between articles and full-page glossy advertisements 
seems to narrow as advertisers inform parents of needs, goals and sometimes ‘studies 
which show…’.  Calling the consumer section ‘Wise Buys’ in Mother & Baby seems 
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to evokes a less rationalist knowledge base than other ‘information’ sections. Using 
the word ‘wise’ rather than, say, ‘sensible’, which is more cerebral, or ‘cost-effective’ 
which through rational economics is even more cerebral, seems to invoke the idea of a 
quiet, patient wisdom and practicality. This can be interpreted as the celebration or 
recognition of the ‘other’ kind of knowledge, more associated with ‘old wives tales’ 
and advice exchanged between mothers through experiential accounts. 
 
The discourse of experience of mothering/parenting can be understood, like a 
religious or mystical discourse, as a ‘subjugated knowledge’ relative to that of the 
medical or psychological expert. These are ‘naïve knowledges, located low down on 
the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (Foucault, 1980: 
p82). Appealing to one’s experience as a mother as the basis for one’s knowledge 
would probably constitute, for Foucault, an ‘unqualified’ knowledge, like that of the 
ill person in relation to the doctor’s. It is granted little legitimacy as truth, but is 
however, attributed some coherence, unlike the ‘disqualified’ knowledge of the 
psychiatric patient. This indicates the historical shift in women’s position in Western 
European cultures since William Cadogan’s time when an account of knowledge on 
the basis of women’s parenting would have been disqualified since he was certain that 
women could not even be supposed to be able to master the proper knowledge to fit 
them for the task of rational childrearing. Foucault calls such (unqualified) knowledge 
‘popular knowledge’, ‘though it is far from being a general commonsense knowledge, 
but is, on the  contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge …which owes its force 
to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it’ (Foucault, 
1980: p82). Criticism, he believed, works through mobilising such knowledges. 
 
The authority of personal experience was a central tenet of second wave Western 
feminism and henceforth provides an implicit epistemological challenge to scientific 
objectivism through its warrant for subject knowledge. In magazines, the first-person 
accounts are sometimes critical of treatment by healthcare professionals. In a clinical 
setting, a mother’s discourse of experience might be one of the stronger positions 
parents can take up in order to oppose expert discourse. For instance, everyday 
formulations such as ‘he’s not normally like this’ could be seen as a claim that 
epistemologically asserts empirical and reliability (generality, for that child’s 
behaviour) claims. A maternal knowledge claim could be bolstered by reference to 
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having raised several children. It could challenge the pathologisation by expert gaze 
by, for example, ‘His brothers were like this at his age, but grew out of it’, or could 
emphasise the reliability of a mother’s extended experience of/with her child in 
contrast to the expert’s limited vantage point of the clinical session (‘He’s not 
normally like this’). Here, a mother’s subjective investment bolsters rather than 
weakens her knowledge claim. Appeals to the particularity of a child, perhaps through 
a psychological discourse of individual differences, challenge the application of a 
certain expert discourse to this child, rather than mounts an epistemological challenge. 
These are ‘familiar’ equivalents to the issue of sample size and reliability in scientific 
accounts. The first-person accounts in parenting magazines carry the realist (‘true 
story’) epistemological claim and are warranted by personal experience, but they 
obscure or minimise the advisory functions they are often put to, as illustrated by the 
use of ‘fact’ boxes in such articles.  
 
Today there are both commonsense and popular resources for challenging objectivism 
by appeals to the relevance or importance of subjective accounts (and some even have 
institutional validation). These sometimes celebrate experience, as opposed to abstract 
knowledge, or practice as opposed to (mere) theory. For instance, the New Labour 
emphasis on parenting classes is mocked in the cartoon below (Figure 5) through the 
mobilisation of the idea that theory might not translate into practice: indeed, taken to 
humourous lengths, might even distract from it. 
 
One of the points of overlap between Foucauldian analyses and radical feminists is in 
attending to what cannot be said in the existing linguistic system, or what is hard to 
say by whom and when (Sawicki, 1991). Communication between a childcare 
professional and a mother is structured by their differential access to expert discourse 
to make their statements authoritative. In theory, each has access to the experiential 
knowledge warrant, but it is likely to present a mother’s most powerful option. 
Personal accounts from professionals may create particular intimacy effects through 
breaching the personal/professional boundary around self-disclosure. But a 
professional’s allusion to psychological issues can imply an objective-realist warrant 
when it might only be their own common-sense ‘pop psychology’. This concern was 
raised in chapter 3 in relation to the use of psychological discourses of parents and 
children by non-psychologists, such as medics working in fertility services. The 
 158
productive nature of discourse means it has become hard to distinguish the discourse 
of psychology (as a expert knowledge) from popular discourses of ‘psychology’, that 
is, of what has become psychological terrain (the emotional, intra/interpersonal, 
subjective and individual cognitive realms).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Checking his parenting class notes 
 
 
Ros Asquith’s cartoon, published in The Guardian, December 3rd 1997, shows a father studying his 
parenting class notes while the child unseen cooks the cat and the baby drinks bleach. It mocks 
parenting classes by pitting theory against practice. Theory or written advice about parenting looks a 
foolish distraction from the fairly obvious immediate practical parenting these children need. 
 
 
Among the experts, between different articles in one issue, for instance, are 
alternative accounts of psychological expertise. The discipline has lost its unity, as 
sub-disciplines and even writers within them have different approaches. This 
multiplicity means that discourses that can be described as ‘psychological’ do not 
produce the same ‘suggestions’ for parental behaviour, and, as I began to explore in 
Alldred (1996b), provide the possibilities for resistance to each other. For instance, 
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discourses of child development as a process of socialisation construct parenting as 
more interventionist than discourses of child development as the ‘natural’ unfolding 
of a self-regulative adaptive organism, and thereby produce greater responsibility for 
parents (Gergen et al., 1990; Reese and Overton, 1970; Ribbens, 1994; Walkerdine, 
1984). Recognition of the plurality of claims to truth means that scientists are now 
more modest and tend to offer opinions, rather than definitive statements. They should 
no longer legislate, but merely interpret (Bauman, 1988). However, any such 
qualifiers tend to get dropped from popularised accounts or in their journalistic 
representation. It is less useful to consider the power of psychology as a discourse, 
than the distinct moments of its impact, since there are times at which its truth status 
remains undiminished and instances when any of the above manoeuvres challenge it. 
 
A particular psychological evaluation of a mother, for instance, as ‘insensitive’ (see 
Woollett and Phoenix, 1991), can be challenged by newer knowledge from the same 
discipline. In this case its claim may be to make further progress in the pursuit of truer 
knowledge (the ‘up the mountain’ model of scientific progress, see Kitzinger, C. 
1990; Rorty, 1980). In this case no epistemological challenge is made. However, self-
identified ‘alternative’ knowledge forms, such as alternative medicine and holistic 
health approaches, (which sometimes surfaced in the mainstream parenting magazines 
as well as the specialist ones), were about the status accorded different 
epistemologies, and sometimes explicitly criticise scientific, Cartesian and allopathic 
thinking. Within even a mainstream magazine are often contradictions in the status 
accorded ‘the natural’ as a basis for knowledge, e.g. the discourse of trust your 
instincts, ‘you’ll just know what to do when your baby cries’ and the ‘don’t worry, 
everyone’s a beginner with their first baby’. 
 
Ideas which are about the topic matter of psychology sometimes manage to imply the 
discourse’s knowledge status for itself. In a similar way to that of the titles ‘Dr’ or 
‘Professor’, speaking of certain ‘objects’ (e.g. ‘attachment’, ‘egocentricism’ or 
‘containment’) invokes expert psychological discourses which may be popularised 
beyond their original bounds (see Riley, 1988). Similarly, a particular style of 
expression - of impersonal/third person, past (perfect) tense, using the rhetoric of 
light, vision and perception – creates the impression of empiricism. Thus objective 
realism comes to be presumed even without making explicit claims. This occurs in 
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many of the magazine articles that are unattributed to experts and was used for 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. This dominant epistemology is the default and enables an account 
to function as if it had made truth claims. It becomes more obvious through the 
chapters that the accounts are written from particular perspectives produced through 
aspects of my own location and formation, because I become more conscious/self-
conscious of the rhetorical forms and techniques for implicitly claiming objective 
realism.  
 
Knowledge is indeed the important currency in parenting practices but there is not the 
certain faith in rationality to guide childrearing as was in Cadogan’s day, and there are 
more minor discourses of forms of knowledge illustrated by ‘trust your instincts’ 
reassurances. There are many discourses of legitimation (Lyon, 1994), producing a 
plethora of discourses jostling in political and popular debate: psychological 
expertise, discourses of experiential knowledge as empirical, or as intuitive, ‘pop’ 
psychology of undeclared origins, and layers of discourse of psychological issues, 
often from earlier expert discourses, which are superseded but not washed away by 
newer expert accounts. Mobilisation of claims to know reveal processes of both 
power and everyday resistance.  
 
6.4 Expertise and the self 
Feminist and Marxist scholars have criticised the regulating and normalising functions 
of expertise which meets moral, military and industrial objectives (e.g. Billington, 
1996). However, as the previous chapter suggested, it does so, not through threat of 
sanction, but through the production of mothers who want ‘hygienic’ homes and 
‘normal’, ‘healthy’ children: ‘it has become the will of the mother to govern her own 
children according to psychological norms and in partnership with psychological 
experts’ (Rose 1989a: p131). Avoiding repressive measures that would prompt 
people’s resistance,  ‘the domesticated private family was …to be both freed from 
detailed prescription of conduct and to be permeable to moralisation and 
normalisation from outside’ (Rose, ibid.: p127).  
 
That is, psychological understandings have not remained the province of 
professionals. They have come to frame the way we understand our own experiences 
as family members, as people in or not in relationships. Psychology and 
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developmentalism invade the lives of all contemporary Western subjects, through 
techniques of the self as well as techniques of government (see chapter 5). 
Developmental psychological theories infuse everyday discussions about children’s 
natures and qualities, about processes of psychological growth and change, and about 
family life (Burman, 1997). What does the shift from the power of individual experts 
to the power of expertise mean for challenging the individualising and 
decontexualising tendencies of psychological knowledge? It means that responsibility 
is more likely to be experienced as individualised, and that earlier feminist critiques of 
the role of the expert are no longer appropriate. It is not a colonising, but a 
constituting power, enjoying subjects to govern themselves and making the ‘effects’ 
of psychological discourse highly pervasive.  
 
The productive nature of discourses of parents undermines the idea that the 
‘empowered’ consumer of ‘throw-away’ childcare literature can take or leave from 
what they read. Similarly, this raises interesting questions about the degree to which 
the critical reading of mainstream parenting and family texts by ‘alternative parents’ 
who consume more specialist ‘holistic’ magazines enable them to escape such 
meanings. Certainly, there is recognition and explicit discussion of the struggle to find 
alternative services or to negotiate with midwives, health visitors and GPs about child 
health issues. However, there appears to be very little mention of doubt on the part of 
parents or of conflicting hopes for their children and their parenting that thinking 
about their own formation through many dominant cultural meanings might suggest. 
Perhaps editors of alternative magazines face a tension between recognising such 
issues and writing confidently to construct alternatives to them. There might be room 
for reflective writing by parents about the difficulties encountered of consciously 
trying to do certain things differently in their parenting than they experienced in their 
own childhoods. 
 
Nikolas Rose, in Governing the Soul, writes:  
‘Parental conduct, motherhood and childrearing can thus be regulated through 
family autonomy, through wishes and aspirations, and through the activation of 
individual guilt, personal anxiety, and private disappointment. And the almost 
inevitable misalignment between expectation and realization, fantasy and 
actuality, fuels the search for help and guidance in the difficult task of 
producing normality, and powers the constant familial demand for the assistance 
of expertise’ (Rose, 1989a: p130). 
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 Expertise has to achieve harmony between ‘the private authority, self-concern and 
aspirations of the autonomous family’ (Rose, ibid.: p129), which according to 
Donzelot (1979) it does through ‘the regulation of images’. Thus, representations of 
motherhood, fatherhood, family life and parental conduct generated by expertise 
infuse and shape the personal investments of individuals, the ways in which we form, 
regulate and evaluate our lives, our actions and goals. Modern ‘psychological 
subjects’ reflect upon ourselves through popular psychological discourses, and might 
draw on psychological discourses to argue, decide or justify. This includes our (for 
some, potential) qualities as parents, mothers and fathers (though also extend to, say, 
our efforts in our studies). 
 
Just as the nineteenth century mothers’ movement ‘invited in’ the experts, so too do 
today’s parents as they create a demand for parenting advice which the magazines 
satisfy. However, complex layers of self-formation through discourses of expertise 
create the desires which are mobilised to create this ‘market demand’. Since as 
chapter 2 argued a strongly positive moral value is attributed to staying up to date 
with information about parenting. Thus, earlier feminist critiques of childrearing 
experts’ ‘unwarranted intrusion…into the private lives of families’ needs rethinking. 
The productivity of discourse is what means expert-parent relations cannot be 
simplified to didactic imperatives, nor can parents wilfully ignore advance and look to 
their own knowledges, as if there might be a reservoir of untainted knowledge. Thus, 
Ludmilla Jordanova’s stinging critique of Christina Hardyment’s book: 
 
‘On the surface it appears to be a book designed to liberate parents from the 
tyranny of the experts, and so cashes in on a superficial radicalism which is 
sceptical about professional authority; and it seeks to return confidence to the 
people in their own authentic responses to life’s challenges. Liberal readers are 
easily made complicit with the book’s arguments, which hinge on a strong 
defence of individualism, and attack on state intervention as unjustified 
interference, a concern to prevent maternal anxiety about child-care, and a 
belief that, somehow, a true and real picture of children will one day emerge. 
(Jordanova, 1985: p112-3). 
 
Commentators tend to concur over a shift in authority from traditionally defined 
relations embedded in institutions such as the church, ‘family’ and ‘community’, to 
the location of authority in the individual. Bauman (1996) sees this as the ethical 
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paradox of modernity. An expansion of the ethical arena has occurred alongside a 
decline in authority which means that although we have to make up our own minds on 
a greater number and range of issues, our beliefs and choices no longer provide us 
with any certainty. The issues and choices about how we live our lives that come 
under this personal surveillance and responsibility are above and beyond those that 
previous generations felt obliged or enabled to think about. This produces a sense of 
more individual responsibility, an expectation of more control, which can further the 
individualism that Burman (1997) and Seidler (1994) highlight. This increasing 
responsibility is in the name of ‘freedom’ (Blackman, 1994; Rose, 1990). The 
individual is free from the strictures of religious conduct, and ‘the family’, by 
occupying the private realm, free from state intervention. This fantasy is contradicted 
by the understanding of power and self-government that chapter 5 introduced. Older 
generations can therefore perceive younger generations as selfishly individualistic 
when their decisions are articulated in terms of personal and individual or perhaps 
immediate family needs and preferences, in contrast to older appeals to ‘it was, so it 
will be’, ‘how things should be done’, or ‘it’s for the best’. However, drawing on a 
psychological discourse to make a particular personal decision does not bring any 
certainty because of the plurality of discourses described above. Such ‘decisions’ are 
therefore contingent, contextual and particular, rather than absolutes, drawn from pure 
(psychological) reason and stable over time. 
 
These meanings do not of course only impact on parents. The depth of cultural 
infusion by discourses of psychology (including psychoanalytic psychology, see 
Parker, 1997) and the social significance of parental and familial status mean that 
being a non-parent, or not being interested in being a parent in future, do not leave 
one free from the pop psychological discourses of parenting, especially those which 
link one’s parental status to one’s psychology. Through both technologies of 
domination whereby others’ interpretations and judgements define you and through 
technologies of the self it is asked whether the childless, middle-aged, heterosexual 
couple are selfish, the ‘batchelor’ is immature and self-centred, the same-sex couple 
narcissistic, with immature sexual object choice. An intellectual awareness that 
producing children biologically and raising them as ‘your own’ is only one particular, 
and individualistic, way of defining family and nurturing does not stop one from 
making psychologically normative assessments of the self. One questions whether 
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perhaps one really is selfish/non-nurturant/’not ready yet’/‘healthy’/‘well-adjusted’. 
If, by these normative discourses one has negative, ‘immature’ ‘answers’, these are 
not a moral failure, whereas to be totally unreflexive is (and goes part way towards a 
psychiatric diagnosis). To be reflexive about ones’ qualities as a parent is an 
increasing requirement of responsible decision-making, expressed in the books and 
articles aimed at women (‘The Mother of all Decisions: Not everyone should have a 
child’, Cosmopolitan, July 1994; and books called ‘Why Children?’ (Dowrick and 
Grundberg, 1980) and ‘A Child: Your Choice’ (Shapiro, 1987) and this is important 
given women’s historical lack of choice around reproduction and mothering. The 
moral persuasiveness of being self-reflective turning psychological discourses upon 
the self might even be such that, paradoxically, in circumstances under which ones’ 
‘fitness to parent’ is being judged, ‘admitting your faults’ might be looked upon more 
favourably than not drawing attention to them if this can be read as unawareness. 
 
The absence of an embodied/authorial expert makes it apparent how much 
government and regulation occurs through parents’/mothers’ own self-government: 
through the wilful adoption of expert discourse to understand her own childrearing 
behaviour and experience. However, once one has read the expert’s accounts of how, 
say, your own parenting might have produced the angry tantrum, it is not easy to ‘read 
it’ the way one could previously. To reflect upon it further would pull one further into 
the reflexive psychological self, to consider psychological teleologies of one’s own 
formation. Neither can we simply counter its claims, as chapter 5 argued. In addition, 
such critique might soon become appropriated (Richards, 1994b). Exhaustive critique 
of developmental psychology is therefore futile because it speaks to such a wide range 
of issues, so popularly, and through us, not ‘at’ us. Thus, both modernist sets of 
promises of freedom proved illusory: the promise of truth, and the promise of its 
ideological critique. Greater knowledge of discourses of child development is not to 
gain freedom, but to gain imperatives and cautions, to become even more self-
conscious and self-scrutinising about one’s parenting and the ‘health’ of one’s 
relationships. To have a feminist critique of the ideological functions of expertise 
neither rids us of such ideas at unconscious levels, nor guarantees that knowledge 
produced with this understanding will be truer or better. 
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It is a loss of credibility by the ‘grand narratives of legitimation’ such as these 
Enlightenment stories of progress towards freedom through Truth and reason, which 
characterise the contemporary ‘crisis of legitimation’ that Lyotard (1984) calls ‘the 
postmodern condition’. These narratives are no longer seen as overarching timeless 
inevitable processes, but peculiarly modernist Western narratives. Rationalism is no 
longer the guarantor of safety, security and a harmonious society, but is the 
conceptual machinery of the Holocaust and the promised freedom illusory (and see 
chapter 5). In particular, feminists and post-colonial theorists have criticised the 
dominant philosophical project of seeking objectivity as something transcending 
situation or perspective.  
 
6.5 Feminist Knowledge Strategies 
How could we know who is ‘fit to parent’ when the traditional means of knowing 
have been shown to be unjust and are relativised? If we have no guaranteed means of 
knowing or describing the world, how do we assert a political critique? Lyotard’s 
critique leaves no place for feminist social criticism of pervasive axes of stratification 
or broad-based relations of dominance and subordination along the lines of gender, 
race or class (Lyon, 1994) hence the impasse which many feminists and theorists on 
the left feel threatens to disable political critique. However, Fraser and Nicholson 
(1990) argue that it is premature to abandon social criticism or politically engaged 
intellectual practice. Rather, it is possible to have a ‘robust postmodern-feminist 
paradigm of social criticism without philosophy’ (p34). Out of the political need for 
social criticism of large-scale inequalities, new paradigms of criticism must be forged 
which do not rely on traditional philosophical metanarratives. Critique must be 
warranted without reifying modernist beliefs that it is the next step in the progress 
towards more truthful accounts of the world, or which claims divine wisdom or pure 
and privileged access to knowledge. Thus, whilst agreeing with Lyotard’s critique of 
Marxism, and sharing feminist critiques of modernism, they do not join him in 
rejecting social theory tout court.  
 
Many feminists argue, similarly, that whilst ‘feminism must remain alert to issues of 
difference and specificity, it is also necessary to retain theoretical tools capable of 
analysing general structural tendencies in order to understand how difference becomes 
inequality’ (McNay, 1992: p154-5). We need to be able to locate people in relation to 
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structures of power, and overcome the self-centred preoccupations of the postmodern 
individual, so, ‘what follows is not that we should renounce theory to avoid its 
dominating discourse, rather we should find forms of theory that will be consistent 
with a localising…participatory, community oriented politics’ (Wolin, 1988, cited in 
McNay, ibid.: p155). 
 
Fraser and Nicholson (1990) argue that that we can avoids appeals to foundationalism 
by avoiding the arrogant truth-claims that accompany essentialist, transcultural or 
historical analyses, and by acknowledging the situated nature of our own critique, and 
applying the same scrutiny and critical reflection to our own analysis. Patti Lather 
(1991) argues that our reflexivity about our practice must try to prevent our analyses 
becoming exclusionary. There is the risk that we polarise local knowledge as only 
liberatory against oppressive theoretical metanarratives (McNay, ibid.). There are no 
unproblematic, alternatively warranted epistemologies, so two types of move present 
themselves: we can either strategically deploy conventional ones, or try to create new 
hybrid epistemologies. The rest of this chapter considers the former, and chapter 8 
explores the two, considering whether even limited empirical claims position oneself 
at the centre of things, glorifying ones’ perceptions and reifying ones’ own cultural 
framework. 
 
Chapter 5 gave an account of Walkerdine’s (1990) argument that it is not enough only 
to critique cultural meanings: we need to examine how they form us. In addition to 
criticism of representations, we should consider their role in our own formation and 
explore our intra-psychic investments, as distinct from and potentially in conflict 
with, our political commitments. This can be applied to the identification and choice 
of options here. The motives expressed are those of the modernist subject (to strive 
for better understanding, for critique that can promote social change for the better). 
Recognising my subjective and political formation through such Enlightenment 
understandings of emancipatory progress means that intellectual critique relativises 
the foundational metanarratives, but does not wash them away. I reject lapsing into an 
infamous postmodern shrug of resignation to relativism and retain some belief in my 
analysis as more truthful than some others and as promoting social change for the 
better. Thus I recognise my modernist narrative of cultural progress from identity 
politics to post identity politics.  
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 This is a pragmatic response to the absence of theory as guide and guarantor, but it 
forces specificity, allows flexibility and avoids re/producing exclusions. It suggests 
the possibility of employing approaches associated with ‘second wave’ feminism, 
such as adopting identity politics, employing strategic essentialism, where they may 
be helpful. For instance, more essentialist discourses of women’s mothering may be 
drawn on to argue that a lesbian mother should not lose her children on account of her 
sexuality, or a woman’s ‘natural’ desire to parent might be deployed to challenge 
attempts to deny lesbians access to donor insemination. What does the call for 
feminists to maintain pluralist strategies of intervention mean in the context of the 
representations of mothers as deviant and to blame for social problems? It means that 
there might be a role for simultaneously criticising the terms of the debate (the limited 
analysis, individualising of blame); and criticising the ideological assumptions and 
epistemological basis of psychological theories, and, further, for presenting 
psychological research ‘findings’ that will support a preferred analysis. These 
different strategies are valuable for different sites of intervention, such as mainstream 
media debates; academic and policy forums; and individual struggles, such as through 
the courts. Above all, pluralist strategies of critical intervention urge ongoing 
reappraisal. 
 
Continual shifts in cultural practices and meanings with time and location will 
inevitably mean that the precise implications of ones’ political position cannot be 
guaranteed, as Foucault and Derrida have shown. Cultural life involves the texts we 
produce, ‘intersecting with other texts that influence ours in ways we cannot ever 
unravel’ (Lyon, 1994: p13). Therefore, not only would postmodern feminists not want 
to fix a single privileged feminist position or mode of response, they would urge the 
continual reinvention of specific interventions. While some celebrate the rejection of 
fundamentalism of any kind, Nancy Fraser admits her ambivalence about the loss of 
socialist and feminist grand narratives for their political force, and speaks of ‘not 
making a virtue of a necessity’ (Alldred, 1999). 
 
6.6 Using the Master’s Tools?
Chapter 3 described how psychological discourses pathologise certain mothers and 
construct some women as unfit to parent. Whether one is responding to lone mother 
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blaming in the media or offensive claims about lesbian mothers, claims that are 
backed up by academic research ‘findings’ or invoke discourses of popular 
psychology, what is needed are interventions in cultural politics, or what Nancy 
Fraser (1995) calls ‘the politics of recognition’. How can feminist and critical writers 
intervene in these debates to resist the status hierarchies produced by psychological 
discourses? In particular, how might feminist academics engage with expert 
knowledge about mothers, and claims to know what is normal and natural? One 
response is to contest the claims from within, that is by doing psychological research 
informed by feminist theoretical critiques and to deploy research findings to make 
counter claims. The second is to take issue with the agendas that inform the appeal to 
psychology, or the conceptual framework of psychological ‘answers’. What might 
these two strategies - of ‘using’ or critiquing psychological research – suggest in 
relation to the representations of parents discussed in earlier chapters. 
  
The first approach is in the hope of producing better, less oppressive psychology. This 
generally embraces or leaves unquestioned the Enlightenment belief in progress, but 
intervenes in terms recognisable to the same audience. Presenting alternative findings 
to challenge specific meanings is intervening in the debate on ‘their’ terms, and this 
means tacitly accepting the legitimacy of the question and this approach to answering 
it. Much feminist debate in Women’s Studies and elsewhere has concerned the extent 
to which ‘the master’s tools’ can be used to dismantle ‘the master’s house’ (Lorde, 
1984) and the possibilities of reformatory engagement within the rules of the 
(knowledge) game (Burman, 1990; 1998, Crowley, 1999; Kitzinger, 1987; Unger, 
1996).  
 
Chapter 3 described how, in popular debate, women who want a child without a male 
partner are sometimes accused of being selfish which implicitly or explicitly 
questions their fitness to mother. McCartney’s (1985) study of single women who 
requested donor insemination concluded that there was no support for describing 
these women’s motivations as ‘purely selfish’. This study responded directly, within 
the terms of ‘the debate’ and produced counter claims which employed a scientific 
epistemological warrant. It was published in a gynaecology journal and so intervened 
at the level of academic debate and professional practice. It does not disclose a 
‘feminist’ intent. 
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 Popular fears about children growing up in lesbian or gay families sometimes include 
whether they will grow up gay, be ‘confused’ about their gender, be ‘tomboys’, 
‘sissies’ or get bullied. On each of these points recent psychological research findings 
can provide reassurance, as psychologists have studied children’s ‘gender identity’, 
‘sex-typed behaviour’, sexual orientation and experience of social stigma. Golombok 
and colleagues have conducted research employing psychosexual and psychiatric 
assessments of the children of lesbian mothers, and in one study compared the 
children of lesbian and single heterosexual mothers (Golombok, Spencer and Rutter, 
1983). They found that all the children in the study (37 in lesbian and 38 in 
heterosexual mother-only households) had ‘gender-role identities’ or ‘self-concepts’ 
that corresponded to their physical sex. There were no differences in sex-role 
behaviour (behaviour deemed appropriate to their gender) between the two family 
types for either boys or girls, and, in fact, children in both types of family were shown 
to be ‘rather traditional’ in their choices of toys, activities, friendships. Whilst sexual 
orientation can probably not be meaningfully assessed, the children mostly reported 
heterosexual crushes, with no differences according to family type. By virtue of its 
direct response to the questions raised, its use of rhetorical style and the ‘objectivity’ 
of its appraisals, this is a powerful study which can be drawn on to support policy 
discussions or individual legal cases concerning lesbian mothers. For campaigning 
and casework on legal and policy issues this kind of study can be invaluable. The 
fourth ‘concern’, that children in lesbian/gay families face stigma and prejudice has 
been used as an argument in child residency disputes, and one can respond to this on a 
variety of levels: with studies which show it not to be the case, or which relativise 
homophobic stigma in relation to the other playground abuse and bullying (about 
weight, wearing glasses, etc.); by rejecting the concern as a victim-blaming form of 
response to discrimination (and that the response to racial abuse would not be to 
segregate); or as Harne et al. (1997) argue that to assume such prejudice is to 
reinforce it. In legal cases, such deconstructive arguments are seen as risky and 
lawyers usually want to be able to respond within the terms of the debate with UK 
empirical research.  
 
One could challenge Charles Murray’s account of an underclass (see chapter 4) by 
studying the values of those he claims hold anti-social values. Challenging the debate 
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might include insisting that it is poverty, not lone parenthood per se that is often the 
problem for lone mother households. However this leaves unchallenged the 
presumption of causal narratives - that certain family forms produce particular types 
of children - and could reinforce Murray’s assumption that all lone parents are on 
benefits (Slipman, 1994). To argue about the amount of financial support a lone 
mother should get from the father of her child can be to assume that children should 
be ‘privately financed’ by ‘the family’ (defined narrowly as parental couple) as 
opposed to receiving adequate state provision. To argue about who meets the/a child 
support bill can be to accept the existing terms of debate about children’s ‘needs’, 
which it has been argued include their need for a father. Edwards and Duncan (1997) 
consider how their study of values about mothering and paid work amongst lone 
mothers risks giving the concept of an underclass credibility by engaging with 
although it can challenge specific aspects of underclass rhetoric and policy responses 
to it. 
 
In each of these examples, the potential value of such research responses can be seen, 
but, as Kitzinger (1987) argues, the crucial limitation of this approach is that the same 
agenda is preserved and there is no chance to challenge the terms of the debate. In the 
case of research about the children of lesbian mothers, this means that tacit support is 
provided for the assumptions that if they are to be considered 
normally/naturally/heathily developing beings, a child’s gender-identity needs to 
correspond to their biological sex; that their behaviour needs to be that prescribed for 
their gender; and that their sexual preference needs to be heterosexual. It can affirm 
the identity categories and presumptions; that is, reinforce the idea that the 
identities/categories have conceptual integrity and meaningful implications for 
behaviour, even as it challenges the precise meanings attributed. This is similar to the 
way that, in Fraser’s (1989) account, validating the issue as of concern reifies it as 
fact. The dilemma lies in the fact that as we intervene effectively in specific debates, 
we also reinforce the idea that complete, appropriate and normal outcomes require the 
production of ‘proper’ boys and ‘proper’ girls. Given the status accorded knowledge 
which makes conventional truth claims, those of us for whom it is available, who can 
deploy ‘qualified knowledges’, perhaps ought not to abandon it too hastily. Chapter 8 
considers whether it is possible to deploy truth claims strategically whilst also 
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challenging the discipline’s knowledge practices within the discipline and critiquing 
the politics of knowledge in the popular sphere. 
 
The second approach involves reflecting upon the character of contemporary debates, 
to identify epistemological presumptions, perhaps to reveal their partiality and thereby 
break ‘the master’s tools’ or question the terms of the debate or reflect upon the 
popular pre-occupations and cultural fears it reveals. Deconstructive approaches 
might destabilise the identity categories deployed or the cause-and-effect relations 
presumed. For instance, challenging the idea that mothers are responsible for what 
their children become or for their living conditions, or insisting on economic analyses 
rather than psychological assertions. Walkerdine (1990) suggests that we need to 
question not only the veridicality of claims to truth, but also the ‘will to proof’ which 
lurks behind them. This must include our own, so for instance, she comments on the 
defensiveness behind her own work on girls’ mathematics performance to ‘disprove 
the proofs, counter[ing] evidence with other evidence, showing that “we can do it too” 
(p61).  
 
Sometimes one can simultaneously engage in and reflect upon a debate. Whilst 
challenging the psychological terms of the debate and responding with better 
‘findings’ are logically opposed, Tasker and Golombok (1991) criticised assumptions 
in the research literature such as that homosexuality is a negative developmental 
outcome, and that influence on the child is merely seen in terms of the parents, whilst 
also providing answers in these terms (such as the sexual orientation of the children of 
lesbian mothers). It prioritised the strategy of providing counter claims, but shows that 
critical arguments can be made alongside (reassuring) ‘findings’. Similarly, Ann 
Phoenix (1991a) provided an empirical account of young mothers which challenges 
the popular notion that women who become pregnant in their teenage years are either 
instrumental or ignorant by countering this with their own (diverse) accounts, as well 
as highlighting the very presumption that young women have ‘different reasons from 
mothers who are over 20’ (Phoenix, 1991b: p87) and the contradiction between 
representations of young mothers as reckless and irresponsible for having unplanned 
pregnancies and as ‘getting pregnant’ in a calculated move to get a council flat.  
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Burman et al. (1996a) argue that both strands of response by feminists are valuable 
and that neither should be precluded, and Erica Burman has argued that ‘strategy may 
prevail over logic; sometimes there are good reasons for not wanting to deconstruct 
authorial authority, particularly when seeking to make a credible case of innovation’ 
(Burman, 1990: p216). So, ‘while we may seek to de-construct “expert” knowledge, 
we may also at times want to assert our authority and “expertise”, perhaps making 
strategic use of such contradictions in different contexts’ (Ribbens and Edwards, 
1998: p204). Prince and Hartnett (1993) argue that challenging psychology must 
involve interrogating both the ‘content of psychology, that is psychological 
terminology and theories, methodological prescriptions and their applications’ and its 
‘power, [and the] political, ideological and institutional structures within which the 
content of psychology is generated and applied’ (1993: p219).  
 
Erica Burman (1998) highlights the compromises that arguing with psychology on its 
own terms entails by constrasting the potential intervention of feminist psychology 
with that of the sub-discipline of the ‘psychology of women’. The ‘psychology of 
women’ retains women as an object of psychological gaze, which sets up the 
problematisation of women’s difference from what is easily understood as the 
‘normal’ subject of psychology. By abstracting gender as its focus, it can easily 
neglect to consider other significant factors which structure experience or easily 
subordinate these to gender, and it accepts that identity categories distinguish people 
unproblematically, and are stable, coherent and summative for a given person. 
Furthermore, whilst it implicitly points out the inadequacy of earlier work, it bolsters 
the discipline as a whole, as would any reformatory moves, lending further support to 
the ethos of instrumentality, control and knowledge of. In contrast, feminist 
psychology is explicitly political (Wilkinson, 1999) and avoids positioning women as 
the object of study, which broadens the range of possible topics of feminist analyses 
and avoids reinforcing the idea of women’s ‘psychology’ as intrinsically different to 
men’s, and as homogenous. However, either approach invests in the ‘master 
discourse’ of psychology which is to accept the institutional conditions and rules 
about what counts for knowledge, about how it is produced or disseminated. 
Therefore, it is, to some degree at least, to accept its fundamentals of empiricism and 
objectivism. Burman wonders:  
 173
‘If we approach psychological practices with the feminist suspicion they merit, 
then how can we intervene without also perpetuating those same practices of 
exclusion and oppression? Are those of us who would assume (or presume the 
viability of) the designation “feminist psychologist” deluding ourselves about 
the extent of critique and space for contest that we can initiate?’ (1998: p5). 
 
The risk that ‘feminist psychology’ allows a feminist critique of psychology to be 
ghettoized while the rest of psychology/the department’s staff carry on regardless is 
considered in chapter 7. It considers how psychology is bolstered by claiming to be 
‘developing’ in response to ‘new approaches to language’ which means that post-
structuralist critiques are effectively silenced as they are incorporated. 
 
Foucault’s analytics of power also enable us to see how we may unwittingly 
participate in reproducing systems of domination despite our conscious protests 
against specific elements of it. There is the danger of reifying what we try to critique, 
such as the categories of mothers whose popular representation we seek to improve, 
and of sustaining the knowledge practices that produce them. The tension is about 
bolstering broader arrogant knowledge claims or specific power relations, as we use 
the tools that allow us to make an authoritative intervention. Thus, as I try to intervene 
around the pathologisation of lesbian mothers, I bolster my own ‘speaking rights’ at 
the expense of theirs.  
 
Within this chapter, mothers themselves remain the objects of my concern and 
children have remained the objects of expertise. However, the discourse of 
experiential knowledge can make their perspective(s) and experiences legitimate 
positions to speak from too, and allow them to take up a position as expert of their 
own condition, or of their own relationships with parents. Only recently have children 
come to be seen as full subjects and seeing them as competent research subjects is a 
recent move - one more developed in the new sociologies of childhood (Edwards and 
Alldred, 1999b), than in psychology. A whole new realm of questions can be asked of 
research about parents and parenting once children have been granted the status of 
research subjects (of active subjects within parent-child relations, and not just the 
object of parents’ actions or affections) which the following chapter explores. 
Whereas the psychological research interventions considered in this chapter have been 
research on children, chapter 8 considers research with children. In Fraser’s terms, 
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‘the interpretations of those in question’ are another of the ways competing claims can 
be adjudicated and it is likely to draw on a warrant of subjective experience, if not 
explicitly then by its public representation as specific voices of children. In Foucault’s 
terms, children’s knowledge is a form of subjugated knowledge. Furthermore, it can 
be seen as a perspective which has been disqualified by developmental psychological 
constructions of the child as a person-to-be, less rational and controlled, more 
emotional, impulsive and imaginative: not what the subject of psychology, or of 
research was hoped to be.  
 
Identity categories illustrate well the limitations of accepting the terms of the debate, 
but also the impossibility of attributing resistance to any particular strategy. The 
gender-neutral discourse of parents might sometimes make what is considered a pro-
feminist intervention, at other times it might not, or it might work for or against a 
particular mother at different moments. Identity is only, as Jill Johnston put it ‘what 
you say you are, according to what they say you can be’ (cited in Kitzinger, 1987), 
but it has been immensely valuable as a means of resistance and visibility for 
devalued groups through ‘identity politics’ over the past 30 years. To warrant ‘voice’ 
by appeal to identity is certainly to be bound by the limits of that identity, and by the 
modernist subject, but as a strategy it remains highly effective. So, whilst hearing 
children’s voices in research is relatively new, the problems of the discourse of 
experiential knowledge are well recognised. Thus, considering how researchers might 
listen to children’s voices draws together particular political and epistemological 
arguments from chapters 5 and 6, and a specific research approach from chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7 
‘Discourse’ in/and the Discipline of Psychology 
 
The previous chapter examined the politics of powerful knowledge claims and the 
epistemological implications of the ‘crisis’ of representation or legitimation. The 
‘crisis’ or ‘discursive turn’ provides a fundamental philosophical challenge to how 
conventional approaches within psychology might have produced knowledge about 
fitness to parent. Chapter 5 outlined ways in which a post-structuralist informed 
discursive approach transformed the object of study and the questions that could be 
asked of it. Since the discipline of psychology makes the strongest truth claim on 
parent-child relationships this chapter examines the implications of the ‘turn to 
language’ for psychological research. How would a discursive psychology approach 
the study of ‘who is fit to parent’? It then asks whether this still constitutes 
psychological research.  
 
7.1 The method chapter?
Chapter 6 presented critical arguments about epistemology and articulated a 
methodological approach. This chapter presents a particular method which rests upon 
this post-structuralist approach. The ‘method’ in question is discourse analysis, but 
the argument here concerns whether it is more appropriately viewed as an ‘approach’ 
than a method, because it embodies a particular methodology. This makes it distinct 
from, and not interchangeable with, other psychological methods, an argument taken 
up in chapter 9.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are ‘the methodology’ and ‘method’ chapters of the thesis. In a 
conventional Introduction, Literature Review, Methods, Results, Conclusion format, 
Chapter 3 might describe the method/s, and the positivist-objectivist hegemony means 
that there might be relatively little discussion of epistemology or methodology. 
Engagement with a discursive approach has prompted a different way of writing a 
thesis, to which chapter 1 refers, and which this chapter should explain. Contrary to 
the conventional narrative of a thesis, the ‘method’ described here has to some extent 
already been adopted earlier in the thesis. It would be naive to assume that topics and 
approaches emerge entirely independently and that approaches do not inform the 
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kinds of questions that are asked even at the start of a piece of research. Once I had 
begun to study this approach, my awareness of the epistemological assumptions and 
rhetorical techniques of mainstream psychology and social science meant that my 
Ph.D topic and question were reformulated and developed in a particular way - most 
notably in the emergence of a concern with how one might claim to know who is ‘fit 
to parent’. Conventionally, method is presented as ‘pure’ technology, without 
reference to the particular object of study, and empirical material is only presented 
after the methods have been elaborated: an order which sustains the impression of 
neutral technology being applied objectively to the substantive topic. It would have 
been disingenuous to have written review or empirical chapters in a style that I had 
become critical of and self-conscious about. However, I did write empirical chapters 
in such a way as to omit explicit reflection on both the position from which I speak 
and the practices through which I ‘know’ the material. These chapters present 
themselves as unproblematised (and therefore implicitly objective) literal re-
presentations of the real. They are much more persuasive accounts for maintaining 
this convention. Having method/ology unannounced colludes with the view of 
knowledge as independent of politics, and reifies selected ‘objects’ as real. The 
accounts of parents in chapters 2, 3 and 4 can now be used illustratively for what 
might otherwise have been an abstract discussion of method. 
 
I intended a discursive tone for this chapter in order to recognise that there are neither 
uncontested criteria for judging this approach, nor any fixed evaluation of it to which 
I would commit (see chapter 6). However, the more powerful and familiar style of 
academic rhetoric proved seductive, and this chapter implicitly charts a progressivist 
course through debates about ‘discourse’ to identify the best definition and approach 
with apparent objectivity. I discuss the appeal of modernist narratives in the final part 
of this chapter (and this remains a core theme of the further two chapters). However, 
differences and disagreements amongst discourse analytic approaches are not ignored 
(see sections 7.2 and 7.3), and the tensions or even contradictions surrounding its 
adoption are not suppressed (see sections 7.3 and 7.4). Rather, disputes are seen as a 
resource; both to aid the understanding of different approaches to discourse analysis 
within psychology (through contextualizing particular approaches within researchers’ 
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theoretical and political orientations); and to keep the approach open and flexible to 
avoid producing another orthodoxy and limiting the directions of future work. 
 
Firstly in this chapter, I locate institutionally some key writers whose work has been 
significant for the development of discourse analytic work in social psychology in the 
UK. Secondly, I discuss the way these writers each define ‘discourse’. Thirdly, I 
discuss whether discourse analytic approaches are seen as an extension of, or a 
challenge to, social psychology. These sections review some of the debates amongst 
discourse analysts in social psychology, in particular, contrasting the approach of 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) with that of Parker (1990; 1992). Finally, I reflect upon 
the irony that the development (or appropriation) of this approach has renewed critical 
interest in social psychology when it can be seen as radically undermining the 
modernist project of psychology. Overall, this chapter aims to discuss some practical 
implications of adopting a discursive framework, and then to reflect more broadly 
upon this approach to consider how it is functioning for the academic institution.  
 
7.2 Studying ‘discourse’ within psychology
Discourse analysis has, over the past five years in particular, established itself as a 
major alternative approach within social psychology (Potter et al., 1990). However, 
the term itself has been used both to refer to different areas of work, and different 
approaches. Potter et al. describe four distinct strands of work laying claim to the title 
of discourse analysis in the early 1980s: a cognitive science approach to discourse 
processes (e.g. patterns of recall for different types of discourse); accounts of verbal 
interaction considered in relation to speech act theory; a strand emerging from 
continental philosophy and the analysis of culture; and a fourth strand of analyses of 
scientific discourse within the sociology of scientific knowledge. They also note the 
way in which conversational analysis can be either a sub-variety of discourse analysis 
(e.g. van Dijk, 1985) or a competing theoretical position (e.g. Sharrock and Anderson, 
1987, cited in Potter et al.,1990). Another distinction can be drawn between discourse 
and text analysis where the former denotes analysis of actual speech/writing and the 
latter analysis of underlying structures of coherence (Halliday, 1978, cited in Potter et 
al., ibid.). Thus, ‘the term is used with radically varying degrees of specificity and 
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subtle theoretical inflection’ (Potter et al., ibid. p206). In Discourse Analytic 
Research, Burman and Parker argue that  
‘…it is very difficult to speak of “discourse” or even “discourse analysis” as a 
single unitary entity, since this would blur together approaches subscribing to 
specific and different philosophical frameworks. In so far as there could be 
said to be commonality, these approaches are united by a common attention to 
the significance and structuring effects of language, and are associated with 
interpretive and reflexive styles of analysis.’ (Burman and Parker, 1993: p3)  
 
That the diversity amongst researchers extends to their adoption of different 
philosophical frameworks, suggests that the epistemological position upon which 
discourse analysis rests in this thesis is not its only or inevitable methodological 
perspective. These parallel the different approaches or research strategies described in 
chapter 6. In chapter 9, I explore further some of the different epistemological 
positions between and among researchers using discursive and/or ethnographic 
approaches. 
 
Up to this point in the thesis, I have distinguished only two broad forms of discourse 
analysis: one more clearly located within social psychology and including key texts 
such as Potter and Wetherell (1987) (which I have described as closer to 
psycholinguistics or Speech Act theory); and one informed by post-structuralism and 
more associated with broader, and interdisciplinary, discussions around 
feminism/postmodernism, (e.g. Burman, Alldred et al. 1996; Burman, Aitken et al., 
1996; Butler, 1990, 1993; Fraser, 1989; Fraser and Nicholson, 1990; Probyn, 1993). 
The more refined breakdown offered by Potter et al. prompts a closer examination of 
the distinguishing features of these bodies of work. Accounts of background 
influences and disciplinary location inform discussion of the differences between 
approaches to discourse. Firstly, some of the significant UK discourse analytic 
researchers will be located within the work ‘clusters’ (Burman and Parker, 1993) that 
represent differing approaches in UK social psychological discourse work. The rest of 
this section locates these study groups geographically. 
 
Several key centres for the study of discourse within psychology (as a discipline, if 
not a department) can be identified. Whilst the current academic climate of short-term 
contracts, as well as the mutual exchange of ideas formally and informally between 
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these centres means that they have not developed in isolation from each other, they 
have produced work with distinctive approaches and themes. The development and/or 
presentation of work in this factional way indicates the institutional culture which 
results from intensifying competition for funding, whereby research groups emphasise 
what is distinct about ‘their’ approach, to present their research as occupying a 
‘market niche’. Constructive exchanges between groups have continued in spite of 
such pressures to compete (for instance, the Constructionism/Realism debate between 
Manchester and Reading groups in 1996). In representing these groups, a tension 
emerges between wishing to identify differences of approach through which to 
elucidate my own, and yet not wishing to overstate these differences, or to construct 
the positions as static and fixed. 
 
Manchester Metropolitan University’s Discourse Unit has the full title of the Centre 
for Qualitative and Theoretical Research on the Reproduction and Transformation of 
Language and Subjectivity and is based in the Department of Psychology and Speech 
Pathology. Erica Burman convenes the group, and Ian Parker, was co-convenor until 
his move to take up a Professorship at Bolton Institute in 1996. Subsequently, a 
separate Discourse Unit was established at Bolton, but for the purpose of 
distinguishing approaches, these will be grouped together, as indeed they identify 
themselves within a Tri-Discourse Unit structure (of Bolton, Manchester and 
Bradford). Their orientation differs from the other UK units in its post-structuralist 
influence - acknowledging a debt to Foucault - and although it shares theoretical 
sources with some Cultural Studies work, it retains a standing in the discipline of 
psychology. This is because of a concern to critique contemporary psychological 
theory and practice and to involve critical/radical practitioners (educational 
psychologists, clinical psychologist, psychotherapists), and it relates to the particular 
interests of Ian Parker in psychiatry, and Erica Burman in developmental and 
educational psychology, and in feminist psychotherapy. The Unit has strong feminist 
and Marxist influences, and supports diverse work, including many Ph.Ds - this one 
amongst them. 
 
The Discourse and Rhetoric Group is the base for a substantial group of researchers 
which includes or has included Jonathon Potter, Michael Billig, Derek Edwards, 
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David Middleton, Ros Gill, and allied writers such as Celia Kitzinger. It is based in 
the Department of Social Science at Loughborough University (which comprises 
Psychology, Sociology and Social Science). Its orientation is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated by the work of Jonathan Potter and co-authors, and in Michael Billig’s 
work, but, in particular, by two key early texts: Discourse and Social Psychology: 
Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), and Ideological 
Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking (Billig, Condor, Edwards, 
Gane, Middleton, Radley, 1988). Margaret Wetherell is keenly associated with the 
Loughborough group particularly through her co-authorship with Jonathan Potter 
(especially of Discourse and Social Psychology, and Mapping the Language of 
Racism), although she is based at the Open University as Lecturer in Psychology, 
from where she co-ordinates a Discourse and Representations Group. Research 
employing conversational analysis (such as by Rob Wooffitt) has also been conducted 
within this group. 
 
Wendy Stainton Rogers is also based at the Open University, where she lectures in 
Health and Social Welfare. More significantly, however, her intellectual work in this 
area has centred around a group connected to the Psychology Department at Reading 
University. Her close link to Reading was through her partnership and co-authorship 
with Rex Stainton Rogers, who died in February 1999. Together they wrote Stories of 
Childhood: Shifting Agendas of Child Concern (1992) and were seen as the 
‘convenors’ of a collective named Beryl Curt which has also supported many 
postgraduate researchers. The group’s name is a spoonerism of the name of a prolific, 
acclaimed British psychologist, Sir Cyril Burt. Burt’s influential twin studies in the 
second quarter of this century were later shown to have been faked, since neither the 
impressively large twin sample, or the researcher he published with, appear to have 
existed. This is a deliberate display of the group’s irreverence towards, yet location 
within, psychology. The group have published Textuality and Tectonics (1994) and 
Social Psychology: A Critical Agenda (R. Stainton Rogers, P. Stenner, K. Gleeson, 
W. Stainton Rogers, 1995) and are a site of current lively debate. 
 
As these book titles show, these discourse units are generally orientated towards 
psychology and provide a niche for discourse analytic research within the discipline, 
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usually in social, but occasionally in developmental psychology. However, in 
psychology departments at Reading, and Manchester Metropolitan, Universities, (and 
also at the University of East London), this work goes on alongside more mainstream 
psychology which can, having granted it a place, keep discourse work ghettoized and 
marginal to the undergraduate syllabus, thereby containing its critique of the 
discipline and its practices. This is one of the three possible responses of psychology 
as a discipline to discourse analytic work which Potter and Wetherell set out in 1987. 
For more detail about UK groups see descriptions by Ashmore (1985, 1989), Parker 
(1991a) and Potter (1989, 1990) (cited in Parker, 1992). 
 
7.3 Defining ‘discourse’: ‘discourses’ versus ‘interpretive repertoires’
In 1987, in their key text, Discourse and Social Psychology, Potter and Wetherell 
develop the concept of ‘interpretative repertoires’. They use the term ‘discourse’ 
‘in its more open sense, following Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), to cover all 
forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal and written texts of all kinds. 
So, when we talk of “discourse analysis” we mean analysis of any of these 
forms of discourse’ (p7).  
 
They describe the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1980, 1984) on the accounts given by 
scientists about research work, and sometimes use the word ‘discourse’ in this 
general, commonsense way: ‘Gilbert and Mulkay designated [the] two situations in 
which scientists generated discourse the “formal” and “informal” contexts, 
respectively’ (p147). So, in order to refer to a particular kind of account which the 
scientists sometimes employed, they use the notion of ‘interpretative repertoires’. 
Thus, an account characterised by empiricism was from the ‘empiricist repertoire’, as 
opposed to an alternative repertoire.  
‘Interpretative repertoires are recurrently used systems of terms used for 
characterising and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A 
repertoire, like the empiricist and contingent repertoires, is constituted through 
a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical 
constructions. Often a repertoire will be organised around specific metaphors 
and figures of speech’ (Potter and Wetherell, ibid.: p149). 
 
Thus, ‘interpretive repertoire’ is an analytic concept to identify a sub-set of the 
linguistic/conceptual resources available. 
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Parker builds on Potter and Wetherell’s definition of ‘interpretive repertoires’, but 
shows, by sounding three notes of criticism, why he prefers the term ‘discourse’: 
‘We should be cautious, though, about three aspects of this label “interpretive 
repertoire”: (i) to talk about “grammatical constructions” is inappropriate and 
risks getting bogged down in formalism at the expense of content; (ii) the 
assertion that there is a “limited range of terms” feeds the positivist fantasy for 
an ultimate complete picture of a particular system, a totality of meanings; and 
(iii) the term “repertoire” has uncomfortable resonances with behaviourism, 
especially when we are invited to look for systems of terms which are 
“recurrently used”’(Parker, 1992: p11). 
 
From this he concludes that ‘it is surely better to label sets of metaphors and 
statements we find as “discourses”’ (ibid.). 
 
Parker’s rejection of grammatical markers for an interpretive repertoire/discourse, and 
his preference for markers that are about content, suggests a greater concern with 
semantics, than with linguistics. It therefore reflects his concern with ideology and the 
political consequences of meaning, and thus indicates his distance from a 
psycholinguistics or conversation analysis approach. It implies a broader focus than 
does Potter and Wetherell’s more grammatical delineation, and this paves the way for 
the differences of opinion as to where the edges of a study are drawn. 
 
Whilst both Parker, and Potter and colleagues are concerned with ‘discourse 
analysis’, examining what constitutes appropriate material for analysis reveals subtle 
differences. Comparing their ‘objects of study’ reveals that their concepts of 
‘discourse’ and ‘interpretive repertoire’ do not, in fact, coincide fully. Potter and 
Wetherell apply discourse analysis to ‘spoken interaction ..and written texts’, and 
describe discourse analysis as ‘focus[ing] on the role of discourse in interaction and 
sense making rather than being concerned with, for example, abstract questions of 
semantics, text coherence or aesthetics’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: p184). Theirs is 
a more inter-subjective focus, such as in conversational analysis, on the specific 
interaction between two individuals. 
 
In contrast, Parker wishes to open up the field of study to ‘texts’, defined far more 
broadly as ‘delimited tissues of meaning reproduced in any form that can be given an 
interpretative gloss’ (Parker 1990a: p193). Texts have ‘discourses “at work” in them’ 
 
183
 
 
  
or contain ‘pieces of discourse’ (Parker, 1992). Since for Parker, all tissues of 
meaning are texts, they are all potential objects of study. Such a broad definition 
renders any aspect of our social world studyable and the range of forms which the 
object of study may take is expanded - one only need specify. Once everything can be 
thought of as textual and the process of interpretation and reflection has been started, 
‘we can adopt the post-structuralist maxim “There is nothing outside of the text” 
(Derrida, 1976, p158)’ (Parker, 1992). Parker argues that this need not necessarily 
commit us to a particular position on the nature of reality, textual or otherwise, and 
this point will be taken up in chapter 8. 
 
Thus, as one examines the discussion of definitions of ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse 
analysis’, it becomes apparent that despite their closeness in the broader picture of 
psychological methods, there are subtle distinctions between ‘discursive approaches’ 
within contemporary social psychology. Parker, and Potter, together with Wetherell 
and colleagues, are not, in fact, speaking about precisely the same approach, nor 
object of study.  
 
7.4 ‘Discourses’ and ‘texts’
Parker’s preferred definition of discourse - following Foucault (1972) - is ‘a system of 
statements which constructs an object’. He points out that ‘people too can be the 
objects of discourse’ (1990a: p191). Discourses are ‘linguistic sets of a higher order 
than the sentence (while often reducible to a sentence) and carried out or actualised 
by means of texts’ (Marin, 1983: p162, cited in Parker, 1990a). Parker’s definition 
and approach draws a post-structuralist influence not only from the work of writers 
such as Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, but also from the UK writers who have 
applied such work to psychology and its ‘subject’ (Henriques et al., 1984; Hollway, 
1989). He quotes Henriques et al. and notes the explicit link to the work of Foucault: 
‘The metaphors, analogies and pictures discourses paint of a reality can be 
distilled into statements about that reality. It is only then that it becomes 
possible to say that a discourse is “any regulated system of statements” 
(Henriques et al., 1984: p105, cited in Parker, 1990a: p192).  
 
This makes clear the fact that the identification of discourse is an act of analysis by 
researchers. A discourse is about objects, and discourse analysis is about discourses 
as objects (Parker, 1992). Although discourses are quite coherent in their historical 
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context, it is through the process of elaborating or interrogating them that they 
become more carefully systematized (Parker, 1990a). It is this condensing or 
abstracting (reducing, say, to a sentence) which produces what we can then refer to as 
a discourse. Thus, the active role of the researcher, and the status of discourse as 
artefact are explicit in this definition. This helps to avoid reifying discourses as pre-
existing social objects. In contrast to this, Potter and Wetherell tend to speak of 
discourses ‘emerging’ from, and through, the reading and re-reading of the text (1987: 
esp. chapter 8). This replicates the conventional practice of obscuring the processes 
by which analysis occurs, and furthermore, implies that any given analysis was 
inevitable, would have been ‘found’ by any researcher and is therefore objective 
(independent of perspective of the researcher). This contrasts with the explicit role of 
the researcher’s own (political) perspective for Parker. 
 
According to Parker, one does not find ‘a discourse’ in a piece of text, one finds 
fragments or elements of a discourse, and this is why a researcher needs to bring in 
their knowledge of the culture of which they are a participant. This shifts away from 
the image of a researcher looking onto culture, as if detached, as in objective-
positivist models of research, (or onto an other culture as if free of the lens of their 
own culture as in the classical ethnographies of cross-cultural anthropology). The 
different implications of these perspectives are examined further in chapter 8. In order 
to disentangle a discourse from within a text, Parker, in a characteristically post-
structuralist move, states that ‘we have to bring a knowledge of discourses from 
outside onto any example of fragment of discourse for it to become part of a coherent 
system in our analysis’ (1990a: p193). This distinguishes different forms of discourse 
analysis. In practice, analysis can either be focused tightly on text such as an 
interview transcript (as Potter and Wetherell tend to), or can be broader than a 
delimited source. The focus could be on the meanings produced by a visual image, or 
a combination of visual and verbal, such as Parker’s (1992) analyses of a badge and a 
computer game, or Whelldon’s (1992) analysis of the contradictions between ideas 
about mothers in the visual imagery and verbal accounts within South African 
women’s magazines.  
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This latter position has been the approach adopted within this thesis. In chapters 2, 3 
and 4, I made interpretations of a range of cultural sources or texts. For Chapter 2, in 
particular, my account implicitly identified discourses from a range of cultural forms, 
not only linguistic within parenting magazines, including, for instance, the way close-
up photography of women’s faces helps constitute the discourse which ‘genders’ the 
reader, or snapshot photographs authenticise the first person accounts as ‘real-life’. 
Discussion sometimes broadened out from the original text, and I drew on 
information from other aspects of my cultural experience. This is perhaps most 
obvious in chapter 4, where discussion of campaigns and reference to campaign 
sources – as well as my more polemical tone - make politics more explicit, but the 
less explicit ways in which my political and personal investments informed the 
analysis of chapters 2 and 3 are no less significant. My use of examples from fiction, 
newspapers and policy documents alongside each other relied on the view of them as 
texts within which cultural discourses could be discerned. However, I did not make 
explicit my own acts of interpretation, nor the processes of selection, abstraction and 
articulation which produce (rather than simply ‘discern’) discourses from texts. I 
therefore colluded in the presentation of method as a neutral tool, applied to material 
from which these analyses, with appropriate methods, would emerge. By not 
specifying otherwise and by employing a comfortable, conventional language style, I 
produced an implicitly realist warrant for the account even though I did not always 
seek to present the account as necessarily objective. Therefore, I reinforced an 
objective-realist epistemology and, as Potter et al. warn against, I reified the 
particular discourses of mothers/fathers/parents that I wrote about. Chapter 6 
considered this problem of reification and chapter 9 considers the dilemmas raised 
when it is apparent that accounts which retain realist and objectivist warrants are 
more powerful than those which admit that they are produced and partial. 
 
7.5 Discourse analysis versus the analysis of discourse
Potter et al. (1990) highlight the dangers of reifying discourses as objects and argue 
that by calling something ‘a discourse’ - and approaching discourse analysis with 
criteria for identifying a discourse, as does Parker - one implies it has the status of 
something prior to analysis. This is one of the three key problems they identify in 
Parker’s approach. They claim that discourses are objectified in being defined as ‘sets 
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of statements’ and they illustrate the danger through an analogy with geological plate 
tectonics: that discourses sound like great plates sometimes crashing against each 
other, sometimes slipping quickly past each other, with the possibilities of volcanic 
eruptions and unseen forces working below. Despite Parker’s intention to the 
contrary, according to Potter et al., the problem is that  
‘discourses in this view become formed as coherent and carefully 
systematized (Parker, 1989, p5) wholes which take on the status of causal 
agents for analytic purposes. That is, the processes of interest are seen as those 
of (abstract) discourse working on another (abstract) discourse’ (p209).  
 
(However, despite these possible dangers, the Beryl Curt collective make broad and 
extended use of geological metaphors for their theoretical approach in their 1994 
book Textuality and Tectonics). According to Potter et al., what is missing is the 
‘actual working of discourse as a constitutive part of social practices situated in 
specific contexts’ (ibid.: p209). Concern with the ‘pragmatic work that is done in text 
and talk’ (p209) reflects their concern with the function of language, and indeed, 
carries strong echoes of Speech Act Theory. Parker’s proposition that discourse 
analysis requires treating discourses as objects of study makes explicit the nature of 
discourse as artefact. He argues that ‘discourse analysis deliberately systematizes 
different ways of talking so that we can understand them better’ (Parker 1992: p5). 
That treating something formulated (not non-empirically) by the researcher ‘as if’ it 
has the status of object allows one to ‘hold it still’ for long enough to consider its 
ideological functions and connections to wider relations of power. This is why Potter 
et al. reject Parker’s conflation of ‘discourse analysis’ with the ‘analysis of 
discourses’ (p208). The concern of Potter et al. with pragmatics or with what the 
discourse is doing in the particular context is a very similar concern to that of Parker 
(1990a; 1990b; 1992) and Parker and Burman (1993), but is focused at a different 
level - at one closer to the individual and their experiences in interactions:  
‘From our perspective, objects are constructed in talk and text in such a way 
as to perform actions, and actions can be studied precisely in terms of their 
context - fittedness and variability, including their uptake - the ways in which 
phenomena such as next turns, responses and reactions implicate them as 
actions’ (Potter et al. 1990: p210). 
 
In contrast they propose that ‘interpretative repertoires’ be understood as 
‘abstractions from practices in context’ (Potter et al., 1990: p209). Extending this 
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argument yet further, some writers, such as Stenner (1993), avoid using either term 
(‘discourse’ or ‘repertoire’) as a noun in order to avoid this problem of reification. 
That is, to avoid making it sound as if the object (which we might call ‘discourse’) is 
real, something that pre-exists, rather than is an analytic invention of, the researcher. 
Instead, Stenner conducts a ‘close reading which attempts to separate a given text into 
coherent themes or stories’, which he calls a ‘thematic decomposition’ (Stenner, 
1993: p114). His themes, or different stories inevitably become objectified within his 
analysis - and it is hard to imagine how one could discuss them without doing so - but 
he attempts to avoid granting them existence beyond his analysis by insisting on 
calling them ‘his readings’ as opposed even to his interpretation (of something 
already there). Stenner’s approach might be located closer to the post-structuralist 
influenced strand, than that of Widdicombe (in the same edited collection) who 
prefers instead to focus on the ‘dynamic and pragmatic aspects of language use’ 
(Widdicombe, 1993, cited in Burman and Parker, 1993: p2). 
 
However, Parker and Burman (1993) believe that we are ‘ineluctably caught in the 
trap of reifying the discourse’ (p162). This danger is particularly acute when 
discourses are depicted as ‘abstract and autonomous meaning-systems that float above 
social practice’ and their delineation is merely an academic pursuit (p162). In this 
sense, the study of discourse is doing to its object what empiricism does as it treats 
that which it can ‘measure’ as the real. Several features of what Parker and Burman 
consider good practice could help to reduce these problems, including attention to the 
complex inter-relation of language and social practice, and reflection on the way we 
try to articulate this, and attempting to avoid constructing discourse as the sum total 
of, rather than the manifestation of, structural power relationships. 
 
Following a Foucauldian approach to discourse as comprising both language and 
social practices (see chapter 5), there is no conceptual distinction between the 
discourse (or linguistic resources) with which to speak of lone mothers, and, say, the 
payment of social security which constructs her as ‘single’, head of household, having 
dependents, and, in turn, positions her in some discourses, as ‘welfare dependent’. 
Parker and Burman (1993) maintain that there is a role for identifying material 
practices distinct from linguistic ones, as a strategic way of emphasizing the material 
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aspects of linguistic practice, but see the two as fundamentally bound up with each 
other and integral to each others’ power. 
 
The discussion of authority regarding childrearing practices in chapters 2 and 6 
provides an illustration of this. Discourses provide the means by which institutions 
are structured and re/produce particular power relations. The institutionalized 
authority positions around children are maintained through the provision of rights to 
speak within psychological discourse. Any of us might express opinions about 
appropriate childrearing practices employing psychological discourses, but our 
authority can be challenged by, and our discursive position subjugated to, someone 
employing a discourse which constructs their knowledge as expertise. A discursive 
statement warranted by reference to personal experience that a mother may make can 
be relegated to the status of mere lay knowledge by those holding an institutionalised 
expert position (health visitor, GP, etc.) at a site at which the supposed objectivity of 
expertise implicitly (or explicitly) devalues experience as ‘merely’ subjective. 
 
It is sometimes argued that the post-structuralist postulate of the all-encompassing 
nature of discourses - reflected earlier in the Derridean comment about all the world 
as textual - and the emphasis on the powerful way discourses operate and their 
connections to institutions leaves no room for resistance. It makes them sound too 
powerful, and as if they are monolithic structures of meaning bearing down on 
helpless individuals. In response to the criticism that discourses sound too fixed, and 
leave no room for a person to say something that has not been said before, Parker 
(1992) cites Henriques et al. (1984: p105-6):  
‘[t]he systematic character of a discourse includes its systematic articulation 
with other discourses. In practice, discourses delimit what can be said, whilst 
providing the spaces - the concepts, metaphors, models, analogies - for 
making new statements within any specific discourse.’ 
 
He continues:  
‘This point raises, in turn, two further issues. First, metaphors and analogies 
are always available from other discourses, and the space this gives the 
speaker to find a voice from another discourse, and even within a discourse 
they oppose, is theoretically limitless. (It is not limitless in practice…)’. 
(Parker, 1992: p13) 
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In reflecting upon whether discourses have been reified in her research account, 
Deborah Marks asks: ‘Have “discourses” come to look like ideological apparatuses? 
The implication here is that people are imprisoned within their texts and that there is 
no such thing as communication, but only the battle between different, untranslatable 
ways of seeing’ (Marks, 1993: p150). This was a key starting point for the elaboration 
of the concept of discourse in this thesis (see chapter 5). To be useful, I have argued 
that a discursive approach needs to recognise both the power of (psychological) 
discourse, and the room for manoeuvre within it, resistance to it, and the 
unpredictable nature of its political effects such that critique needs continually 
reworking. These points have been persistent features of feminist engagements with, 
and criticisms of, the work of Foucault.  
 
Potter, Wetherell and colleagues emphasise the constitutive and functional aspects of 
language. Indeed, the body of work they prefer to identify as discourse analysis is 
marked by the presence of these three strands: (1) a concern with the functional 
orientation of language, (2) a concern to ‘address the constructive processes that are 
part and parcel of the functional orientation, and (3) an awareness of the variability 
thrown up by this orientation’ (Potter et al., 1990: p207). Agreeing with post-
structuralist and social constructionist approaches about the constitutive nature of 
language, there is a danger that a concern with ‘the functional orientation of language’ 
could leave as little room for individuals to resist dominant discourses as some critics 
felt of a Foucauldian approach. However, Potter et al. argue that this must not be 
understood in a mechanical way. They point out that meanings and outcomes cannot 
be guaranteed, and offer Billig’s (1987; 1989b) approach to the study of discourse as 
an analysis of rhetorical struggles. 
 
Parker retains each of these aspects, but builds on them to develop a slightly different 
emphasis. He is more concerned with the social relations of power that discourses 
support, than with the technical details of the operation of a given grammatical 
structure in interaction between individuals. Hence, in addition to his seven necessary 
and sufficient criteria for identifying a discourse, are three ‘most important’ auxiliary 
criteria which research should focus upon: that discourses support institutions, 
reproduce power relations and have ideological effects (Parker, 1992: p17). 
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Parker does not want to use grammar as a marker of discourse because, for him, this 
would limit the approach. An emphasis on semantic links better allows a politically 
informed analysis. Alongside the issue of the extent to which one ought to ‘go beyond 
the text’, these indicate something coherent in the differences between the 
orientations of these two centres of discourse analytic work. It can be argued that the 
approach of Potter and his colleagues is closer to a psychological, or linguistic focus 
on language, and that Parker’s broader analysis is closer to a cultural studies or 
contemporary social/political theory. This difference appears to be a feature not only 
of backgrounds in different theoretical traditions: where psycholinguistics, and 
microsociological approaches such as ethnomethodology (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987), as opposed to semiotics and post-structuralism, orient these researchers in 
different directions, but also a matter of political and/or academic investments. Where 
Potter’s interest is in developing ‘a coherent discourse analytic programme in 
Psychology’ (Potter et al., 1990: p205, my emphasis) or ‘a new social psychological 
orientation to such [discursive] research’ (ibid.: p207), Parker’s interest is reflection 
on and criticism of the knowledge practices and truth effects of psychology and the 
institutional practices such theory sustains. This is supported by his belief that such 
‘attention to language can also facilitate a process of progressively politicising 
everyday life’ (Parker, 1992: p21). 
 
Of course, my presentation of the debates undoubtedly relates to my own interests and 
emphases in this study. My aim is not to produce knowledge about the significance of 
these writers’ backgrounds from a ‘superior’ vantage point which implies I can see 
(know) what they cannot. This is why their comments on each others’ work is of 
interest. Indeed, the authors may feel the differences are more significant than I have 
conveyed, since they might resist my initial placing of them within the same category 
and therefore as comparable. Potter et al. (1990) mark a significant difference when 
they locate Parker’s approach amongst those influenced by semiology or post-
structuralism and describe it as ‘centred in the entirely different tradition of 
continental social philosophy and cultural analysis’ (1990: p206). My rhetorical use 
of the construction of two ‘camps’ is not intended to reify and fix (two) oppositional 
theoretical positions. Indeed, interesting collaborative work has been produced since 
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this chapter was first written (e.g. Nightingale and Cromby, 1999; Parker, 1998; 
Parker and the Bolton Discourse Network, 1999). My aim is to explore some of the 
issues raised by the use of discursive approaches within psychology and the 
distinctions between researchers who have taken ‘the linguistic turn’, yet remain 
within social psychology. 
 
7.6 Doing ‘discourse’ within psychology? 
In the introduction to Discourse Dynamics (1992), Ian Parker develops his 1990 
position, putting politics first, before an investment in bettering the discipline of 
psychology. He writes:  
‘it is better to start with a wish to deconstruct power and ideology and then 
look at how a study of discourse dynamics could help. You have to be, in 
some senses, outside psychology to do that. Inside psychology, the emergence 
of a discourse framework starts with the “turn to language”.’ (pxi) 
 
In contrast to this, some researchers begin ‘inside’ the discipline - perhaps being 
already located in psychology, their personal investment in this as ‘what they do’ 
means that ‘valuable work’ is defined solely within the terms of the discipline itself. 
These are terms which do not rate political intervention or ethical ‘application’ 
centrally. Potter and Wetherell (1987) emphasize the development of the approach 
from influences within, or close to, psychology (e.g. psycholinguistics, linguistic 
philosophy, ethnomethodology). This creates the sense of legitimacy for discourse 
analysis (Burman, 1990). As Burman argues, restricting the focus to within the 
discipline precludes recognition for the impact of broader influences, including 
critique and resistance, in the same way that Reason and Rowan’s (1981) account of 
post-positivism fails to locate it within the history of feminist criticism and current 
critical debates. This narrow focus also reinforces the idea of the natural, evolutionary 
development of the discipline (which is constructed as a ‘healthy’ discipline 
responding to change). Firstly, it was argued by those influenced by feminist, post-
colonial or post-structuralist writing that the object of the discipline was actually an 
historically and culturally specific form of human subject. This required that 
psychology amend its assertions of universality and ahistoricity, and qualify the 
presumed centrality of its perspective (see chapter 8). It adapted though, because 
being a science, disproving old theories to develop new ones is its trade. By reducing 
difference to graspable (indeed measurable) ‘factors’ it was able to incorporate ‘non-
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standard’ subjects - and it now looked at the individual in his (now ‘his or her’) social 
context and provided a gender or class analysis of difference between subjects. 
However, its knowledge of even these differentiated individuals was problematised as 
the individual-social dichotomy was undermined by the ‘turn to language’. This is the 
point at which this discussion - of whether discourse work is incorporated into, or 
stands outside of psychology – can be located. 
 
Potter and Wetherell’s position is contradictory. At times they present discourse 
analysis as the next step in developing better methods in psychology, and at other 
times they use it to deconstruct the conventional approach and rhetoric of 
psychological research (Burman, 1990). Discursive work can occupy an ambiguous 
position inside or outside (and against) psychology, and overall, Potter and Wetherell 
emphasize their location within social psychology and retain their authority as 
experts. Despite criticizing psychologists’ use of particular rhetorical techniques to 
convey authority, they are largely unreflective of their own position as producers of 
knowledge. This is particularly significant given the ‘key text’ status that this book 
now has within the field. Section 7.7 continues the discussion of reflexivity in this 
text. 
 
Parker describes discourse analysis as ‘both a symptom and part of the cure’ because 
he sees the ‘preoccupation with language in contemporary psychology [as] a symptom 
of an evasion of the material basis of oppression (in the practical order) on the part of 
academics’ (1990a: p201). Psychology’s conventional perspective has been a narrow 
focus on its object of study, the individual. This individual is constructed through the 
‘fantasy of bounded and knowable beings, and ‘“sold” on the “best-selling stories” of 
“the Cartesian Family”: about minds without bodies, mental skills rather than 
embodied and situated collective performances’ (Macauley and Gordo-Lopez, 1995: 
p17), that it is not difficult to see that social psychology - as we have known it - might 
be conceptualised as humpty-dumpty (Burman, 1990: p218). That is, it’s hard to see 
how psychology can be put back together after such challenges to its fundamental 
nature and ways. 
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Discourse analysis has succeeded in provoking a reflection on psychological practice, 
and its philosophical underpinnings, by examining psychologists’ discourse (Potter, 
1988b) and it ‘reframes the object’ - individual psychology - and allows us to treat it 
not as truth, but as one ‘truth’ held in place by language and power (Parker, 1990a). 
By employing his three auxiliary criteria, Parker believes we can ‘describe, educate 
and change the way a discourse is used’ and so shift the relationships it 
encodes/produces: ‘Discourse analysis should become a variety of action research, in 
which the internal system of any discourse and its relation to others is challenged. It 
alters, and so permits different spaces for manoeuvre and resistance’ (1990a: p201). 
Though as Parker and Burman (1993) identify, in our efforts to make discourse 
analysis more accessible, we can end up teaching it as ‘a technology, as a theory-free 
method’ (p162) and allowing it to function in ways that are compatible with 
conventional empiricist research. Without attending to Parker’s three supplementary 
points, there is the danger that the analysis of discourse becomes just another method 
(Parker, 1992). Politics are not tied to, or guaranteed by, this method, but rather, when 
applied within a ‘progressive’ political framework this approach may facilitate 
‘progressive’ analyses. 
 
Discourse analysis alters the questions that are asked (Gergen, 1989; Harre, 1989). 
Abrams and Hogg (1990) in an exchange in Philosophical Psychology ask whether 
discourse analysis can look at the same things that social psychology does. They want 
to integrate discourse analysis into social psychology, are keen to emphasise 
interpretative aspects and stress that discourse cannot be analysed in the abstract, but 
needs empirical study of its operation in context and attention to ‘what the reader does 
with it’. Their concern is that although ‘discourse can be regarded as the social 
process par excellence, it is portrayed by Parker as abstracted, reified and 
unconnected with individual or social psychological processes’ (1990b: p230). Their 
emphasis is on social processes underlying people’s use of discourse, and they argue 
that Parker attributes agency to the discourses (constructing objects) instead of to the 
people using them. They keep Mead’s (1934) usage of reflexivity and read Parker’s 
‘we have to take a position [as a subject within discourse]’ as too strong, as attributing 
too much power to discourse. It becomes apparent, however, that their criticisms of 
Parker’s work stem from their non-post-structuralist position on language: 
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‘It does seem plausible that power relations are reflected in discourse, but not 
that discourses reproduce these relations. Discourse is not an agent, it is a 
medium for, and form of, communication’ (p221). 
 
A useful aspect of discursive approaches which could benefit work throughout 
psychology is the reflexivity urged upon researcher and reader (Parker, 1992). 
Reflexivity is about trying to look critically, in a way that makes the everyday, and 
our place within it, seem strange (after Dorothy Smith, 1987), which is to say, make it 
visible as opposed to taken-for-granted. Parker’s position is that ‘reflexivity needs to 
be grounded and post-structuralist work can locate discourse and meaning 
historically’ (1990a: p190). Reflexivity is not, however, a panacea, it does not 
dissolve discourse, though it can help us reflect on what happens when we speak or 
write (Parker and Burman, 1993). Parker, like Nancy Fraser (see chapter 6), notes that 
reflexivity itself, as well as the discourses it might reflect upon, is culturally and 
historically specific. Some of the forms reflexivity commonly takes in social research 
are explored in chapter 8. 
 
Harre, Shotter and Gergen have been key writers in the uptake of social 
constructionism in psychology. At times, their approaches to discourse have been 
more constructionist than post-structuralist informed in that they have shared a focus 
on individual interaction, and ‘small scale or intimate forms of social life’ (Morss, 
1995: p55). This position sometimes presupposes a liberal analysis of society 
comprising ‘distinct individuals with rational awareness of needs’ (ibid.: p56). Two 
problems with this are that there sometimes remain elements of humanism in which 
the unitary subject is left intact (Bowers, 1988), and that this voluntaristic model of 
the individual sustains a naïve model of the free market in which it is assumed all 
individuals are free to make their rational choices, denying the structural inequalities 
which prevent equality of access. Abrams and Hogg (1990) view Parker’s approach as 
allowing no room for psychological processes, but symbolic interactionist 
approaches, and therefore the notion of reflexivity which they adopt from Mead, rely 
on this modernist (psychological) construction of the subject. 
 
7.7 The new improved psychology
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Post-structuralist informed critiques of psychology challenge its fundamental 
assumptions. They destabilize the discipline by relativizing its claims to knowledge. It 
is therefore difficult to see how the project of psychology can be maintained whilst 
these critiques are acknowledged, yet it appears that certain new approaches within 
psychology claim not only to acknowledge, but actually incorporate post-structuralist 
or postmodernist ideas. This section will consider the way in which some texts 
present themselves as informed by the radical arguments of post-structuralism, yet 
manage also to present themselves as authorities on the latest ‘developments’ in ways 
of doing psychological research. General paradoxes surrounding the uptake of post-
structuralist ideas in the academy are illustrated through the particular ironies of these 
texts. Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology (described 
above) is of particular significance within British social psychology, and occupies the 
tenuous position of espousing an approach which radically destabilizes conventional 
psychological study and the authority of researchers, yet secures for itself a location 
on the bookshelf as an authoritative pronouncement of the latest way to do 
psychological research. Kenneth Gergen, a well-known and prolific US psychologist, 
occupies a similar position when he describes a ‘postmodern psychology’ in Steiner 
Kvale’s collection Psychology and Postmodernism (1992). I characterise these texts 
in order to draw out the potential ironies of postmodernist academic theory, without 
claiming that they represent each author’s work or necessarily characterise their later 
work. 
 
To summarise some of the arguments presented in chapters 5 and 6, post-structuralist 
approaches within the social sciences problematise the conceptualisation of language 
as a mirror of social reality; the existence of ‘the individual’ prior to and distinct from 
the social; and the conceptualisation of the subject as unitary and rational. 
Postmodernism questions the epistemological presumptions to challenge the scientific 
method’s claim to provide privileged access to truth. The existence of truth, as 
something objective and independent of the perspective from which it is viewed 
(Truth) is undermined. As a consequence, the presumed universality of knowledge so 
generated is doubted. In place of Truth are more modest culturally-specific 
knowledges, within which are even more partial subject positions or vantage points 
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which an observer might occupy. Furthermore, the attempt to claim such knowledge 
is subject to contestation or political deconstruction (chapter 6 and 8). 
 
Each of these arguments provide the grounds for a radical critique of psychology. Its 
whole project is fundamentally problematized: firstly, as a modernist practice 
(seeking objective truth through the evolution of special methods providing privileged 
ways of looking at reality); and secondly, as a discipline for which the objects of 
inquiry have been conceptualised as essentially pre-social objects (the mind, the 
psyche or the individual). Neither psychology’s object nor methods of inquiry remain 
unproblematized, yet somehow, the radical nature of this critique can be contained 
and the approach can be incorporated back into psychology as a ‘new method’ 
(Parker and Burman, 1993). 
 
Changing the Subject, the collectively written text by Henriques et al. (1984), was a 
key text in which the implications of post-structuralist ideas for psychology were 
elaborated and a new approach to the theorization of subjectivity was developed. 
Venn, in a chapter which presents a critique of the theoretical presuppositions 
underpinning the discipline, demonstrates that the new approach ‘cannot occupy the 
theoretical space of existing psychology but is part of a wider project’ (p152). 
 
However, despite the fact that, as Gergen notes, the majority of contemporary 
psychological inquiry is still conducted within a modernist framework (scientific 
psychology remaining ‘insulated from both extraneous stimuli and disagreeable ideas’ 
(1992: p20)), there has been a significant, although perhaps relatively confined, 
interest in social constructionism and deconstructionist approaches within the sub-
discipline of social psychology. Sage publications now has at least nine books in the 
Inquiries in Social Construction series. The series editors are Kenneth Gergen and 
John Shotter, both of whom are important figures associated with the uptake of post-
structuralist ideas into psychology, and both of whom have a chapter in a 1992 book 
in the series, Psychology and Postmodernism. 
 
In Gergen’s chapter, ‘Towards a Postmodern Psychology’, one of the indications of 
the ‘damage limitation’ exercise he performs on potentially undermining arguments, 
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is the way he mentions, in passing, that the reason he engaged with postmodernism in 
the first place was because it ‘promised to be an interesting intellectual adventure’ 
(1992: p26). This somewhat reduces the urgency of responding to these ideas, as if 
the discipline might confidently elect not to engage with these culture-wide shifts, 
such as general challenges to scientific authority (Lyon, 1994; Richards, 1999). 
Furthermore, it becomes apparent that Gergen does not share the political concerns of 
writers who developed post-structuralist approaches in tandem with their critiques of 
the individualism inherent in the individual-social dichotomy (e.g. Henriques et al., 
ibid.). His motivations are therefore not, (or are not made explicit as), political ones 
which can be allied with theorists whose work is drawn on in chapters 5, 6 and 8, who 
are, at least historically, associated with the left, and/or feminist or anti-racist 
struggles. 
 
After discussing features of ‘the postmodern turn’ that are problematic for 
psychology, when Gergen says ‘Yet, such a rapid exit seems both unwise and 
unwarranted’ (p25), it becomes apparent that he is not referring to an exit from 
psychology, but from postmodernism! His explanation as to why such a move is 
unwarranted comes close to the argument that taking up or responding to new ideas 
are all part of the inevitable march of progress: 
“It is unwise because postmodernist views, once savored, can scarcely be 
abandoned. They are, as one young man put it, like a ‘sweet poison’. Once 
tasted, the appetite becomes insatiable. They are an outgrowth of our historical 
era, and once sophisticated there is no return to virginal purity.”(p25) 
[emphasis added] 
 
This discourse of progression from purity or naïvite to sophistication retains the 
‘civilizing’ project of science. It is a developmental narrative of progress. 
Interestingly, whilst the language of ‘appetite’ and ‘savouring’ echoes this narrative 
through the idea of biological urges being brought under control by (rational) 
knowledge, this mind over body construction is employed with a twist: sophistication 
is not healthy and wholesome, in fact it is an ambivalent and ultimately damaging 
‘sweet poison’. 
 
It becomes clear that departure would be unwarranted: because postmodernism does 
not present such a terrible threat after all. The purported challenges to psychology are, 
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according to Gergen, over-exaggerated because, what ‘the postmodern turn’ actually 
does is ‘begins to offer psychology new ways of conceptualising itself and its 
potentials’ (p25). This promise of renewal for psychology again draws upon the 
progressivist ‘up the mountain’ discourse, so that newness is advance and betterment. 
This is the conventional way of presenting change within a scientific (or pseudo-
scientific) discipline. Gergen’s ‘better’ psychology might be something that I would 
agree is more ethical, but because he does not present ‘progress’ as politicized, as 
informed by political criticism of psychology, but as inevitable (simply by drawing on 
the default rhetoric), his text does not offer any evidence that it may be. Whilst a 
postmodernist position might reject any ‘betterments’ as suspect, a feminist post-
structuralist position might ‘permit’ that I allow myself to be convinced by a 
discourse of progression/progressivism when it is explicitly politicized (so that the 
criteria are rendered visible and hence subject to reassessment), and with a degree of 
reflexivity that acknowledges the critique is as much a historical product of culture as 
the phenomenon. By remaining politically non-committal here, Gergen appears to 
retain, largely uncritically, the project of psychology. The potentially radical nature of 
the critiques is not recognised, and the position he assumes is one of reformer of the 
discipline. Far from challenging the psychological project, it is reinforced. That the 
challenge post-structuralist or postmodernist ideas present might be so easily dropped 
if they prove too difficult is a position more easily available to established and 
tenured academics who feel they can retreat into mainstream psychology if needs be, 
where shifts in perspective will be viewed positively as progress in ‘new directions’. 
In places, his comments have the tone of reassurances to petulant psychologists that 
‘it’s not so bad really’. He continues to identify himself with a psychological 
perspective, which underscores the stability of the discipline, as well as his location 
within it, and promotes the option of ignoring (these or other) potentially ‘poisonous’ 
ideas. 
 
What does Gergen’s new psychology look like then? It includes  
‘various forms of therapy, skill training and minority education programs 
[which] serve as useful technologies for various groups’ and is accompanied 
by the caution that psychologists must not ‘objectify terms such as 
“performance”, “deficits”, “evaluation” and “psychotherapy”, but instead must 
remain sensitive to the social and valuational implications of such work, then 
such technologies would be congenial with postmodernism’ (ibid.: p26).  
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That we ought to be reflexive about the politics of our practice is, I agree, an 
imperative, but one which very modernist critiques of psychology (Marxist, feminist 
and humanist) have long since pointed out. As Parker is at pains to stress, ‘reflexivity 
needs to be grounded if it is to have progressive effects’ and it seems post-structuralist 
work can usefully ground discourse and reflexivity (1992: p4). 
 
Gergen’s retention of a modernist role for psychology is confirmed when he writes 
that ‘psychologists should not be dissuaded by postmodernism from forging ahead 
with technological developments’. To justify this reassurance, he writes that ‘It is not 
technology (or “knowing how”) that is called into question by postmodernism, but the 
truth claims placed upon the accompanying descriptions and explanations (the 
“knowing that”)’ So psychologists can retain cause-and-effect narratives of ‘how (e.g. 
mainstream developmental psychology) and psychology itself can be saved from what 
might have been a damning critique - so long as psychologists omit to say ‘and this is 
true’ they can avoid the criticism that they’re making authoritative statements that 
embody a claim to superior knowledge. Even a position which is careful to only 
‘know that’ is necessarily presuming and thereby reinforcing all kinds of things upon 
which the ‘knowing that’ rests. Given that the authority of psychology as a discourse 
is already so well established that it remains powerful without either making explicit 
its knowledge warrant or being associated with the body of an expert (as chapter 2 
and 6 discuss) it would seem that its claim to be providing a superior truth will remain 
wherever it is not explicitly undermined. Gergen’s position here implies a failure to 
acknowledge existing power relations, and to recognise that different discourses, for 
example, that of a child’s psychological ‘adjustment’ against one about ‘short, sharp 
shocks’ at detention centres, or a teacher’s account of a child as hyperactive versus 
his mother’s position that he is a naughty boy, do not operate ‘on an level playing 
field’. He even states explicitly his position that ‘discourse exists in an open market’ 
(p26). Post-structuralism has been drawn on within this thesis to counter precisely this 
position. This fantasy of the ‘free market’ is closely linked to neo-liberal (e.g. 
Thatcherite) ‘non-intervention’ in the economy. To imagine that competitors begin 
with equal advantage, from the same starting point is, at best, naive, and at worst, a 
dereliction of moral duty in allowing existing relations of power to be perpetuated. 
There is no neutral or ‘free space’, rather the ‘space’ as it is imagined is already 
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marked with power relations and investments (including corporate, institutional, 
disciplinary and professional). This includes the realm of meaning, where there is no 
clean slate onto which only new meanings can be projected (unlike fantasies of 
cyberspace sometimes presume), instead there is a struggle to assert our preferred 
meanings and continued tensions with those of the past (Alldred, 1996c). To fail to 
appreciate this represents the worst of postmodernist relativism. 
 
Despite Gergen’s ‘nod’ of recognition to Foucault for pointing out that ‘matters of 
description cannot be separated from issues of power’ (p23), it is not clear how ‘know 
how’ avoids being bound up with power. Would it not be a well-meaning, 
predominantly white psychology providing the ‘minority eduction programs’? Even 
‘know-how’ rather than ‘know-that’ presumes some validity for its knowledge, so 
how would the power inherent in these claims, and in the relations between (white or 
black) psychologists and black/minority clients be managed? This mirrors the well-
intended attempts to conduct more egalitarian research (see e.g. chapter 8) or to have 
less imbalanced therapeutic relationships and the critique of the notion of 
empowerment that has since developed. Gergen does not seem to recognise the power 
vested in psychology to any degree that would require he reflected on the investments 
he and others have in psychology and in the position of psychological expert. 
 
Despite not articulating a political project, Gergen holds onto the idea that psychology 
has emancipatory potential through transforming discourses and therefore promoting 
cultural change. He believes that psychology can furnish people with alternative 
options by challenging taken-for-granted concepts and allowing other concepts to 
replace them, and by ‘telling it like it may become’ rather than simply ‘telling it like it 
is’. This creative gesture could go beyond the merely descriptive role Gergen outlined 
above. However, it is not clear what will ensure that the replacements are preferable 
to the old concepts since he does not state any political objectives, nor make his 
values explicit. It is interesting that he can avoid using the word ‘political’, (and avoid 
agitating a discipline whose scientific epistemology has allowed it to present itself as 
politically neutral), by using the less contentious term ‘cultural change’. This is less 
threatening because it can be linked with a discourse of inevitable, even evolutionary 
change. Gergen does convey the impression of progressive intent in a general sense. 
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He writes of a ‘postmodern consciousness’ which is imbued with the motive of 
‘attempt[ing] to bring psychologists and society closer together’ (p28). This rather 
implies the independence of psychology from society. It also reveals Gergen’s 
implicitly humanist orientation (Morss, 1995). 
 
Within British social psychology, the use of approaches which are described as 
‘discourse analytic’ is becoming increasingly popular. By far the most widely 
acknowledged single text on discourse analysis is Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) 
Discourse and Social Psychology. The subtitle of this book is ‘Beyond Attitudes and 
Behaviour’ and a detailed critique of the psychological concept of attitudes is 
presented which, indeed, forms the basis of what might be a broader critique of the 
way the discipline has framed its objects. However, as in Gergen’s (1992) account, 
discourse analysis is presented as the latest modification to an ever improving 
psychological method. Hence a sense of legitimate influence is created and the 
concept of academic progress is retained. 
 
Instead of acknowledging the direct influences of post-structuralist approaches, the 
development of the approach is attributed to disciplines which have been seen as 
much closer to psychology and so from which fruitful influence might well be 
expected. As Burman (1990) notes ‘the potential of discourse analysis to surprise, 
disrupt and unsettle psychology is instead safely attributed to developments in 
ethnomethodology, ordinary language philosophy and linguistics’ (p216). The 
discourse of a discipline which is constantly evolving, supports the presentation of  
this ‘new psychology’ as simply the next step, and an improvement on the old, so 
there is no need to panic about the threat that it appeared the ‘turn to language’ 
presented. 
 
In fact, as Burman (1990) highlights, what better way to disarm what promised to be a 
radical challenge than to appropriate its arguments and to claim to have incorporated 
its insights? Deconstruction can be watered down to such an extent that it loses the 
critical potential that made it of such promise originally, and this makes it even more 
difficult to bring the full force of these critiques onto the practice of psychology 
(Burman, 1990). The more radical possibilities can be lost by the inability to make 
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political positions explicit. The new ‘postmodern’ psychology is not even a phoenix 
rising up from the ashes of psychology, since the majority of mainstream psychology 
appears relatively unchanged by these arguments. It is more like a strain that has 
mutated from the old body of psychology and now provides the body with resistance 
to the challenges with which it will be presented (Gordo-Lopez, pers. comm.). 
 
There are inconsistencies, though, in the way Potter and Wetherell present 
themselves. Sometimes they write of the role of discourse analysts being to criticise 
social psychology and at other times they present themselves as ‘the new’ social 
psychology. As with Gergen, the teleological assumptions behind the rhetorical 
construction of ‘new developments’ are retained. Again, like Gergen, Potter and 
Wetherell fail to deconstruct their own positions as social researchers. Whilst they 
begin the book with a reflection on an alternative first paragraph which raises 
profound questions about academic authority, knowledge claims and rhetorical style, 
and do work ‘deconstructively’ on psychology, they offer little reflection on the way 
they employ similar techniques to work for them. In presenting discourse analysis as 
the new improved psychological method they employ the same devices to produce 
their own textual authority. Perhaps the tension between revealing a discipline’s 
production of its own authority, and undermining or retaining the same pillars for 
one’s own account is an inevitable one. Avoiding undermining one’s own authority is, 
of course, a useful strategy to adopt when one is trying to intervene politically 
(Burman, 1990; Sawicki, 1991) or produce a convincing account. Indeed, this thesis 
illustrates this tension. Potter and Wetherell might, however, have provided some 
degree of reflection on the ways in which their own accounts function, the power 
invested in their statements, and on how and why they retain their position of 
privilege in terms of their ‘access to expert knowledge’. If they had reflected on the 
tensions they faced in wanting to employ both a conventional warrant for their work, 
and take a critical perspective on such a warrant, it would avoid creating the 
impression of issues of power and the politics of author(ity) being tacked on in a post 
hoc fashion. 
 
There is an amusing irony in social science writing which - in a realist tone - 
describes, promotes or presumes a deconstruction of the realist empiricist discourses 
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of knowledge. Leaving the tone or rhetorical style of their own writing 
unproblematized is a form of ‘having one’s cake and eating it’, and suggests that the 
authors are not being reflexive about their own knowledge practices. However, the 
meaning of ‘being reflexive’ is given an ontological or empirical distinction by 
Woolgar and Ashmore (1988). They adapt a three-stage model of self-consciousness 
to draw a parallel with research decisions about reflexivity. First, there is the unself-
conscious ‘habit’ (e.g. employing the conventional progressivist rhetoric); then a self-
consciousness out of which one withdraws from (or blocks) this ‘habit’; then finally, 
there may be a self-conscious choice to resume the habit, only it is no longer an actual 
‘habit’ (Cohen and Taylor, 1976, cited in Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988). Therefore, to 
the reader, the witting use of, say, conventional presentation style, might be 
indistinguishable from the unreflective use of it as default or dominant understanding. 
Potter and Wetherell, and Gergen, in their pieces could be making deliberate 
decisions not to undermine the status of their own authorial voices. They could ‘be’ 
reflexive, but be deciding to conceal it so as to intervene in an academic climate 
where (like most places) realist presumptions prevail. Potter and Wetherell might 
have chosen their words in the light of publishing, marketing and career pressures, 
and Gergen might be amused to see that I missed the irony in his use of ‘naïvite-
sophistication’ and ‘sweet poison’ imagery. The following chapter considers the 
strategic implications of this in relation to research dilemmas about representing 
children’s opinions. 
 
There are certain contradictions then within these forms of ‘postmodern psychology’. 
One element of which is their adherence to certain features of Enlightenment or 
modernist thought. However, there is also a degree of irony in my criticism of an 
approach which is claiming to be postmodern for its lack of logical consistency, 
particularly when, in order to write convincingly about it myself, I retain most of the 
conventions. Perhaps the structure of any argument is fundamentally modernist. Even 
in academic writings on postmodernity and post-structuralism, in order that the essay 
functions as a persuasive piece of rhetoric (in the way in which we are accustomed), it 
must take this form, and must, for instance, imply progression from the ideas of 
which it is critical, to those it advocates. Because ‘progress’ is such a fundamental 
narrative of Western culture, it is difficult to imagine being able to write convincingly 
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without its rhetorical customs and imagery. Hence it appears difficult to avoid ironies, 
or even direct contradictions, between the arguments made and the rhetorical devices 
employed to make them, when we seek to convey authority and to be persuasive 
either in academic or political spaces. Just as modernist ‘up the mountain’ (Rorty, 
1980) (progressivist) rhetoric is often used to create a convincing argument about the 
‘loss of faith’ in the grand narrative of progress, so it is the case with the presentation 
of a thesis which reflects on some of the knowledge practices it employs itself. 
Refusing modernist rhetorical styles for presenting knowledge would not only be a 
problem because of the constraints of academic thesis writing, or of producing 
knowledge which counts as psychology, but is one of making convincing, meaningful 
arguments at all. Thus, the issue of the authority of an account is obviously very 
important politically and is considered in more depth in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Research with children: representational dilemmas 1
 
Psychology positions children as the products of parenting or of family and would 
therefore treat them as the objects of psychological gaze in studies of parenting. In 
contrast to this, however, second wave feminism and other struggles waged through 
forms of identity politics have paved the way for the children’s rights movements and 
the recognition of children’s political perspectives, providing the conditions of 
possibility for children to be attributed full subject status. Once children are 
considered to be subjects researchers may do research with, not merely on, them. 
Children’s views therefore become ‘a perspective’ from which parenting can be 
studied.  
 
Certain forms of discourse analytic work, as chapter 7 described, refuse to give any 
text the status - of unitary and objective truth - that children’s accounts were denied 
previously. Thus, children’s accounts are granted the same status as any other text. 
However, researching children’s perspectives would require representational claims 
of some sort. The ‘crisis of representation’ (which was described in chapter 6) 
challenges conventional empirical claims that the researcher simply provides a 
‘window in’ onto children’s views, and leads to a set of difficult theoretical questions 
and political dilemmas about whether and how we take up positions in which we 
claim to represent others. Rather than offering solutions to these dilemmas, this 
chapter opens up for critical scrutiny some of the decisions we make as researchers, 
and argues that explicit, reflexive discussion might help us to make better strategic 
interventions into policy debates or broader cultural politics. It therefore focuses on 
one particular set of options for feminist research interventions around the cultural 
politics of parents and children. 
 
8.1 Deconstructing ‘representation’: objective re-presentation or political 
re/presentation? 
Particular ethical and political dilemmas arise in representing the lives of people who  
 
1 This chapter was re-written to appear in Ribbens, J. and Edwards, R. (eds) Feminist Dilemmas in 
Qualitative Research: Public Knowledge and Private Lives, London: Sage. I am grateful to Jane 
Ribbens for her editorial support and comments, and to members of the Women’s Workshop on 
Qualitative Family and Household Research for stimulating discussions and feedback. 
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are marginalised within, and by, the domain of professional knowledge and public 
debate. In order to remain critically reflexive about the decisions we take as 
researchers we need to make explicit both the nature of the dilemmas we face, and the 
losses, as well as gains, that result from our decisions. This chapter discusses some of 
the representational dilemmas of research work with children which arise in the 
production of research accounts for dissemination in the public sphere. What claims 
to represent children’s voices can researchers make? What political issues arise as a 
result of adopting representational claims for others? For instance, what meanings 
may we unwittingly reinforce as we make such public re/presentations? 
 
Different methodologies provide different claims for the status of the knowledge 
produced. How do these claims relate to the epistemological positions described in 
chapter 6? Whilst both discourse analytic and ethnographic approaches enable a 
response to the political call to ‘hear the voices of children’, and provide a means of 
re/presenting their opinions in, say, policy debates, they often entail radically different 
ideas about language. Thus, their epistemological foundations differ. As a 
consequence they make different kinds of representational claims about the status of 
their accounts. What are the implications of these different claims and warrants for 
knowledge in terms of the strategies they provide for feminist or critical researchers? 
 
In order to intervene in cultural politics, or engage in academic knowledge practices, 
some form of representational claim is often required, whether this is to support a 
characterisation of popular debate (as in chapters 3 and 4), to support particular 
empirical accounts (such as chapter 2), or to claim to represent others politically or 
empirically. Since the foundations have been laid for children to be research subjects 
on issues concerning parents or parenting, I may wish to produce research accounts 
which claim to represent their views as expressed to me. Yet the main concern of this 
thesis is with political and theoretical doubts about the representational claims that 
have conventionally warranted research. It has made ‘the reflexive turn’ (chapter 6) 
and is critical of the modernist foundations of empiricism. However, political 
dilemmas arise from my recognition, or suspicion, that despite these doubts, the 
discourse of voice and the claims of objectivism and realism to guarantee my 
‘findings’, still provide the most powerful warrant for my research account. In 
addition to the modernist presumptions around knowledge, another set of concerns 
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arises about the particular notion of ‘the subject’ to which children have to conform in 
order to be potential research subjects, and, in particular, how metaphors of ‘voice’ 
serve this model of the individual. What then are the options? What dilemmas arise as 
the possibilities are viewed alongside the pitfalls of responding to the ‘voices of 
children’ discourse within the terms of existing debates? Does research work which 
adopts a ‘hybrid’ approach of discourse-ethnography offer a way forward? 
 
This chapter also asks to what extent these representational issues are common to 
research with any marginalised group, or specific to research work with children. It 
concludes that the issues themselves apply to research with any less powerful social 
group who have little access to the practices of public knowledge production. 
However, the dilemmas we face must involve the consideration of the specific 
meanings attributed particular social groups since, for instance, in the case of 
children, certain ideas about their psychological development can allow them to be 
more easily disqualified as participants of research. Exploring the dilemmas in 
relation to children therefore engages both specific discussion within contemporary 
childhood research (Alanen, 1990; James and Prout, 1990; Kitzinger, 1990; Mayall, 
1994; Waksler, 1991), and more general debates in feminist theory about the status of 
knowledge after the ‘crisis of representation’. 
 
This chapter does not draw on research material in the form of ‘original data’, but my 
experience of research fieldwork on the Children’s Representations of Family Life 
project with Margaret O’Brien (O’Brien et al., 1996) stimulated my thinking on many 
of the issues raised in this chapter. At an early stage of my Ph.D journey, I intended to 
analyse some empirical material from this project and contrast developmental 
psychological with discourse analytic approaches. I felt overwhelmed by the political 
dilemmas described here and uneasy about adopting different approaches at work and 
in the thesis. Six years later, I am exploring these dilemmas further in research on 
Children’s Understandings of Parental Involvement in Education with Ros Edwards 
and Miriam David, and this is a key part of the context for my writing about impure 
strategies and representational dilemmas. 
Children’s ‘voices’, or rather, my re-presentations of what child research subjects 
have said to me, are absent from this chapter. Instead, I focus on the claims of adult 
researchers, and how we may warrant our accounts of what children say. Of course, 
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some of the arguments I make about the difficulties surrounding researchers’ claims 
to represent children, apply to my representation of the work of other researchers. 
However, there are also significant differences: firstly, I am representing adult 
researchers, not child participants (although I will consider whether this alters or 
simply intensifies the issues); and secondly, material I re-present is from published 
accounts of research (so I am not serving up privately elicited accounts for public 
consumption, as is the case for much research). The researchers themselves have 
placed it in the public arena and have therefore had a chance to reflect upon how they 
(re)present themselves. Following Spivak’s (1988) distinction between representation 
meaning proxy, or meaning portrayal, I am representing other researchers in the sense 
of portrayal (the ‘photographic’ meaning of representation), but not in the sense of 
advocacy. However, in our research roles, these two may not be clearly distinguished, 
or indeed, we may wish to ‘represent children’ in both senses. Interrogating the 
doctrine of empiricism raises problems with both these meanings of ‘representing 
children’.  
 
James and Prout (1990) note the elision of a temporal (re-presenting) and a 
significatory meaning of ‘representation’. Whilst the temporal meaning of re-
presenting as repeating raises the possibility of seeing representation as an active 
process, and therefore one which is conducted from a particular perspective, the word 
‘re-presentation’ itself does not insist on this. Indeed, both of these meanings may 
assume that an object exists and is then truthfully reflected in (portrayed by) its 
representation. I think this ambiguity about what the word means epistemologically is 
what Hall (1992) identifies when he notes that the term is used currently not only as 
an unproblematic notion of ‘image of’ (portrayal or signification), but also to indicate 
a radical displacement of that notion. I prefer to use the terms ‘re-presentation’ and 
re/presentation to indicate that my research account is actively produced by me and 
embodies my perspective, using the former when emphasizing process (repeat) and 
the latter when emphasizing an active representation, a portrayal by me, which might 
be ‘political’ for its role in cultural/‘recognition’ (or ‘representational’) politics. 
However, these do not provide a distinction between the epistemological positions 
which this chapter discusses. By making reference to the word ‘representational’ 
(even with a critical note) they each suggest both an empirical meaning of portrayal, 
and the significance for cultural politics of either images of a social group or their 
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advocacy. I like the way in which ‘re/presentation’, to some extent, admits this 
ambiguity of meaning. 
 
8.2 Childhood research: giving voice to children?
As the children’s rights movement has been developing in the UK, ethnographic 
research has ‘given voice’ to children, enabling them to begin to play a more direct 
part in the production of sociological knowledge than the adult/researcher determined 
categories of survey or experimental methods (James and Prout, 1990). Hence 
discourses of ‘giving voice’ offer a way of constructing children as active subjects, 
not objects, and of recognising that they may have distinct perspectives on the world. 
The recognition that meaning embodies perspective is at least an implicit challenge to 
objectivism and the arrogant assumption that a perspective is universal, an account 
definitive. Ethnography has the most established place in the social sciences and 
humanities as an approach which attempts to place subjects’ own perspectives 
centrally. Its ethical promise rests on its (compatibility with) voice metaphors; its 
political force, on the salience attributed identity in contemporary political discourses; 
and its immense appeal, on its ‘promise to delve into the “concrete” (in the hope of 
finding “real” people living “real” lives)’ (Probyn, 1993: p72). Because it matters 
‘that some speak and that others are merely spoken’ (Probyn, ibid.), it offers to meet 
feminist concerns to ‘give voice’ to those whose opinions are rarely heard. 
 
This discourse of ‘voice’ must be distinguished from the specific approach of Carol 
Gilligan and co-workers. I am referring to the particular, but loose, set of metaphors 
of voice which circulate in popular political discourse and link (political) perspective 
closely with ‘who the speaker is’. Ethnographers might use the discourse of voice to 
mean something akin to perspective, and perhaps some use it in non-literal, 
illustrative ways. Whilst discourse analysis is an approach which can be employed to 
analyse the things children say, it rejects some of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
voice-as-perspective discourse. However, both approaches can recognise that 
interviews are a particular form of social interaction in which meaning is constructed 
jointly in the discursive exchange between researcher and participant; see meanings as 
grounded in their contexts; and base analysis and interpretation on a theory of 
discourse and meaning (Mishler, 1986). 
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What Oakley (1981) called the ‘hygienic’, traditional approach to interviewing 
obscures the relations of power that characterize the research relationship. However, a 
post-structuralist discursive approach requires us to consider reflexively the 
institutional power carried by researchers, and to avoid creating the illusion of 
‘democratized’ research through the fantasy of empowerment (Marks, 1993). Whilst 
ethnography can lodge a powerful critique of the conventional research practices 
Oakley described, it can also be employed within an otherwise conventional 
approach. The following three sections describe key tensions that can arise within the 
ethnographic study of children, which are, I believe, general representational 
dilemmas for researchers. They challenge the assumption that adults’ benevolent 
attempts to represent children (as proxy or advocate) are necessarily always in their 
interests, and the simplicity with which it is assumed that what children say can be 
represented (portrayed) through research. 
 
8.3 Ethnography of ‘children’s culture’
In order to gain access to children’s perspectives, William Corsaro employed the 
ethnographic technique of participant observation through which he became ‘a 
participant in children’s culture’ (Corsaro, 1981: p118), ‘joining in the children’s 
activities whilst not affecting the nature or flow of peer episodes’ (ibid.: p133). 
Notions such as ‘entering the child’s world’ (Mandell, 1986; 1991) and interacting 
‘with children in their perspective’ (Mandell, 1991: p59) (emphasis added) imply that 
adults and children occupy separate social worlds. This risks constructing children as 
(little) alien(s) to the dominant culture, as the exotic objects of some other culture. 
‘Other’, that is, to the presumed norm or centrality of adult culture (which is thus 
itself imputed with homogeneity and harmony or consensuality). The centrality of the 
researcher and the pseudo-colonialist relation of rendering the strange in terms 
familiar to the observer culture - which is sometimes reinforced by metaphors of 
travel (Pratt, 1986a, cited in Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) - is, of course, not 
particular to work with children. For contemporary childhood research there is surely 
a tension between studying children simply as people, and giving them research (or 
political) attention because they are currently marginalised, which then risks 
reinforcing the idea of them as a ‘special case’. So fundamental is our ‘knowledge’ of 
adult-child difference that it is difficult to imagine research in which participants 
happen to include adults and children, yet no between-groups comparison is made. 
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Although, for the present, a strong case can be made for the benefits of ‘special case’ 
attention. 
 
When considering his power as researcher, Corsaro notes that ‘adults are much bigger 
than children and are perceived as being socially more powerful’ (Corsaro, 1981: 
p118). Physical size may well have been significant (although he did not attempt the 
‘least-adult’ role that Mandell, (1986; 1991) developed), but it is only one of the 
features that may have affected the interaction between the children and himself. He 
might also have considered the ways in which the interaction was informed by 
dominant cultural meanings assigned to his age and gender, and ideas about paternal 
playfulness and/or pedagogic authority. However, in later debates amongst 
researchers about the extent to which adults can enter children’s worlds, Corsaro 
(1985, cited in Mandell, 1991) insists that age and authority continue to separate 
adults and children and so qualifies his participation as partial, whereas others argue 
that all aspects of adult superiority except physical differences can be cast aside and 
that adults can participate fully in children’s culture (Goode, 1986; Waksler, 1986, 
both cited in Mandell, 1991). 
 
Beyond the interactions during fieldwork, in later stages of the research process, there 
is also an unequal power relationship. Not only are adult researchers ‘perceived as 
being socially more powerful’, they are more powerful by virtue of their role as 
researchers, through which they are in a position to interpret, as well as to represent 
(Burman, 1992). Reflexive consideration of researchers’ power and status can be 
limited by a focus on the dynamics of the interaction ‘in the field’, with little 
consideration of the broader power relations within which this is constituted. This is a 
criticism that Probyn (1993) makes of even some recent ethnography: that reflexivity 
extends only to the immediate context of meaning production (in Corsaro’s research, 
the classroom), and not adequately to the production of meaning in the account 
(processes occurring back in the academy). Corsaro does identify the problem of adult 
assumptions and interpretations of children’s behaviour and abilities, so recognizes 
that how children are heard is an issue. He believes that an adult perspective is the 
result of removing the interaction from its full social context. ‘Contextualisation’ is, 
as in chapter 8, the guarantee of validity of interpretation. However, although Corsaro 
(1981: p118) recognises that ‘adult interpretations and assumptions about children’s 
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behavior are themselves topics for inquiry (Schwartzman, 1978)’, such a study is 
viewed as separate: 
One of the central aims of ethnographies of childhood culture is the suspension 
of such interpretations. The researcher must attempt to free himself [sic] from 
adult conceptions of children’s activities and enter the child’s world as both 
observer and participant. (ibid.: p119, original emphasis) 
 
The idea that it is possible to suspend, or step outside of, the cultural meanings 
assigned to childhood must be viewed with scepticism. From where might the 
researcher’s conceptual framework - indeed, the words to speak - then come from? A 
more realistic aim might be to attempt to examine the ‘adult conceptions’ closely 
alongside, and in relation to, the observations that one makes. In this way one could 
begin to reflect upon the concepts and processes of the analysis as an ‘interrogation of 
the methods ...simultaneously with, and as an integral part of, the investigation of the 
object (Woolgar, 1982)’ (Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988: p8). 
 
The approach adopted by both Corsaro and Mandell is realist and implicitly 
objectivist: children’s culture is seen as existing prior to, and independently of, the 
researcher’s gaze, so that they may enter that culture, observe it without altering it, 
then objectively report without distortion what they have ‘merely observed’. 
Therefore, the ethnographer’s perception is the guarantee of the knowledge produced. 
Corsaro’s ‘escape from’ an adult perspective into the ‘real’ children’s culture 
demonstrates his reliance on conventional notions of language as reflective or 
representational (rather than constitutive) and consequently he presents his work as a 
straight-forward representation (re-presentation) or portrayal of children’s culture. 
Claiming this representational status is so conventional in Western scientific discourse 
that the warrant need not be made explicit. Ethnographic techniques can embody a 
realist epistemology even where they have rejected (unitary) objectivism. So that 
whilst a researcher explicitly recognises the existence of different perspectives (hence 
studying the participants’ perspective as particular), it is simply assumed that readers 
of the research will rest their faith in the researcher’s own perspective. 
 
8.4 Otherness and the centre
Ethnography is ‘a writing practice in which the other is inscribed within, and 
explained by, the power of the ethnographer’s language’ (Grossberg, 1989: p23) with 
 212
  
‘the onus on the other to fit her experiences into an understandable order’ (Probyn, 
1993: p63). As in the classical anthropological monographs documenting the West’s 
cultural Others, the crucial relation is of the observed culture to the researcher’s 
culture. Can a description by an outsider remain faithful to the framework of the 
subjects, as it is inevitably rendered in the observer’s terms? Is the representation to a 
dominant group or culture of ‘other’ perspectives necessarily ‘imperialist’, serving to 
bolster their own sense of centrality and extend cultural power through ‘knowledge 
of’? But, even if it is, what other means are there of challenging (or relativising) that 
centrality (‘self-centredness’)? 
 
Adult-(ethno)centrism can be seen to operate at both an individual level, whereby 
adults tend to interpret the actions and utterances of children as immature versions of 
their own speech and behaviour (Bruner et al., 1976), and also at a cultural level. A 
researcher employing a discourse analytic approach might share the concern with 
adult-centrism, without expecting to be able to avoid it entirely as if such a thing were 
possible voluntarily. Since representation is through language, and the language and 
hegemonic concepts are those of the dominant culture, marginalized groups have 
described how the dominant conceptual framework which is not ‘their own’ may be 
imbued with negative meanings for them (for instance, Spender, 1985, on the 
androcentrism of the English language). For adult-dominated culture, language is, ‘by 
definition’, reflective and productive of adult power, status and authority. Since the 
whole frame of reference is adult-centred, it is difficult to see to what extent children 
could, as ethnographic subjects, present ‘their own’ account of their worlds. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that children are having to render themselves 
meaningful in adult-centred terms, and explain themselves convincingly to those in 
power over them (this parallels the discussion by Edwards and Ribbens, 1998). Seen 
in this light, children’s interviews, because they entail the requirement to make sense 
for adults, might not necessarily be empowering occasions for children. The idea that 
any ethnographic subjects are free to present their own meanings in any radical sense 
fails to acknowledge that dominant culture provides hegemonic meanings. 
 
Post-structuralist approaches to language disallow the fantasy of speaking from 
outside of the language system, which is why feminist writers influenced by post-
structuralism (Barrett, 1991; Butler, 1990; Diamond and Quinby, 1988; Fraser, 1989; 
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Sawicki, 1991; Weedon, 1987) emphasize the recognition of resistance to powerful 
discourses. Recognizing the fact that in providing a research voice for a particular 
group we may simultaneously reinforce their construction as Other, and concurrently 
our own perspective or the dominant cultural perspective as central, prevents us from 
naively assuming that our work is bound to be liberatory. Patai (1991) believes that 
ethical research is simply not possible in an unjust world, since researchers replicate 
structures of privilege through the institution of knowledge. Taking up a position as 
one who knows, in relation to those who are oppressed, is fraught with ethical 
problems which are not assuaged by good intentions. At the very least, this requires 
that we focus on the potential losses as well as gains of particular approaches to 
research. In relation to placing children’s voices in ‘the public sphere’, we need to 
examine the broader context of meanings that will be brought into play. Through what 
cultural understandings of children are the words of any child heard? 
 
8.5 How we hear what children say
Corsaro (1981) notes that adults often describe as ‘silly’ or unimportant what they do 
not understand in children’s speech or behaviour. Berry Mayall describes how 
discussions of ‘methodological issues’ in childhood research sometimes constructs 
children ‘as cognitive incompetents, […] routinely wrong and misunderstand[ing]; 
likely to confuse fact with fiction; and ...give the answers they think adults want 
rather than reply accurately’ (1996: p13). She reminds us that adults also vary in our 
knowledge and experience, and that ‘we [all] interweave fact and fiction both 
consciously and unconsciously and tell interviewers what we think they want to 
know’ (ibid.). This illustrates how the specific cultural positioning of children within 
developmental discourses of incompleteness, and as ‘not yet there’, can further extend 
the doubts that some have about the validity of ‘subjective’ research in general. 
Where objectivism prevails, the subjectivity that is understood as a problem for 
research, is seen as exaggerated in the case of children. There are also particular 
discourses of children’s ‘more limited’ communication skills, knowledge and self-
reflection. Therefore, it is not just a case of hearing children’s ‘voices’, but of how we 
hear them. In terms of feminist intervention, it might be that providing a public 
platform for children’s perspectives is not enough. We need to attend to the meanings 
that will be made of the accounts. 
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Both possible meanings of the title of this section are in operation. By emphasizing 
the how of ‘How we hear what children say’, I am arguing that, as researchers, we 
face ethical decisions about how to go about trying to hear what children say. 
Different methods are underpinned by alternative epistemological perspectives which 
provide different ways of thinking about the relation between participants’ voices and 
the knowledge that is produced about them. Alternatively, when hear is emphasized, 
attention is drawn to the way in which children’s voices are actually heard. This 
problematizes the passivity which ‘to hear’ usually conveys and highlights issues of 
interpretation. How do both specific context and broader cultural discourses affect the 
ways in which what children say is understood? Although they are not conceptually 
distinct in a discursive approach such as that taken here, we can consider this at the 
level of how researchers hear children, and then how research reports are ‘heard’ in 
the public sphere. 
 
Children’s voices are heard through cultural constructions of childhood. It is 
simultaneous attention to childhood, as opposed to a sole focus on (particular) 
children, that distinguishes writers influenced by social constructionism, such as 
Burman (1992), Marks (1996b), Mayall (1996), and James and Prout (1990), from 
more conventional ethnographers such as Corsaro (1981; 1986) and Mandell (1986; 
1991). As chapter 7 argued, discourse analytic approaches, such as Parker’s (1992; 
Parker and Burman, 1993), prompt us to take into account the social construction of 
childhood, by insisting that we bring in knowledge of discourses from ‘outside’ the 
research, including those that our politics identify as broader power relations, in order 
to analyse discourse. 
 
8.6 Discourse Analysis: Power, Politics and (Subject) Positions 
Like ethnography, discourse analysis allows researchers to emphasize children’s 
interpretation of and active participation in the social world, which reveals the 
influence of symbolic interactionism and interpretive approaches on its development. 
However, difference between these approaches regarding their epistemological 
perspective results in different kinds of representational claims. Because knowledge is 
seen as socially constructed and powerful through its productive nature, direct 
representational claims would not be made by (most) discourse analysts. Although 
some strands of discourse analysis focus on the detail of linguistic features of the 
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interaction and are therefore closer to conversation analysis, psycholinguistics, or 
microsociology, the strand I consider here is influenced by post-structuralism and 
tends to define discourse more broadly, and so might analyse cultural texts (as well as 
specific interview material, etc.) (Potter et al., 1990). Writers I associate with the 
latter strand include Parker, Burman and Marks, and are concerned with the 
ideological and subjective implications of the discourses (at/in specific moments and 
contexts). Burman (1990; 1992) employs a post-structuralist informed discourse 
analytic approach in order to facilitate a feminist analysis without accrediting the 
politics to the approach. Indeed she warns against investing too heavily in a method 
that could, in fact, be appropriated from opposing political positions, and suggests 
feminists might consider its adoption strategically and in context-specific ways. 
Parker (1992) argues that discourse analysis ought to be about the ways in which 
discourses support institutions, reproduce power relations and have ideological 
effects, but again, both the background cultural knowledge and the motivation for 
such an analysis are the researcher’s politics, not the approach’s. The consequence of 
this is that one cannot rely on any particular warrant for knowing to produce a 
politically informed analysis. Whilst both ethnographic and (post-structuralist) 
discursive approaches locate meaning socially, I would argue that the latter can be 
stronger politically because they offer the conceptual space for contested meanings 
and resistance, and, in some formulations (e.g. Burman, 1992; Fraser, 1989; Parker, 
1990a; 1990b; 1992) direct attention to broader institutional power relations in 
addition to interpersonal ones. Within a discursive approach, speaking of multiple 
meanings within which some are more dominant (as well as multiple subject positions 
instead of unified subjects) could help avoid giving an over-rosy, neatly consensual 
impression. It might then be possible to speak of meanings in which one is powerfully 
enmeshed, but is not consenting to, or that are not in one’s interest. 
 
A discursive approach locates the power relationally in the subject position(s) the 
researcher can occupy, rather than in the researcher as a person (as ‘a subject’). 
Burman’s (1992) study illustrates both the researcher’s power to define the 
parameters, topic, tone and diction of the discussion, and ties this power to the role, 
and therefore the respective subject positions taken up by researcher and researched. 
When she invites the child she is interviewing to swap roles and ask questions of her, 
Burman finds herself acutely embarrassed at being obliged to divulge personal details 
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without being able to define the terms in which she speaks of her relationships and 
friendships. About being asked if she ‘has a boyfriend’, she writes that not only had 
she to position herself in the discourse of compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1983), 
but that she ‘could not negotiate the meaning this term held, not introduce other terms, 
without departing from the fragile ‘role-exchange’ [I had] set up, that is without 
breaking the rules of the encounter as voluntary and collaborative’ (1992: p55). Thus, 
even this negotiated ‘role’ exchange allows those in structurally less powerful 
positions to wield considerable power in this specific moment. Use of the word ‘role’ 
is qualified in order to distinguish ‘subject positions’ - understood as constitutive of a 
person’s subjectivity at a given moment, from ‘roles’ which imply a pre-social 
individual adopting a superficial cultural mantle. For Burman, the analysis of power 
relations between herself and the child participants is not merely a post-hoc exercise 
in reflexivity, it is the explicit concern of her study. 
 
Losing faith in objectivity means losing the reassuring promises that validity is 
guaranteed, that particular ‘findings’ were inevitable (since from where, except faulty 
science, might other versions come?), and that our research produces knowledge 
which is politically neutral. Instead, questions of epistemology and issues of 
interpretation within research become hugely significant. Within a discursive 
approach, one may still wish to conduct research interviews. Indeed, one may share 
the political concerns that make the discourse of ‘giving voice to children’ appealing 
to ethnographers of childhood. However, rejecting naive objective realism must have 
implications for how interviewees’ ‘voices’ are heard. Can one still employ a 
discourse of ‘giving voice’ when a discourse analytic approach contradicts some of 
the assumptions this contains? Do the dilemmas that arise pose making use of a 
currently effective political discourse of voice, against retaining theoretical 
coherence? 
 
8.7 The status of ‘voice’ in discourse analytic research
In post-structuralist informed discourse analytic research, representations of 
interviewees’ account are made without a realist, objectivist warrant. Research is 
recognized to be a practice of re-presentation, and ‘findings’ a re/presentation through 
a particular lens. This invites reflexivity about the production of the account. The 
participant’s ‘voice’ is seen as produced from what was culturally available to them, 
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rather than from a private reserve of meaning. The fantasy of the authentic subject, 
one whose subjectivity is imagined to be independent of, or prior to, culture is 
rejected. Deborah Marks interviewed young people about exclusion from school. She 
writes:  
researching into people’s experience is fraught with epistemological and 
ontological dilemmas. Social constructionist theory has warned that giving our 
‘subject’ a ‘voice’ involves the fantasy that it is possible to have unmediated 
direct knowledge of experience (James and Prout, 1990). Derrida has challenged 
the phonocentricism implicit in the notion of speech as a direct and immediate 
form of expression. Giving primacy to interviewees’ talk about their experience 
of exclusion suggests that their speech may refer to themselves as a unified 
authentic subject. This Cartesian subject, whose self-consciousness acts as 
guarantor of meaning, is challenged both by versions of psychoanalysis 
(Althusser, 1971; Frosh, 1987) and discourse analysis (Parker, 1992), which see 
the subject as being fragmented and constituted within language. (Marks, 
1996b: p115) 
 
Marks does not treat the accounts obtained as final and fixed, rather they are ‘often 
ambivalent, contradictory and changing’ (ibid.: p115). She notes that ‘the relationship 
between an original exclusion and the way pupils talk about it in their interview or 
discussion group is highly complex’, and therefore she doesn’t ask about their 
experiences in order to try to establish ‘what really happened’. She does not position 
herself as able to ‘penetrate the manifest content in order to reveal its hidden kernel’ 
and so she is not central in her warrant for the research knowledge: ‘I cannot say how 
participants really experienced the exclusion. However, asking about the experience 
of exclusion brings forth a number of productive ways of seeing the event’ (ibid.: 
p116). For some pupils, the tone of the interview was confessional as they took 
responsibility for bad behaviour. For others, their accounts took the form of factual 
reports and had a disengaged tone, and in a third type of account, pupils protested 
their innocence. The complexity of thoughts and feelings about their exclusions meant 
that they might be positioned in conflicting ways. Whilst identifying how these may 
have functioned psychologically and emotionally for the individuals, and indeed for 
herself - since she too experienced exclusion by the children during a group 
discussion - she deliberately avoids ‘establishing an opposition between emotional, 
conflicted and hence “authentic” accounts and generalised, jargon-laden “inauthentic” 
accounts’ (Marks, 1996b: p129). The imperative that discourse analysts attend the 
broader social meanings within which research occurs leads Marks to consider these 
interviews in relation to powerful psychological discourses of self-regulating 
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individuals who, on reflection, repent their misdemeanours. The possibility that the 
interviews functioned to regulate further some participants by providing a space in 
which they drew themselves under disciplinary gaze to produce themselves as good 
children and self-governing individuals, prevented Marks from assuming the 
interviews to be necessarily (or only) liberating. 
 
8.8 Warranting discourse analytic work 
Many feminist theorists (including those cited above) use post-structuralist 
approaches to show how knowledge claims entail plays of power. Without an appeal 
to objectivity and without asserting the centrality of one’s own perspective, with what 
authority can one present discourse analytic research? Is there an alternative rhetoric 
of research? Most importantly, could an alternative support effective feminist or 
critical intervention? This issue is key in debates about feminism and postmodernism, 
as well as having exercised researchers who have taken the reflexive ‘turn to 
language’. Burman, Alldred et al. (1996) argue that rejecting conventional ideas of 
authorship and of knowing through personal identities need not mean losing the 
relevance of individual experience, nor the possibility of political critique. Losing 
faith in objectivity need not mean completely undermining our own warrants for 
speaking critically (Burman, 1990). As chapter 6 argued, a case can be made for 
feminists and other social critics to present local empirical accounts, without the 
grandnarratives which universalize and ahistoricize (Fraser and Nicholson, 1990). 
That is, that there can be social criticism without the conventional metaphilosophical 
warrants that modernist narratives provide. Empiricism without objectivist 
foundations requires us to extend self-reflexivity to recognize that our analyses, as 
well as their objects, are culturally specific. 
 
Erica Burman (1992) interviewed primary school-aged children, but neither warrants 
her analyses by appeal to objectivism, nor grounds her interpretation solely in her 
ontology. Her own psychological processes form part of her reflections on her 
interpretation, but are not the warrant for it. She argues that reflexivity must include 
the broader context; relations not just within, but also beyond, the interview:  
One of the places where feminist and post-structuralist concerns meet is in 
affirming reflexivity, both as structured within research relationships (no longer 
colluding in the sanitization of subjectivity, identification and emotion from 
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research encounters) and within the theory-method relation (e.g. Hollway, 1989; 
Walkerdine, 1986). (ibid: p47) 
 
Through an analysis of interview excerpts, Burman demonstrates how the structural 
relations of power and discursive positioning (of interviewee and interviewer), as well 
as broader social relations of power and knowledge, can inform the micro-analysis of 
statements from an interview. She argues that drawing on the broader context in this 
way prevents her refusal to claim objectivity from collapsing into a complete 
relativization of her analysis. This theoretical position treads a careful path between 
‘naive realism’, and an idealism which might, in a pure form, fall prey to relativism 
and immaterialism. 
 
In her research, Burman set up an agreed exchange of interviewer and interviewee 
roles with the children, which allowed moments in which the children occupied 
powerful positions in relation to her. The concept of researcher and researched 
occupying particular ‘subject positions’, (rather than being thought of as subjects 
whose position is fixed and unitary), facilitates recognition of the complexity of the 
play of power in these exchanges. She shows how a particular statement from a boy is 
open to various interpretations, including as a threat to steal her bicycle. Her 
interpretation of it recognizes cultural adult-child power relations, the specific context 
of the co-operative switch of ‘roles’, and her actual retention of authority despite this. 
She comes to understand the statement as a request that the topic of conversation 
shifts. Its implicit nature, which prevented the shift from being abrupt or from directly 
challenging her (supposedly relinquished) conversational control, shows the subtlety 
of recognition of the power relations at play. Thus, such an analysis can conceptualise 
power as operating through both the manipulated (‘role exchanged’), and the 
underlying, positions of researcher and researched (and show the children’s 
understanding of this distinction), without simplifying to a model of power as 
summative. Burman goes ‘beyond simply affirming different accounts’ and warrants 
her own interpretation by arguing it is produced and fixed by the particular power 
relationships, although it is not the only one warranted by them: ‘The point here is not 
to arrive at a unique and unambiguous interpretation, but to demonstrate that an 
analysis of power relations privileges some interpretations over others’ (ibid.: p54). 
Indeed, this indeterminacy, she argues, is itself only a function of the text being taken 
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out of its linguistic and wider discursive context. Thus, discourse analytic work which 
is informed by post-structuralist understandings of power can demonstrate how power 
enters into the interpretation, as well as the production, of discourse (Burman, ibid.). 
This includes how power inheres in the processes of analysis ‘back in the academy’, 
as well as in the research encounter. However, this type of micro-analysis still, 
inevitably, abstracts the interaction from its context to some degree, and places it in 
another context for viewing from other perspectives. We can be critical of a 
researcher’s (political) judgement, and hopefully, such critical scrutiny is allowed by 
a reflexive style that acknowledges that the analysis is an artefact, produced in a 
particular moment, by a person occupying particular subject positions, and within 
particular power relations. 
 
8.9 A ‘new ethnography’?
Some discursive approaches employ qualified empiricism, as the above illustrates, 
and some ethnographic approaches recognize that representation is an active, not 
merely reflective, practice. So, moving beyond my oppositional account - which is, 
therefore, revealed as partial, perspectivised, artefactual - there are now, in fact, 
researchers who occupy a range of epistemological positions ‘within’ each approach. 
 
Ethnography has not remained untouched by the ‘turn to language’. In addition to 
radical critiques across the disciplines of cultural studies, critical anthropology and 
sociology (Ticeneto Clough, 1992; Nencel and Pels, 1991; Probyn, 1993), there are 
also ethnographers who are developing a ‘more textual’ ethnography within sociology 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: p239), for instance, Plummer’s (1995) sociology 
of sexual stories. In a chapter about the rhetorics or poetics of ethnographic writing - 
perhaps tellingly at the end of the book - Hammersley and Atkinson argue that an 
ethnography ‘is produced as much by how we write as by the processes of data 
collection and analysis’ (ibid.: p239). Therefore, unlike in Corsaro’s work, (which, 
admittedly, was conducted much earlier), their reflexivity does include textual 
production within its remit. However, they maintain a broadly objective-realist 
perspective, illustrated by their remark that it is ‘knowledge of’, rather than politics, 
which motivates them. 
Similarly, Berry Mayall’s (1996) research with children is strongly influenced by 
ethnography, yet - as with many others in contemporary UK childhood studies - is 
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also informed by social constructionism. She writes of how children’s lives are 
framed within adult understandings of what children are like, and problematizes the 
conceptualization of children as Other. She partially relativizes her account by 
recognizing that ‘no doubt another approach would lead to another story of where and 
how children’s lives are lived’ (ibid.: p19), but retains an empiricist warrant and 
employs the ‘up the mountain’ discourse of new scientific knowledge improving on 
the old (Kitzinger, 1987; Rorty, 1980). Her position is neither that of radical social 
constructionist nor ‘naive’ objective-realist, but the empiricist epistemology locates 
her closer to realist ethnography than post-structuralism.  
 
Mayall presents statements from children’s accounts ‘contextualized’ within 
comments from interviews with adults. Inevitably it is Mayall’s own conceptual frame 
that allows her to articulate the comments from children with those of adults. She 
recognizes the power imbalance between herself and the child interviewees and is 
modest about the extent to which it can be rectified. She even wonders: ‘[i]f one is not 
a child, can one and should one attempt to understand and convey what children’s 
experiences are?’ (ibid.: p1). She describes child-friendly measures she took during 
the interaction (sitting on low chairs, letting children choose their companions), and 
she briefly reflects upon her position as author of ‘children’s accounts’, 
acknowledging that it is her own argument and mentioning her hope that in future 
research she will co-write with participants. She therefore engages both of Probyn’s 
(1993) two levels of reflexivity: that is, within the interaction, and in the interpretation 
and production of the research account. However, on the issue of textual authority, 
whilst she is explicit about the authority of her account vis-à-vis the child participants, 
she does not open up issues of the text’s authority as one claiming an empirical 
warrant. This might have been explored if she had been (openly) reflexive about the 
processes by which she produced her analysis (for instance, how she ‘meshed 
together’ adult and child accounts) and the rhetorical style in which it is presented. 
 
This raises several points. Firstly, we are reminded that how researchers present their 
work, including their epistemological warrants, relates to considerations of forum, 
format, and funding. Working within a research unit that is grant-dependent, (as does 
Mayall), does not lend itself to radical critique of the research enterprise. Secondly, it 
illustrates the complexity of positions we may take up as researchers: recognizing the 
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productivity of language, yet incorporating such insight into empiricist ethnographic 
methodology. The radical challenges the concept of discourse may present can be 
neutralized by an appropriating gesture (Burman, 1990), and the ‘findings’ of 
discourse analytic research (about interaction between researcher and ‘subject’) can 
even be taken up to ‘improve’ mainstream experimental work (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987). Thirdly, the issue of research strategies provides an alternative way of seeing 
this second point: retaining an objective-realist research warrant provided Mayall with 
a more powerful position and may have made the particular intervention she desired 
more effective. As readers of the study, we cannot actually distinguish between an 
unreflexive conventional style, and an account which for strategic purposes employs 
conventional rhetoric and ‘deliberately conceal[s] any ostensive signs of reflexivity’ 
(Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988: p6). Thus, Mayall’s approach may either be straight-
forwardly realist, or her account may reflect a decision to take up the authoritative 
‘voice’ of the researcher. 
 
8.10 Some pitfalls and possibilities of hybrid approaches
The warrant we claim for our research knowledge, whether stated explicitly or 
implied by rhetorical style, is the basis of its authority. Feminists have identified the 
danger of ‘kicking the platform from under our own feet’ (Burman, 1990) by 
deconstructing the warrant for our preferred account, but some (Burman et al., 1996; 
Weedon, 1987) see feminist possibilities in the selective use of post-structuralist 
arguments such as those employed here. The privilege accorded empirical knowledge 
makes research powerful, and because the discourse of ‘hearing the voices of 
children’ is highly persuasive in contemporary UK cultural politics, ethnographic 
realism probably provides the most effective warrant for intervention, say, in debates 
about health or education services for children. So, might I adopt the discourse of 
voice and employ qualified empirical warrants, in spite of having ‘lost faith’ in 
objectivism at a philosophical level? The sections above illustrated how empirical 
claims are sometimes made alongside differing degrees of reflexivity, or recognition 
of ethical issues surrounding a researcher’s power to interpret and to produce an 
account and the significance of the broader cultural meanings assigned childhood. If 
one refuses to employ arrogant, ‘self-centred’ assertions of objectivity, yet can see 
current political value in them, could a self-reflexive, re-presentation of others’ 
‘voices’ enable partial uptake of research authority? This would not resolve the 
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dilemma once and for all, but neither is that desirable. Burman et al. (1996) argue that 
we might consider our research as a series of strategic decisions, rather than wed 
ourselves to any particular approach. Such commitment to an approach would be to 
imagine that any approach could embody, and therefore guarantee, (our) politics; that 
‘politics’ remain fixed; and that little attention need be paid to the context which 
informs how our research is heard. As a temporary strategy, it allows movement 
beyond the impasse, but is tentative and resists closure, thereby requiring its context-
specific reinvention. 
 
A strong case can be made for presenting research as ‘hearing the voices of children’, 
and children as deserving and capable of articulating their perspectives, whilst there 
are still important political gains for children in being granted full subject status. 
However, we must consider the potential risks of employing the voice rhetoric in each 
particular case: generalized assertions cannot be made about how it may operate. So, 
for each research account, we must assess whether the particular research issue or the 
general affirmation of children as subjects outweighs the pitfalls described above: the 
reification of ‘the centre’ at the expense of the margins, or of ‘the Other’; the re-
assertion of objective-realism; and the obscuring of the researcher’s role and denial of 
perspective in the discourse of representation as portrayal. 
 
Might a ‘hybrid’ position be possible in which the discourse of voice is employed, but 
subjects are not attributed authenticity outside of (dominant) culture? Instead, we can 
present them as finding ‘their voices’ within and through the networks of meanings 
made available to them, including where they resist the dominant meanings ascribed 
them (as does Marks, 1996b). Employing the discourse of voice risks reinforcing 
ideas about ‘the psychological subject’, the Cartesian construction of the individual, 
but perhaps there are some ways of limiting this, such as by surrounding the term 
voice with quotation marks to indicate its metaphorical status. Referring to ‘subject 
positions’ allows for an individual to be multiply or shiftingly positioned and hence 
avoids complicity with the fantasy of unitary, logical beings whose experiences are 
stable, fixed by identity and internally coherent (Butler, 1990). We might retain the 
distinction in this chapter between children’s voices themselves and the discourse of 
‘the voice(s) of children’ and sometimes it may be appropriate to make this distinction 
explicit. The discourse may still be heard in the singular (‘the voice of the child’), but 
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here, in a thesis, I can avoid reinforcing the idea of homogeneity amongst children 
since no compromise is needed such as might be in a piece for a popular readership. 
The argument for the recognition of differences amongst children might appear, in the 
abstract, to be robust and incontestable, but there may be times when we decide this 
oversimplification is worthwhile. James and Prout (1990) suggest that we use the past 
tense in empirical narratives, because the present tense fixes children in a timeless 
place devoid of context thereby contributing to their objectification. These 
suggestions sketch an approach which could still link perspectives to social location, 
but would aim to avoid relying on the concept of identity in such a way as to fix and 
over-simplify this relationship. In these ways, local empirical narratives employing 
the voice metaphor in a qualified way - what we might call discourse-ethnography - 
could provide ways of doing politics and research without grounding positions in 
reified identities. 
 
However, some cautionary notes are needed: methods rest upon methodologies, which 
themselves embody particular epistemological positions. Given that the most crucial 
aspect of the context of the public research account to be considered relates to the 
authority necessary to intervene, the risk of a hybrid method is that it makes neither 
epistemological claim authoritatively. For instance, it would be problematic to present 
a realist warrant, (such as for ethnography), within an account that has set up a non-
realist framework. ‘Triangulation’ - using more than one method to study an object - 
could not employ a discursive approach alongside a non-discursive one, because 
triangulation assumes realism for its object. Such separation of methods from their 
epistemological perspectives is not only an issue of theoretical coherence: in order to 
take up ‘the voice’ of knowledge authoritatively one usually has to state one or other 
type of claim. However, the dominant epistemological perspective of empiricism, 
means that it can be assumed where it is not made explicit, and the rhetoric of light 
and vision surrounding knowledge can imply the adoption of truth claims. If we 
assume that such epistemological inconsistencies may go unnoticed in a given forum, 
questions arise about how explicit we ought to be about our epistemological 
commitments. Should chapters 2, 3 and 4 remain as they are with the rhetorical style 
of empirical accounts, even as they display their political positionings, or ought they 
to be more carefully qualified and situated with disclaimers that limit extrapolations? 
In which case, which audiences do they convince and which do they exclude? 
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8.11 Reflexivity
If reflexivity involves being explicit about the operation of power within the actual 
processes of researching and representing people (Burman, 1992; Ribbens, 1989), we 
become suspicious of the techniques (as well as epistemological claims) through 
which accounts are rendered authoritative. Researchers’ power can be conceptualized 
as operating through multiple levels: through the hegemonic cultural perspective 
contained within the language we (must) use; through the subject positions we take up 
and are positioned within (including our deliberate claims to researcher positions); 
and through our particular individual relationships with participants and to our field of 
inquiry. In relation to research with children, the first was illustrated earlier through 
the adult-centrism of language and the second was explored through Burman’s study, 
where a particularity of research with children is the conflation of adult/child with 
researcher/researched. The third level raises very interesting questions in relation to 
research with children: how do we account for our own unconscious projections and 
fantasies concerning children, which include those stemming from our own 
experiences, above and beyond (though not outside of) culture-wide ones?  
 
Ethnographic research raises questions about how much to listen and how much to 
interpret (Ribbens, 1989), but discourse analytic approaches highlight how the two 
cannot ultimately be separated out. If we necessarily hear others through culturally 
dominant meanings, an unacknowledged perspective is most likely the hegemonic 
one. The task of reflexivity, according to Mishler (1986), is to make explicit the 
theoretical basis of interpretation. Deconstructing the photographic meaning of 
representation, as a critique of objectivism begs, means taking greater caution over 
our representational claims and avoiding obscuring the perspectival nature of 
knowledge. This issue emerges in considering how close to keep to participants’ 
actual words (see Standing, 1998; 1994). Whilst their language and concepts will be 
of central interest if we wish to (and believe it is possible to) re-present (portray), we 
might wish, or be drawn, to employ more politically relevant terms and analytic 
frameworks when we want to make representation for/about children either as 
advocacy, or when we take it upon ourselves to intervene in ‘the relations of 
representation’ (Hall, 1992) or in the ‘politics of recognition’ (Fraser, 1995). The 
options can be understood as being about the representative role we adopt. Finch 
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(1993) described the conflict she faced between using women’s own terms, and 
providing the structural analysis she felt their position called for, and Ribbens (1989) 
argued that if we do not agree with what our participants say, we will have to decide 
in the context whether and how we try to respect their opinions. In research with 
children, this conflict is between promoting particular re/presentations of children as a 
social group, and re-presenting the accounts of the particular children who 
participated. We must be clear about when our priority is to make an admittedly 
flawed (say, qualified empirical) re/presentation of children’s voices, and when it is 
for the presentation of our analyses, reflecting an adult, and perhaps personal, agenda 
within cultural politics. The dilemma can then be located within the realm of research 
strategy if, from the start of a given piece of research, we are clear about whether we 
are engaging in representational politics, and in which case will present aspects of the 
research in particular ways to intervene on particular issues; or we are attempting to 
hear and re-present particular children’s voices. I would want to be decisive about this 
from the outset in order to be explicit with my participants about which type of 
representational role I was taking, and clear about my priorities for any particular 
representative act, though not necessarily explicit within it. In short, it appears that in 
either case, we might employ literal (‘naive’), or reflexive, or covertly reflexive 
representational warrants. 
 
Of course, the two-horns of the dilemma are an ideal separation because even if we 
adopt an empirical warrant for placing the ‘voices of children’ in the public sphere, 
we surely retain responsibility for not re-presenting uncritically, say, a racist 
discourse. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) and Parker and Burman (1993) agree 
that the researcher’s responsibility extends to consideration of the default meanings of 
the context of research publication. What we consider to be progressive 
re/presentations could be subverted and carry undesirable meanings in another 
context. We cannot completely control the meanings that can be made of our research 
(Foucault, 1983). Not only might our careful wordings, qualifiers and warrants be 
lost, but another context might produce meanings that we could not have predicted. 
We cannot ensure our preferred readings, but we must attempt to ward off ones we 
believe to be oppressive. These, as well as decisions about how to frame, how to 
write, how and where to publish, are more than mere ‘editorial control’ over the 
accounts, and our politics are clearly highly significant, yet because of the taboo on 
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speaking of politics in academic work (a legacy of objectivism), I have been very 
relieved to find a few spaces - such as the Women’s Workshop on Qualitative 
Family/Household Research and the Discourse Unit at Manchester Metropolitan 
University - for discussing these concerns. Without recognition and discussion of 
these dilemmas we risk relying on unexamined assumptions. Reflexive discussion 
amongst researchers and activists can thus inform our strategies, but are sometimes 
blocked by the presumption of realism. Hopefully, being reflexive enables us not 
simply to reproduce the cultural positions, but to ask new questions about the 
existence of these positions. 
 
Reflexivity can be extended to make explicit the warrants we employ for the status of 
our accounts, to attempt to disassemble them where we feel it is appropriate, but 
perhaps we may take up positions of authority and present our research as 
‘knowledge’ where we feel it is politically expedient to do so. To demonstrate our 
recognition that we actively provide narratives for our material, and construct the 
authority of knowledge, we may use active verbs such as ‘producing’ (also avoiding 
the realist implication of pre-existing data), and might undo the specular metaphors of 
research which obscure the processes, deny the particularity of perspective and the 
different investments in particular kinds of knowledge. However, it might sometimes 
be useful to exclude discussion of our methodological dilemmas in our finished 
reports. This goes against the grain of recent feminist research debates about making 
explicit both our practices and dilemmas, but there might be good grounds for 
considering which ‘public’ we are open with about issues; contrasting, for instance, an 
audience of feminist and critical researchers, with a hostile policy forum, or a broader 
audience when we aim to disseminate our accounts widely. Could we choose a 
strategy of omitting the discussion of decision-making processes or the political 
nature of knowledge production, that is, maintaining these conventional silences? For 
instance, might we deliberately employ the specular metaphors of research despite 
their implicit objective-realist warrants? The description earlier of different 
epistemological warrants within either discourse of representation suggests moments 
at which this might be useful. However, is it ever acceptable to present a piece of 
research with a contradiction between its re/presentational claims and our actual 
confidence in these claims? This is one of the ethical questions that politically 
motivated researchers might begin to discuss more broadly. One of the contributions 
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of a book such as Ribbens and Edwards (1998) is the opportunity to voice questions 
and discuss the dilemmas we work with, without the pressure to find ‘answers’ that 
writing for a broader public usually requires. 
 
8.12 How our accounts might be heard
Being critical of the presuppositions of the voice discourse would not necessarily 
prevent me from insisting ‘that children be heard’ in a particular forum. However, 
when employing it, I would be concerned that my research might satisfy the demand 
that ‘the voices of children’ be heard, without actually altering how they are heard, or 
challenging the limited impact that what children say usually has. This illustrates the 
limits and risks of answering within the terms of the debate, as chapter 6 put it. 
 
Discursive approaches, by rejecting the possibility of escape from the cultural web of 
meanings, direct our attention to the consideration of what ideas we unwittingly 
reinforce. Given that the cultural construction of childhood is dominated by 
discourses of developmental psychology, there is a danger of reifying these particular 
ideas about children through our research. Even our strategic use of ‘voice’ metaphors 
may endorse the hegemonic notion of the rational, integrated, psychological subject 
(of which post-structuralist positions and some non post-structuralist feminist 
positions are critical), but furthermore, these may have particular implications for 
children. 
 
Children, in particular, can be closely associated with the emotions, through ideas 
which link them to nature, and through discourses of their development towards 
rationality (Walkerdine, 1988). Where rationality is privileged, ‘emotionality’ can 
disqualify them as research participants. Similarly, failure to meet the expectations of 
conventional interview research (of consistency, and of ‘independence’ from the 
researcher), can be interpreted as failings of children to be successful interviewees, 
rather than problems with the mythical notion of the ‘individual’ which underpins the 
approach. This too can function to undermine the idea that children can, or should, be 
‘given voice’. The concept of attitude (or opinion) involves a single, stable or 
consistent perspective (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). However, interviewing anyone 
about ‘family’, for instance, will elicit a range of contradictory ideas (as I found in my 
research with Margaret O’Brien), so a contribution of discourse analytic work is to 
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demonstrate that multiplicity, complexity and contradiction are features of our 
linguistic repertoire, rather than the limited cognitive sophistication, or incompetent 
expression, of a particular child. In conventional accounts, the ambiguity of children’s 
talk would either not be recognized, or, if acknowledged, would be interpreted as 
evidence of immature logical reasoning or loss of narrative control because of its 
abstraction from social relationships (Burman, 1992). 
 
For the above reasons, we may be critical of children being ‘given voice’ only if they 
can present themselves as subjects or individuals in this (Cartesian) sense, and 
ambivalent about some of the policy changes which require such bases for 
recognition. For instance, my support for the 1989 Children Act’s requirement that 
children’s wishes be heard on decisions that affect them, is tempered by the 
knowledge that popular psychological notions about children (about fantasy, 
‘impressionability’, reliability as witnesses) form the inescapable context within 
which statements will be heard. The complexity of issues that we face is illustrated by 
the fact that these same psychological discourses of the subject which allow some 
children to be heard, will disallow other children, including those who present 
contradictory or illogical accounts and don’t manage to make themselves understood 
by (particular) adults, in ‘adults’ terms’. Attaining subject status in current hegemonic 
discourse is fraught with risks as well as benefits for those currently on its margins. 
 
Even after we have adopted a strategy either of engaging in representational politics 
or of claiming to re/present particular children, further issues may arise which repeat 
this question. Within either approach, particular discourses may have apparently 
contradictory implications. For instance, a discourse of child protection can reinforce 
the idea that children are weak, vulnerable and in need of (adult) protection 
(Kitzinger, 1990), even as it simultaneously provides help for particular children. 
Alternatively, there may be times when this kind of emphasis benefits children as a 
social group, say in securing funding for services, but is unhelpful for an individual 
child.  
 
Even though ‘the voices of children’ discourse is deliberately plural, there is the 
danger that invoking the category, despite taking care to speak of particular children, 
risks reifying children as an homogeneous social group whose ‘nature’ is different 
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from that of adults. As discussions amongst feminists have elaborated, for the 
category ‘women’, there too may be times when the benefits of naming the social 
group outweigh the costs. Throughout this chapter, I have retained ‘children’ as an 
unproblematized category in order to focus on questions of representation. I have 
presumed the constituency of childhood when, perhaps, a key dilemma in 
representing children relates to which children’s lives are represented in discourses of 
childhood. 
 
Standing (1998) also explores the risk that our research reinforces assumptions about 
the research participants. There is the danger that our critiques reify what we would 
rather dispel if we concentrate too much on dominant meanings, with too little 
attention to times and places in which they are contested (Alcoff, 1988). Parker and 
Burman remind discourse analysts of the importance of theorising the ‘fluctuations 
and transformations in discursive relations to ward off a reading of them as 
unchanging’ (1993: p164). This dilemma can be aligned crudely with the tension 
between ‘gritty realism’ (‘showing it like it is’) and ‘positive images’ (presenting the 
‘good news’ or a preferred version) (for instance, explored in Roach and Felix’s 
(1988) discussion of cultural images of black women). It re-states the alternative 
between re-presentation (understood as empirical, realist) or re/presentation (as an 
intervention in cultural politics). I have argued that, although this is a false opposition 
(as Walkerdine,1990, and others have shown) and risks reasserting a truth/ideology 
distinction (see chapter 5), it can be useful for thinking strategically about our 
research. 
 
8.13 Representations in the public sphere: choosing a strategy
To summarize, our strategic decisions might include, not only which approach to 
adopt and what representational claims to make, but also, precisely how reflexive to 
be about these in a given forum. One could be aware of the rhetorical ploys and 
epistemological imperialisms by which one’s textual authority is supported, but 
choose not to deconstruct it at a given point, in which case, the strategic use of 
conventional research rhetoric might be indistinguishable from its unreflexive use 
(Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988). However, in doing so, hitherto taken-for-granted 
notions may have been displaced. For example, James and Prout (1996) call for 
children to be studied within family contexts once again because they are an 
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‘important social context in which children discover [sic] their identities (James, 
1994)’ (James and Prout, 1996: p42), rather than, unthinkingly, because the family 
has been naturalised as the place where children exist. Another illustration might be 
using the discourse of ‘public sphere’ in order to emphasize the broader political 
consequences of our research, despite rejecting theoretically its implication that there 
is a separate sphere of (private) meanings which are not cultural. Perhaps another 
illustration is my use of the notion of strategy despite its implication of rational, goal-
oriented subjects (and its militaristic resonances) (Edwards and Ribbens, 1991). Yet 
another, is the fact that I have deconstructed the modernist construction of the subject 
in relation to interviewees, whilst retaining it to speak of us decision-making 
researchers! Indeed, throughout this thesis, I write about the mythical status of the 
rational, bounded individual, but do so in a linguistic style and tone which tacitly 
reaffirms it. I also write myself into it in ways which are contradictory, at times 
adopting, and at others claiming to ‘reject’, identity categories. 
 
In the same way that researchers set the terms for discussion in an interview, so public 
debate may already be framed in such a way - again by adults - that intervening within 
the terms of the debate is a compromise. ‘A sense of perspective’ is needed to weigh 
up whether an idea is worth challenging, or whether granting it research attention 
bolsters its status (but there are no external referents set up as ideals or guarantees for 
this perspective). This issue can be thought of as a question about whether to try to 
make gains within the existing terms of the debate or to challenge those terms 
(Alldred, 1996a; Kitzinger, 1987; Prince and Hartnett, 1993, and see chapter 6). The 
dilemma, again, concerns the risk of reification by critiques. 
 
How specific to research with children are the dilemmas discussed here? It seems that 
the theoretical issues are not specific. Rather, they apply ‘across the board’ in feminist 
and critical research. However, the precise meanings assigned childhood in this 
culture make the detail of the dilemmas of research with children particular. Ideas 
about marginal groups may be structured similarly in relation to the presumed centre, 
but do not necessarily require the same responses. It is the specific forms of these 
dilemmas to which researchers must attend in relation to the participants’ social 
group, and in relation to the precise moment and location of their research 
intervention. Thus, the possible losses and gains of employing the discourse of 
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hearing voices must be considered in relation to children (as a rhetorical category), 
and perhaps in relation to particular children, and the discourse might then be drawn 
on with varying degrees of literality. 
 
Whilst much feminist research is concerned with adequately recognizing difference, 
representing children within research is always characterised by Otherness across the 
construction of a defining adult-child difference. Unlike Women’s Studies, Childhood 
Studies has not arisen from a politics of experience (Oakley, 1994) and is conducted 
by adults on those who are Other to them. Children do, of course, make political 
representations on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of others (Hoyles, 1989), but 
more often through direct action, rather than through re/presentational or recognition 
politics. As adults representing children we can try to recognize the ways in which our 
researcher status may confound and exploit our adult status, and clarify whether we 
are representing children in the realist, photographic sense of portrayal, or using our 
political perspective to make judgements about the way they are represented as we 
engage in struggles about ‘recognition’ or meaning. Referring to ‘children’s 
perspectives’, naming their particularity, even though inevitably drawing into play 
their Otherness and our cultural centrality, we may be able to make use of the benefits 
this can provide in claiming that people who are marginalised ‘as children’ ought to 
be heard. Researchers interviewing children need to consider how we hear children’s 
voices, meaning not only the approaches we employ, but also how the representations 
we make of their voices will be heard in the public sphere. Children’s voices need to 
be heard alongside critical attention to the way childhood is constructed. This should 
then inform a more preliminary question, which, as Alderson (1995) notes, is often 
bypassed: not how, but whether the research should be done, and, I would add, not 
just how, but whether each particular re/presentational act should be made. 
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 Chapter 9 
Parents, Popular Psychology and Performativity: ‘Post-Identity’ Parenting?  
 
This thesis has examined theoretical shifts in the social sciences from approaches 
which take a modernist model of the individual as their unproblematic centre, to 
approaches which develop the notion of subject positions and an understanding of 
identities as performative. Chapter 5 also narrated changes in British cultural politics 
over the last thirty years from the primacy of ‘identity politics’ to the emergence and 
popularisation of cultural and political strategies which neither presume a modernist 
subject, nor that representation is a literal matter. The theoretical narrative of the 
thesis therefore parallels broader shifts in cultural practice/s, as well as those in theory 
itself. These are illustrated in, and are popularised through, cultural forms which 
challenge the authenticity of the subject and of representation (e.g. ‘postmodern’ 
cinema, performance art, sampling, pastiche, and retro-fads, the significance of 
advertising and of direct action politics in/and ‘the media age’). But what are the 
implications of ‘post identity politics’ for parental identities? Are they to be 
welcomed?  
 
This chapter brings a ‘performative’ approach to identities to bear on some of the 
current debates and themes in British social policy. Firstly, it considers some of the 
implications for contemporary parents of a post-structuralist informed discursive 
approach to subjectivity, through particular cultural discourses of ‘fitness to parent’. 
This is framed by accounts of broader change in family and social life, (or perhaps in 
ways of thinking about family life), which highlight the value of psychosocial 
approaches for linking the subjective with the cultural. Secondly1, it outlines some of 
the potential implications of viewing identity as performative for thinking about 
parents: that is, how such an approach might work ideally, and then goes on to look at 
contemporary social policy concerning parents and/or families with this in mind. It 
draws together disparate, and admittedly selective, arguments and concepts within 
social policy to argue that they illustrate a shift towards understandings of identities as 
 
1 Earlier versions of this argument were presented at the Discourse and Cultural Practice conference, 
in Adelaide, Australia, in February 1996, and to the Women’s Workshop on Qualitative Family and 
Household Research in 1997, and I am grateful to members of the workshop for critical feedback and 
discussion. 
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 performative, rather than as static, all-embracing categories. It argues that such moves 
towards the principle of performativity for thinking about families, whilst not 
guaranteed, tend to be for the better. 
 
9.1 ‘Fitness to parent’ 
This thesis has examined popular debates in the British media about parents, mothers 
and fathers. Journalists’ implicit questioning of whether a person or identity group 
were ‘fit to parent’ suggested a focus on the discourse of fitness to parent, as a quality 
or qualities. ‘Fitness to parent’ appears very powerful as a moral discourse, yet it is 
‘vacant’ of ‘qualities’ that might be expected to give it meaning. This lead to a focus 
on the claims to know, and the politics of knowledge, psychological expertise in 
particular, surrounding ‘fitness to parent’.  
 
Psychological discourses are popularised and morally persuasive today (e.g. 
promoting child/ren’s self-esteem, improving communication skills, maintaining 
appropriate ‘boundaries’ and healthy relationships). Partly because of their 
popularisation, they invoke a range of types of warrant or epistemological claims to 
back them. Their epistemology, like the psychological discourses themselves, is often 
naturalised. Different chapters have described discourses that relate to, but no single 
authoritative discourse of, fitness to parent. Indeed, the argument here is that no single 
discipline holds an uncontested territorial claim over fitness to parent, and that this is 
what allows various mobilisations of this powerful notion. 
 
‘Fitness for’ suggests a functionalist or utilitarian ethos. ‘Fitness to parent’ evokes 
ideas about genetic quality and evolutionary progress which have supported social 
engineering programmes and eugenicist atrocities. Perhaps a painful association with 
Nazi eugenics only 60 years ago explains its mutedness. Although such a discourse is 
not explicit, there is sometimes a eugenic flavour to popular conservative arguments 
about parents today, such as those expressing concern over the birth-rate amongst ‘the 
underclass’. Whilst they do not reduce characteristics to crude biological terms, 
arguments about the cost to society of delinquency, crime and welfare ‘dependency’ 
suggest ‘social pathologies’ which can ultimately have similar implications, and at 
many cultural sites we are witnessing a resurgence in sociobiological ideas. 
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 ‘Fitness to parent’ is a term whose meaning is more vague than its apparent 
‘confidence’ would suggest. It is not a concept with coherence and integrity. There is 
no current consensus on it, but various, contradictory popular and expert accounts. As 
a ‘vacant’ but powerful idea, it is subject to competing attempts to ‘fill in’ its 
meaning, just as is ‘family values’. Neither is it truly a discourse according to the 
definition adopted here of a distillation of statements which cohere around a core 
meaning and are reducible to a sentence or so (Parker, 1992, see chapter 7). Whilst no 
particular discipline makes an over-riding claim to it, psychological discourses are 
most highly valorised around parent-child relationships. Direct assertions of ‘fitness 
to parent’ would not be in the style of contemporary psychology. Indeed, the 
discipline would not hold together if ‘it’ tried to produce a unitary view. However, 
professionals other than psychologists hold the jobs which specifically regulate access 
to parenthood through reproductive technologies or adoption. This split between 
psychologists and those whose work administers psychology through institutional 
regulation and surveillance of parents allows popular/psychology to remain powerful, 
naturalised and without official challenge or update at these sites of practice.  
 
The dominant British popular cultural understanding of fitness to parent then, rather 
than being viewed as an ideology, is better understood as a site at which a whole 
range of discourses about parents and children, individuals and society intersect. 
Among these are some of the discourses that have featured in this thesis: of modern 
parents, good mothers, (good) fathers, and of maturity, selfishness and responsibility; 
of children as the object of parental concern and outcome of parental behaviour, and 
of their needs, individuality and normal development; of childrearing, the natural, 
fitness for the job, cost to the tax-payer, threat to the family. Instead of trying to 
articulate a coherent discourse of fitness to parent, the multiplicity and complexity of 
this site is recognised. These various discourses straddle or intersect each other, at 
times competing, and at others merely present by virtue of their assertion as 
contemporary common-sense or self-evident truths. It can be seen as a discursive 
complex, a site at which the web of discourses pertaining to it produce the appearance 
of solid meaning, where it can be imagined there is conceptual integrity.  
 
Within this complex, psychological discourses (as topics or warrants) operate 
powerfully today. However, ‘psychological discourses’ may either be statements of 
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 dominant mainstream psychology, which carry the power of disciplinary knowledge 
(i.e. operate as warrant/epistemological basis), or they may be alternatives which 
(can) contest these, but whose power rests on the fact that they nevertheless answer 
the same concerns (i.e. as topic). They might thereby ‘beat psychology at its own 
game’, using the ‘psychological’ or subjective to pose an alternative to disciplinary 
knowledge.  
 
Psychology, therefore, rules this domain. There are, though, many reported sightings 
of the ‘king’, sometimes in different dress, and sometimes the prince is mistaken for 
him and carries out public duties in his place. Still within popular memory though, are 
stories of the previous king, biology, whose fitness was judged through ideas about a 
broader good than simply how individual subjects fared, and there are some who 
herald his return. Memories of cruelty committed in his name (such as the exile of 
certain of his subjects) appear less significant in people’s minds than the truth and 
rational order that he promises. 
 
Even if it were a coherent discourse, fitness to parent itself is seldom articulated 
because it is mostly defined by its absence. Most significant for understanding what 
dominant social expectations of those who are ‘fit’ to raise children, are the powerful, 
negative discourses that construct ‘unfit’ parents, particularly in the popular sphere. A 
discursive approach, with the concepts of muted or subjugated discourses, can 
recognise the significance of ‘silences’ and absences such as those indicated in what 
Phoenix and Woollett (1991) identified as the normalised absence/pathologised 
presence of devalued subjects/positions. For example, the clearest indications of what 
presence in children’s lives mothers, and, differently, fathers are expected to have 
comes from sharp characterisations of absent fathers (or mothers), or neglectful 
mothers (or parents). Mothers who meet social disapproval reveal some of the implicit 
expectations of mothers. Chapter 3 saw how ‘virgin birth’ mothers were constructed 
as selfish for depriving men of the opportunity to take on family responsibilities, just 
as lone mothers are sometimes constructed as depriving their children of a father 
(Phoenix, 1991), and partnered mothers are sometimes held responsible for their 
partner’s relationship with their (mutual) child (Marshall, 1991). This shows how 
much responsibility for the family falls on mothers, or, more precisely, how much 
blame falls on mothers when there is concern about the family. It is therefore through 
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 the negative discourses of women who are not seen as making fit mothers that we can 
see what good mothers are expected to be and do. This is not, however, in the 
coherent way I first imagined: specific negatives point to their implicit, often 
normalised, opposites, but there are many contradictory ‘negatives’ (such as whether 
‘good mothering’ means staying at home or doing paid work outside the home, see 
e.g. Edwards and Duncan, 1997) and they do not ‘add together’ to define negatively 
the perfect, or even a ‘good enough’, mother. Because the range of discourses at work 
culturally do not form a coherent whole, they do not each, nor any one of them 
always, work against mothers/for fathers. While currently they most often have a 
disproportionate impact on mothers, to assert an inevitable anti-feminist consequence 
would be to essentialise the politics of a particular discursive formulation and abstract 
and over-generalise unhelpfully.  
 
9.2 The psychosocial imagination 
C. Wright Mills, writing in the 1950s, offered a prognosis of our ‘postmodern’ 
present. We would, he argued, see the collapse of liberalism and socialism as the 
reigning ideologies theorising the relationship between the individual and society 
(Denzin, 1987). A central premise of this thesis is that Mills was correct and that the 
collapse of these existing ideologies creates the conditions of possibility for 
psychosocial studies to map the same terrain differently. Some of the questions Mills 
thought ‘the sociological imagination’ might address have, in this thesis, been 
subjected to the, actually a (my), ‘psychosocial imagination’: He asked ‘what type of 
man, woman and child would appear at this historical moment?’ and ‘what manner 
and form of human problems would this new generation create?’ (cited in Denzin, 
ibid.). 
 
In chapter 5, it was argued that we are now ‘psychological subjects’, which is to say 
that we constructed and construct ourselves and our relationships through 
psychological discourses. Whether these are drawn from the expert knowledge base or 
popular folk wisdom, they concern ‘psychology’ as a topic or terrain. This may or 
may not accompany the rejection of the (unitary, rational) subject on which 
psychology was founded. The persuasiveness and pervasiveness of psychological 
discourses is illustrated by the fact that they are the objects of criticism here, yet also 
arguments through which I make some of my points. For example, in chapter 4, I 
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 claim that a powerful discourse of ‘father absence’ accepts residential markers of 
presence as a basis for judging fathers, as opposed to emotional or psychological 
ones, which would be preferable. Similarly, in chapter 5, I argue that the concept of 
‘role models’ is superficial in an emotional or psychological sense. These show how 
psychological discourses are persuasive because of their appeal to ‘real life 
experience’, to a dimension of life whose significance is newly appreciated, and the 
possibility therefore, of ‘beating psychology (the discipline) at its own game’. The 
criticism of psychological concepts for being psychologically inadequate suggests 
either (or both) the failure of the discipline to live up to its claims, or the rapid cultural 
adoption and development of the discipline’s terrain. I would argue that both of these 
have occurred. Chapters 6 and 7 show the particularity of the epistemological and 
methodological paradigm through which mainstream psychology was forged, and 
which took the discipline away from other, more philosophical and existential, 
intellectual resources. Section 9.4 takes up the issue of the ‘psychologisation’ of the 
popular sphere. Speaking of ‘psychological subjects’ requires careful qualification, 
since it assumes a particular reconceptualisation of subjectivity, rather than the 
reification of ‘the subject of psychology’ (the discipline). 
 
A feminist Foucauldian approach to discourse, power and the self, and a Butleresque 
approach to identity has enabled me to begin to think about the significance of 
cultural discourses of parents, mothers and fathers for the experience of individuals at 
this historical moment, without reducing subjectivity to the passive adoption of 
socially-prescribed parental roles. It allows an understanding of the formation of 
subjects whose desire to parent children is culturally produced, but no less real for 
that. It therefore provides a way through the psychosocial problematic. The 
conventional concerns of psychology, of emotions, relationships and identity, can be 
approached without neglecting their socio-cultural production or individualising their 
implications. It recognises the powerful role played by culture whilst allowing a 
dignified, complex subjectivity, and recognises an unconscious without making it the 
source of authentic desires beyond the reach of culture. Subjective desire is both 
culturally produced and genuine. This problematic is not only that of psychosocial 
studies, and, as previous chapters have suggested, echoes sociology’s structure/agency 
debates, communication studies’ audience/ideology, and cultural and literary studies’ 
reader/text tensions.  
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This approach constructs parents, and would-be parents, as ‘governing’ themselves 
and the discourses surrounding fitness to parent as elements in their self-formation 
and self-regulation. The desire to parent might sometimes be in conflict with 
discourses around fitness to parent. Whilst people are positioned differently regarding 
‘fitness to parent’, by the discourses described throughout the thesis and others, and 
will ‘take up’ different positions themselves, they will share the operation of power 
through their subjective will, not to the same ends, but to produce their (varied) 
experience - from their most fulfilling to their most anxious moments - of parenting. 
No greater imperative is needed (no instructions from psychologists, nor the threat of 
social workers) to think through how fit one is to parent than the will to do the best for 
our child/ren, and the fear of doing otherwise, coupled with our increasing obligation 
to do ourselves proud by our children and be fulfilled through our intimate (especially 
sexual and parental) relationships. The personal agonising heard in certain liberal, 
middle-class quarters from women who are able to choose when to conceive is part of 
governing ourselves through the whole constellation of discourses around fitness to 
parent, responsible parenting, what children need, women wanting to ‘have it all’, 
pleasure and life satisfaction. 
 
The thesis of the ‘triumph’ of a preoccupation with the self, and the powerful 
epistemology of experience and subjective knowledge has, according to some 
contemporary social theorists, a much larger cultural resonance, which section 9.4 
considers. As section 9.5 attests, I envisage this general shift, and a performative 
approach in particular, as potentially helpful for thinking about/representing 
parenting, but I am ambivalent about its application to certain issues, in a way which 
echoes the concerns many feminists have about postmodernity (Burman, 1990; 
Burman et al., 1996a; Jackson, 1992; Lovibund, 1989; Soper, 1991). For example, a 
recurrent concern of the thesis is with the merits and dangers of referring to people 
who parent children as if they are ungendered, given the profoundly over-determining 
nature of gender in Western culture - and especially, it seems, around children and 
their carers. There are of course, quite different meanings given to mother absence 
than to father absence, and quite different markers of deviance, immaturity and 
irresponsibility for adult men and women, as chapters 2 to 4 attempted to show. So 
the shifts I describe must be seen in the context of these less pro-feminist discourses. 
 240
 In the examples mentioned above the emphasis is on differences in meanings 
attributed to mothers and fathers in cases of negative judgements. From these, I 
surmise that it is at the boundary between fit and unfit, and particularly in the 
demarcation of women who are deemed unfit to mother, that the differences in 
expectations according to gender are either intensified or more starkly revealed. This 
is where they stand out as needing feminist responses because they are where women 
are judged particularly harshly according to conventional markers of femininity, 
wifeliness and motherliness. A preoccupation with the self and with individual 
responsibility distracts from the social and material conditions only within which can 
we be expected to ‘take responsibility’. Even then, what is the price to pay for the 
reassertion of ‘the responsible subject’ when is it not founded on the rational subject? 
Section 9.4 allows a glimpse of the way the responsible subject might not deny their 
irrationality, but be reflexive about it. But a problem that attends this triumph of the 
self is that confessing one’s failings or revealing one’s unconscious motivations can 
replace any imperative to change. So can reflexivity sometimes mitigate 
responsibility? C. Wright Mills also proposed questioning how ‘the family’ might 
respond to this ‘new generation’ and new period in Western history, and the rest of 
the chapter considers this.  
 
9.3 Parents and ‘parenting’: expertise and authority 
In addition to the popularisation of the gender-neutral term ‘parents’, (which chapters 
2 and 6 discuss), recently we have seen the emergence and popularisation of the verb 
‘to parent’. Speaking of the activity of ‘parenting’ clearly avoids constructing it as an 
essentially gendered activity, but it also dissociates it from mothers (or fathers) as 
people. Taking these aspects separately: as a strategy, creating an ungendered identity 
of ‘parent’ has the potential to challenge some of the gendered discourses of mothers 
and fathers, as chapter 6 described, and may serve feminist ends. Retaining an identity 
category, but ‘vaguing’ its gender can undermine the gender binary, but will 
sometimes simply allow gendered discourses to map onto or exist alongside it, which 
is where mothers, and perhaps sometimes fathers, can find themselves ‘caught 
between’ gendered and ungendered discourses and failing on both counts. Thus, I do 
not assume that the ungendering is necessarily progressive (see chapter 6).  
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 Mukti Jain Campion’s (1995) book, Who’s fit to be a parent?, as the title suggests, 
focuses on people, and asks which people have the individual qualities for the job of 
being a parent. By contrast, my emphasis is on the discursive constructions of fitness 
to parent, that is, how it is constructed as a(n assumed) quality, and object of 
knowledge and I have become particularly interested in the limitations of mapping 
meanings onto particular people/groups. The distinction is between highlighting 
parenting as a relational activity, or parents (and parenthood) as a noun naming an 
identity category (or state/status). In addition, whereas Campion’s title posits parents 
as her objects whom she looks in upon, my concern is with ‘fitness to parent’ as of 
subjective importance to people (including myself) and as part of the meanings 
through which we (or many of us) ‘psychological subjects’ are constituted and govern 
ourselves. 
 
Referring to ‘parenting’ offers the possibility of recognising doing parenting as 
performative and producing ‘parents’ (see chapter 5). This commonsense 
understanding of parenting as performative in the sense of being about childcare 
activities, which clearly produces ‘relations’, is extended in the specific theoretical 
development of the concept of performativity. However, there are firm definitions of 
who ‘has’ the identity of parent and non-parent in legal and social policy, in contrast 
with, say, racial identity which is not directly legislated upon (at least not aside from 
immigration legislation which seems to use ‘nationality’ as a proxy for race’), yet 
which is understood as a matter for self-definition. Neither of these are popularly 
understood as radically performative in the theoretical sense because it rests on an 
understanding of language as productive which is not fully popularised. The popular 
discourse of parenting both enables, and is produced by, the professionalisation of 
motherhood (Phoenix and Woollett, 1991) and now, the professionalisation of 
parenthood (Campion, 1995), either of which produce a newly problematised activity 
and way of being (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; Urwin and Sharland, 1992). I 
share much of Campion’s analysis, but draw different emphases around the popular 
consequences of expert knowledge: 
‘The very appearance of the word parenting signifies its transformation into a 
category for study and expertise, no longer just one aspect of daily living but 
something that requires particular skills, behaviours and knowledge - which only 
professionals can know’ (Campion, 1995: p117).  
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 Certainly, professionals have built up new ways of looking at parent-child 
relationships through their language and processes, but, I would argue, this does not 
function simply to create a ‘growing gulf’ between professionals and ordinary people. 
They have not, as Campion describes it, ‘unwittingly created closed systems largely 
impenetrable to an outsider not versed in their professional rules’ (ibid.: p117). I have 
argued that psychological expertise on parent-child relations is powerful precisely 
because it ‘makes sense’ to parents, and to Western subjects more generally. The 
discourse functions authoritatively in the popular sphere. It remains powerful because 
we want what it claims to offer, and ‘functions as truth’ because we sometimes make 
sense of our experiences through it, thereby making it ‘come true’ in a performative 
sense.  
 
The disciplinary power of psychological knowledge means that mothers, fathers, 
foster carers etc. are subject to professional judgements, assessments and 
categorisations, but I have also argued that the power of psychological discourses can 
be brought to bear by using the language of psychology, even without institutional 
backing as pop-psychology. Even explicitly non-expert appeals to psychology operate 
powerfully as the terrain of ‘the psyche’, the subjective and the emotional, become 
increasingly valorised, seemingly across British culture. This is not to imply that the 
latter can necessarily oppose the former, but that the outcome of struggles between 
them is not determined in advance purely by an expert’s claim to knowledge. The 
particular discursive positions that open up, and how they fare when forced to 
compete, are subject to so many contingent understandings that their operation can 
only be understood in each specific context. 
 
As chapter 2 argues, the ‘colonisation’ by experts of the terrain of concerns we have 
about the everyday treatment of children, was a consequence of the shift from 
traditional to rational forms of authority (Weber, cited by Richards, 1999) on 
childrearing and, later, ‘parent-child relations’. Whilst we may no longer trust the 
experts as we once did, we still seek out expertise. As subjects born on the promises 
of modernity, we have a ‘will to truth’ and a desire for the comfort of an external 
authority whose answers to our concerns we may be guided by, even though we may 
also contest, criticise and query. We want expertise, even as we criticise and scoff at 
particular experts, particular ‘answers’ or even their theoretical frameworks.  
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Barry Richards (1999) argues that it is not so much a ‘crisis of authority’ as the 
emergence of new forms of authority. Social institutions are powerful for us because 
of what we project into them, and it may be that particular projections are no longer 
channelled into the particular authorities that they were. He suggests a Freudian 
topography for thinking about the different forms of projection we make into different 
forms of authority (institutions, religious figures, knowledge forms, experts, 
politicians). In what we might call a ‘classical modern mode of emotional 
management’ different forms of projection were invested in distinctly different 
sources of authority, such that we had superego investments in moral authorities, ego 
investments in practical/rational authorities, and libidinous energy might be projected 
into charismatic figures. Whereas this contemporary form of (post-‘crisis’, perhaps 
post-1950s) emotional investment in authority might be characterised by a collapse of 
these boundaries, such that different psychic investments are no longer channelled 
into different forms of authority. If we look to rational knowledge bases such as 
mainstream psychology for containment of our fears around the care of children, then 
not surprisingly as we critique one form of expertise, we look for another to replace it. 
Valorising the expertise and professionalism of ‘alternative’ knowledges or 
approaches to childrearing, health or ‘holistic family life’, which chapter 2 described, 
seems less surprising in the light of this.  
 
What does this account mean for children’s investment of authority in their parents? 
Are their libidinous pleasures any less forbidden than they used to be? This would 
also suggest a way of understanding the possibility of over-investing in a discursive 
framework, in the hope that it is essentially progressive. Perhaps we can see ourselves 
torn between wanting to be able to trust in an external authority for the answers, and 
yet wanting to be ‘independent’ of it because we know the limitations of the 
discourse, and accept its critique. Once again, to have a critique of a knowledge form 
does not free us from it. Thus, we are ambivalent subjects in part because we 
recognise, and perhaps resent, the power that expertise has over, in and through us, 
yet realise we still seek it out in the belief that it will meet some of our needs. 
Acknowledging the limitations of our own knowledge, and moreover, the limitations 
of any knowledge form, can be interpreted as reaching the depressive position in a 
Kleinian developmental framework. As reflexive subjects we might recognise in 
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 ourselves something of what our desire for, and investments in, knowledge are about 
individually, but can a culture that makes a ‘reflexive turn’, such as in postmodernity, 
be said to be more developed, more mature? Whilst psychoanalytic interpretations of 
cultural phenomena have much to offer (e.g. Creed, 1993; Fanon, 1969; Kaplan, 
1992; Richards, 1994; Walkerdine, 1990), a characterisation of postmodernity as 
maturity clearly risks re/asserting the superiority of Western culture, normalising its 
particular development. Erica Burman (1995) presents a parallel critique of the 
normativity of the masculinist subject of developmental psychology and the 
imperialist presumptions of the Northern hemisphere’s ‘development’. In both cases 
peculiarly ‘Western’ development is naturalised as progress and exported. As regards 
the truth status we accord psychoanalytic (or indeed, developmental) interpretations 
of society, as Ian Parker argues in his recent work (Parker, 1997), this analysis makes 
sense because Western culture is already saturated with, and formed though, 
psychoanalytic understandings. Rose (1985, 1990) and De Swaan (1990) each look 
then to the wider cultural shifts by which we come to see the experts as engaged with 
our concerns. 
 
9.4 Parents in ‘the postmodern’ 
Some theorists prefer the term ‘reflexive modernity’ to postmodernity or ‘the 
postmodern condition’. This makes the link with the epistemological arguments made 
in this thesis and their implications for research work. It also highlights the 
continuities, that is, it avoids implying that there is a new age upon us which is 
qualitatively different from that which went before. Instead it suggests that modernity 
turned its gaze, reflexively, upon itself and this usefully allows that, for all the 
significance made of this shift (in this thesis/in social theory) the old order has not 
been overturned, and that, alongside change, much remains the same. 
 
Recent sociological work describes how relationships are becoming less status bound 
and more negotiated in situ between individuals. Research on intimate relations in 
contemporary, post-traditional society argues that we are moving towards more ‘pure’ 
and voluntaristic family relationships (Finch and Mason, 1993; Giddens, 1992). Finch 
and Mason (1993) stress the way responsibility and reciprocity are negotiated 
between individual family members. Even back in the late 1950s, Wilmott and Young 
described how fathers in the working-class families they studied not only ‘took a 
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 hand’ in childcare, but that the boundaries of gendered parental roles (of mothers as 
nurturers and fathers as breadwinners) were less rigidly defined and were performed 
in consultation (Young and Wilmott, 1957/1962: p30, cited in Day Sclater et al., 
forthcoming 1999). Giddens (1992) argues that intimacy in its modern form entails a 
radical democratisation of the interpersonal domain ‘because it assumes not only the 
individual being the ultimate maker of his or her own life, but also equality between 
partners and their freedom to choose lifestyles and forms of partnerships’ (Weeks et 
al., 1996: p4). This is core to understanding changing attitudes to homosexuality (see 
Weeks, 1995), and also suggests that heterosexual relationships may be becoming 
more like homosexual ones to the extent that lesbian and gay relationships have 
always been free from at least a gendered dynamic of inequality and, once outside of 
the dominant discourses of heterosexuality, have had to invent relationships afresh 
(Weston, 1991). Indeed, recent research with lesbian co-parents shows that 
heterosexual couples might learn from their more equal sharing of childrearing, 
earning and housework (Dunne, 1998, see Saffron, 1999). Such findings complement 
the writings of Beck (1992) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995), in which 
individuals are seen to, and come to be expected to, take more personal responsibility 
for relationships and biographies than in previous times. Judith Stacey’s (1990) work 
on contemporary family life in the USA draws similar conclusions, and from a 
different theoretical approach, one informed by Foucault, Nikolas Rose’s work (1990; 
1993) on the invention and government of the self through ‘psy’ discourses results in 
a subject who sounds very similar to Beck’s (1992) ‘reflexive individual’. 
 
Beck writes from the perspective of contemporary Germany, Stacey’s work was with 
the inhabitants of Silicon Valley (though not only middle-class and/or white), and 
some critics (e.g. Leonard, 1996) have questioned whether ‘reflexive 
individualisation’ is a middle-class privilege, and for Britain, a phenomenon which is 
rather more applicable to the ‘Guardian-reading liberal middle-class’ than these 
generalising analyses imply. This may well be true, and certainly the metropolitan 
London that introduced me to these features of ‘the postmodern condition’ was of 
specialist cultural practices and tastes (I am thinking particularly of the ICA, and of 
Soho’s aesthetic/consumer fads). But the everyday London that convinced me of its 
relevance was of my own experience of shifting between different social spaces and 
meanings which can be aware of and challenge each other’s meanings. Is a ‘gut 
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 feeling’ argument, that performative approaches ‘made sense’ to me personally, 
unsatisfactory because it relies on the author’s ontology, or should I unhesitantly 
warrant my account with an appeal to personal experience? If the role of ontology, the 
limitations of the identity-based dominant framework for speaking of it, and the 
subjective nature of the account are admitted, then does an account do all it can to 
avoid the imperialist tendencies of assertions of knowledge? I am convinced by the 
accounts of writers such as Beck in that they resonate with my own experience, and 
whilst I suspect that they have broad currency, I should try to avoid the temptation of 
asserting broad-based characterisations of contemporary social life by reminding 
myself of the aim to examine the potential value of new theoretical approaches to 
identity for thinking about parents, rather than to assess its prevalence. However, I 
explore points at which I believe I can see it surfacing to provide examples for 
thinking about its potentiality. 
 
Writers such as Weeks (1995) describe the loss of old certainties concerning roles, 
expectations and duties, and increasing freedom from rigid religious and cultural 
pressures (particularly for indigenous white populations of mostly Christian heritage, 
and perhaps too for minority ethnic groups under the influence of multiculturalism or 
‘Westernisation’). That our identity is not assigned once-and-for-all on the basis of 
our familial, religious or occupational role by our local community, but is already 
made multiple by the range of spheres we inhabit in contemporary social life, lays the 
foundations for performative approaches to identity (Butler, 1990; 1993, Grosz, 1995; 
Hall, 1996; Henriques et al., 1984; Mercer, 1994; Sarup, 1996; Probyn, 1993). Whilst 
the above writers celebrate the loosening of rigid social expectations, they recognise 
the burden that such responsibility can bring to bear upon individuals. Being given 
decisions about aspects of one’s life which might have been mapped out in earlier 
times can feel daunting. It can produce a paralysing degree of choice and an 
‘unfixedness’ that can feel like the loss of identity, value and place in society. Being 
given responsibility for undesirable aspects of one’s life or oneself is pressurizing and 
normalising. Once the conditions for achieving ‘normality’ have been realised for 
everyone, deviance is attributed solely to personal failure - or to an individual 
impairment or pathology which the appropriate expert should (help you) correct (De 
Swaan, 1990). This attributes an unrealistic, and therefore unfair, degree of 
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 responsibility because it occludes political analysis of the constraints some people 
face.  
 
The association of old certainties of identity with value allows Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (1995) to express this as the tension over ‘love or freedom’. It is, 
therefore, no liberation from social judgement, but more of a heightened requirement 
of reflexivity and responsibility. Not surprisingly then, there is much ambivalence 
about this ‘mixed blessing’. One ‘must’ devote time and thought to imagining every 
potential judgement by others and by the self. As before, whilst the multiplicity of 
subject positions provides a range of possibilities for the self, access to these is still 
produced through structures of differential disadvantage. Here again freedom has 
limits. As chapter 5 argued, the discourses from which we are ‘liberated’ may be part 
of our formation and so ‘old’ ideas about duty, obligation, ‘goodness’ or 
responsibility may still be felt sharply, only they may be felt alongside secular, 
consumerist, or otherwise contradictory ideas. Furthermore, ‘reflexive individuals’ in 
‘postmodern families’ (Stacey, 1990) are still subject to powerful judgements by 
professionals or interventions by agencies. And when their individual responsibility is 
emphasised, structural understandings of disadvantage and the restrictions on 
individual choice and freedom get forgotten and can individualise social problems and 
expect those most disadvantaged to take individual responsibility for avoiding or 
ameliorating disadvantage. This is where one needs to recognise that from some 
positions less freedom is allowed, and where the post-structuralist concern with power 
should prevent analyses lapsing into relativism. 
 
The ‘mixed blessing’ of reflexivity about parenting means that one might, for instance 
in my own social milieu, be expected to be able to articulate one’s desire to parent 
through a whole set of reflexive discourses. This might include acknowledging the 
contribution of layers of ‘rosy images’ of motherhood and of narcissistic investments, 
of feminist critiques, up-to-date and liberal disciplinary discourses, popular 
disapproval and complex ethical quandaries about what ‘children need’, ‘parents 
need’ and what mothers are ‘allowed’ without feeling guilty. These all exist alongside 
‘stop rationalising and just do it’, ‘trust your instincts’ and ‘you’ll soon see how 
significant biology is’ discourses of over-intellectualisation.  
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 In addition, nothing can be assumed about either the partnership or parental 
relationships, or the residential and financial arrangements, or the practicalities of 
child-care, employment, life-stage, job opportunities or career paths/breaks. Here 
alternative discourses compete to provide the trump card in the reflexive dilemmas 
between say, how much a child needs you there, versus how much better the quality 
of your parenting if you have fulfilling relationships outside the home. There are 
fewer intrinsically positive or negative decisions, but what is crucial is that they are 
narrated through these types of discourse, to display this form of reflexivity. In 
addition, there are further forms of reflexivity to be addressed in their particularities: 
we are impelled to relate our decisions to our own hopes and fears of family which 
‘must’ somehow involve reflection on not only our own childhood but also the effects 
and consequences this had, and may in future have. Regardless of critiques of 
developmental assumptions and limited perspectives, we risk serious approbation if 
we do not imply a degree of reflexivity here. Our future or actual child, and our own 
‘inner child’ have a particular place in our narrations of self and in understandings of 
interiority from Shakespeare onwards (see Steedman, 1995). As Burman (1994c) 
shows, the child is key in how contemporary Western culture(s) sees the relation of 
individuals to society. Furthermore, parenting is at the very crux of dominant and 
critical understandings of how individuals are produced in the particular cultural form 
recognised in the West, at the interface of ‘the social’ and what we experience as the 
individual, constructing their child’s identity before it is born, interpellating it into 
sets of culturally specific meanings before it can talk. 
 
There is an irony that relates to the discussion in chapters 6, 8 and here, of the 
presentation of the researcher or author as strategic and goal-oriented, yet 
deconstructing the rational Subject for interviewees, parents, etc. It is that the 
reflexivity produced in us by the development of these emphases on individual 
responsibility for personal satisfaction ‘require’, and so produce, the sense of coherent 
self-identity and if not ‘life-plans’, then ‘route rationales’, at the same time as many of 
the discursive strands that comprise self-reflexivity disavow this modernist subject 
and encourage recognition of the parts that over-spilled. Thus, writing a thesis 
requires me to perform a particular mode of (authorial) subjectivity which, through 
my performance of it, I (sometimes) experience as if it were essential.  
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 9.5 The potential of performative approaches 
A performative approach to identities has the potential to refocus our thinking about 
parents on relationships, rather than identities. It therefore facilitates the continuing 
move away from the presumptions of identity politics, and could prove valuable for 
thinking about parents and parenting. By distinguishing between roles and 
relationships, one can move away from ideas about (assumptions based on) who 
someone is, towards more detailed focus of who they are in relation to something or 
someone. That is, leave stereotypes for actuality, and construct a more relational 
approach. This allows that family relationships are defined differently from different 
vantage points, which allows us to recognise the complexity of today’s families - for 
instance, that ‘who someone is’ to me, is not necessarily ‘who they are’ to someone 
else (e.g. the parent of a child may be a step-parent of another child in the same 
family). Shifting the focus from identities to relationships acknowledges the 
complexity and non-unitary nature of one’s position in ‘family’ by theorising at more 
detailed levels, through concepts such as subject positions, and identifications. Rather 
than the identities or roles of mother, father or parent, which assume stable, fixed and 
oversimplified relations, are ‘parenting responsibilities’ or relationships. Identities are 
only useful where it is understood that they are fleeting and situated, always 
performed in situ and produced as real through that performance. Relationships are 
the important elements, and these produce subjects who are, at a given time and place, 
positioned as, and identify as, ‘parent’. 
 
This relational emphasis has the potential for emphasising family dynamics over and 
above family forms. It might therefore mitigate against the prejudging of families, in 
the abstract, on account of their ‘form’ (usually the constellation of gendered adults 
that comprise them). Attempts to judge how good a family is for the child/ren reared 
within it, can therefore at least be nudged to concentrate on the actual relationship 
dynamics between its members. Similarly, we might open up the space to consider the 
actual quality of boys’ relationships with their fathers, rather than merely the presence 
of fathers. This amounts to a recognition of the limits of sociological (or 
demographic) views of families, and to according higher priority to ‘psychological’ 
ones which focus on subjective, emotional, interactive aspects.  
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 A deconstructive approach to the discourse of family allows the recognition of parent-
child relationships as distinct from adult partnerships or sexual relationships. These 
are conflated within dominant discourses of family. We know too that there remains 
no inevitable link between biological and social parenthood, and that there are many 
cases in which biological kinship does not predict care relationships. When the use of 
the family discourse is not limited by identities, same-sex couples might co-parent on 
the same terms as heterosexual couples, ‘families’ will define for themselves their 
boundaries, and might comprise one, two, three, four co-parenting adults of 
whichever gender, and relations of care need not be limited to those between adults 
and children. (As more of the population come to need care in their old age, perhaps 
we will be able to define families as units of care relationships rather than, as hitherto 
(Van Every, 1991), by the presence of a child.) When relationship markers are not 
identity restricted, certain socially recognised relationships would not be restricted to 
use by those conservatively defined as suitable, e.g. discourses of family (which are 
already in use) amongst lesbian and gay adults and the children in their care (Weeks 
et al., 1996), same-sex marriages (Sherman, 1992), and perhaps we could usefully 
extend our terms to recognise co-parents who are neither lovers or kin.  
 
It is quite obvious that in making decisions about children’s well-being, the focus 
must be on the emotional and practical relationships as they are lived, not the way the 
family looks from outside, nor whether it conforms to the narrow image of the nuclear 
family. This is an argument that relationships should be defined subjectively, but one 
can also argue this on the grounds that it is a more child-centred way of thinking 
about family. Research on children’s own perspectives on parenting argues that 
children themselves describe having a safe and loving family, rather than any 
particular family form as important (Smart and Neale, 1999). When they define as 
family those who ‘look after them’, who are ‘there for them’ after school etc. they are 
defining in performative and relational terms. I think such a performative approach to 
thinking about parents is politically desirable: not only because it provides a more 
realistic understanding of how people live their family lives (an empirical warrant for 
it), but primarily because it allows a less conservative, restrictive understanding of 
parenting and a more inclusive (political warrant) discourse of ‘family values’. 
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 Before presenting an account of possible performativity in actual policy, a brief note 
on the claims made for the account: The emotional and intellectual investment most 
academics have in their analysis must make confirmatory examples more easily 
identified than contrary ones. The final stages of a PhD might be analogous to the 
common account of reading a medical dictionary, whereby even if one recognises this 
dynamic, one sees in abundance the symptoms of whichever condition is in focus. 
This is similar to the ‘desk drawer phenomenon’ whereby positive experimental 
findings get reported, while negative or inconclusive findings are ‘left in the desk 
drawer’ and do not receive the same academic or public attention. In the intrapsychic 
version, both conscious processes (such as decisions about re-presenting examples) 
and unconscious processes (whereby confirmatory examples are noticed and seized 
upon whilst contrary illustrations slip past unnoticed) can work towards the same 
ends. What follows is then, inevitably, a selective account, and it is possible that an 
account to the contrary could be produced. The question would be how persuasive 
they were to the reader, which in part would relate to the use of an authoritative, 
empiricist rhetorical style. Hence I do not claim that this is an objective account of 
policy developments, indeed I would not know ‘from where’ that might be possible. 
However, I will use a conventional rhetorical style that obscures myself and the 
processes of production of the account. Moreover, since I identify what I consider to 
be positive examples, all I can do is admit its selective nature and reflect upon the 
possible implications of my own investment in a positive reading of social policy and 
the production of an account of a world which is gradually getting better. The very 
engagement with policy work relies on a modernist belief in progress to more just 
mechanisms of social regulation and is what chapter 6 called ‘using the master’s 
tools’ and as such carries the risks attendant to accepting the terms of the debate. 
 
9.6 ‘Post identity’ thinking in the popular sphere 
Over the past few years there has been a general shift in preferred terminology such 
that we no longer refer to ‘blacks’, ‘gays’ or ‘the disabled’, but instead speak of 
‘Black/black people’, ‘African Caribbean or Asian people’, ‘people of African decent’ 
or ‘people of SE Asian decent’, ‘women who are lesbian’, gay men, and ‘people with 
disabilities’. This ‘people with/of’ formulation helps prevent one aspect of identity 
being seen as definitive, recognises that people are not exhaustively represented by 
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 these category labels, and points to diversity within a group and hence the need for 
more specific markers.  
 
Challenges to racist and sexist stereotyping which had much popular and institutional 
attention throughout the 1980s helped to open up space for more considered thinking 
about identities and diversity amongst those accorded the same sociological identities. 
Has this helped challenge the meanings attributed to black/African Caribbean mothers 
as much as it has challenged, legally at least, the prejudices against lesbian mothers 
(Harne et al. 1997; Woodcraft, 1997)? Theoretical deconstruction of ‘race’, 
stimulated by increasing recognition of the multiplicity and complexity of ethnicity, 
as well as of racial heritage, has challenged the black-white binary of ‘race’ (e.g. ‘new 
ethnicities’, see Hall, 1992). Similarly there is more public unravelling of other 
binaries, as demonstrated in the increasing visibility of bisexuality, and popular 
curiosity about sexual minorities, especially about transgendered people. In health 
education work on HIV prevention, the recognition that identity categories did not 
necessarily confine sexual practice accordingly, has lead to the now customary 
reference to ‘men who have sex with men’, rather than ‘gay men’, in order to more 
accurately identify ‘riskier sexual practices’ and not exclude on the basis of identity 
definitions.  
 
With the influence of feminism, ideas about gender have become increasingly 
liberalised, which helps divorce expectations of behaviour, abilities and personality 
from gender identity. Similarly, discourses which link personality or psychological 
qualities to sexual preference are heard less frequently and there is a general 
liberalisation around homosexuality in policy, and increasing recognition of same-sex 
relationships and desires. For instance, the 1996/7 Housing Act passed through 
Parliament without comment to rule that Local Authorities treat homosexual couples 
like heterosexual ones in cases where a tenant dies (and indeed is employing a broad 
meaning of relationship when it also obliges councils to re-house long-term carers or 
companions). As chapter 3 described, fostering and adoption agencies do consider 
unmarried couples and single people, and sexuality may not be seen as relevant by a 
social worker whose assessment suggests they could provide good enough care for a 
particular child. 
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 9.7 Parents in policy: Towards performative parental identities? 
Firstly, I will look for signs of performative approaches to parenting in the New 
Labour Government’s 1998 consultation paper Supporting Families. I will then draw 
illustrations from a range of parenting-related policy issues.  
 
It is interesting that this first piece of British social policy to address the family 
directly does so at a time at which its object is hotly disputed. Alongside the newly 
problematised activity of parenting, the family has now become an explicit problem 
for policy, whereas previously it was naturalised. Perhaps its status as such is now 
waning. Supporting Families refers to ‘parents’, as opposed to mothers and/or 
fathers, and the activity of parenting, and so is in line with the 1989 Children Act, the 
1991 Child Support Act, the 1996 Family Law, and Adoption Acts which enact 
concepts such as ‘parental responsibility’, and refer to ‘absent parents’ or ‘parents 
with care’. It argues that the Government’s role is to provide support and advice 
services for parents, including parenting classes, and it proposes an extended role for 
Health Visitors; a national parenting free-phone line; and most significantly, a new 
National Family and Parenting Institute. The Institute’s name is interesting, since the 
‘and’ can be interpreted as admitting that parenting is not wholly contained within 
‘family’. 
 
One of its suggestions is of secular baby-naming ceremonies for parents who are non-
religious but wish to show publicly their long-term commitment to their child/ren. 
This is a desirable move towards recognising the distinct nature of the parents’ 
relationship to each other, from their relationships to their child. It allows marriage to 
be seen as a matter of personal choice, but commitment to a child to be important 
regardless of marital status (Ribbens McCarthy and Edwards, forthcoming 1999). 
That the Government would/could not legislate for marriage, but will for children’s 
parenting shows their different moral statuses and reflects the uncontested idea that 
parental commitment is in children’s interests (contestation only begins over which 
parent) compared with the disputed social significance of marriage. 
 
The following aspects of the Green Paper also seem compatible with performative 
approaches: it seeks greater recognition for the role of the wider family, especially 
grandparents; proposes child-care tax credit to help working parents; and a guaranteed 
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 minimum income for ‘working families’. It states that excessive workloads detract 
from family life and makes provision for up to 3 months unpaid ‘parental leave’ when 
a baby is born or adopted. In making the child’s need to be housed the priority in 
court settlements, it refers to the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary carer’, which follows from 
the emphasis on the continuity of parent-child relationships beyond adult partnerships. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: A parent’s vow to his child 
 
Jackie Flemming’s cartoon, published in The Guardian, December, 1998 shows a father making a vow 
of parental responsibility, but questions whether the commitment will be more lasting and unshakable 
than that promised in marriage vows. 
 
 
I agree with the document’s opening statement that ‘strong and stable families provide 
the best basis for raising children’, but not with the following assertion that ‘marriage 
provides the most reliable framework for raising children’. Lone parents and same-sex 
couples can provide equally strong and stable families for children, and furthermore, 
many cohabiting couples are both registered on the child’s birth certificate and 
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 provide long-term stability for their children. There is nothing intrinsic to marriage 
that makes for better parenting, although social recognition itself often conveys some 
advantages over unmarried co-parents. Privileging one form of family is not good for 
children living in other familial environments (Creear, 1998). The focus must be on 
the quality of parenting, rather than the type (e.g. legal status) of the parents’ 
relationship to each other. Instead, this focus on marriage constructs as the norm 
something not available to same-sex couples in Britain, thereby automatically 
privileging heterosexual couples and excluding gay couples from those seen as 
providing stable families. Supporting Families does recognise that a child’s parents 
may not be their biological parents in the case of step-parents or adoptive parents, but 
I would argue that this logic should be extended explicitly to lesbians and gay men 
with parenting responsibilities and relationships. In spite of aspects that are 
compatible with a performativity framework, the privileging of marriage reinstates 
necessary categories of (gendered) identity. Such an exclusion could have been 
avoided by referring to long-term/stable relationships or partnerships instead. 
 
There is an acknowledgement that ‘families have changed’, are now more 
complicated, and that parents do not want to be nagged, nannied or preached to (p4), 
and the document urges that advice seeking by parents be seen, not as failure, but as 
responsible parental behaviour. The emphasis on inclusion - that all families must feel 
able to use the services provided - notwithstanding, the advice and educative 
functions set out for the Institute have the potential to be highly normalising. It is easy 
to imagine a failure to include lesbian/gay/sexual minority communities in 
consultation exercises because of a presumption that child/family-related issues are 
not of relevance to them. In a response to the Green Paper from the Labour Campaign 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights, we insist that the Institute needs to be inclusive at every 
level: its imagery and rhetoric, staff and service providers, and community 
consultations (Exall et al., 1999). Even within a progressive (‘performative’) 
framework there remains the danger that inclusive intentions do not always guarantee 
that discrimination does not occur. The use of gender-neutral language and avoidance 
of specifying identity categories allows that lesbian and gay parents may theoretically 
take up provision for ‘parental leave’ etc., but not explicitly referring to lesbian and 
gay men will leave heterosexist assumptions unchallenged in many contexts. Some 
employees may not feel confident about disclosing their family responsibilities, for 
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 instance, where this means ‘coming out’ to their employers. ‘Inclusive’ legal 
provision is not enough: in order to allow access by all families the Institute must 
challenge heterosexism and homophobic prejudice. As chapter 8 argued, it is 
necessary to intervene in the fields of meaning within which provision for ‘voice’ or 
service use is made. This also highlights how attempts to allow access by same-sex 
parents which rely on identity categories can fail to recognise diversity amongst them, 
which might include whether or not they identify as ‘family’, as lesbian/gay, and if 
they do, whether or not they are ‘out’ to their employer. 
 
While the Paper is candid about the role of poverty in family stress and problems, it 
makes a (qualified) causal link between parenting and broader social problems:  
‘It is the Government’s view that strains on family life and inadequate parenting 
are having a serious negative impact on the lives of children, and that family 
difficulties are contributing to a range of other economic and social problems - 
such as educational underachievement, anti-social behaviour and youth crime.’ 
(childRIGHT, December 1998: p5). 
 
This risks defining social problems as the problems of families and individuals 
thereby reifying more conservative analyses of the relationships. Concluding that 
what is needed is confident parents individualises and ‘psychologises’ issues, when 
many parents under pressure need money, access to cultural pleasures and means of 
self-expression, and a sense of being valued socially. Tackling the problem through 
targeting parental behaviour and particularly through mentoring schemes, such as the 
programme to provide male role models for boys with absent fathers, ‘over-estimates 
the degree of influence over their children, and underestimates the severe pressures 
that many of them are under’ (childRIGHT, December 1998). As Creear (1998) is at 
pains to point out, poverty is only associated with single parenthood because of the 
way society is currently structured socially and economically (because of women’s 
wage inequality and the lack of good, affordable child-care). What is most apparent in 
the chapter on family-friendly employee rights is that the document is a response 
couched within the existing terms of the debate (modifying employment law rather 
than questioning whether work should occupy such a large part of the lives of the 
‘work-rich’), as ‘sensible’ policy from conservative New Labour, rather than creative 
proposals from any pro-socialist party. 
 
 257
 The 1989 Children Act provided welcome recognition for the fact that not all adults 
parenting children are biological parents. The concept of ‘parental responsibility’ 
(PR) which it introduced is not limited by biological status, in fact, it precisely allows 
adults other than birth mothers and married fathers (who are granted it automatically), 
to gain legal recognition of their (parental) status regarding a particular child. 
Grandparents and co-parents of various kinds (a partner of parent with PR, such as a 
lesbian co-mother, resident unmarried fathers, or ‘mum’s boyfriend’) can apply to the 
court for PR, and since the marker is of time spent co-residing with the child, a 
friend/flatmate/godparent who has co-parented a child can apply. This has the 
potential to grant legal recognition to those parenting in ‘unconventional’ 
arrangements and by centring on the relational quality of responsibility and a marker 
of actual practice (length of time in co-residence), instead of ‘parental rights and 
duties’, shifts the focus to the actual relationships and existing actual practical care 
arrangements, rather than abstract, pre-ordained roles. In addition, the number of 
people PR can be awarded to in relation to a particular child is not limited, and 
referring to ‘child residency’, rather than custody, helps emphasise both the everyday 
practice of it, and that, in line with the increasing proportion of joint residency 
arrangements, it is not necessarily an all-or-nothing thing. The Children Act therefore 
illustrates several aspects of a performative approach. Contrary to this, however, has 
been the recent suggestion that unmarried fathers be granted automatic PR (Lord 
Chancellor’s Dept. consultation paper, May 1998). This would allow a merely 
biological marker to be the basis for conveying legal rights. This seems more in line 
with the thinking that lay behind the Child Support Act (that is wanting the legislation 
to connect fathers - who aren’t already socially connected - to their biological 
offspring), and run contrary to what a performative approach, focusing on existing 
social relationships, would suggest. In the cases in which I believe PR would be 
appropriate, social markers would be adequate.  
 
Making presumptions of ‘fitness to parent’ from identity categories for lesbian or lone 
mothers appears to be possible only for particular ‘discourse publics’ (Fraser, 1989), 
although the collapse of distinctly ideological positions means that homophobic 
discourses do not necessarily map neatly onto particular political positions. At the 
close of the1990s, an increasing tolerance of lesbian mothers is seen in the popular 
media. Lesbian mothers are treated in the liberal press, as they are in court (Harne et 
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 al., 1997), ‘as mothers first and lesbians second’, so that the left-liberal Guardian is 
comfortable referring to ‘mothers’ partners’ and acknowledging the possibility of 
female partners (e.g. Dr. Louisa Dillner, writing on health/medical issues). More 
surprisingly, in the Sunday Express on 14th February, 1999 (Valentine’s Day, no 
less), was an article ‘Lesbians Can Make Better Parents’ about the equal sharing of 
childcare, earning and housework amongst lesbian couples in Gill Dunne’s (1997) 
study (see earlier). The editorial urged politicians, employers and all families in 
Britain to ‘take heed of the valuable lessons in equality that can be learned from 
lesbian parents’ (Saffron, in Diva, April 1999). More interestingly, in a hostile front-
page article about (particular) lesbian mothers in The Sun (April, 1997), in spite of 
the sensationalising misrepresentation of payment in the headline: ‘LESBIANS PAY 
£5 FOR A BABY: Fury at DIY birth’, the article fails to come up with arguments 
against lesbian parenting per se. Instead, reading past the rhetoric of outrage and fury 
and the editorial concern about the ‘mockery [made] of the family’, these women are 
actually being criticised for having a child whilst claiming benefits. There is no 
mention of concern about there being no man in the household, instead it is about 
there being no earner. The tentative conclusion I draw from this is that it now appears 
hard to make principled arguments against lesbian mothers on the basis of that aspect 
of their identity alone (Alldred, 1998b, see Appendix A). No psychological objections 
could be raised, (for instance, concerning the child’s psycho-sexual development), 
and the most powerful argument mustered was that the child might be stigmatised or 
face bullying at school, which I describe as a sociological argument, and one that 
blames the victim of discrimination (Burman, 1997) in a way that would be 
unthinkable regarding ‘race’, or other bullying issues such as weight or social skills.  
 
The arguments made against lesbian mothers who faced the courts in the 1970s are no 
longer convincing even in popular polemic, but it appears increasingly permissible to 
condemn those who are poor for having children. This is part of the conservative 
backlash against benefit claimants and a key site of the mobilisation of the 
‘underclass’ discourse. Its deployment in The Sun relies on a splitting of an 
‘undeserving poor’ from an honourable working class. In several examples in chapters 
3 and 4, and particularly regarding child support (both treatment by the Child Support 
Agency and popular imagery), gender at first seems key, but economic circumstances, 
which traverse gender and sexual identity, are in fact more significant. It is ‘parents 
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 with care’ on means-tested benefits who are worse off as a result of the CSA, and 
although most of these are mothers, many commentators agree that whilst its family 
and gendered ideological interventions drew much attention, the Act was crucially 
about money. Lorraine Fox Harding argues that whilst the CSA may ‘attempt to 
reinstate a form of private patriarchy, in the sense of making more women 
economically dependent on individual men, it appears more strongly to be a part of a 
project of rolling back the state’ (1996: p131). Together, these illustrations show there 
is more intense concern about ‘state dependency’ and the cost to the taxpayer of ‘the 
breeding underclass’, than about their (homo)sexual identities, or the erosion of ‘the 
family’ symbolised by ‘absent fathers’. The ‘old’ stigmatised identity categories no 
longer ‘hold’ the psychological attributions they used to. The concern centres on 
money, and it is through this that gendered identities become embroiled. 
Psychological discourses are only deployed in the service of financial concerns, such 
as by using the devalued term ‘dependency’ to pathologise benefit receipt. 
 
Recent years have seen a concern to distinguish fostering from adoption, such that 
they are now regarded as distinct ways of caring for children. The earlier conflation in 
the term ‘foster or adoptive parents’ has been replaced (and encoded in legislation by 
the time of the 1989 Children Act), by ‘foster carers’, which marks them as substitute, 
and more temporary, carers, and ‘adoptive parents’, which signifies the formation of 
a parental relationship. This reflects their respective legal positions in relation to the 
child, and for children in foster care, the state. There is a distinction between roles and 
relationships here. Foster carers are performing a role (for which there is sometimes a 
small payment towards expenses), whereas adoptive parents are adopting a child into 
their family and attendant to that relationship is their private financial provision for 
the child. In practice, of course, some children spend years in the same foster home. 
This distinction has come about in conjunction with attempts to promote ‘inclusive’ 
care by fosterers, so that a child’s care is shared with their birth family and the Social 
Services department, and ‘open adoption’ where children have knowledge of, and 
often contact with, their families of origin, both of which require the careful 
delineation of relationships with, and relationships to, the child, (both to the child, as 
well as to others concerned). 
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 The proportion of children placed in families which resemble ‘the traditional family’ 
(with two parents, one of whom works full-time, the other is not in work, with older 
children, and homes with three or more bedrooms) is higher than the proportion of 
children whose families resemble this in the general population (Bebbington and 
Miles, 1990) (although it may be that a foster ‘mother’s’ receipt of even low pay for 
her labour alters the picture). But it seems that there are some cautious moves away 
from such a search for idealised ‘normal family life’. The pressure Social Service 
departments face in recruiting foster carers has led some of them to encourage 
applications from ‘less traditional’ carers, such as from those without older children 
or without employment, from single carers, and for some, from lesbian or gay couples 
(Nutt, 1998). This challenges the identities and sociological markers of family forms 
that were not previously considered ‘fitness to foster’ (Nutt, ibid.). In addition, there 
has been an increasing emphasis on the specific ‘fitness’ of carers for the particular 
child ‘being placed’, and emphasis on placement-specific, rather than initial, 
assessments. The individual case challenges to foster/adoptive carer eligibility that 
have received media attention have mostly been about identity limitations to approval 
criteria, such as age-limits, racial matching, racial discrimination awareness, sexual 
preference, being ‘overweight’ or ‘smokers’, but perhaps these are simply the cases in 
which arguments that assessments are unfair can be made precisely through appeals to 
identity categories.  
 
Because the procedure has been seen as sequential, adoption is almost automatically 
preceded by a term of fostering, and older children have often been through a series of 
foster placements before eventually being adopted. Sometimes they must leave 
successful foster placements (or adults approved as fosterers, but not adopters) in 
order to move to a permanent placement. Removing or reducing the dichotomy 
between fostering and adoption could provide a speedier route to permanency. Bury 
and Salford Social Services have launched a scheme under which prospective 
adopters will initially work as foster parents alongside professionals to reunite their 
foster child with their birth families. However, not all foster carers want to become 
adoptive parents, and some might value the possibility of a care relationship with a 
child which does not bring full parental responsibility. 
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 Debates about transracial adoption in recent years have challenged what had become 
the orthodoxy of prioritising the ‘colour and culture matching’ of carers for minority 
ethnic children (see Gaber and Aldridge, 1994). The arguments employed have 
illustrated broader problems with identity politics. To some degree the identity 
categories revealed their own limitations in practice, such that social workers have 
faced difficult decisions about the degree of cultural specificity to strive to achieve 
when racial colouring, ethnicity, language, religious and political identifications, 
class/caste/wealth, and for some, historical and political context of immigration to 
Britain might all be considered. Gilroy (1987) argues that ‘race’ and ethnicity should 
not be awarded automatic privilege over other dimensions of social difference (class, 
language, location) in making placements, and must not be reified as essentialising 
categories. One could argue that prioritising ‘race’ as a marker for placement 
selection is ‘superficial’ to the intimate, psychological parent-child relationship 
(unless adult projections of racial difference profoundly structure this relationship) 
and is a more sociological concern (about how this family is constructed from 
‘outside’, like household structure might be seen for lesbian or lone-mother 
households) or political concern (that black families are not stereotyped as 
dysfunctional, and black babies are not sought as ‘cute’ adornments to white families 
in which it is assumed they are better off). However, the importance of learning 
strategies for dealing with racism, including self-esteem issues, has been highlighted 
in these debates (and is beginning to be heard in relation to dealing with homophobia 
for children of lesbian mothers, see Woodcraft, 1997), but there might be other 
priorities for infants. In arguing for a less restrictive approach to placing minority 
ethnic children, Richards (1994b) sees claims about the importance of racial matching 
for infants as confusing a child’s social or sociological identity (which includes 
gendered and ‘classed’ as well as racial, ethnic and religious aspects), with personal 
or psychological identity. Personal identity, he argues, is fundamental to the child’s 
sense of self as separate from, and in relation to, the carer/s, and is a necessary 
foundation for the child’s further elaboration of their identity in cultural and relational 
terms. This suggests that, rather than delaying the placing of infants in order to 
achieve a higher degree of ‘matching’, it is more important to enable them to begin a 
process of relating securely to long-term carers.  
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 The legal definition of single is no longer a reliable indicator of relationship status. 
Popular usage of ‘single’ contrasts it with ‘being in a relationship’, as opposed to be 
legally married. Since legal documents continue only to offer the options of ‘single, 
married or divorced, those in long-term relationships and even childrearing 
partnerships somewhat misrepresent their situation by ticking ‘single’. Some recent 
sociological work by Jane Lewis (1999) suggests that while most unmarried long-
term cohabitees do not wish for full legal recognition of their coupledom, they would 
like greater social recognition for their relationships. As popular responses to the 
Child Support Act demonstrated (see chapter 4), a broader range of terms for 
relationships than legal or conventional social identities provide was being met by 
their invention. 
 
The changing names given to welfare benefits traces a fascinating political narrative. 
The concern of the Major Government to distinguish Unemployment Benefit from 
Income Support makes an identity distinction between those who are unemployed but 
have previously worked and paid national insurance contributions, from those whose 
income remained low perhaps after part-time work. In practice, this has tended to 
differentiate ‘professionals between jobs’, from those caught in the poverty trap of 
low-paid work and long-term poverty. The name-change to ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ 
was to ‘remind’ the unemployed that benefits are conditional on their actively seeking 
work, and justifies a withdrawal of benefits if such activity cannot be proven. Rather 
than being based on being an unemployed person, as an identity or status, it is based 
on an activity to be performed.  
 
The idea behind the existing child-care cost ‘allowance’ (a benefit disregard of £28 
per week) for lone and low-income mothers claiming Family Credit, has been 
extended in the 1999 Budget so that all families with child-care costs can benefit. The 
abolition of the Married Couples’ Allowance, a merely status-based entitlement, was 
announced, with the money saved being ‘ear-marked’ for parents, to be distributed 
through the increases in child benefit, and in future, a new Children’s Tax Credit, 
neither of which are dependent on particular parental relationships. There is a 
reconsideration of the Widow’s Pension which, as its name suggests, is paid to 
widows irrespective of their wealth, and a question over whether widowers too should 
be eligible if their partner was the primary earner. The emphasis on activity in the JSA 
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 name-change has echoes in a range of current welfare reforms concerned with 
families. Family Credit was a means-tested in-work benefit, but its replacement with 
the Working Families Tax Allowance, illustrates a deliberate rhetorical shift from 
families as a unit of entitlement, to the activity-based qualifier ‘working’. The 
rationale for the unpopular benefit cut for lone parents in autumn 1997 was that 
benefits were not due on the basis of identities (i.e. lone parents), and that those 
among them who are poor parents would be eligible for other benefits. Similarly, for 
New Labour being a mother, or a lone parent, is no longer an acceptable reason not to 
be pursuing paid work outside the home. 
 
Criteria based on income or needs relate to actual circumstances more than do 
identities, and can be considered to be more ‘performative’. These examples therefore 
suggest a discernible shift in current British social policy towards performative 
understandings of identity and social life, or at least, of movements away from 
identity categories and in directions compatible with performativity. However, in spite 
of the previous section’s optimistic account of the possibilities, the benefits examples 
show that performative thinking does not necessarily produce results of a particular 
political hue, and cannot be relied upon to promote, for instance, fair, generous 
benefits, let alone wealth redistribution. Furthermore, an approach cannot be relied on 
to deliver particular results over time. For instance, in practice, means-testing to 
assess needs in the past became identity-linked, and unpopular precisely because of its 
production of stigmatised identities. As the potential to replace a focus on identities 
with circumstances is celebrated, we must be aware of the possibility of attempts 
backfiring in such a way. This is a reminder that the political implications of a 
particular theoretical approach cannot be guaranteed. 
 
9.8 Reflections on a happy ending 
I would argue that these policy examples illustrate an increasing flexibility and 
tolerance for complexity, which means that thinking about parents and children is less 
constrained by identities, and more centred on relationships. This is part of a triumph 
of ‘the psychological’, in the sense that it is an increased recognition of and esteem 
for the realm of the subjective, the psychological or the emotional. This has raised the 
value accorded reflexive and responsible selfhood, personal growth/self-development, 
emotional expression and intimacy, self-expression and self-definition, mental well-
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 being and interpersonal dynamics. Closely related to these discourses of the 
subjective, is the more context-limited triumph of a discourse of specificity, over 
general, abstract, ‘objective’ knowledge. A detailed interrogation of the relationship 
of this popularisation of psychological/subjective discourse in Western culture, to the 
academic discipline of psychology could take Denise Riley’s (1983) work as an 
historical and theoretical starting point, and perhaps use Parker’s (1997) study of 
psychoanalytic discourse in Western culture as a framework. One consequence of this 
popularisation is that psychological professionals are increasingly called upon to be 
consultants to the corporate world: for business, management, advertising, and 
statutory/voluntary sector service-providers. However, where this disciplinary 
knowledge employs scientific epistemological warrants, it may sometimes be 
challenged by discourses of experience, as opposed to (abstract) knowledge (as Figure 
5 illustrates). Such challenges might deploy ‘the subjective’ against the ‘objective’; 
might argue that there are different perspectives as opposed to one truthful account; or 
that the specific is more relevant than the general. I am arguing that each of these are 
available within the contemporary popular repertoire. Assessments for foster 
carers/adoptive parents might be a rich and fascinating site at which to study how 
such competitions between epistemologies can be played out. 
 
In this final chapter, the thesis has returned to focus on social policy concerning 
families. Chapters 2 to 4 focused on specific issues and later chapters broadened the 
view to allow these to be seen in the context of characterisations of the contemporary 
condition: a conventional thesis structure. However, discussing methodology in later, 
rather than earlier, chapters allowed ways of ‘doing knowledge’ to become an object 
of enquiry itself, and disrupted the conventional narrative whereby a rational, 
reflexive researcher describes the lens through which they will view their object. 
Instead, it is argued that there are limitations to such reflexivity, which include the 
dominance of empiricism and of the conventional narratives and specular rhetoric 
which imply it, including in evidence in chapters 2, 3 and 4. At a cultural level, the 
limitations of reflexivity are being recognised at precisely the same time at which its 
value is popularly emphasised. This reflects the deconstruction of the subject at the 
same time as marginal subjects were making it ‘to the table’ and appeals to subjective 
warrants for knowledge were being seen to challenge mainstream knowledge more 
powerfully. 
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The concept of discourse and the attendant dissolution of the individual-society 
dichotomy means being able to see how processes of change (regarding gender in 
particular) between individuals are not in simple unidirectional cause and effect 
relationships with culture. Cultural shifts in gender expectations and the critique of 
conventional masculinity and femininity have profound consequences for, yet also 
resistances from, individuals whose psyches are formed through conventional 
meanings. Individual struggles to live with the anxieties such changes bring in their 
wake are manifest at a cultural level in popular expressions of anxieties which are at 
the same time reflections, consequences and causes of shifts in relations between 
gendered individuals (Day Sclater and Yates, forthcoming 1999; Richards, 1989; 
Walkerdine, 1990).  
 
The very formation of the self must now become a site of struggle. Deconstruction of 
the self/Other dichotomy needs to be put to constructive use in trying to forge new 
modes of subjectivity which avoid the violence this splitting does to Others, and to the 
self (Bhabha, 1994; Lorde, 1984; Spivak, 1988; Venn, 1985; Walkerdine, 1990). 
However, in doing so, we need to avoid simply transferring the projections of 
Otherness elsewhere. For instance, this thesis highlights the risk that promoting the 
gender-neutral discourse of parenting might serve to reinforce the adult-child split, 
and we must engage with cultural representations of parents and children to challenge 
points at which it does simply reinforce the construction of child as Other, and 
naturalise children’s fulfilment of this psychic role for adults. A thoroughly ‘post-
identity’ form of psychoanalysis could be valuable here. It needs to emphasise process 
and relations, over identities and family roles, avoid universalising across or within 
cultures, avoid being psychically or culturally reductionist and determining and 
recognise the situated nature of its own cultural production as just one interpretive 
approach. For instance, the generalisation of patterns of psychic constellations and 
formation is in tension, though not irreconcilable when done cautiously, with the 
concern not to restrict analyses to a reliance on gendered identity because it is not an 
exhaustive account of our differences from each other, and our different individual 
formations. As chapter 5 tried to show, psychoanalysis holds a complicated position 
in these debates as both object of critique (in its metanarrative form), and as key 
element in the ‘new improved’ approaches. This is because there exist today different 
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 strands of psychoanalytic theory whose epistemological positions vary sharply: it has 
both archetypally modernist, as well as postmodernist forms. 
 
There are fascinating parallels between the ‘erosion of the traditional family’ and the 
methodological/theoretical shifts this thesis depicts: symbolised by a loss of 
patriarchal authority, where the patriarch was also the one who knew. Recent 
historical social change involving critique and subsequent partial erosion of authority 
relations between men and women has a crucial role in each it seems. For the 
decentring of the Western subject and ‘his’ authority, ‘post-colonial’ critiques, and for 
the family, critiques of power relations between adults and children, have also been 
important. The Supporting Families document shows the breadth and significance of 
contemporary concern about authority, and an apparent contradiction: it reflects both 
the concern that parents have lost their authority vis a vis their children and seeks the 
return of this, but yet when speaking of the advisory role for new body, it is careful to 
avoid implying old-style authoritative experts. This highlights again, (as did the 
contradictory Sun article), how even meaning-producing institutions do not manage 
to present a sealed ideological viewpoint, that politics are no longer straightforwardly 
ideological (more than the U-turns that produced New Labour), and the complexity of 
current social relations and concerns, or rather their mediation within the popular. The 
loss of traditional authority, and then challenges confronting rational authority, are 
what - at a theoretico-cultural level - allow this thesis to take psychology as its 
problematised object rather than disciplinary gaze. The loss of faith in objectivity 
means that it is now recognised that seeing, let alone interpreting, family change is 
infused with politics. As Beck (1997) asks:  
‘cannot the indicators of radical change in the family, such as high divorce rates, 
declining numbers of children, extramarital ways of life, mothers working 
outside the home and so on, also be interpreted in keeping with… a 
‘democratisation of the family’? Might this not even be a compromise between 
those who claim to be able to discern dissolution in the data and those who 
claim to be able to read a constancy of familial structure from that same data? 
(p152). 
 
Parallel between the empirical observations of family change, the fact that these very 
observations are disputed, and the features of this thesis which reflect certain 
characteristics of the socio-political moment - radical challenges to the knowledge 
form of a discipline, methodological divergence within a discipline, questioning the 
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 notion of objectivity, and an opening up of epistemology. Each of these has a parallel 
in what Beck describes for the family. Rather than simply taking up its terms and 
arguing about degree of change, he reflects upon the debate: 
‘Does not the family (quite similarly in the churches, political parties, trade 
unions and organisations) reveal the break-up of traditional structures of 
dependency and authority that typically goes hand in hand with taking 
advantage of freedoms (and with all the same conflicts, dilemmas and decay of 
order)?’ (Beck, ibid.: p152). 
 
A major irony is that such a narrative - one of development of ideas as part of the 
development of knowledge - is part of the Enlightenment fantasy of civilisation and 
progress. Whilst explicitly undermining this, I have used it to make irrelevant an 
extended discussion of my own investments/positionings, in line with academic 
conventions. Such modernist narratives are more difficult to avoid than rational 
critique alone might imply. I have more invested in it than can be deconstructed in a 
thesis - since its focus at least is at the conscious level of rational argument. Even if 
one works to reject the understanding of Western ‘civilisation’, it is disturbing to 
accept the idea that society is not ‘progressing’ towards one’s vision of social justice 
and that one’s actions do not bring it even slightly closer. Even Fraser’s position, 
which chapter 6 argued allows movement beyond the impasse, can engender 
disillusionment as one recognises the limitations of one’s own perspective and 
therefore the contingency of its political analysis. Just as feminism cannot liberate us 
from particular cultural ideas about mothers, so it was naive to imagine that 
deconstructing modernist narratives of knowledge and progress would liberate me 
from my investment in their promises. As Walkerdine (1990) showed, one cannot 
simply be liberated from the discourses through which one is produced. As an 
academic and activist, I remain formed through ideas about political change and 
progress, and am invested in them and in the idea that there is value in academic work 
towards this end. Only through my understanding of academic production as engaging 
in re/presentational politics, and of redistributive politics requiring struggles over 
meaning, do I find investment in academic work, yet this investment has shaped my 
analysis, producing it as optimistic. Perhaps what might be said to make a 
contemporary thesis most ‘postmodern’ is the recognition and toleration of such 
contrary strands within in. Engaging with post-structuralist ideas has allowed a 
particular form of ‘reflexive turn’ whereby I am able to see some of the modernist 
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 tropes that I rely on in (and beyond) the thesis. Others are implicit, and will remain 
undeconstructed until my investment in the thesis wanes, and yet others will perhaps 
remain so because my investment in them is more than academic.  
 
After a celebratory adoption of post-structuralist feminist ideas (because they did feel 
‘true’ and ‘liberating’), an epistemological ‘come-down’ is most evident in chapter 
8’s recognition of the limits of communication that the fallacy of ‘representation’ 
points to (i.e. ‘how can I ever hear anyone without dominating their meaning by my 
conceptual framework?’). The thesis has therefore elaborated on and traced paths 
through (from?) the struggle I had in doing empirical work with children, once I had 
‘savoured the “sweet poison”’ of postmodernist views (Gergen, 1992, see chapter 7) 
which is referred to in chapter 1. A position of ambivalence towards contemporary 
theory - because it robs even as it ‘reveals’ - can be interpreted as a bid for ‘maturity’ 
in particular discourses of individual development, whereas a wholly ‘good news’ 
thesis might be interpreted as immature and naïve. So how is an optimistic ending 
read? That I experience post-structuralist writing as ‘revealing’, reveals myself as 
formed through modernist discourses of knowledge and enlightenment, moreover, 
that I can feel positive about postmodernist ideas through which I am thinking slides 
easily into a thinking-feeling dualism. As Fraser and Nicholson (1990) argued, one 
can only begin from where one is, and must recognise that one’s analysis is limited by 
that positioning. My thesis journey has, of course, moved my own positioning and 
indeed, reflecting upon the journey metaphor, I now want to reframe the thesis using 
Bauman’s (1996) tourist, rather than pilgrim metaphor. 
 
This thesis has considered a deconstructive approach for challenging some of the 
particular understandings of family mobilised in contemporary debates about parents, 
children and society, and the naturalisation of conservative definitions of family. It 
has also discussed more ‘constructive’ approaches, in terms of supporting ‘giving 
voice’ to those who are in less powerful subject positions or for promoting subjugated 
knowledges. It has, however, considered the potential pitfalls of replying within the 
terms of the debate (such as, within the terms of the discipline) and the repercussions 
of engaging with the knowledge game as it is currently played. It has tried to reflect 
on the limitations of each of these approaches as strategies for promoting social 
change through the medium of cultural politics.  
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